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ABSTRACT 
The suite of problems peculiar to the late twentieth century and collectively 
referred to as the 'ecological crisis' is similar in character to the problems of general 
social collapse which confronted the thinkers of the early modern period. At issue is 
the inadequacy of established myths, values, knowledges and institutions in the face 
of novel societal and, in the case of the late twentieth century, novel ecological 
disturbances. Given the problems of technological optimism and widespread 
disappointment at the limited fulfillment of Enlightenment ideals, the thesis 
speculates about alternative paths for modernity and suggests that a modest 
scepticism relative to humanity's rational capacities is now a more fitting ethical, 
cognitive and practical stance. 
The inadequacy of the defining myths, norms and institutions of modern life, 
in the face of novel ecological and social crises, can be traced to a particular 
conjunction of historical circumstance that demanded stability and certainty, qualities 
which are now supplanted by the need for flexibility and adaptability in institutional 
arrangements and in their supporting values and knowledges. The deficiencies of 
modern institutions may be explained in part by their failure to promote 
responsibility as a core behavioural norm. The rejuvenation of civil society and its 
public spheres has been proposed as the site for potential radical social 
transformation, which, it is argued, is implicit in the activity of new social 
movements and in green movements in particular, since they are in a unique position 
to integrate a radical critique of modernity with a radicalized ecological 
consciousness. 
The sustainability discourse raises fundamental questions about how humans 
should dwell on the planet, and consequently sustainable development is examined as 
an attempt to respond to this quintessential dilemma of human existence in the 
context of generational inequity and global ecological decline. As a keystone of 
liberal capitalism, private property rights are found to have failed as an instrument of 
autonomy and of environmental protection and arguments are advanced for a 
different ethical basis for property ownership, one grounded in responsibility and 
more fitted to contemporary social and ecological realities. 
Ecological theorists have proved to be strong on prescriptions for end-states, 
but rather weak on how to get there, on praxis. At various times in western history 
the praxis paradigm has been useful in providing indications for proceeding in the 
face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties. Given the enormity of the problems 
presently confronting humankind and the apparent inability to respond to multiple 
danger signals, it seems appropriate to draw on the paradigm once again in order to 
frame a radical ecopraxis, a praxis of ecological restructuring which constitutes a 
programme for ecosocial transformation, radical in its objectives but modest in its 
means. 
In the disillusioned light of earlier utopian ideals, the question of whether 
sustainability as a project of ecopraxis can facilitate the necessary ecological 
restructuring, while avoiding the pitfalls of revolutionary change, is a relevant 
consideration. The further question of whether sustainability can rejuvenate the 
political economy of liberal democracy, in the face of severe legitimacy problems, is 
similarly germane. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I have been particularly fortunate to undertake the exacting task of 
researching this thesis, which has been as much an endurance test as it is an academic 
exercise, in the stimulating and supportive collegiality of the Centre for 
Environmental Studies. Researching a doctoral thesis can be a very lonely 
undertaking and it has been not only the stimulating intellectual environment but 
equally the personal and social interaction and support, which is an especial 
characteristic of the Centre for Environmental Studies, that has sustained me. I thank 
all my staff and student colleagues for all the lunches, breakfasts, other social 
occasions and especially the morning-tea repartee (to which the barbed witticisms of 
Dr. Jim Russell have been a memorable contribution) which have helped immensely 
in the endurance process. 
In particular, I wish to thank my various room-mates, including David Harries 
for long and stimulating conversations on a variety of topics; Least Livingston for his 
friendship and intellectual support, and for leaving me a room largely to myself over 
the crucial last six months;, and Mary Jenkins for her support, encouragement and 
perceptiveness. Within the School of Geography and Environmental Studies the 
technical staff, David Sommerville and Mike Harlow, have been exceedingly helpful 
with their computing know-how, while, within the Centre, Nita Saunders, Tazina 
Frank and Glenda Fahey have been always ready to assist. In particular, Glenda, who 
has endured numerous and probably irritating interruptions, has been a good-natured 
and supportive friend. Of the academic staff, I wish to particularly recognize Elaine 
Stratford for her cheery and boundless enthusiasm, for her emotional support, and for 
her never-ending efforts on behalf of postgraduate students, especially her efforts to 
support and encourage the processes of academic scholarship. The help offered by 
Peter Wilde, a former staff member, in reading sections of my thesis and papers for 
publication and providing fruitful feedback, is much appreciated. 
I have been especially fortunate in having a supervisor who has always 
encouraged me to be confident in the worth of my own work, to develop aspects of 
my research for presentation at conferences and for publication, and whose clear-
thinking responses to my theoretical dilemmas have been immensely helpful in the 
production of this thesis. It is to Peter Hay that I owe the intellectual inspiration for 
the general thrust of the research, that is, the need for environmentalists to pursue an 
integrated approach to social change, involving the transformation of institutional 
iv 
structures, values and relationships, and to keep theory and practice in appropriate 
tension. 
Finally, my thanks go to my patient family: to my husband, John, who has 
encouraged me in this project, yet, at the same time, has done much to keep me 
honest, while providing me with the support necessary to bring it to completion by 
taking over my family and household duties when necessary; to my children, Stewart, 
Ross and Clare, who will be much relieved by its completion, but especially ,my 
eldest son, John, who was always cheerful and happy to accede to my requests for 
computer assistance, to run errands, and to transport and look after the younger 
children in the midst of his own busy life as an undergraduate. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract 	  
Acknowledgements 	 iii 
Table of Contents  
List of Figures 	 ix 
List of Abbreviations 	  
INTRODUCTION 	 xi 
PART I: ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF MODERNITY, ITS ETHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 
CHAPTER 1: MODERNITY: ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO 
ENLIGHTENMENT 
1.1: Introduction 	  1 
1.2: The Enlightenment 	  2 
1.3: The Legacy of the Enlightenment 	  4 
1.4: Distortion and Disillusionment  5 
1.5: Enlightenment Ideals: An Evaluation 	  6 
1.5.1: The Reasonableness of Rationality  6 
1.5.2: The Progress of Progress 	  7 
1.5.3: Freedom and Autonomy  12 
1.5.4: Justice and Equality 	  14 
1.6: Pathology and Crisis 	  17 
1.7: Institutional Decline  20 
1.8: Liberalism as Moral Order 	  21 
1.8.1: The Origins of Modern Morality 	  22 
1.8.2: The Nature of Modern Morality  22 
1.8.3: Emancipation from Morality 	  25 
1.8.4: Summary 	  27 
1.9: Responsibility  27 
1.9.1: Accelerated Irresponsibility: The Neoliberal Turn 	 34 
1.10: An Alternative Source of Enlightenment 	  36 
1.10.1: Enlightenment as Critique 	  36 
1.10.2: Montaigne 	  38 
1.10.3: Lessons for Late Modernity 	  .44 
vi 
1.11: Maturity and Ecological Enlightenment 	 45 
1.11.1: Moral Maturity and Sustainability 46 
1.11.2: Ecological Enlightenment 	 48 
1.12: The Biological Metaphor 	 50 
1.12.1: The Challenge of Ecology 	 50 
1.12.2: The Dangers of the Biological Metaphor 	 52 
1.13: Changing Frames: Thinking Dangerously  	 53 
1.14: The Ecological Order and Sustainability 	 54 
CHAPTER 2: THE PUBLIC SPHERE RECONSIDERED: ITS 
REPOLITIZATION AND REMORALIZATION 
2.1: Introduction 	 59 
2.2: The Critical Public 	 60 
2.2.1: The Transformation of the Critical Public Sphere 	 63 
2.2.2: Social Movements in Context 	 69 
2.2.3: Social Transformation and Cultural Challenge 	 69 
2.2.4: Complexity: Contradiction and Uncertainty 71 
2.2.5: Structural Inadequacy 	 74 
2.2.6: The Crisis of Legitimacy and the New Political Culture 	78 
2.2.7: The Critical Public Reconceived 	 82 
2.3: Contemporary Collective Criticism 85 
2.3.1: The Challenge to Modernist Ideology 	 87 
2.3.2: The Challenge to Modernist Institutions: The New Politics 	 90 
2.3.3: Green Movements and Sustainability 	 93 
2.3.4: Impediments Facing Progressive Social Movements. 	 102 
2.4: Conclusion 	 109 
CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS A REFORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
PROBLEM 
3.1: Introduction 	 112 
3.1.1: From Moral Economy to Self-regulating Market Economy 	 113 
3.2: Ecology and Ethics in an Alternative Economics 	 122 
3.3: The Case for the Reinstatement of Ethics 	 128 
	
3.3.1: Old Questions: New Context   129 
3.3.2: Responsibility, Knowledge and Power    130 
3.3.3: A Future-oriented Ethic   131 
vii 
3.3.4: Obligations and Duties 	 134 
3.3.5: Ontology and Ethics  135 
3.3.6: Summary 	 136 
3.4: Sustainable Development: Rhetoric or Ethical Ideal? 	 138 
3.4.1: Sustainable Development: Interpretations 	  140 
3.4.2: Sustainable Development and Ethics  143 
3.4.3: Sustainable Development, Ethics and the Good Life 	148 
3.4.4: Sustainable Development, Autonomy and the Common Good 	 150 
3.4.5: Summary 	 154 
CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS ECOLOGICALLY RESPONSIBLE PROPERTY 
RULES 
4.1: Introduction 	 157 
4.2: The Case for Rethinking Private Property Rights 	 159 
4.3: The Social Evolution of Private Property 	 163 
4.4: Theories of Property: Rights and Duties 165 
4.5: Foundations for a New Theory: Extending Our Ethical Horizons 	 170 
4.5.1: Reconceiving Justice 	  171 
4.5.2: Expanding Moral Theory 173 
	
4.5.3: Summary    175 
4.6: Alternative Property Regimes 	 176 
4.7: Private Property Reconceived 181 
4.8: Conclusion 	 183 
PART II: THEORIZING THE TRANSITION: CONCERNING THE PRAXIS 
OF SUSTAINABILITY 
CHAPTER 5: TOWARDS A RADICAL ECOPRAXIS 
5.1: Introduction 	 185 
5.2: Praxis: Theoretical Background 	 187 
5.3: Ecopraxis 	 193 
5.3.1: Ecotopia  194 
5.4: Towards a Political Economy of Sustainability 	 199 
5.4.1: Biases Against Sustainability 	 200 
5.4.2: Transformative Possibilities 204 
5.5: Structural Change in Capitalist Societies 	 205 
viii 
5.5.1: Regulation for Sustainability 	 206 
5.5.2: Reorienting Sustainability 214 
5.5.3: Localization and Agency 	 215 
5.5.4: Reorienting Consumption Norms 	 218 
5.5.5: Autonomy and Creativity 	 219 
5.5.6: Sustainability and Ecological Competency 	 224 
5.6: Social Environmental Learning 	 228 
5.7: An Ecological Restructuring Model of Social Transformation 	232 
5.8: Sustainability as Ecopraxis 	 234 
5.9: Conclusion 	 236 
CHAPTER 6: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
6.1: Introduction 	 242 
6.2: To Rejuvenate or to Transcend? 	246 
6.3: Conclusion 	 271 
CONCLUSIONS 
• 7.1: Introduction 	 277 
7.2: Rethinking Enlightenment Ideals 	 278 
7.3: Ecological Responsibility 	 281 
7.4: Sustainability:Preconditions 287 
7.5: Beyond Sustainability 	 288 
7.6: Ecological Enlightenment and Maturity 	 289 
REFERENCES 	 291 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Sustainable Development: Alternative Interpretations    141 
Figure 2: The Environmentalist Critique of Liberal Democracy 	246 
ix 
List of Abbreviations 
EM Ecological Modernization 
ER 	Ecological Restructuring 
MSR Mode of Social Regulation 
INTRODUCTION 
xi 
he second half of the twentieth century has been witness to significant 
decline in environmental quality and rising social crisis and it would appear that the 
foundational values and institutions of liberal democratic capitalism have reached the 
limits of their capacity to respond to what are apparently insurmountable and 
increasingly complex issues. These include most notably global warming, 
biodiversity loss, and increasing disparities of wealth, reflected in urban decay, food 
and water shortages, entrenched unemployment even in the richest nations, 
fundamentalism, and youth alienation and suicide. A parallel can be drawn between 
the apparent helplessness and impotence of liberal institutions in the late twentieth 
century and the period of general social crisis in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. This, too, was an era that demanded a revolution in values, in systems of 
knowledge, and in organizing institutions, when it seemed to the innovative thinkers 
of the day, the philosophes, that existing modes of understanding and organization 
were at a loss to respond to the kinds of dilemmas and questions then being raised. 
The purposes for drawing this parallel are severalfold. Firstly, an excavation 
of the circumstantial origins of the body of theory and the institutional framework 
that is the legacy of that era, and which our era currently relies upon to organize 
social, political and economic life, explains in large measure the constitution of 
existing value systems and institutions. It explains why early liberals opted for 
institutions and values which provided them with certainty and stability and therefore 
the attractiveness of world-views based around the metaphor of the machine. And 
consequently, it also serves as an explanation for their impotence in the face of issues 
characterized by complexity, uncertainty, interconnectedness, circular feedback, and 
rapid change. 
Against this background, the general objective of this current research is to 
theorize more environmentally benign modes of existence and the transition thereto. 
Accordingly, the thesis consists of two parts. The first investigates the legacy of the 
Enlightenment, its hopes and ideals and their subsequent incomplete fulfillment; it 
traces the development of some of the principal organizing institutions of modern life 
- the public sphere, the economic sphere and the self-regulating market, and private 
property - from their origins to the present day. There are very specific reasons for 
selecting these institutions and ignoring others. In line with my objective of 
theorizing the transition, it appears that the emergence of the new social movements 
and their attempts to reclaim the public sphere of civil society, which has become 
almost synonymous with the state, holds the most promise in this respect. Moreover, 
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the monolithic structure of the state apparently precludes radical internal change and 
in the new social movements lies the considerable promise of a countervailing focus 
of power. While green movements have received adequate treatment in green 
literature, the same cannot be said of the ethical foundations of the economic sphere 
or of property rights. Environmental theorists have recognized that economics 
cannot remain ethically neutral, but the necessary theorizing is still at a rudimentary 
stage. I attempt to set out the elements of a responsible economics and to assess the 
ethical claims of sustainable development strategies. Further, despite the centrality 
of private property rights in liberal capitalism, little systematic attention has been 
applied to them in green political economy. I attempt to remedy this deficiency, 
drawing on recent feminist contributions to moral theory in order to develop an 
ethical foundation grounded in responsibility and care. 
The reason for an archaeological approach is to better grasp the realities of 
contemporary life and to erect a sound basis for arguments for the obsolescence of 
the orthodoxies of modem life and hence the need for their transcendence either 
through reformulation or abandonment, to be able to demonstrate that conditions 
which obtained in the eighteenth century are not those that obtain now and that 
world-views grounded in certainty and stability and underpinned by mechanistic 
metaphors are inadequate for the conditions outlined above. The present crises 
require world-views favouring contextual and organic metaphors. 
The second part of this thesis attempts to tackle the most elusive and difficult 
task facing theorists of matters ecological - the question of praxis, of the transition 
from seeming impotence to an ecologically sound or responsible future. The 
explanation for the difficulty rests largely in the reluctance of present generations to 
give up on the certainty-providing thought frameworks and their complementary 
institutional arrangements. What mainly seems to be missing is the sense of common 
purpose that is necessary to confront the difficult and complex issues of ecological 
sustainability and global social justice. A sense of common purpose and a viable 
public politics are prerequisites for a satisfactory response to these problems, for it is 
my view that neither ecological sustainability nor socioeconomic sustainability are 
possible without substantial material sacrifices from the world's materially privileged 
peoples. It will be argued that as long as liberal democracy adheres to a radical 
individualist ontology, it will fail to marshall either the theoretical or practical 
resources to generate the necessary common purpose. 
My approach in bringing understanding to contemporary problems is to 
utilize contextual and organicist metaphors. That this is a valid course is confirmed 
by the work of Anne Buttimer and her attempt to make sense of western history and 
its emancipatory moments. To facilitate a better understanding of western humanity's 
experience of the world, Buttimer (1993) distinguishes four world-views or 
metaphorical interpretations, namely, forrnism, mechanism, organicism and 
contextualism. Briefly explained, fonnistic or mosaic metaphors are concerned with 
pattern and rhythm; mechanistic metaphors are analytic and concerned with the 
qualities of things and the laws governing qualities and causes; organicist metaphors 
are to do with wholeness, connection and synthesis; while contextual metaphors 
explain the context of events, uniqueness, holism of particular events, and, like 
organicist metaphors, are synthetic and geared to change. It is the mechanistic 
metaphors which have predominated throughout modernity (with other metaphors 
emerging for brief interludes) and which structure modern institutional arrangements 
for stability and containment. These mechanistic structures block the transition to the 
theorizing and practice of more ecologically responsible modes of dwelling and 
underlie the apparent malaise of western thought. 
A contextual metaphorical vision is appropriate for a time when the old 
certainties lose their power to explain the world as it is (Buttimer, 1993, 206). 
Interest in events-in-context arises when accepted truths lose their, explanatory power 
and life becomes suffused with uncertainty. The utility of a contextual view is in its 
scepticism about universal theories (Buttimer, 1993, 189), which means firstly, that 
the contextualist is more concerned with the practical relevance of truth-claims to 
everyday life and to problem-solving, and secondly, that it is modest about the 
limitations of human knowledge and understanding. In this respect, contextualism 
follows in the Socratic tradition, which, as I shall discuss, was expressed later in 
western intellectual history in the work of late Renaissance humanists like Michel de 
Montaigne and in philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as David Hume 
and Adam Smith. I maintain that the tradition of modest scepticism furnishes 
environmental theorists sufficient scope for an intellectual stance that could prove an 
antidote to the Faustian structures of mechanistic modernity. 
As the contextualist has an instrumental approach to. truth, he/she is not 
wedded to a single tradition of theory but rather is eclectic in selecting those branches 
of thought which apparently hold the most salience for problem solution. 
Accordingly, my research work will range across a number of different disciplines 
and traditions of thought in an effort to bring critical understanding to the crises of 
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modern life. Most particularly, this is the case in Part II , where I enlist the praxis 
paradigm in order to develop an ecopraxis oriented to the transcendence of 
established thought and practice. The notion of praxis has been particularly useful at 
times of crisis in human affairs, because it offers a framework of thought that can 
furnish critical understanding and a means to transcend obsolescent and intractable 
orthodoxies. I have also drawn upon regulation theory for its explanatory power in 
the matter of the durability of a seemingly crisis-prone system of production, namely, 
capitalism. And similarly, I engage the social learning paradigm for its insights into 
human learning processes and because periods of rapid change and crisis demand 
ongoing learning. 
It is the function of the contextualist to bring critical understanding to the 
paradoxes and contradictions of taken-for-granted ways of thought through revealing 
the context-sensitiveness of truth. Myth has been recognized as one particular 
avenue for reaching such understanding. In this context, Buttimer argues that the 
mythical figure who is best able to critically evaluate the established traditions of 
thought and action and who best symbolises reflective, critical moments in 
intellectual history is Narcissus. A visit to the Pool of Hippocrene may have either of 
two outcomes. A conservative response will reaffirm the status quo, as has been the 
case with ultra-right fundamentalists left behind by the rapid technological and social 
change of the last several decades. A progressive response will result from "insight 
into all the processes that led to the present malaise, a better understanding of history 
and the drama of events and their contexts. From this, Narcissus may emerge ready 
to shed the harness of routine ways and to pave the way for fresh alternatives" 
(Buttimer, 1993, 45). 
Western societies have, as yet, been unable to accept the need to transcend the 
old certainties of modernity. As a critical movement, postmodern deconstruction 
has, for the most part, served only to promote despair and to sharpen the "sense of the 
absence of creativity and hope" (Buttimer, 1993, 71). It has failed so far to do as the 
philosophes of the Enlightenment did, and that is to furnish the means of proceeding 
on, of transcending the mechanistic frameworks of thought and practice and hence of 
overcoming the western malaise. It is my belief that environmental thought provides 
the necessary hope and could furnish the means of proceeding further. 
A transcendent Narcissus points to neglected dimensions of human existence, 
criticizing the hegemony of currently valorized dimensions. Thus ecological 
theorists are critical of modern society and its institutions for their preoccupation 
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with instrumental-bureaucratic rationality, lamenting how these forms have come to 
dominate and, indeed, to devalue life itself. Complicit with instrumentalism in the 
suppression of life is that narrow understanding of human potential by which politics 
is made subservient to economics and by which humankind's primary functions are 
strictly confined to producer/consumer, namely, economism. The outcome of this 
unfavourable alliance is that the relations between social and cultural life and the 
biophysical environment have become patently dysfunctional. I seek in this thesis to 
further this critique and to recover alternative traditions within western thought, 
which have been side-tracked by the mechanistic juggernaut. Most particularly I seek 
to rescue that tradition of modest scepticism about the claims made for reason and 
abstract thought in the tradition exemplified by Montaigne, whose brand of 
reasonable thought was unfortunately shunted aside in the urgent need for order and 
certainty in the early modern period. 
Contextual analysis sanctions the convergence of theories of being (ontology) 
with theories of knowledge (epistemology), as they do in the recursive learning 
modes of the social learning paradigm. For too long, theory has been abstracted from 
living reality in western reductionist modes of knowing and being, a deficiency 
which ecological theorists have endeavoured to remedy by fitting new insights from 
evolutionary biology to accepted theories of human society, thereby exposing the 
shaky foundations of existing frameworks of understanding. In so doing they 
emphasise the tentative and fallible nature of theory that is not tied to reality. My 
approach has been to work backwards from the realities of ecological and social 
crises and to cast around for explanatory frameworks which best fit the reality and 
which also furnish a means or, at least, an understanding that facilitates the means, of 
proceeding further. The approach is both eclectic and synthetic, having as its 
objective a salient contribution to understanding the preconditions for an ecologically 
responsible society. 
An understanding of events, places and problems in context is important for 
the critical insights that it may afford, by creating awareness of the differentials 
between spirit and letter, and of the contradictions of entrenched orthodoxies and 
unwieldy structures. The now routine ways of thinking and being have to be replaced 
by modes of dwelling more appropriate to a rapidly expanding human population, an 
explosion of information and communication, rising wealth disparities and global 
environmental decline. I argue "that the as-yet-Faustian response to ecological 
problems - technical and procedural innovation, energy and resource use efficiencies 
- is unlikely to generate the necessary ameliorative action, since the reductive, 
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mechanistic approach to problem-solving results in fragmentation rather than unity of 
action. This response cannot generate the new levels of understanding that humanity 
and the planet need to construct alternative ecologically sound ways of dwelling. 
Moreover, while contextual metaphors help to explain the world as it is and 
how it came to be that way, to transcend established modes of thinking and being, 
which have only served to sunder relationships between humanity and its 
environment, necessitates the use of metaphors that express the wholeness of human-
nature interaction. Such organicist metaphors, Buttimer (1993, 158) observes, are 
characterized by four concerns; firstly, a concern for wholes rather than parts and for 
the "coherence and unity of reality" (Buttimer, 1993, 167); secondly, a concern for 
understanding dynamism and dialectical change; thirdly, a concern for transcendence, 
for the "processes leading to higher levels of complexity and unity where previous 
contradictions could be resolved in higher-order integrations of reality"; and fourthly, 
a conviction that humanness cannot be understood simply in terms of material 
processes, but that transcendent elements, like spirituality, are also part of its essence. 
Throughout western intellectual history, organicist metaphors have come into 
play when there was a need to reassertthe wholeness of being, when the need arose 
to transcend fragmentary ways of knowing and being and to ascend to a more unified 
mode of dwelling. Organicism allies itself well with the symbolic figure of the 
Phoenix, with its emancipatory and pioneering spirit, when humans seek to leave 
behind the ruins of obsolescent dwelling modes and reach higher integrations of 
understanding, being and becoming. It is for these reasons that organicist metaphors 
are particularly congenial to environmentalist emancipatory thought in its challenge 
to the rationalistic dogmatism of scientific reductionism, economic liberalism, and 
bureaucratic containment. The emancipatory relationship between organicism and 
the spirit of the Phoenix has thus been useful "at times and places when a liberation 
song about the integrity of life was called for - that is, whenever certain dimensions 
of experience, such as the social, intellectual, material, or spiritual aspects of human 
life, were ignored, oppressed, misconstrued, or simply forgotten" (Buttimer, 1993, 
158). 
While contextualism and Narcissus expose the contradictoriness of 
established patterns of thought and action, organicism allied with the spirit of the 
Phoenix furnishes the means for their creative transcendence. The creative 
possibility of the organic metaphor rests in its openness to paradoxical logic (rather 
than the analytic logic of mechanistic metaphor) and a synthetic approach to reality. 
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However, unlike contextualism, which is dispersive in its synthesis, that is, where 
particular events, places and periods are put in their overall context, organicism is 
integrative, that is, it seeks to integrate diverse components into an organic whole. 
Truth thus proceeds by means of an integrative process, resolving itself into an 
integration constituting a "higher level synthesis, which recognizes the claims of all 
fragments, transcends them and harmonizes them into a richer and more concrete 
whole" (Buttimer, 1993, 172). Creative potential lies in the conflicting interplay 
between diverse forces. 
Consequently, in the context of harnessing the Phoenix spirit and organicist 
dialectical synthesis, Part II endeavours to advance understanding of the processes 
and conditions of creative transcendence, to discern zones of dissonance for their 
potential as sites of innovation, while integrating insights from different thought 
paradigms and bringing them to bear on the problems of and prospects for 
sustainability. The praxis paradigm is enlisted for the understanding it elicits 
concerning the impediments to human creativity and autonomous action in addition 
to the conditions necessary for autonomous flourishing. Its attractiveness is that it 
shifts the focus of intellectual endeavour and creative action from liberty and rights 
to autonomy and the conditions for human flourishing, which are pre-eminently 
sustainability concerns. Based on the intellectual contributions to the paradigm and 
from its historical practice, I develop guidelines for a programme of radical ecopraxis 
oriented to sustainability. Within the parameters thus set, an assessment is made of 
the capacity Of sustainability to rejuvenate liberal democracy and to augment its 
capacity to respond to ecological problems. The ecocentric critique is used to elevate 
liberal democracy's encounter with sustainability to a more fruitful plane of 
understanding with respect to its possibilities and deficiencies. 
For environmentalists, organicist metaphors disclose previously occluded 
realms of thought just as they did for the visionaries of the Renaissance. Indeed there 
are distinct parallels between our own era and that earlier period of creative 
flourishing in the fifteenth century. Like our own time, that was an era of expanded 
horizons of space and time through the great explorations and advances in 
cosmological and astronomical understanding, just as the twentieth century has been 
characterized by the compression of space and time, the conquest of extraterrestrial 
space and innovations in the understanding of matter. Similarly, the invention of 
print made communication easier and facilitated accessibility to new and different 
ideas, while discourse, once confined to Latin, was expanded to various vernaculars. 
These events are replicated in our time by the explosion of microtechnology and the 
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democratization of information via the Internet. In the fifteenth century the great 
explorations kindled new knowledges and new understandings, which challenged 
existing orthodoxies and undermined established ecclesiastical authority. In the 
twentieth century new insights in ecology and evolutionary biology are challenging 
existing orthodoxies concerning the competitive nature of species and hence notions 
like 'survival of the fittest', which ground business ethics and social provision. It may 
not be too farfetched to argue that the unlocking of the Roman Church's hegemony by 
the Reformation of the Christian Church has a parallel in the emerging resistance of 
local elements to global capitalism's hegemony over the planet's economic and social 
systems. On the evidence, then, the twenty-first century has the potential to be a 
moment of creative discovery and to recover those qualities of humanness suppressed 
by the hegemony of capitalist economics. 
Sustainability is a concept which has apparently broad if ambiguous 
support, and is a possible harbinger of such a creative, emancipatory moment, serving 
as a bridge between a human-centred modernity and an ecocentric "postmodernity". 
However, this will only be the case where it is adopted in its full normative sense. 
Sustainability, as a political-ethical concept, is to be distinguished from sustainable 
development, which refers to the simultaneous maintenance of economic growth and 
a non-deteriorating stock of natural capital. As Barry (1996, 117) points out, 
"[s]ustainability, unlike sustainable development, is concerned as much with the ends 
of our use of the environment as with the ecological means to economic 
development". Sustainability should set the parameters of sustainable economic 
development, the objectives of which should be broadly compatible with the need to 
ensure ecological sustainability and sound human development. In nuce, this thesis 
will argue that there are radical implications for the distribution of power and 
responsibility in liberal democracies if the justice due to nonhuman entities and 
future generations is routinely taken into account in political and economic decision-
making. 
PART!: 
ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF MODERNITY, 
ITS ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 
CHAPTER 1 
I 
MODERNITY: PATHS TO ENLIGHTENMENT 
1.1: Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the legacy of the Enlightenment, its hopes and 
subsequent distortions to its ideals, institutional failure, and the inadequacy and 
pathology of modern society, including crisis, nihilism, and the loss of norms and 
values. In reference to the latter, responsibility constitutes a major theme of the 
thesis and consequently I research modern ethical and moral systems in some detail, 
particularly the emancipation froin responsibility which characterises modern modes 
of organising life. The early moderns' search for certainty and freedom from moral 
anxiety has had the perverse effect of creating a theoretical, institutional and 
ideological framework of "organised irresponsibility" (Beck, 1995a), which now 
threatens existence itself and reveals the search for certainty as an illusion. In this 
respect the loss of certainty, once guaranteed by modern science, and its corollary, 
the return of ambivalence, are seen as necessary steps in the reinstatement of 
responsibility to ethical considerations and thus in the search for sustainable human 
existences. 
There is some dispute as to whether modern society is a rationally created 
one, that it was not a project at all, but rather was conceived in the breach as it were 
(Bauman, 1995, 106). One might argue, as does Stephen Toulmin (1990), that the 
uncertainty-generating experience of the Religious Wars of 1618-1648 had a most 
profound effect on the philosophical discussions of the ensuing century and a half. 
Toulmin explains the search for a rational social order as a direct result of a half 
century of religious and political crisis and turmoil, of social disorder and economic 
retreat, and of intellectual and spiritual decline, culminating in "the breakdown of 
public confidence in the older cosmopolitical order" (Toulmin, 1990, 71). The work 
of Descartes, Newton and Leibniz was then a response to the urgent need for rational 
certainty devoid of religious divisiveness, to the urgent practical needs of the time. 
And like the philosophes of early modern Europe, my research programme is 
oriented to the urgent tasks of a social order in decline, of a modernity that in 
hindsight, it may be argued, took a wrong turning on the journey to enlightenment. 
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1.2: The Enlightenment 
To understand the course taken by modernity we must know something about 
its origins and the conditions under which the modern social order was conceived, for 
hopefully we may avoid repeating what appear now to have been erroneous 
judgements. I have, for the most part, relied on the account by Peter Gay (1973) for 
an understanding of the Enlightenment, of its ideals and of the philosophes who 
promoted those ideals. The novelty of their thought is set against a backdrop of 
repression and the arbitrary exercise of power, of wretched living conditions, of 
ascetic and all-powerful religions, and of a miserable historical fatalism. It is the 
experience of the eighteenth century which makes their thought that much more 
revolutionary and novel. It was an age of improvement', of innovation, of emerging 
confidence in the capacity of man. Gay (1973) describes the experience as "a 
recovery of nerve", of the recovery of the self-confidence lost with the asceticism, 
mysticism and pessimism of the Christian era. 
Historical fatalism had been broken by Bacon in the previous century and the 
Age of Enlightenment became an all-out attack on established religion and autocracy 
and the misery that was their consequence. Science and knowledge would be used to 
improve the lot of mankind, since, for Descartes, the preservation of health was the 
foundation of all the other goods of life. However the application of reason to the 
many spheres of life was not without its side-effects and was of doubtful benefit to 
many (Gay, 1973, 6). Economic improvement, for example, was not without its 
miseries. The enclosures, although in the long-run resulting in improvements in 
agricultural production, meant the interim displacement of the landless peasantry and 
all its attendant evils. Despite the upheavals, though 
men saw life getting better, safer, easier, healthier, more predictable 
- decade by decade, and so they built their hopes less on what 
had happened than on what was happening, and even more on what 
they had good reason to expect would happen (Gay, 1973, 12). 
On science and rationality in particular were heaped the expectations of the 
age. Not only would rationality provide the antidote of certainty and predictability to 
the "pitiless cycles" (Gay, 1973, 3), allowing man to be the "architect of his own life 
1 Plumb (1982, 332) notes that "improvement" was the watchword of the eighteenth century, used ad 
nauseam for all areas of human endeavour. It is interesting to note the parallel use of the words 
"development" and now "sustainability" in our own time. 
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and fortune" (quoting Shaftesbury, p.7), but it was seen as a weapon in the attack 
upon religion (Gay, 1973, 63). Some of the philosophes, like Diderot, expected that 
science should not only explain the physical dimension of nature but that it should 
also supply moral precepts. Science was to be the "bridge" between facts and values, 
with the possibility of science becoming the site of future values; thus natural 
philosophy might set the bounds of moral philosophy. 
As well, scientific thinking was to be the model for all other kinds of 
thinking, for it was seen to be superior to any other kind of human knowledge system 
(Gay, 1973, 166). Theology and metaphysics could no longer provide the answers to 
the old questions of man's nature and man's place in nature, that is, "Who am I?" and 
"What must I do?" The answers to these questions were now sought and found in 
science. And what is more, the scientific method provided the progress and certainty 
which the dogmas of the theologians never could. Its principle appeal was in its 
"sheer magnificent effectiveness" (Gay, 1973, 164). 
The hope expressed by Hume and others was that objective knowledge 
would serve human ends with "abundance and freedom" (Gay, 1973, 166). However, 
it has been the very realisation of abundance and the peculiar construction of freedom 
over the ensuing centuries that has served to repress these timeless questions until 
recently when they have resurfaced courtesy of global and personal crises. But, 
whereas the questions that confronted the scientists and philosophers of the 
Enlightenment were questions concerned with the relationship between man and the 
natural world and man and society, now they are to do with the relationship between 
society and nature. Once again our values, our knowledge systems and our 
institutional order are being called into question because we are losing confidence in 
their practical efficacy. 
Unlike the eighteenth century, however, it is not pessimism and lack of 
confidence that bedevils our existence, but rather overconfidence and hubris with 
respect to our technological capacity that brings us to the point of self-immolation 
and, some would argue, demands a renewal of enlightenment (Beck, 1995b). The 
iconic statement for an ecologically sound social, transformation might be one of 
modest optimism, along the lines of vivereamus sapienter (let us enjoy life wisely) 
rather than the overconfident Cartesian cogito ergo sum. 
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1.3: The Legacy of the Enlightenment 
The function of the philosophes was to raise fundamental questions about the 
relationship between man and society. They enquired into all the institutions of state 
and society, of religion and of the Church arid subjected them to the tests of natural 
utility and the pleasure-pain principle for their satisfaction of the needs of man. The 
attack on religion and its dogmatism, on the divine right of monarchy, and on 
superstition and ignorance undermined the institutions of church and monarchy with 
the result that theology and metaphysics were overtaken by secular philosophy. Most 
particularly it was the doctrine of 'original sin' on which they set their sights, for it 
was that which was the straitjacket that committed people to accept suffering and evil 
and sustained absolute obedience to church and state (Manuel, 1965, 4). The new 
secular philosophy emphasised humanity and equality and was responsible for the 
"rehabilitation of the passions" (Manuel, 1965, 192), which Christian theology 
considered mortal sins. But the passions were more problematic for the philosophes. 
Pride, for example, could be both malevolent or beneficent. It was pride as self-
confidence which was an essential virtue for the enlightened man. The recovery of 
pride reflected the spirit of the age and the new-found confidence in the mastery of 
nature. 
In applying reason to the whole gamut of human affairs, the philosophes 
expected that human affairs would progress, economically, socially, morally and 
politically. Thus reason as reasonableness was synonymous with humanity and 
signalled a move away from brutality and aggression. In turn the spread of humanity 
was intimately linked to the expansion of commerce. Indeed, the restless activity and 
industriousness of the new bourgeoisie was considered a virtue (Manuel, 1965, 45) 
with the result that commerce and its merchants were assigned a high social value for 
their usefulness in shifting the energies of men away from the making of war and 
desolation (Manuel, 1965, 51). 
In attacking the state, the philosophes were concerned with freedom of the 
individual from arbitrary power, with equality and with justice. They took on the 
judicial system and customary law, condemning particularly the cruelty and 
irrationality of punishment as contrary to the natural rights of man (Manuel, 1965, 
11). In pushing for political reform, their principal concern was with the right of 
equality before the law regardless of birth and with the application of equal justice. 
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As a corollary to the pursuit of equality and justice, the political sphere was to be the 
sphere in which legitimate authority was exercised and public happiness generated. 
They dissected feudal law and denounced its customary elements, which 
blocked geographical mobility, stifled free expression and prevented• freedom of 
occupation, while property ownership was enmeshed in a web of feudal dependencies 
with no social relevance. They demanded reform of these institutional hangovers as 
well as economic freedom from guild and dynastic prohibitions. Thus each 
individual looking after his own interests would contribute to the general economic 
interest (Manuel, 1965, 12). 
In the sphere of production and trade, criticism was aimed at the long-held 
doctrine that the sovereign's interest was tantamount to the general interest. The 
position of the theorists was of course inimical to the interests of the mercantilists for 
whom power was more important then wealth. For the economists of the 
Enlightenment, by contrast, wealth came before power and its distribution was as 
equally important. The classical economists, such as Hume and Smith, argued the 
advantages of a flourishing economy, maintaining that such a situation benefited the 
poor while augmenting the power of the sovereign (Gay, 1973, 356). They argued 
that it was economically irrational to allow radical inequality for the rich are then 
tempted to oppress the poor and such a state of affairs is uneconomic. Rather, 
general prosperity increases the proportion of the middle-classes, a development 
which is conducive to public order. 
1.4: Distortion and Disillusionment 
The ideals of the Enlightenment philosophes were not necessarily fulfilled in 
the way that they would have hoped. Some have been carried to their logical 
conclusion in the absence of a guiding moral framework; some have become 
distorted and debased; while others remain unrealised. In the first instance I have in 
mind individual rights and the cult of individualism that, together with the doctrine of 
self-interest, is now a threat to our collective existence, as I shall discuss in Chapters 
3 and 4. In the second instance, the notion that the wealth which society produced 
was for the good of all was quickly debased such that even by the early nineteenth 
century the production of wealth had become an end in itself and remains so 
(Sismondi, 1819[1991]). Similarly the work ethic engendered by the industriousness 
of the early bourgeoisie has deteriorated in this century to "workaholicism". The 
situation now prevails where a disproportionate amount of the available work is 
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executed by a professional elite labouring abnormally long hours accompanied by 
underemployment or unemployment among an increasingly larger section of the 
working population. 
Moreover, the fortunes of the middle-classes, the standard-bearers of the 
hopes of the philosophes, are in relative decline. The resurrection of an individualist 
and competitive politics drawing on early classical liberalism has had as its 
consequence widening inequalities between the richest and poorest sections of 
western societies with many former middle-class adherents now falling into the 
category of the "working poor". The permanently unemployed and underemployed, a 
category which includes many young people, constitute a developing and 
recognisable underclass. These developments fuel disillusionment with mainstream 
political parties and contribute to the emergence of fundamentalist and other ultra-
right wing political groups. 
Thus, while continuous economic growth could obscure inequalities within 
society with the promise of better things to come, the falling growth rates of recent 
decades with their attendant cutbacks in social welfare compensation have exposed 
the soft underbelly of modem economic societies. Similarly, those existential 
questions about the society/nature relationship, long repressed by the doctrines of 
individualism and abundance, now re-emerge, as the side-effects of this existential 
vacation become manifest. 
1.5: Enlightenment Ideals: An Evaluation 
1.5. The Reasonableness of Rationality 
Disillusionment with the legacy of the Enlightenment among twentieth 
century thinkers has for the most part focussed on rationality 2, specifically the 
application of reason in the scientific method, and more generally on progress 
through the application of reason to all the spheres of human affairs. The literature is 
voluminous and I can only cover some of the most salient and critical points. Of the 
critical assessments of modem rationality, that of Max Weber is very much in the 
Enlightenment tradition, where the modernisation process is a process of progressive 
rationalisation and the process of history is progress towards reason (Wellmer, 1985, 
40). However it is a qualified process of rationalisation, which is both a source of 
21n the context of this and subsequent discussion a distinction needs to be made between rationality 
and reason as critical thought. 
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emancipation and of reification. In the first sense, rationality allows for increases in 
economic and administrative efficiency and also brings order and coherence to the 
general chaos of multiple beliefs, values, experiences, choices, opportunities for 
action and so on. But it also signifies disenchantment or de-sacralization of the 
natural and social worlds, even as it makes for better understanding through the 
application of scientific objectivity. 
Weber's assessment of modernisation in its capitalist guise was a pessimistic 
one and from his analysis of the institutions of the capitalist order he concluded that 
the systems of capitalist economy, bureaucracy and objectivist science would most 
likely result in the imprisonment of the modern individual in the "iron cage" of 
bureaucratic order rather than their emancipation. The autonomous individual is thus 
a myth with meaningful life choices being degraded to a "pluralism of privatised 
value choices" (Wellmer, 1985, 41). Life would become increasingly more reified, 
bureaucratized and depersonalized. 
The darkest assessment of Enlightenment rationality is undoubtedly that of 
Adomo and Horkheimer (1944[1972]) and the Frankfurt School, no doubt coloured 
by the fact that they wrote in the darkest days of German Nazism. For the German 
philosophers truth and knowledge inevitably implied the domination of nature and of 
men, for knowledge and power are synonymous (Adorn° and Horkheimer, 
1944[1972], 4). Although the Enlightenment rid the world of superstition and myth, 
it simply replaced one mythology with another, science. Just as earlier myths were a 
way of explaining the world, so was science, but whereas mythology was the realm 
of the sacred in pre-Enlightenment times, "in the enlightened world, mythology has 
entered the world of the profane" (Adorn° and Horkheimer, 1944[1972], 24, 28). 
Adorn° and Horkheimer further criticised the objectifying tendencies of science, in 
which the whole of human existence is reduced to computation and equivalence. 
"Myth turns into enlightenment, and nature into more objectivity" (Adorn° and 
Horkheimer, 1944[1972], 9). Objectification and domination are of a piece. 
In this respect the Adomo-Horkheimer critique of Enlightenment reason is 
close to Michel Foucault's genealogy of power/knowledge. Indeed, as McCarthy 
(1990) points out, Foucault's radical critique of reason is not too far removed from 
that of one of the principal disciples of the Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas. The 
latter's "colonization of the life world" by which he describes the increasing intrusion 
of instrumental and strategic rationalities via the forces of the market and government 
administration ("monetization" and "bureaucratization") into other spheres of life 
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could be thought of as one side of the critique of reason. Foucault's notion of the 
disciplinary society is effectively a critique of the failure to pursue a life informed by 
reason "by developing and institutionalizing modalities other than the subject-
centred, instrumental ones that increasingly shape our lives" (McCarthy, 1990, 444). 
Thus, while Habermas laments the overdevelopment of instrumental rationality, 
Foucault deplores the failure to develop and nurture other forms of reason. 
However it was in fact Habermas who went on to expand on the unutilized 
potential of rationality, reasoning that, as the lifeworld is conditioned less by 
traditional understandings and is opened up further to "modern structures of 
consciousness" (White, 1988, 97), not only are individuals more instrumentally 
rational in their behaviour but this modernization process opens up opportunities for 
communicatively rational behaviour. Hence, "these same developments also enable 
discursive and critical reconstruction of the life world. Subjects can coordinate their 
actions through talk rather than unthinking compliance with norms, and it is through 
talk that an attack can be launched against instrumentalization". 
The development of communicative rationality has been undertaken by John 
Dryzek, who has enlarged on the consequences of the dominance and pervasiveness 
of instrumental rationality in modern societies. But, whereas Habermas envisaged 
communicative rationality as, firstly, freeing the life world from myth, custom and 
illusion, and secondly, as a defence against the objectifying and instrumentally 
rational incursions of experts and administrators (Habermas, 1987), Dryzek (1990, 
20) proposes extending discursive rationality into both system and life world as a 
"counter-offensive". He argues that instrumental and communicative rationalities are 
not incompatible, that they should co-exist; it is rather a question of the balance 
between the two. In the real world political sphere the potential for communicative 
rationalization is being realized by various agents of democratic renewal, including 
social movements and voluntary associations seeking the defence of locality and 
culture. Environmental movements, in paiticular, are in the vanguard of democratic 
renewal and the reorientation of politics towards public interests, thus endeavouring 
to reappropriate the unutilized rational potential of modernity, beginning the 
dissolution of the bars of the "iron cage" as it were. As Habermas maintained, the 
communicative model would provide the "critical foothold" for determining the 
rational potential of modernity (White, 1988, 118). 
Habermas and Dryzek are representative of those who remain committed to 
the modernity project. There are however others who, at the end of the twentieth 
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century, are pessimistic and cynical about the fulfillment of the Enlightenment's 
goals. Particularly among the French structuralist and post-structuralist writers, 
whose critiques of the rational project expose its irrationalism or unreason, reason is 
considered the source of a number of delusions (Racevskis, 1993, 4). Their writings 
on reason are largely concerned with relationships of power in society. They 
maintain that the use of reason as rationality has not produced progress as promised 
and that reason which replaced divine revelation as a transcendental authority is 
simply another form of the same; that the modern subject who should be in control is 
in fact controlled (Racevskis, 1993,, 9, 11). The postmodern critique of reason is 
encapsulated thus: 
Reason, we now realize, could never be the universal and objective 
interpreter of reality that a traditional representation of the 
Enlightenment once proposed. What was forgotten in the wake of 
the enthusiasm generated by the Enlightenment was that reason 
always needs the support of the relations of power and institutions 
it has created. Thus, the ideals promoted by the Enlightenment 
were from the start liable to be co-opted by socio-economic 
interests and reason could become the prerogative of a class, race, 
gender, or a nation - that is, of a clearly circumscribed area of 
political or economic interests that sought to promote its own aims 
as those of an eternal and essential humanity. 
And further: 
The ultimate goal of enlightened reason, which was to make society 
in some way transparent to itself, is thus revealed to have been the 
ultimate illusion. What has taken us to this impasse is the failure to 
account for power - the crucial element complementing and 
competing with reason. Reason was incapable of guaranteeing the 
integrity of the Enlightenment project because it had no hold over 
the workings of power (Racevskis, 1993, 65-66). 
What Foucault and the other postmodems have done is to problematize the faith in 
reason and the power relations which accompany truth-claims just as the philosophes 
problematized religious dogma and superstition as transcendental truth. 
1.5.2: The Progress of Progress 
From the beginning of the modern era, the notion that social and moral 
progress would follow from material and technical/scientific progress has had its 
critics and crises of belief. Even the strongest supporters of Enlightenment ideals, 
such as Rousseau, were deeply ambivalent about its consequences. The Romantic 
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movement of the nineteenth century was simply the reactionary high point of the 
criticism of the chain of consequences set off by the French Revolution. Other critics 
were deeply pessimistic. Marx, for example, in interpreting the realities of 
capitalism, had rendered the progress of history as "a permanent struggle involving 
class and power" (Joas, 1990, 182); while Nietzsche, the most radical and pessimistic 
critic of progress, envisaged history as "a continuum of meaningless struggles" (Joas, 
1990, 184). 
The belief in progess was further battered by the crises consequent on the 
global conflagrations and economic depressions of the first half of the twentieth 
century. But in the years after 1945, the notion of progress made a recovery. This 
time it was very clearly interpreted as "development", that is, economic growth 
through technological progress. Development was the process of implementing the 
belief in progress. It meant the development of better technologies for controlling 
and exploiting nature, thus to improve living conditions (Norgaard, 1994, 58). The 
opportunities for development which arose in this period were accompanied by 
expansion in scientific and technical know-how, and by the acceptance that 
government intervention through social and economic planning might eventually 
solve the problems that bedevilled the early part of the century. There was an 
optimistic belief that economic growth would support social progress, a belief 
strengthened by the very real improvements in living standards experienced by many, 
at least in western democracies. 
The faith in progress, although still the dominant ideology for political and 
economic elites, began to unravel in the 1970s with the resource crises, although for 
many in the "developing" world it remains the ideology of exploitation and 
domination. The diseconomies of progress for late twentieth century societies have 
been documented by Schroyer (1983). On the global scale, he cites the ecological 
costs of the "logic of simplification that is being imposed on the organic complexity 
of global ecosystems by the encompassing power of the international 
technoeconomic system" (Schroyer, 1983, 168). As a result the less developed 
countries of South America, Central America, Africa, India, and Asia are suffering 
ecological decline through deforestation, overgrazing, desertification, salinization, 
and loss of biodiversity through destruction of habitat, all in the name of 
development sanctioned and encouraged by' international monetary and credit 
agencies in the service of capital accumulation. Allied with ecological costs are 
social and other costs - the costs of social conflict resulting from the maldistribution 
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of environmental bads and inequalities in the distribution of natural resources and the 
knowledge and technology to develop them (Schroyer, 1983, 169). 
The slow-down in the process of capital accumulation, which coincided with 
the end of the postwar boom, has necessitated alternative strategies to maintain profit • 
levels. Thus capital has tended to-centralize in core centres, shifting away from more 
marginal economies, often abandoning them to conditions of severe depression, or it 
has moved offshore to low-wage "developing" economies. The last several decades 
in the cycle of capital accumulation have therefore been marked by high 
unemployment, factory closures, reductions in government services, and other hidden 
costs of development, such as "ever-widening consumerism", the need for extended 
periods of education in order to gain and retain employment, and the lengthening 
periods of capital accumulation required for the "capital-intensive household" 
(Schroyer, 1983, 170). Articulating these hidden costs has the further effect of 
unveiling hidden dominations, mainly resulting from the homogenizing effects of 
western technologies (Norgaard, 1994, 58-60; S chroyer, 1983, 169-170). 
The "dwindling faith in progress", Norgaard (1994, 55) maintains, is 
responsible for much of the recent atomization and loss of meaning among western 
cultures. The belief in progress acted as a lubricant for the wheels of collective 
decision-making, but with the loss of faith in the notion, comes a loss of a collective 
sense of the future. This has implications for many spheres of life. Political 
groupings are more likely to take up entrenched positions, since no group is willing 
to make concessions on the basis that more opportunities will arise in the future. The 
outcome is political gridlock. As well, young people are less inclined to concentrate 
their efforts on study, when they lack a secure vision of the future. Yet, while some 
sections of society are alienated and their hopes unfulfilled, we remain addicted to 
technological innovation as a solution to the problems which confront us. Our faith 
in technology and science deludes us into postponing the necessary collective 
thinking processes until there is conclusive scientific proof, by which time the 
problems may be insuperable. 
The original conception of progress, as moral progress through material 
wellbeing, has gradually lost its moral force. This combined with the secularization 
of society and the waning guidance of Christianity as a moral force left only 
individual action as the ground for moral direction. Lacking moral direction, the cult 
of the individual runs rampant and for many people on the treadmill of unending 
material consumption, progress and its attendant ideologies - individualism, 
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consumerism, the invisible hand, and positivism - has become a hollow conceit. 
Disenchantment is widespread. The motto of the age is: consumo ergo sum. 
Consumption becomes the compensation for the loss of communal identity - the loss 
of connection to kin, community and locale. Progress has been led astray by "liberal 
individualism, excessive emphasis on exchange relations, and globalization" 
(Norgaard, 1994, 123). 
Aside from the descriptive treatments of the disillusions of progress, a 
systematic attempt to measure the actuality of human progress has been made using 
criteria of progress from evolutionary biology by Gowdy (1994). He challenges the 
arguments for human progress from the standpoints of (1) morphological complexity; 
(2) adaptive ability; (3) accumulation of genetic information; (4) increasing biomass; 
and (5) increasing resistance to extinction. On all five counts, he contends, we 
cannot sustain the idea of human progress. Firstly, we are becoming more 
genetically and culturally uniform; secondly, in spite of increasing technological 
complexity, our flexibility and adaptive capacity is declining as similar social 
systems founded on the same market mentality spread worldwide; thirdly, the 
development era has been marked by a dramatic loss of biodiversity and a loss of 
information of how to survive in the natural world; fourthly, the inordinate increases 
in population are in fact a threat to the survival of the species and are not an 
evolutionarily progressive step; and fifthly, our adaptive capacity comes increasingly 
to rely solely on technological advance, which has proved to be of doubtful benefit to 
much of humankind (Gowdy, 1994, 47-48; Norgaard, 1994, 57-58). Gowdy (1994, 
55) concludes that on these criteria progress cannot be conceded; nor has the vehicle 
of progress, economic growth, produced "an unambiguous improvement in the 
human condition". 
1.5.3: Freedom and Autonomy 
For the philosophes of the Enlightenment, the progressive project had as its 
anticipated outcome "the fullest extension of human freedom" (Kumar, 1978[1986]). 
It was very much an emancipatory project. However, if autonomy is defined as the 
freedom to actualize one's human potentials, then the programme of the "technical 
transcendence of the earth" (Schroyer, 1983, 183), which constitutes the 
contemporary guise of progress, in effect constrains human potentials. What we have 
are negative freedoms, freedoms from rather than freedoms to or for. 
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Drawing on the Habermasian notion of communicative rationality, Schroyer 
(1983, 182-183) argues that societies progress not only through the application of 
rational science to their problems and therefore through technical learning, but also 
"in the opening of opportunities for discursive communication in all institutional 
contexts". Individual autonomy is limited by "systematically distorted 
communications", but because communicative rationality presupposes open, 
undistorted communication, then "a free society and an autonomous ego reciprocally 
presuppose each other" (Schroyer, 1983, 18). Discourse opens up those possibilities 
for freedom foreclosed and distorted by instrumental rationality and objectification. 
The assumption that human emancipation is progressed by technical learning 
has as its side-effect the abstraction of technological problem-solving from its natural 
and cultural contexts. Thus any proposals which purport to serve human needs and 
therefore further human autonomy escape the critical purview of the discursive 
process, while their normative rightness and ecological fitness are rarely justified. 
Thus it is for Habermas (1985) that the democratic potential of the early liberal ideals 
remains to be fulfilled. 
The early sense of progress embodied a complex and interconnected 
framework of meanings which have been gradually eroded as economic rationality 
assumed dominance. The idea of progress came more and more to be identified with 
economic progress. According to Carlo Mongardini (1990), this has the effect of 
culture being dominated by economic rationality and the enslavement of humans to 
the present. As economic rationality eroded the complex sense of progress, change 
became change for change's sake and thus a value in itself. Change is for appearance 
only with little substance, "a change in order to preserve the status quo, not a change 
in order to generate new and more adequate forms of society" (Mongardini, 1990, 
56). Such is the 'cunning of modem reason' recognized by Hegel or the delusion of 
modem reason, referred to as such by postmodern critics. However, the ideology of 
change creates uncertainty and unease when people experience seemingly endless 
change with no apparent improvement in their life quality, thereby limiting the 
possibilities for a progressive collective existence. Fragmentation and alienation 
ensue and the only responses that abstract rationality can make are "primitive forms 
of fantasy, magic, regression, and negation of history" (Mongardini, 1990, 57). The 
pseudo-aesthetic fantasy, sensationalism, kitsch and historical fetishism of the arcade, 
of the spectacular event or of the museums of the past do not have the answers to 
cultural erosion, to the loss of values, meanings and ideals, and the loss of historical 
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reference points which were once embodied in the notion of progress as the process 
of human emancipation. 
1.5.4: Justice and Equality 3 
The concept of equality has its roots in Athenian democracy and although it 
has a long history, its meaning has varied with prevailing political conditions. In the 
Greek polis, it bore two understandings: justice as fairness, and equality as sameness 
or homogeneity, although it did not mean that citizens were not free to cultivate their 
differences, nor that a degree of inequality between classes was untolerated. Rather 
equality involved the fairness of distribution of equal shares between equals and 
unequal shares between unequals (Lummis, 1992, 39). 
The notion of a universal equality only came to apply when the need to 
consolidate a number of diverse peoples demanded some unifying formulation. Thus 
Alexander the Great and later the Romans adopted the Stoic idea of a common 
human nature as a basis for the governance of vast empires. So too the Christian 
view demanded that all peoples conceive of themselves as similar in their 
unworthiness, holding that they could only gain respect by belonging to the one 
universal religion, Christianity. 
In the Middle Ages, equality was conceived as a characteristic of equal status, 
that is, among members of the same social class. Although in England there was a 
strong tradition of equality before the law (if not in actuality) and social equality was 
a strongly-held ideal among the lower classes,' it did not become a significant 
political force as an ideal until the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Though it had different interpretations, the most important ones were 
grounded, not in social class, but in the human condition (Lummis, 1992, 41). The 
Levellers, for example, entertained a positive view of human nature, their definition 
emphasizing human correspondence, that each individual faced the same existential 
task of living a life (Lummis, 1992, 41). Hobbes, by way of contrast, saw people as 
equal in their weakness, and as a result their only choice was to submit to a sovereign 
power. 
The evolution of the modern economic state has meant corresponding 
modifications in the notion of equality. While it retains its sense of equality as 
31 treat the ideals of justice and equality as if of a piece since in modern life justice has largely come to 
be considered synonymously with economic equality. 
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justice in order to underwrite claims against racial, ethnic and gender discrimination, 
the understanding which now dominates is justice as economic equality. The prime 
vehicle touted for achieving economic justice in the postwar period is economic 
growth, interlinked with notions of economic development as social progress, both at 
national and international scales. 
However, at the end of the twentieth century, the hopes for economic 
development remain unfulfilled; indeed they are receding as the gap between richest 
and poorest both within and between nations noticeably widens. The fact is that 
economic development under conditions where the accumulation of capital is the 
prime motivating force presupposes inequality (Smith, 1990). Justice has to be more 
than the roughly equal distribution of economic benefits. Not only does economic 
inequality have logical limits - a democratic society presupposes a rough economic 
equality among its citizenry (Spragens, 1990, 166) - but justice, as a number of 
feminist philosophers have demonstrated, cannot be reduced to distributive fairness 
(Young, 1990). 
Marion Young's (1990, Ch.1) critique of the "distributive paradigm" exposes 
its preoccupation with outcomes (things, resources, income, wealth and social 
positions or jobs), a preoccupation which causes it to ignore the underlying social and 
institutional contexts producing distributional differentials. She argues that justice 
should not only turn on questions of the distribution of outcomes, but that, because it 
also concerns decision-making power and procedures, it should also turn on the 
provision of the means to develop and exercise human capacities or "functionings" 
(Sen, 1992, Ch.3). Accordingly, she contends that domination and oppression, the 
degree to which citizens are prevented from exercising capabilities, should be the 
starting point for theorizing about justice. It is in this respect that institutional 
contexts are relevant because "they condition people's ability to participate in 
determining their actions and their ability to develop and exercise their capacities" 
(Young, 1990, 22). 
The critics of the post war drive towards global economic development (see 
for example Sachs, 1992 and Norgaard, 1994) have also taken the development 
paradigm to task for its deficiencies in producing equality, pointing to the inherent 
inequality and ultimate illogicality of a world economic system. Lummis (1992, 46- 
47), for example, points out that the world's peoples would need the resources of five 
planets to exist at the per capita energy consumption level of Los Angeles, so that the 
idea that all nations should aspire to that standard of material consumption and that, 
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in the context of resource depletion and global environmental decline, economic 
equality should be achieved by "levelling up", is mythical. 
Thus just as Young divines the starting point of justice in the dominations and 
oppressions which prevent people from exercising capacities rather than in economic 
equality, so too do the development critics contend that equality is more a matter of 
"shaking off burdens", by which they mean those homogenizing tendencies of the 
world economic system with its one standard of wealth and wellbeing. It is a system 
which "dispossesses the world's peoples of their own indigenous notions of 
prosperity" (Lummis, 1992, 48) and therefore of social and economic diversity, 
thereby reducing capacities for resilience to external shocks. It is a system which 
creates inequality and dependence. 
Following the resource depletion shocks of the 1970s and the obvious 
patchiness of world development, it was accepted that the need to conserve resources 
would impose limits on economic development. At the same time, critics of 
development were making specific links between expansive postwar economic 
development and a rapidly declining biosphere. 4 While "sustainable development" 
emerged as the preferred economic strategy, a broad constellation of understandings 
has crystallized around the notion, among which is an expanded meaning for justice. 
Justice, which has now assumed the novel context of ecological integrity, is extended 
to encompass not only global equity (not economic equality) between contemporary 
generations but also the maintenance of ecosystemic functioning for future 
generations. The notion of justice being due to the environment, of the right of all 
living beings to the conditions sufficient to fulfill their evolutionary potential, far 
transcends earlier understandings. 
Our understanding of justice in the context of sustainability has benefitted 
from critiques of western notions of development and their ignorance of diverse 
perspectives on social and natural environments, and from criticism of Gross 
National Product as a measure of social wellbeing and the consequent need to invent 
broader measures of welfare and therefore justice if the needs of present and future 
generations are to be accommodated (Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Henderson, 1994). 
Feminist critics of development have also brought our attention to the male-
centredness of development projects, the failure of the formal economy to account for 
the productive and reproductive activities of the informal sphere and the injustice 
4For a comprehensive bibliographic list of economic growth and development critics, see Esteva 
(1992, 24-25) and Sachs (1992, 36-37). 
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suffered by women as a result (Harcourt, 1994). And yet, increasing dependence on 
the global trading system means continuing environmental and social decline for 
many in both 'developed' and 'developing' spheres and the foreclosure of evolutionary 
possibilities. 
1.6: Pathology and Crisis 
The decline of faith in progress has as its corollary the normalization of crisis. 
Crisis-talk results when there is no clear vision of the future or as Holton (1990) 
would describe it: "crisis becomes a more or less permanent condition [when there is 
no] clear sense of the possibility of new patterns" and the future is apparently 
foreclosed. One particular implication for later discussion of possible normative 
dimensions is that the sense of entrapment in the present encourages short-term time 
horizons. One response to a reluctance to begin the future is: 
short-run modes of crisis-management oriented to performance. 
The attraction of technocracy with this short-run perspective is that 
it defuturizes the future. This is achieved by reducing complexities 
associated with uncertain expectations about that which is to come. 
Technocracy seeks therefore to control surprise, and multiply short-
run possibilities for maximizing performance. This leaves space 
for a symbiotic relationship between technocratic crisis-managers 
and private consumption-oriented households. Neither party has 
much stake in the future beyond tomorrow (Holton, 1990, 44). 
The upshot of this phenomenon is a minimum of social integration and normative 
order as relations are to a greater extent mediated by "largely impersonal networks of 
communication and exchange, namely, the market and representative democracy" 
(Holton, 1990, 45). Moreover, this same symbiotic relationship erodes public 
politics and thus the "scope for social criticism". 
Crisis has thus become an established feature on the political and social 
landscape5 . More specific explanations for what appears to be a more or less 
permanent feature of late modern society are almost as various as producers of the 
explanations are numerous. Daniel Bell (1979, 480) explains the social tensions and 
conflicts of western society as a result of disjuncture between the spheres of social 
structure, polity and culture. The present is characterized by a lack of fit between the 
social (economic, occupational and technological systems) and the cultural. Victor 
5HoIton (1990, 49) cautions against representing the general dissatisfaction with modern life as crisis, 
because, in equating what is a condition of normalcy in modern life with crisis, we lose the capacity to 
differentiate between acute pathology and normalcy. 
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Toledo attributes the sense of crisis to the globalization of the human, which is the 
origin of our unease by obliging us to rethink all the spheres of human existence - 
"politics, economics, culture, diplomacy, education, and life styles" (Toledo, 1993, 
34). The present crisis is therefore a crisis of civilization. Contiguous with processes 
of globalization is an increasing consciousness of a global ecological crisis, a 
growing awareness of biophysical limits, which obliges us to rethink not only the 
concrete present but also our past and our future (Toledo, 1993, 36). 
Moscovici (1990) mounts a similar argument for a crisis of the social rather 
than a simple legitimacy crisis of the political. This is a crisis of the social in which 
nature replaces society as ideality. Such a development constitutes a new form of 
truth which will emerge as a response to "a collective desire for survival". In 
Moscovici's optimistic future, nature becomes an end in itself rather than a means to 
an end and the crisis consists in us coming to terms with this different vision of 
society. 
This new way of thinking will eventually sweep away the 
representation of society as an artificial order constituted in a 
breach with a disorderly and hostile nature, in which the anarchy of 
individuals must be reduced through the hierarchy of institutions. 
In this emerging vision, society will no longer be seen to shackle 
nature. Rather it will come into alliance with it, encouraging 
beliefs and practices which will tend to enrich the possibilities of 
the species and increase its prospects for survival (Moscovici, 
1990, 8). 
• My own view is that we will begin to achieve and accept this vision of society only 
when there is general acceptance that western society was and is constituted in the 
breach, that its institutions are hostile to unsubdued nature and are necessarily 
defective in protecting the fundamental interest of all species, including human 
individuals, to develop autonomously. 
The blame for the pathologies of the twentieth century has been laid on the 
•doorstep of irrationality or unreason (Alexander, 1990). A counterintuitive argument 
has been mounted by Bauman (1989) who has used the horrors of the Holocaust to 
show how reason as instrumental and bureaucratic rationality can be employed to 
justify and perpetrate the most horrendous acts; in other words, the pathologies are a 
consequence of the exercise of reason. In this century the dream of reason, human 
emancipation through the application of reason, has been subverted by violence, 
fascist tyranny and war, thus revealing the dream as an illusion: "Alongside the 
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spread of rational understanding, there has emerged ... an outbreak of brutality and 
violence on an unprecedented scale" (Alexander, 1990, 25). 
The irrationalities experienced by the modern individual can be said to derive 
from the unreasonable and incongruous conditions of modern existence (Benhabib, 
1992, 80-81). Drawing on a Habermasian characterization of an underdeveloped 
lifeworld and its colonization by an overdeveloped strategic-instrumental rationality 
via the steering media of money and power, Benhabib suggests that the irrationalities 
of modern life result largely from truncated access to "an autonomous public sphere 
of political reasoning and discussion" and the consequent lack of opportunity to 
participate in "the consensual generation of principles to govern public life". The 
conditions of closure consist of: firstly, access to a sphere of political reasoning being 
denied to many on the basis of class, gender, race, age and religion; secondly, money 
and power coming to form the basis of the social bond rather than "the consensual 
generation of norms"; thirdly, as a result, individuals experiencing a loss of 
individual agency and efficacy, with political alienation, cynicism and anomie being 
the consequence; and fourthly, continous change and revision of traditions retarding 
the development of a coherent sense of self and community. 
The twentieth century therefore is characterized by the spread of both rational 
understanding and by violence and antireason. Even those societies which escaped 
"the nightmare of reason [are] haunted by a sense of disappointment with modern 
life" (Alexander, 1990, 26), manifesting as the loss of the sense of individual and 
collective purpose and in attempts to escape from the demands and uncertainties of 
the modern world through addictions of divers kinds, mystic religions, and various 
brands of fundamentalism. 6 Ulrich Beck (1995a, 54-55) speaks of the hazards of an 
"overbred industrialism" and the anxieties and insecurities so generated, involving a 
"radicalized problematization of all the principles for guiding one's life". Thus the 
downside of modernity is "a collectively threatened existence mediated by the nature-
society context, that modernity had promised under the aegis of autonomy, choice, 
individualism" (Beck, 1995a, 51). 
6Giddens (1994, 66ff.) explains compulsiveness or addiction as a result of the failure of modernity to 
come to terms with tradition or detraditionalization. Thus "compulsiveness, when socially 
generalized, is in effect tradition without traditionalism, repetition which stands in the way of 
autonomy rather than fostering it" or "repetition which has lost its connection to the 'truth' of 
tradition". 
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1.7: Institutional Decline 
The literature is replete with claims regarding the declining institutions of 
modernity. Some deal with the imminent demise of industrial society generally while 
others address themselves to the failings of particular institutional arrangements, such 
as liberal democracy, the welfare state, capitalism, the nation-state and so on. Of 
particular interest to Ulrich Beck (1992; 1995a; 1995b) are the self-generated threats 
to the institutions of industrial society. Beck's analysis of late modern societies 
centres around the notion of ecological risk and the paradoxes of the search for 
security. Thus he argues that the industrial state was conceived for the purposes of 
security, but the institutions which industrial modernity put in place to obviate and 
minimize risks, to deal with "the dangers of its own creations" (Beck, 1995a, 107), 
are themselves endangered by the very scale of the ecological, nuclear, chemical and 
genetic hazards which now confront it. Beck sees this state of affairs as a paradox 
because "the technological security state enters into contradiction with itself' (Beck, 
1995a, 107) and the impossibility of precaution becomes a destabilizing influence 
within the institutions. The long-established method of anticipating future 
uncertainty and hazards by taking out insurance and making a claim in the event of 
misfortune or accident is no longer applicable. The 'logic of risk' is not appropriate 
for large-scale, global and amorphous hazards, since they are incalculable, 
unattributable and uncompensatable (Beck, 1995a, 109). The result is a "crisis of 
responsibility" provoking a rethink of attribution and regulation. What is more 
important, the development of large-scale hazards shakes the governing principles of 
modern society - reason and progress. "The Janus-headed 'progress of self-
annihilation' ... gives rise to conflicts that put into doubt the social basis of rationality 
- science, law, democracy" (Beck, 1995a, 110). 
It is my contention that the institutions of early modernity, which were 
conceived in response to an entirely different suite of conditions and to which late 
modernity clings, are incapable of providing a response to the ecological risks 
generated by nuclear, chemical and genetic hazards. Gottweis (cited in Beck, 1995a, 
81) has written of the gap between the potential hazards and risks of modern society 
and the political capacity to handle these technological and cultural developments. 
This manifests as a "crisis of political output". As citizens, increasingly aware of 
risks, mobilize against the threats, "the ensemble of legal and administrative tools, 
developed for the solution of quite different problems and hence antiquated, comes 
up against factual and financial limits to the solution of problems". The immediate 
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consequences of environmental disaster can be observed in the political breakdowns 
of some parts of the "developing" world, but more generally the function of 
ecological risk is to raise fundamental questions about human social organization 
summarized thus: 
[B]ecause ecological issues generally are either larger or smaller 
than our ecologically oblivious institutions, they raise additional 
questions about how we might restructure the scale and functioning 
of human, social, economic and political practices as well as the 
selfs relation to these practices (Coles, 1992, 194). 
It is becoming clearer that the programmes of welfare state liberalism and 
socialism are bereft of responses to the kinds of problems confronting the late 
twentieth century. They no longer have the same illuminative power nor are they 
capable of motivating and mobilizing action, a contention which will be enlarged 
upon in Chapter 2. However, problematizing their exhaustion, as Stephen White 
(1988, 2) says, is to question some of the central tenets or values of modern culture. 
Liberal regimes are criticised for their inability to achieve social justice, to overcome 
racial inequality, or to prevent oppression of minorities (West, 1995). The dimension 
of freedom is characterized as negative and insufficient for genuine freedom (Gould, 
1988), while the nexus between liberalism and capitalism is viewed as the most 
compelling obstacle to genuine freedom and equality. Moreover the restriction of 
liberal values to political and economic arenas means that governments are at a loss 
to intervene in essentially cultural problems, such as oppressions based on race, 
gender and sexual preference. 
1.8: Liberalism as Moral Order 
"Liberalism both needs morality, and makes it impossible" (Poole, 1991, ix). 
As a social order, liberalism is thin on moral direction. The preoccupation 
with individual freedom means that specifying the goods of life has been relinquished 
to individual choice. Further, the paramountcy of individual freedom means that 
liberalism construes the pursuit of individual goods as a constraint on others' pursuit 
of individual freedom. Justice both ensures individual rights and contains the pursuit 
of individual goods. This narrow interpretation of justice prevents liberals from 
seeing that justice due to others may well be constitutive of one's own good and that 
ensuring justice by attending to our individual rights is a necessary but not altogether 
a sufficient condition for our wellbeing. Consequently liberalism is incapable of 
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grasping the ecological insight that individual goods are constituted by the goods of 
others with whom one is in constitutive relationship (Poole, 1991, 86). 
It is because justice and welfare have been restricted to questions of 
individual rights rather than justice being conceived as just one of the goods 
necessary for sound human wellbeing that liberalism has so far failed to develop an 
adequate moral ground for human action. Indeed, its organizing precepts and 
institutions make moral behaviour decidedly difficult. Scientific reasoning, which 
expelled questions of value from the domain of truth, has also failed to deliver on its 
claims to objective truth, while the capitalist market and mode of production serve to 
reinforce instrumental values, where others can only function as the means to 
fulfilling the desires and needs of the self (Poole, 1991, 88). The values of utility 
govern all relationships, severing the constitutive links between individuals and 
focussing the goals of action on consumption and power. 
These goals are at once both unsatisfying and unsatisfiable. Disillusionment, 
dissatisfaction, and pathology are the necessary outcomes of the thin moral order that 
is liberalism. Its institutional arrangements and systems of knowledge have cut the 
moral ground from beneath the individual who must now attempt to fashion a 
coherent existence without recourse to objective moral values. However, for the 
modern individual, cut off from his/her own moral resources and without the 
possibility of recourse to a wider social context, identity loss and failure to construct 
a coherent sense of self are the only possibilities; in short, nihilism. 
1.8.1: The Origins of Modern Morality 
Modern morality had its origins in that constellation of events, forces and 
ideas which increasingly gained general acceptance throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Stephen Toulmin has described how the switch to rationalist 
science, with all its radical implications for ethics, law, philosophy, politics and 
theology, was in fact a search for certainty in an era of general crisis, in the social and 
economic spheres as well as intellectual and spiritual provinces (Toulmin, 1990, 
69ff.). He documents an era in the first half of the seventeenth century of not only 
political and economic breakdown, but also of theological horror wrought by the 
Protestants and Counter-Reformationists. These developments were accompanied by 
a change in the accepted order of nature, no doubt exacerbated by the occurrence of a 
mini Ice Age, which had significant implications for agricultural production. "The 
breakdown of public confidence in the older cosmopolitical consensus" was therefore 
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not surprising. Nor is it surprising that early moderns should be attracted to a 
cosmology and epistemology which could override the uncertainty of those years and 
which could take a neutral stance between competing religious positions. 
However, the desire for a regular and orderly world had considerable 
implications for the moral order. The experience of the Religious Wars had as its 
legacy a loss of faith in the moral nature of humankind. Underpinning the new moral 
order was Thomas Hobbes' pessimistic conclusion that people could not be left to 
themselves to be moral or to act morally. They needed the guidance of rules - 
proscriptions and prescriptions. His essentially pessimistic view of human nature is 
not surprising considering that the Thirty Years War was indeed "a war of all against 
all". The only alternative was a moral order founded on rules. Having systematic 
guidance for moral behaviour was the only antidote to erratic, unreasonable and 
uncontrollable action (Bauman, 1995, 257-259). "The moral thought and practice of 
modernity was [therefore] animated by a belief in the possibility of a non-ambivalent, 
non-aporetic ethical code" (Bauman, 1993, 9). 
The mistrust of passion and emotion and human spontaneity which was the 
motivating factor in the search for such an unambiguous ethical code had as its 
corollary the elevation of reason and logic to the task of providing regularity, 
controllability and predictability to the conduct of human affairs. Applications of 
reason and logic would control the irrationality of human behaviour at the same time 
as the unpredictability of other nature would be brought under human control by 
enlisting the services of rational science and technology. It was but a short step to the 
equation of moral progress with technological progress (Jonas, 1984, 162-169). 
The experience of modernity has ultimately given the lie to this latter fiction 
(Bauman, 1991, Ch.1 ex parte). Some argue that those ways of knowing derived 
from Enlightenment conventions of reason and objectivity, and which favour 
technocracy, in fact have diminished our capacity to address questions of value and 
have proven incapable of attending to complex issues and problems (Spragens, 1981; 
Poole, 1991). Further, the 'legislative ethics' which would govern human affairs and 
provide certainty does not have the capacity to function as a guide for the making of 
choices for both meaningful individual and social existences: 
Morality has _taken the form of duty; it seeks, not to guide our 
choices towards meaningful life, but to restrict them. Morality has 
learned to limit its concern to what is right; it leaves it to us to work 
out what is good. Once morality has chosen to concentrate on 
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issues of right and duty, it is ill-suited to offer guidance on the more 
subtle and nuanced questions as to how we might pursue our 
wellbeing (Poole, 1991, 135; see also Bauman, 1995, 35-37). 
1.8.2: The Nature of Modern Morality 
In seeking to sublimate the free-play of the irrational passions, modernity 
created a split between reason and emotion, a division which is concretely expressed 
in the public/private dichotomy (Pateman, 1989, Ch.6). Two different moralities 
apply to these spheres. The morality of the public arena is extrinsic, impersonal and 
lends itself to universalizable rules. It is a morality which is appropriate to the 
impersonal, market relations of commercial society. It is instrumental in that its 
purpose is to regulate transactions between property-holders and other contractual 
relations in the interests of consistency and efficiency, by specifying the rights and 
duties which apply to either party. It is a morality of duty, in which each of the 
parties has reciprocal rights and duties sanctioned by penalty. The morality which 
guides these instrumental relations takes the form of a set of constraints on one's 
actions imposed by the rights-claims of others. It is one's duty not to interfere with 
another's exercise of his rights. Justice is done by attending to one's duty. As these 
duties are imposed heteronomously, there is little scope for the development of the 
autonomous moral self (Poole, 1991, 51-56; Bauman, 1993, 53-61). 
By contrast, the morality of the private sphere is intrinsic, the instrumental 
egoism of the public sphere being transcended. Familial relations, rather than being 
universalizable, are particular and personal. Individuals are valued for themselves, 
rather than as means to an end. The motivation for action is the wellbeing of the 
other family member or friend. It is not the prospect of suffering a sanction or 
penalty but the desire to fulfill one's commitment and responsibility to the other 
person, with whom one is in relationship, that is the motivation for action. Thus 
while the public sphere is governed by an ethic of justice and duty, the morality of 
the private sphere consists in care and responsibility. Here the good of the carer 
- resides in achieving the good of others (Poole, 1991, 51-56). 
The historical basis for this dichotomy of modern moral philosophy has been 
located in the overthrow of the teleological view of man in the Aristotelian/Christian 
worldview and its replacement with the early modern notion of the autonomous and 
private self (Benhabib, 1992, Ch. 5, esp. pp.153-158). Prior to the modern period, 
moral theory was principally concerned with achieving the good life, but from the 
time of Hobbes it became focussed on justice as fairness alone, the good life 
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becoming the subject of the individual subject's own interpretation and creation. 
With the destruction of the old teleological view of man's relation to nature, 
"morality is thus emancipated from cosmology and from an all-encompassing 
worldview that normatively limits man's relation to nature", while the individual's 
relation to the cosmos (the order of nature) and to ultimate existential questions of 
being becomes privatized (Benhabib, 1992, 154). It is this bifurcation of the moral 
order of justice and the moral order of the good life, which underlies the 
schizophrenic existence of the modern individual, who is at once both "public person 
and private individual" and who must negotiate the conflicting demands of 
"autonomy and nurturance, independence and bonding, the sphere of justice and the 
domestic, personal realm" (Benhabib, 1992, 158). 
1.8.3: Emancipation from Morality 
The thinness of modern morality has much to do with the constraints dictated 
by two of its most pervasive institutions - the market and the state. The market with 
its invisible hand and the state with its access to pooled resources, both with a 
capacity to reduce the essential messiness and ambivalence of moral decision-
making, are attractive substitutes to the individual exercise of moral responsibility 
(Bauman, 1993, 182-183). The moral code of the market has its basis in the 
utilitarian doctrine of the pursuit of rational self-interest as a foundation for social 
wellbeing, tempered by a Kantian moral regard for reciprocal rights and duties 
(Poole, 1991, Ch.1). As I shall demonstrate both philosophies have significant limits 
in the context of justice for the environment. 
The emergence of egoism or self-interest as a defining feature of the modem 
age is explained by Romand Coles (1992, 178) as arising from the two "ontological 
conceits" of modernity, namely, a belief in a largely discoverable universal truth and 
the belief that man is the ground of the truth of things. As a result truth and norms 
shift about according to which power strategy is employing the truth, thus destroying 
any claims to universality. In the absence of universals man is left as his own 
ground, and those who inhabit the social world can only exist as "beings-for-the-
self'. Ergo egoism prevails along with the restless search for truth. The humans who 
inhabit this world bereft of metaphysical truth often become "self-aggrandizing", 
"unlimited by past morals". Norms, such as they are, are directed to the enhancement 
of productivity, while the "various forms of nihilism ... deflect criticism and thwart a 
sense of responsibility for and commitment to anything that lies beyond the self' 
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(Coles, 1992, 179). Thus it is that productivity and responsibility sit in constant 
tension in modern life. 
The requirement of market relations that partners in transactions be treated 
instrumentally means that we cannot recognize the "independent existence of others 
... as a necessary condition of our existence" (Poole, 1991, 143). The first step 
towards social morality is to recognize others as ends in themselves, as having their 
own distinct existence. 
The demands of the modern economic order for a mobile labour force and for 
self-interested behaviour have resulted in the handing over of formerly familial and 
communal responsibilities to the state, which not only provides for the needy but 
decides who. is needy and their relative needs. Thus both the market and the state 
absolve us from moral decision-making at the cost of a loss of moral fluency 
(Mulgan, 1997) or moral competency and foreclose on opportunities for the 
attainment of moral maturity, that is, the development of the moral self. 
Paradoxically, the modem state and the modern market 
cdemodernize' those exposed to their impact: they both dwarf the 
most modern of the modem person's qualities: the ability to choose 
autonomously, and to choose where it really counts. Both cloud the 
reality of the modern moral condition - both belie the fact that at 
the end of the day all the substitutes for moral conscience only dull 
moral responsibility and render moral action all that more difficult, 
while changing nothing or next to nothing in the incurable solitude 
of the moral person, face to face with the aporia and ambivalence 
of her or his moral condition. No amount of mediators and no 
'agentic state' can change the truth of the matter - that, in the last 
resort, it is - as it always has been - a question of being able to act 
as one's own moral agent (Bauman, 1993, 183). 
Modem technology, too, is a source of estrangement from the moral order. It 
is argued by Bauman (1993, 188) that the course taken by modern technology has had 
as its outgrowth the domination of means over ends, that is to say, that simply having 
the technical capacity justifies whatever ends: "the outcomes are worthy because the 
know-how is there". The objective of modern progress is not the achievement of 
particular ends, but to increase man's capacity for action or for achieving whichever 
ends he may decide are appropriate ends for his technology. 
The Promethean application of science to modem society's problems has had, 
as one of its victims, the moral self (Bauman, 1993, 198). Technology's modus 
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operandi is to split problems into manageable units and attack them separately with 
different bodies of expertise. Humans are no less technological products and 
therefore no less fragmented than any of the technical problems confronting 
humanity (Giddens, 1991, 137). 
The moral self cannot and does not survive fragmentation. In the 
world mapped by wants and pockmarked by hurdles to their speedy 
gratification, there is ample room left for homo ludens, home 
economicus and homo sentimentalis; for gambler, entrepreneur or 
hedonist - but none for the moral subject. In the universe of 
technology, the moral self with its negligence of rational 
calculation, disdain of practical uses and indifference to pleasure 
feels and is an unwelcome alien (Bauman, 1993, 198). 
In the task-oriented, problem-solving world of modern technology, there is no room 
for homo moralis, concerned about the ends to which technical invention may be 
applied. 
1.8.4: Summary 
In summary, the shared principles which should serve as a guide to collective 
existence are being undermined by the very institutions and conceptual ideals that 
were supposedly designed for moral certainty. Liberalism is nihilistic and incapable 
of furnishing the conditions under which individuals can fashion a coherent sense of 
self and thus meaningful individual and collective existences. Legislative ethics or 
the morality of duty imposed from without leaves little scope for the development of 
the autonomous moral self, while the institutions of modernity - market and state - 
with their narrow senses of reason stifle the practice of moral action. Moreover, the 
bifurcation of modern life between public and private spheres begets conflicts 
between public duties and private cares, while public morality, which dominates, is 
fit only for the impersonal and contractual relations of the market. Further, 
technological progress has not brought moral progress. Rather the practice of 
technology privileges means over ends, thereby removing values from any discourse 
about the ends of technology. It is a case of the means determining the ends. 
1.9: Responsibility 
In the search for moral certainty, the substitution of autonomous moral choice 
by an ethical code has proved to be an illusion. The side-effects generated by 
industrial production, by the nuclear industries and by genetic engineering have 
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brought modernity full-circle, to the starting point of moral ambivalence and 
existential uncertainty (Bauman, 1991; Beck, 1992). Modern society was deluded in 
thinking that it could absolve itself of responsibility, attaining moral certainty by 
delegating questions of moral choice and moral dilemma to the market, the state or 
its bureaucratic apparatus. 
Responsibility is, as Bauman (1989, 184) says, "the building block of all 
moral behaviour". It is the product of proximity - of being with others - and 
conversely, social distance results in the lack of a moral relationship, "heterophobia". 
Modern rational society, through its technological and bureaucratic apparatus, 
achieved not only social distance but also distanced society from its biophysical 
environment, by seeking to make society independent of nature. Consequently both 
fellow humans and nonhuman nature were transformed into the Other. The 
separation of individuals within society and of society from nature meant that the 
morally responsible behaviour of "being with others" was neutralized: 
"Responsibility is silenced once proximity is eroded" (Bauman, 1989, 184). 
In order to determine the kind of responsibility that might inform our lives, 
we need a better understanding of responsibility per se and of how it has been 
silenced. Writers of the postmodern, for example, have characterized the ethics of 
the modern as a 'responsibility to act', distinguishing this from a postmodern 
'responsibility to otherness' (White, 1990). This is a useful distinction because 
differentiating the modern sense of responsibility to act resonates with the notion that 
modernity had its origins in the search for certainty and order and with other 
fundamental tenets underpinning modern existence, namely productivity, utility and 
individualism. It also resonates with claims of a narrow sense of responsibility 
peculiar to the liberal order (Sayer, 1995) and with feminist differentiation of a 
masculine ethic of justice and rights from a feminine ethic of care and responsibility 
(Gilligan, 1982; Benhabib, 1992). For the purposes of later discussion we might 
characterize the modern sense of responsibility as an immature or simple one 7 . A 
simple sense of responsibility entails only responsibility to the self and to self-serving 
relationships. It is the responsibility which governs the instrumental relationships of 
commerce. It embodies only a limited sense of responsibility to the other, that is, to 
constitutive relationships. 
71t is interesting to note that Weber (1961, 127) also made the connection between responsibility and 
maturity. Thus the mature individual exhibits an awareness of responsibility for the consequences of 
his/her actions and acts accordingly. 
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Responsibilities to the other are those responsibilities which arise simply 
from human existence. They are the inescapable responsibilities from being with 
others, prior to any sorts of social arrangements or moral rules. Bauman (1995) 
differentiates these moral responsibilities from concrete responsibilities, which 
accrue "through contract, calculation of interests, or enlisting to a cause". The ethical 
code of modernity is a legislative ethics that absolves the modern individual from the 
ambivalence and messiness of making moral choices, where responsibility is reduced 
to a "finite list of duties or obligations" (Bauman, 1995, 4). Conscience and guilt for 
wrongs done to others are replaced and "simplified to the straitforward dilemma of 
obedience or disobedience to the rule" (Bauman, 1995, 4) with the result that the self 
has become the centre-point of modern ethics and consideration of the Other has 
been temporarily suspended. The self of the modern project, freed from the agony of 
sin and religious prescription, and disembedded by being absolved of responsibility 
to others, was furnished with a pretension of certainty by a legislative ethical code. 
In the process, human choices were severed from their moral essence. Individual 
freedom meant not only freedom from arbitrariness and religious stricture, but also 
freedom from moral choice, that is, irresponsibility. 
Meanwhile responsibility "has shifted from the moral subject to supra-
individual agencies now endowed with exclusive ethical authority" (Bauman, 1995, 
4). These ethical agencies include the principal organizing modes of modern life-
bureaucracy, a "hollowed out" public sphere, markets and business, science and city 
life. Bauman and others argue that it is by these means that consequences have been 
separated from moral responsibility. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the whole of 
industrial life has been painted as an "elaborate labyrinth" of "organized 
irresponsibility" (Beck, 1995a, 61). Modernity's modes of organization, conceived to 
restore certainty and eliminate randomness, have now become the sites of unforeseen 
side-effects for which no one can take responsibility. The problem arises in large 
measure, according to Hans Jonas (1984), because our inherited ethical codes have 
much to do with contemporaneity and proximity, but our present technological 
capacity supercedes those rules. Actions may have unanticipated consequences in 
unanticipated places at unanticipated times. It becomes impossible to sheet home 
blame for consequences such as the effects of climatic change, for if the truth be 
known, we are all responsible, if only in a small way. Responsibility becomes 
collective rather than individual. 
The impossibility of directing responsibility is further exacerbated by the 
intense division of labour and technical specialization of modern societies. Large 
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numbers of people may have participated in the production of side-effects, but each 
may have played only a small part. Who then takes ultimate responsibility for 
disastrous consequences? 
As well, the fragmentation of persons into roles allows the avoidance of 
responsibility (Bauman, 1993, 19). It is a relatively simple avoidance strategy to say: 
"It's not my role", when confronted with an unpalatable task. It is the conditions of 
modem life taken together which allow responsibility to float (Bauman, 1993, 17- 
19), or in Bauman's words, "the guilt is spread so thinly, that even a most zealous and 
sincere self-scrutiny or repentance of any of the 'partial actors' will change little, if at 
all, in the final state of affairs" (Bauman, 1993, 18-19). 
The process by which some actions or objects of action are placed beyond the 
sphere of moral evaluation into ethical neutrality, Bauman (1995, 149, 261) terms 
adiaphorization. This process operates through all those modes of organization 
mentioned above. In the bureaucratic sphere, the standard by which actions are 
evaluated is procedural correctness. Responsibility is that due to the organization 
and supercedes all other responsibilities. In modem organizations, members are 
trained to put their own moral feelings into neutral and to be subservient to the 
discipline of the organization. In this way members are morally exempted from the 
consequences of their decisions. So too in business, instrumental rationality, as its 
guiding principle, allows means to overtake ends. One may only deliberate about 
varying inputs; the ends to which products are put or the conditions of production are 
not up for moral debate (Pepper, 1996, 89-90). The allocation or distribution of the 
products is achieved by means of allotment to the highest bidder, but the efficiency of 
the allotment process says nothing about the entitlements or the suitability of the 
bidder. It is an ethically neutral process: 
[The logic of business which rules unfettered contemporary 
markets breeds also oblivion and indifference to anything not 
relevant to the instrumental task at hand, everything extending 
beyond the immediate space and time of action (Bauman, 1995, 
263). 
Poole (1991, 7) similarly concludes that the instrumental logic of business, where an 
individual, can only be a means to another's ends, makes it "impossible to conceive of 
activities which are genuinely other-directed". In other words, markets are oblivious 
to side-effects and the moral claims of future generations and other natural entities. 
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Markets are one of those agents offered to us to ease the agony of being moral 
subjects. If we attend to our self-interest, then the invisible hand will ensure our 
shared interests, excusing us from concern for our fellows' wellbeing. It is quite a 
seductive offer and "an ingenious method for the dispersing of responsibility in 
society, so that it can no longer be identified with any geographical, social or political 
location" (Altvater, 1993, 20). 8 The "dispersal and hiding of responsibility" in the 
liberal social order by handing over political decision-making to self-regulating 
markets had its origins in a deep pessimism about the political capacity of existing 
authority, that is, religious hierarchy or inherited social status, to ensure the security 
of property and of persons. Thus it was the constant possibility of property 
confiscations and the insecurity of social status that explains the recourse by early 
liberals to the market and the ensuing depoliticization of liberal societies (Kassiola, 
1990, 83-90). The irony is that the anonymization of responsibility in fact protects 
the real power holders (Kassiola, 1990, 89). 
The capacity for moral agency has also been dulled in modern societies as the 
state has taken to itself the bulk of social welfare functions, liberating its citizens 
from decisions about who should receive succour and the character of needs 
(Bauman, 1993, 183). The centralization of decision-making denies responsible 
action to both individuals and communities (Norgaard, 1994, 165) and has been 
linked by Franck Amalric (1994, 234-235) to the failure to control population growth 
and environmental degradation in "developing" countries. Amalric links the growing 
intrusion of state and market into local control of natural resources, in other words, 
their development, with the "de-responsibilization" of local communities. This 
process represents a breakdown of community institutions which formerly were 
responsible for population control and for the sustainable use of local resources. On 
this reading, it is tempting to conclude that responsibility and sustainability go hand 
in hand. 
Not only are individuals limited in the exercise of moral choice by modern 
life, but our democratic representatives find themselves incapable of making 
decisions on technical matters involving the welfare of their constituents and 
necessarily delegating responsibility to technical and scientific experts in decisions 
about such areas as maximum allowable pollution levels or resource use (Beck, 1992, 
186-187; Beck, 1995a, 117). Business shunts its responsibility into the unforeseen 
side-effect and the "commercial decision", while scientific institutions are cut off 
from the consequences of their innovations by the belief in the ideology of progress, 
8Poole (1991, Ch.1) provides a more comprehensive understanding of the moralities of the market. 
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which shields them from scrutiny. The legislators and administrators "subvert their 
own responsibility [by transferring it to] 'scientific-technological' expertise" (Beck, 
1995a, 117; but see also Beck 1992, 212-213): As a consequence elected 
representatives surrender their power to politically unaccountable corporate elites 
(whose only claimed responsibility is to shareholders), while retaining all 
responsibility, thus becoming impotent. This impotence is reflected in the citizenry's 
loss of confidence in the political sphere (Beck, 1992, 186-187; Crook, Pakulski, and 
Waters, 1992, 94; Mulgan, 1997, 193ff.). 
Progress, one of the foundational ideals of modernity, is deeply implicated in 
the organized irresponsibility of modern life in that it sanctions social change without 
question (Beck, 1992, 213-214). The faith in progress substitutes for moral decision-
making, permitting social transformation without democratic legitimation as business 
and technoscience carry on their activities unaccountable for their side-effects. The 
blind commitment to progress brooks no heretical dissent based in the belief that all 
change is progressive change. Any questioning of development proposals usually 
provokes counter charges of impending job losses and economic downturn if they fail 
to proceed. Progress and its side-effects are accepted as inevitable and used as an 
excuse for powerlessness (Beck, 1995a, 65-66). "Progress is social change 
institutionalized into a position of non-responsibility" (Beck, 1992, 214). There is a 
double irony here; firstly, that the principle of progress, a guiding tenet of 
development since early modern times, should now be employed as an ideology to 
sever productive activity from moral responsibility, and secondly, that the belief in 
progress which created modernity should have become a tradition which now 
threatens to subvert it, a secular religion with all the features of an unreflective 
religious faith (Beck, 1992, 214). 
City life too contributes to the floating of responsibility. Modern city life has 
its origins in the breakup of feudal social relations and the dispersal of agrarian 
communities in part as a result of the enclosures of the early modern period., which 
saw the aggregation of more and more people in cities. These were essentially cities 
of strangers and in order to cope with the crowding of physical space, certain 
strategies were necessarily evolved. These strategies enable social and therefore 
moral distance to be maintained (Bauman, 1993, 153ff.; 1995, Ch.5). As the 
individuals with whom one shares physical space remain socially distant, 
relationships can be anonymous, encounters episodic and skin-deep, and therefore 
involving no moral commitment. Because there is no engagement between "spatially 
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and temporally whole selves", city life suspends moral self-consciousness and 
responsibility for the other (Bauman, 1995, 134). 
Additionally, the physical organization of cities bifurcates city-dwellers' 
actions from their consequences. Urban systems do not always fit with the needs of 
the ecosystems on which they rely for food and water supplies, transport and waste 
disposal. It is the centralization of these systems that denies city-dwellers the 
opportunity to be responsible for supplying their own needs - capturing water, 
growing food, generating energy and so on. The use of water in cities is profligate 
since users for the most part do not pay the true cost of its harvesting, while the 
centralized collection of sewage and solid waste means that city inhabitants are 
relieved of responsibility for the side-effects of their activities - stormwater pollution, 
disruption to marine and aquatic ecosystems from sewerage outfalls, and 
evergrowing quantities of solid waste, which are rapidly devouring available landfill 
space. 
In endeavouring to impose certainty on human affairs and to evade the 
agonies of moral choice, modern societies have erected a panoply of institutions, 
ideologies and strategies for evading, floating, delegating and dispersing 
responsibility to the extent where Hannah Arendt (cited in Beck, 1995a, 65, 90; 
1995b, 93, 151; and Bauman, 1993, 126) could speak of the "anarchy of progress", 
leading to "no man's rule", the greatest tyranny of all because no one bears any 
responsibility. It seems paradoxical that a social order designed to forestall 
uncertainty and reduce moral anxiety should now be so riddled with irresponsibility 
that its institutions, in the face of serious social, economic and environmental 
disruption, appear incapable of addressing the uncertainty generated by the side-
effects of its own development. 'Passing the buck' is undoubtedly a dis-ease of late 
modern life. 
Nevertheless, on the nostrum that in adversity there is opportunity, Bauman 
(1995, 7, 19) contends that the demise of the certainty-producing ethical code is an 
opportunity to acknowledge responsibility and to accept that the moral condition is 
inherently one of ambivalence. It is tempting to propose that modernity may have 
mis-taken its path in the early modern period and that the urgent need for certainty 
may have set modernity on the road to irresponsibility. A hypothetical alternative 
path to the kind of social order which guaranteed human freedom and moral 
autonomy and security of persons and property may have been a more modest but 
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less morally certain one, and more cognizant of the realities of human existence, 
most importantly its interdependence with the biophysical realm. 
1.9.1: Accelerated Irresponsibility: The Neoliberal Turn 
Before I consider the philosophical underpinnings of a possible alternative 
journey, the neoliberal turn that a number of democracies have pursued in varying 
degrees over the last two decades needs to be analysed in the context of 
irresponsibility. I would argue that the processes leading to system-wide 
irresponsibility have been accelerated during this time as governments have 
undertaken a zealous and ideologically-driven pursuit of programmes favouring 
deregulation and privatization. An argument could be mounted that in the 
atmosphere of general crisis and incapacity, the neoliberal turn constitutes an escape 
or a retreat to the market, "a general loss of political nerve" (Pierson, 1991, 218-219), 
as a response to a loss of political legitimacy. There is a parallel here with the 
experience of the eighteenth century and the recourse to a self-regulating, anonymous 
market by a commercial bourgeoisie hamstrung by aristocratic/patriarchal power (See 
Ch.3). The crisis of political legitimacy postulates a situation where politicians from 
mass milieu parties and leaders of trade unions can no longer mobilize mass support 
and consent for the development programmes which ensure the social conditions of 
production. For an increasing proportion of citizens they no longer furnish the norms 
and values which underpin the consensus on which economic development and social 
and political stability depend. 
It is a simple matter for governments to absolve themselves of responsibility 
by blaming the 'discipline of the market'. Markets are morally indifferent to all but 
that which is relevant to the transaction at hand. They do not facilitate moral 
behaviour, as I have already discussed, but rather "bring very strong incentives to 
evade responsibilities, to pass costs onto the community and to devalue the future 
and what is left to later generations" (Mulgan, quoted in Bauman, 1995, 263-264). 
The neoliberal turn has the effect of accentuating the market's moral indifference, as 
its concepts of private ownership, competition and small government are more likely 
to reinforce self-interested, short-term behaviours (Sayer, 1995, 163). The 
experience of the neoconservative era, of greed, selfishness and corruption in 
government and business, bears out this claim. 
The privatization/deregulation route can only prove to be a dead-end (Tickell 
and Peck, 1995). To use Beck's (1995b, 88) analogy, neoliberalism is "an attempt to 
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bail out the water flooding into a ship at sea by boring a hole into the bottom". In 
terms of the cycle of capital accumulation, it might be construed as a 'last ditch' effort 
to "restore the supportive conditions for profitable capitalist accumulation and labour 
control" (Soja, 1989, 28). It is a programme aimed at reducing costs to business 
through smaller government; it is about governments divesting themselves of some 
of their responsibilities as a response to falling tax receipts (consequent on falling 
profits and creative accounting) and relegating those functions to the vagaries of 
markets. It also involves business downsizing labour to reduce costs, which the 
business community applauds as commercial soundness. The lack of a government 
response to these developments expresses both its moral indifference and impotence. 
What the recourse to deregulation and privatization serves to do, however, is 
to highlight and exacerbate the irrationalities of the modernity project and to 
diminish further any capacity for moral direction and therefore any capacity to 
address complex issues and problems. The "consensual generation of norms" has 
been replaced by "money and power" as the cement for the social bond (Benhabib, 
1992, 80). Consequently, individuals sense a loss of efficacy and agency, leading to 
alienation and cynicism. The late twentieth century is thus characterized by loss - 
loss of a coherent sense of self and a sense of belonging that comes with the practice 
of collective responsibility. 
There is a sense that, at the end of the second millenium, the modernist 
project of securing certainty and predictability for existence and alleviating moral 
anxiety has come full circle. Progress has benefitted many, but disappointed even 
more. Persistent and deepening disparities of global wealth, recurring famine, social 
dislocation and inequality, the breakdown of personal relationships, and 
environmental degradation are interdependent phenomena. It is clear that the 
objective of constructing a universal moral code was an illusion. With the illusions 
of certainty and legislating for moral conduct now exposed, individuals can at last 
confront the fact that moral evaluation is a condition of individual autonomy - there 
is no freedom without responsibility, or in the pithy revelations of a former 
Australian politician, "there is no such thing as a free lunch". Of the lessons to be 
learnt from the modern experience, for Bauman (1993, 10, 12) the most telling is the 
essential moral ambivalence of the human condition and uncertainty the perennial 
condition of the moral self. 
The fact is that absolution from responsibility in modern life has not produced 
existential certitude but rather has eroded moral competencies and devalued the 
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moral qualities or virtues necessary for living sound and meaningful existences. The 
institutions of modernity as they have evolved fail to encourage the social conditions 
which nurture the development of the necessary moral qualities. The question then 
arises of what philosophical foundations the early modems might have utilized to 
produce the kinds of social institutions and therefore moral qualities which would 
have favoured socially and environmentally sustainable relationships. 
1.10: An Alternative Source of Enlightenment 
1.10.1: Enlightenment as Critique 
Despite the ambiguity of the Enlightenment's benefits and disillusionment 
with the non-fulfillment of its ideals, the project remains attractive to late modems 
for its emancipatory potential. Ecological theorists are inclined to jettison the whole 
project largely because they associate it with the mastery of nature ideal. Thus the 
origins of the present ecological crisis are located in the will to subjugate and 
dominate all that is associated with nature, including women, just as Francis Bacon 
ordained for the betterment of mankind. That there may be untapped potential in the 
Enlightenment project for ecological thought is a possibility explored by Tim 
Hayward (1994, 19), who argues for the relevance of "significant parts" of the project 
in theorising the ecological transformation of human social structures and values. 
Hayward locates that potential in the mastery ideal's twin, enlightenment as critique, 
albeit that, as he concedes, criticism "seems permanently threatened by the ideal of 
mastery". 
The ideal of enlightenment as critique is associated with one of the two 
parallel trajectories of modernity, namely the tradition of humanism, which Stephen 
Toulmin (1990) argues had its origins in the intellectual options opened up by the 
late Renaissance humanists, such as Rabelais, Erasmus, Shakespeare and Montaigne. 
The ideas of the humanists were influential until the early seventeenth century when 
the cumulative effects of fifty years of general societal crisis resulting from the 
fundamentalist horrors of religious dogmatism made the rational social order 
promised by natural philosophers such as Descartes and Newton appear very 
attractive. Toulmin argues that the humanist tradition was eclipsed by the rationalist 
revolution of the seventeenth century, when the urgent need for certainty and stability 
made a rational social order more attractive than a lively society modelled on 
humanist ideals. Although the rationalist trajectory, embodying the ideal of mastery, 
has come to dominate modern life, humanism and its critical ideal was never entirely 
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overshadowed. It has surfaced from time to time throughout the period of modernity, 
in the works of Spinoza and Vico in the seventeenth century, Hume and the Scottish 
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, Hegel and Nietzsche in the nineteenth 
century, and in the writings of the Critical Theorists and postmodernists of the 
twentieth century. 
For both Toulmin and Hayward the antidote to rationalism and associated 
mastery problems resides in recovering devalued elements of the modernity project — 
thus Touhnin seeks to recover the self-critical scepticism typified by the works of the 
Renaissance humanist, Michel de Montaigne while Hayward argues that renewal of 
the Enlightenment project through recovery of its critical ideal has much to offer 
ecological thought. For Hayward, advancing the critique of knowledge, which is 
indispensable to ecological thought, can be achieved by drawing on the critical 
tradition within enlightenment thought and imbuing it with a degree of reflexivity 
such as developed by Critical Theory. In joining critical reflexivity to ecological 
thought, he hopes to generate the kind of enlightenment necessary for ecological 
transformation and thus to reign in the mastery project. It is in the problems common 
to ecology and enlightenment that Hayward identifies this potential and by 
addressing these problems together, he argues, the enlightenment project can be 
renewed. 
The concerns common to both ecological and enlightenment thought revolve 
around how we understand the nature of the world, the place of humans in it, and the 
determination of appropriate guiding principles for human action (Hayward, 1994, 
39). While ecology can furnish understandings of the natural world and the place of 
humans in it, it cannot "explain the full range of human social behaviour". The 
necessary "concepts and categories ... simply cannot be worked up within ecology as 
a natural science" (Hayward, 1994, 40). There are advantages for ecological thought 
in recovering the critical ideal of enlightenment thought in guarding against the 
assumption of an uncritical and dogmatic ecology (see Section 1.13.2 on the dangers 
of an uncritical acceptance of biological metaphors). However, to yield the kind of 
substantive knowledge crucial to the project of ecological transformation, it must go 
beyond the simple critique of challenging presuppositions, albeit that this is a crucial 
step in the project. "If critique is to be turned to ecological ends, ... critical theory 
will also need to be informed by ecological understanding of a realist sort" (Hayward, 
1994, 40). A critical realism informed by ecology thus recognizes that human social 
structures are "embedded in, conditioned by, and in turn [act] back upon the rest of 
nature" (p.49), notwithstanding the difficulties of grounding determinate values and 
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obligations in an ecological ethos. Critique inspired by a realist ecology leads one to 
conclude that relations between knowledge (science) and values, and reason and 
nature take more of a dialectical form than an oppositional one as those ecological 
theorists who would reject the enlightenment wholesale would aver. Thus while 
Hayward argues that ecological thought can engage productively with enlightenment 
thought through the tradition of critique, I seek to demonstrate that there are 
resources in the now subordinate humanist trajectory of modernity, prefigured in the 
works of Michel de Montaigne and his self-critical, self-aware scepticism, for the 
development of the ecologically informed critical realism advocated by Hayward. 
1.10.2: Montaigne 
In drawing out the differences between the humanistic modernity prefigured 
by Montaigne and the rational modernity resulting from Descartes' self-assertive 
cogito, Toulmin demonstrates why a Renaissance figure like Montaigne is 
particularly congenial to us in the late twentieth century. Most importantly, 
Montaigne exemplified the openmindedness, sceptical tolerance and reflective 
modesty about the limits of human capacity in matters of "unquestioned Truth" and 
"unqualified Certainty" that characterized the humanistic tradition. He recommended 
the suspension of judgement on matters of general theory, advocating rather the 
accumulation of a "rich perspective" on both natural and human worlds, based on 
actual human experience. As Toulmin (1990, 27) observes: "This respect for the 
rational possibilities of human experience was one chief merit of the Renaissance 
humanists, but they also had a delicate feeling for the limits of human experience". 
As a result they were tolerant of plurality, ambiguity and uncertainty, and thus 
accepting of the very essence of human existence. Unfortunately those insights were 
trumped by the scientific revolutions which followed, along with any intellectual 
concern for the practical lcnowledges previously supplied by oral traditions, the 
particularities of daily existence, the experience of particular localities, and the 
timeliness of events. They were replaced by abstract, general, universal and timeless 
theories (Toulmin, 1990, 35). 
This theoretical turn in philosophy was initiated by Descartes. The essence of 
the rationalist impulse is to be had in the phrase, cogito ergo sum, which contrasts 
starkly with the intellectual modesty of the humanists, typified by Montaigne's 
rhetorical question: "Que scay-je?" 9 (Book II: 12, 591 10). But Montaigne's modest 
901d French form meaning "What do I know?" 
10A11 references to Montaigne's texts are those found in M.A. Screech's 1991 translation. 
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self-scepticism with its acceptance of the uncertain realities of human existence was 
not much in demand by the mid-seventeenth century. The need for certainty, to 
banish doubts and to secure order, meant that Descartes' method for rational thought 
with its resolute firmness was a much more attractive proposition than the pliant 
ambivalence of Montaignean doubt. Descartes used doubt to escape from 
uncertainty, but as Ulrich Beck (1997, 163) remarks, his method of escape set 
modernity on the path to "expertocracy". 
Drawing on Toultnin's insights into Montaignean scepticism, Beck (1997, 
162) has attempted to explicate the possibilities of radical self-doubt (dubito ergo 
sum) for "an ethics of post-industrial and radically modern identity and social 
contract". He senses this possibility in the destruction of the old grand illusions: 
Scepticism, contrary to a widespread error, makes everything 
possible again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, 
science, knowledge, criticism, morality, society, only differently, a 
few sizes smaller, more preliminary, more revisable, and more able 
to learn. That also implies, however, being more curious and more 
open to contrary ideas, things unsuspected and incongruous, with 
the tolerance based and rooted in the ultimate certainty of error 
(Beck, 1997, 163). 
However, Beck is not referring to just any doubt, but reflexive doubt, which 
unlike linear doubt (subject to infinite regression and despair) is doubt turned back 
upon itself. It is the doubt that creates the possibility for learning and for 
responsibility. Reflexive doubt is the antidote to dogmatic truth. It is productive 
rather than destructive. It is the virtue which enables self-limiting development and 
therefore perhaps the "ecological reform of society". Doubt is the vehicle for 
thinking, learning and creativity. 
The philosophers of the Frankfurt School and subsequent postmodernists 
have criticised the theoretical direction taken by modernity and the debilitating effect 
it had on its critical potential. Thus, "ffluthlessly, in spite of itself, the 
Enlightenment has extinguished any trace of its own self-consciousness" and further 
"[o]n the way from mythology to logistics, thought has lost the element of self-
reflection" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944[1972], 37, 4). Modern thought was thus 
weakened by the loss of its capacity for self-reflection while its ability to 
accommodate the destructive aspects of progress, or what Adorn° and Horkheimer 
(1944[1972], xiii) refer to as its "recidivist element", suffered as a consequence. It is 
the recovery of modernity's critical potential that most concerns Ulrich Beck, Julia 
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Kristeva (Norris, 1994, 90) and other postmodern thinkers". The later Foucault 
(1984) was also beginning to interpret "enlightenment" as a permanent critique. For 
inspiration he turned to Immanuel Kant's small text, What is Enlightenment?, seeing 
it "located ... at the crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on history" 
(Foucault, 1984, 38), and arguing that enlightened reason had subsequently become 
perverted into unreflective instrumental rationality 12 . For Foucault critique is the 
enabling condition for truth and therefore of the possibility of an ethics and a politics 
with genuine emancipatory values. For my own project, it is Montaigne who holds 
the promise of a recovery of that ethical agency which can result from reflective, self-
critical thought. 
Before I explore his relevance for the question of ethical agency, I would like 
to digress somewhat and consider just how Montaigne's, humanism resonates with 
contemporary thought and its relevance to an ecologically sensitive age, in addition 
to Beck's harnessing of his dubito for a critical social theory of reflexive modernity. 13 
Above all else, Montaigne was concerned with the human condition, 
particularly the relationship between the individual and the rest of life. He devotes a 
great deal of attention to the traditional problems of philosophy, that is, to questions 
of existence, for to know how to die well is to know how to live well (Book 1:26, 
163). The aim of philosophy is the practical one of living, not the theoretical one it 
became under Descartes' influence, of the acquisition of knowledge for technical 
means. Through his scepticism he is able to see that science and philosophy can only 
provide approximate interpretations of reality and not the exact or ultimate truth. 
"Montaigne's scepticism is more in tune with the doubts of recent science than with 
the confidence of the great period which immediately followed him" (Sayce, 1972, 
188). 
It was also his scepticism which enabled him to distil the truth of the human 
condition, the fallibility of human reason ("imbecillite de nostre jugement") and the 
uncertainty of all knowledge (Book I: 25). In the Apology, he seeks to demolish the 
pretensions of human reason with humour and irony, thus developing a moderate 
rationalism (Coleman, 1987, 56). He was fully aware of the paradoxes of the human 
condition, of its dignity and absurdity (Book I: 54, On vain cunning devices), of its 
11 See Racevskis (1993) on the resuscitation of alternative streams of Enlightenment thought in the 
construction of a postmodern critical project. 
12See Norris (1994, 121ff.) on this particular turn in Foucault's project. 
13To this end, I have relied on the commentaries of Coleman (1987), Sayce (1972) and Screech 
(1991). 
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contradictions (for example, Book I: 38, How we weep and laugh at the same time; 
and Book IL 20, We can savour nothing pure), and of the inherent inhumanity of 
human beings (Book III: 9, On vanity). 
What is most striking about the Essais is that what they have to say stands out 
most starkly in comparison to what followed in the succeeding centuries. His was a 
moderate epistemology based on the recognition of the many obstacles to knowledge 
and therefore truth, including differences of view, custom and the vagaries of fortune 
(Sayce, 1972, 170-171). Reason was an "uncertain prop" in the search for truth 
(Sayce, 1972, 177) and could be accommodated to any sort of bias, a tendency which 
subsequent natural philosophers ignored (Book IL 12) (and which recent feminist 
critics have raised as a problematic characteristic of the use of reason in modern 
times — see Sect. 1.5.1). Experience, that is the direct perception of reality, is the 
preferred means of attaining truth, a position which follows naturally from his 
intellectual scepticism and rejection of logic and metaphysics. 
If Montaigne's sceptical attitude to the claims of reason are attractive to 
critical theorists, then so too are his thoughts on the mind/body dualism of interest to 
feminists. His stress on the indivisibility of body and mind (mens sana in corpore 
sano, borrowed from Juvenal's Satires) parallels a call for the fusion of the rational 
and the voluptuous. It is the balance of these two characteristics for which one•
strives. The devaluation of the emotions and the passions in subsequent centuries, as 
ecofeminists have demonstrated, has had enormous consequences for the treatment of 
women and nature (Merchant, 1989). 
Of interest to environmental thinking is his injunction to live according to the 
laws of nature - secundam naturam - for to live simply is to live wisely (Book ifi: 13, 
1218) 14 . What is more in tune with contemporary evolutionary and environmental 
thinking though is his conclusion that humanity is simply one genus among the rest 
of creation, owing respect and duty not only to beasts, but also to trees and plants. 
"Between them and us there is some sort of intercourse and a degree of mutual 
obligation" (Book II: 11, 488). This attitude contrasts sharply with the 'transcendence 
of nature' philosophies which were to predominate from the seventeenth century 
onwards. Again in the Apology (Book II: 12, 513-514), he emphasizes the 
similarities of humans to other creatures: "We are neither above them or below 
them". It is "our empty arrogance" that makes us put ourselves above nature. 
14 Recognition of this injunction is not to ignore the dangers of relying on nature as a blueprint for 
right action. On this aspect, see Section 1.12.2. 
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This is where his relevance for contemporary thought relates to questions of 
ethical agency. When practical philosophy gave way to theoretical philosophy and 
rationality and logic were separated from rhetoric and the emotions, the implications 
for the sense of respect and obligation felt by Montaigne were profound. For him, 
part of one's humanity was in being comfortable with one's corporeality, of having 
the capacity to accept responsibility for bodily failure, for feelings and for the effects 
of the things we do (Toulrnin, 1990, 40). Descartes, on the other hand, held that 
emotions and passions were nothing more than a hindrance to the proper functioning 
of rationality; they were to be suppressed. As a consequence, we needed only to take 
responsibility for our rational calculations, not for our emotions. "Treating the 
feelings as mere effects of causal processes, takes them out of our hands, and relieves 
us of responsibility: all we are rationally responsible for (it seems) is thinking 
correctly" (Toulmin, 1990, 41). 
Consequently, in confining epistemology to cognitive issues, a whole realm 
of human experience was excluded from consideration - the realm of feelings, 
emotion and bodily experience. Further, as Toulmin continues: "epistemology 
involves not just intellectual, but also moral issues" and ignoring the insights of 
Renaissance humanists like Montaigne constitutes for modernity a form of "moral 
escapism". Thus, when particularity and local situatedness were bypassed for general 
and universal knowledge, the possibility for ethical agency was ceded to a 
heteronomously applied legislative code of ethics (Bauman, 1989, 162; 1991, 20-26). 
Following the efforts of feminist theorists over the last several decades, we are only 
now beginning to recover Montaigne's insights into the rigidities and constraints on 
human potentiality resulting from the reduction of morality to a routine code of 
ethics. In this respect, Gilligan (1982) and other moral theorists have differentiated a 
public morality of duty - the ethic of justice - from a private morality of responsibility 
- the ethic of care. Comments such as those by Ross Poole (1991) resonate with 
Montaigne's avowal of a positive morality thus: 
I would risk the kind of justice which would take cognizance of 
good actions as well as bad and give me as much to hope for as to 
fear: not to be fined is an inadequate reward to bestow on a man 
who has achieved better than simply doing no wrong (Book DI 13, 
1215). 
Poole (1991, 60) similarly laments the bleakness of the morality of duty: "It 
ignores, or considers only indirectly, many aspects of human life and personal 
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relationships, and in its very universality, it seems to have no place for the 
particularities of human existence". And Montaigne again: "As nature has furnished 
us with feet to walk with, so has she furnished us with wisdom to guide us in our 
lives. ... The more simply we entrust ourself to Nature the more wisely we do so. ... 
Were I a good pupil there is enough in my own experience to make me wise" (Book 
III: 13, 1218). Experience is a better guide for moral behaviour than a code of laws 
which favours moral rigidity and thereby limits human potentiality. "To keep 
ourselves bound by the bonds of necessity to one single way of life is to be, not to 
live. Souls are most beautiful when they show most variety and flexibility" (Book 
DI: 3, 922). It is the capacity for flexibility and adaptability which is the main talent 
possessed by humankind. 
Central to Montaigne's notion of flexibility is the idea of diversity, which is a 
continuing refrain throughout the Essais. In fact diversity is the universal principle 
of existence: "When collating objects no quality is so universal as diversity and 
variety" (Book LII: 13, 1207). One must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the 
diversity of customs, laws, rules, and circumstance, and to the inconsistencies, 
contradictions, and general chaos of reality. It is the multiplicity of reality that is the 
basis of his scepticism, and it is that which gives him flexibility. A "powerful mind" 
- which is a consequence of a sceptical attitude - finds its nourishment in ongoing 
"amazement, doubt and uncertainty" (Book DI: 133, 1211), generated by the 
multiplicity and contradictions of reality. 
Along with the indivisibility of mind and body, a recurring theme throughout 
the Essais, Montaigne is preoccupied with the getting of wisdom, a life-long exercise 
in building the capacity to respond creatively to the multifariousness of reality. If 
there is any progress it is progress towards wisdom and, for Montaigne, wisdom is in 
balancing corpus and mens, corporeality and intellect. How different from the notion 
of progress through technological achievement, which has been the guiding 
philosophical force for the modernity of industrial society. 
And so it is that Beck finds in Montaigne's moderate rationalism, creative 
self-aware scepticism and self-reflective, productive doubt a possible method for an 
alternative enlightenment, which can perhaps "lead to a way of life on the human 
scale" (Beck, 1997, 161-162). Doubt recovers and valorises those spheres of human 
existence devalued by the rational turn - the personal, the particular, the oral, the 
local and the natural. The recovery of these spheres also encourages the possibility 
of ethical agency, agency set free from the constraints of heteronomous social 
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structures, for both autonomous and collective responsibility. The moral life is 
delinked from constraint and relinked to autonomous fulfillment. 
The reclamation of the tradition of reflective, self-critical thought prefigured 
by Montaigne but subsumed by the rationality of what Beck calls simple 
modernization is captured in the term "reflexive modernization". 15 Reflexive 
modernization opens up possibilities foreclosed by the industrial deviation of simple 
modernity. Reflexive modernity, aware of threats and danger, and accepting of 
ambivalence and diversity, constitutes a radicalized modernity whose engine is doubt 
and scepticism (Beck, 1997, 168), and irony its governor: 
The god of fully established modernity is doubt, ... [which] makes 
it possible to transfer the dogmatism of the industrial into the 
reflected self-limitation of post-industrial modes of production and 
living (Beck, 1997, 171). 
1.10.3: Lessons for Late Modernity 
In this era of apparent civilizational change, there are a number of significant 
lessons to be had from an archaeological investigation of the foundations of modern 
society. The most obvious conclusion is that attempts to create a social order which 
maximizes predictability and certainty inevitably end in their opposite, disorder and 
uncertainty, as now increasingly characterizes industrial society. The needs of late 
modern societies are not those of the early modern period, for which institutions 
guaranteeing uniformity and therefore order may have been appropriate innovations. 
Secondly, exploring the history of modern rational thought enables us to see 
that the rationalist philosophy, which underpins the political, economic and 
increasingly the social spheres of society, rests on a truncated notion of reason; it 
equates rationality with formal logic. Consequently, if we combine this with the first 
conclusion, we can see that rationalist philosophy requires the balance of 
reasonableness and tolerance undergirt by an acknowledgement of the diversity and 
uncertainty of existence. This latter point suggests that solutions prescribing more of 
the same - more growth, more production, more markets and more centralized 
governments - are part of the problem rather than the solution. 
Thirdly, as we learn to value human experience along with logic, we need 
organizing structures which ensure adaptability and flexibility (Toulmin, 1990, 183). 
150n the critical power of reflexive modernization, see also Lash (1994, 110ff.). 
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The metaphors of the solar system and the machine favoured the creation of stable, 
hierarchical systems. Those metaphors are no longer apposite. What is needed are 
metaphors which assist us to create stable institutions based on complexity and which 
possess an adaptive capacity. The rigid, mechanistic and atomistic models of social 
order which were informed by those metaphors no longer meet the needs of globally 
interdependent societies. They lack the flexibility, adaptiveness, resilience and 
robustness, and appropriate feedback mechanisms required in the face of rapid social 
and natural change, increasing cultural diversity and increasing global 
interdependence. The institutions of industrial modernity - the nation-state, 
representative democracy, mass political parties, trade unions, large-scale industrial 
conglomerates, self-regulating markets, and generous private property rights - were 
appropriate to an era of relative stability, of cultural uniformity and a world of 
relatively closed systems, peopled by independent units, and controlled by 
hierarchical modes of organization. It is to organicist metaphors that emphasise 
dynamism and change, interdependence and creative transcendence that an 
unfulfilled modernity must now repair. 
Modern society is at a cross-roads similar to that faced by western societies in 
the early modern era. A self-confident rationalism with its promise of order was then 
decreed to be the antidote for the extremes of disorder occasioned by differences in 
religious faith. Our European forebears foresook a moderate rationalist path to order 
tempered by the insights into human behaviour afforded by the Renaissance 
humanists, and replaced religious dogmatism with an arrogant faith in reason as 
mechanistic science. The controlling and ordering structures of industrial society are, 
as a result of self-generated risks, in various states of crisis. As Beck (1994, 7) 
concludes: "People are being released from the fictional order of industrial society 
into the "turbulence of the global risk society". 
1.11: Maturity and Ecological Enlightenment 
This section will endeavour to draw together Montaigne's insights and 
Toulmin's arguments for an earlier humanist starting point for modernity, together 
with the earlier exposition of a rational modernity which is limited in its capacity to 
take responsibility for its side-effects, in order to argue that, in part, the moral 
maturity of modernity consists in the acceptance of limits on its projects and in taking 
responsibility for their side-effects. I have already linked responsibility with the 
taking of a self-critical attitude. Here I would like to pursue the proposal that self-
criticism involves a process of unlearning (Habermas, 1987), that is, of making our 
46 
pre-understandings the subject of reflection. In other words, self-criticism as a 
process of unlearning is crucial to reflexive learning and in part to the practice of 
reaching maturity. A discussion of the concept of ecological enlightenment in the 
context of maturity and human possibility follows. 
1.11.1: Moral Maturity and Sustainability 
The development and adoption of more ecologically sound modes of 
existence, of knowing and of societal organization must necessarily begin with a 
process of self-criticism and unlearning, although it must not be restricted to "a 
critique of deformations" (Habermas, 1987, 400), but must also involve the opening 
up of pre-understandings - "non-reflective modes of thought" (Foucault) - to critical 
reflection. The unthought can be brought to consciousness, as was Montaigne's 
practice, by reflecting on contradictions and by comparison with the thought 
frameworks and practices of other cultures. However, as Habermas (1987, 400) 
advises, there is a need to comprehend not only "the learning processes that separate 
'us' from 'them', but also to become aware of what we have unlearned in the course of 
this learning". 
In referring to pre-understanding we are talking here of those "nature-like" 
characteristics of the social order, which have the capacity to legitimate themselves 
and are apparently immune to criticism (Ashley, 1990, 95), for "Mat which stands 
beyond all doubt seems as if it could never become problematic" (Habermas, 1987, 
400). Included here are Habermas's steering media, money and power, and property 
relations, the latter to be the subject of Chapter 4. Self-criticism also involves 
recognizing and examining the social values underlying the philosophical 
assumptions of social organization and reproduction. The survival of these 
underlying social values is critical for the legitimacy of any social order. Thus 
Kassiola (1990) views self-criticism in the contemporary context as a process for 
ridding ourselves of the social value of unlimited growth, which, through 
technological progress, grounds modern industrial civilization. The legitimacy of 
economic growth as a social value is now under a question mark, with environmental 
movements acting as the agents of disillusionment. 
A self-critical stance encompasses both unlearning and learning responses. 
To understand where the potential for learning lies, reference might be made to 
Stephen White's (1990) interpretations of Heideggerian thinking for ethics and 
politics. By distinguishing a 'responsibility to act' from a 'responsibility to otherness', 
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we can glean some idea of where our learning is deficient. The former sense of 
responsibility is implicit in western thinking about politics and ethics. 
It is a sense of responsibility to act in the world in a clearly 
justifiable way, that is, a moral-prudential obligation to acquire 
reliable knowledge and act to achieve practical ends in some 
defensible manner. This responsibility derives from the character 
of being in the world both physically and politically: from the need 
to survive physically, avoid harm, conform to time constraints, and 
meet the expectations of others. Such a responsibility always 
requires one, at some point, to fix or close down parameters of 
thought and to ignore particularity and differences among actors. 
To act in this sense means inevitably closing off sources of possible 
insight and treating things and people as alike for the purpose of 
making consistent and defensible decisions about alternative 
courses of action (White, 1990, 80). 
By contrast, the responsibility to otherness embodies a moral-aesthetic sense, which 
"refers to the need to be attentive to that which lies beyond the margins of our identity, 
our concepts and our projects" (White, 1990, 81). He is referring here to the neglected 
dimensions of our experience, which he clarifies subsequently as: "all that precedes, 
exceeds, and succeeds our purposes and projects" (White, 1990, 92). That which 
precedes includes underlying values and assumptions and, as was recognized above, 
bringing these to consciousness requires processes of unlearning. That which exceeds 
includes the unintended side-effects of our projects and that which serves only 
utilitarian value, such as nature's provision of resources. That which succeeds 
includes the generations of living beings to come, whose interests our systems of 
neoclassical economics and democratic politics are unable to take into account. 
The learning processes with which we are concerned therefore involve 
acknowledging the unacknowledged costs of modernity's learning projects, which 
have been principally directed towards the accumulation of rational knowledge in 
order to solve the problems confronting us. Where Heidegger differs is in pursuing a 
learning process which is not cumulative, but a 'becoming aware', a 'recollecting' of 
all that is shunted aside and suppressed in modern consciousness. His learning is a 
sensitivity to otherness which continuously recognizes our finitude (White, 1990, 92) 
and therefore bodily experience, particularity and those aspects of human experience 
denied by the rationalist turn of modernity and its performative ethic. Learning 
sensitivity to otherness must necessarily mean accepting human imperfectibility and 
fallibility and hopefully will result in modesty about our capacity in the design and 
implementation of political and economic projects. The process of reaching moral 
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maturity or keeping the responsibility to act in "fruitful tension" (White, 1990, 81) 
with the responsibility to otherness means adopting a sceptical, self-critical attitude, 
which brings to consciousness unthought, received truths and therefore opens up not 
only previously excluded realms of human experience but also human possibility. 
We might further explore the meaning of maturity by referring to what it 
meant for Kant and some subsequent theorists in the context of enlightenment. The 
challenge for Kant was to develop a radically new understanding once the received 
truths of religion and metaphysics had lost their philosophical force. 16 He viewed 
enlightenment as a release from "self-incurred tutelage", that is, the inability to make 
use of one's critical faculty, understanding, without reference to or guidance from 
another. Maturity consisted in having the courage - .aude sapere - to use one's critical 
rationality in order to examine that which is beyond all doubt, those 
values/assumptions which reassure us with the comfort and certainty of existing 
practices. Immaturity is therefore moral incompetence or refusing to take 
responsibility for the exercise of understanding, being comfortable with the tutelage 
of another. 
However, for Foucault (1984), who also visited the question of 
enlightenment, Kant's heroic stance, or what he called the "modem ethos", was only 
partly mature. Maturity also consists in adopting "an ironic stance towards one's 
present situation. ...The ironic stance results in seeking in the present those practices 
which offer the possibility of a new way of acting" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986, 
117). If these authors are correct about Foucault's development of "a new ethical 
form of life which foregrounds imagination, lucidity, humour, disciplined thought 
and practical wisdom", then perhaps the recovery of Montaigne's insights is assured. 
1.11.2: Ecological Enlightenment 
At this juncture we might apply some of the insights gleaned from Kant and 
Foucault on enlightenment to our current historical era. Beck (1995b) has attempted 
a reinterpretation of the Kantian notion of enlightenment for this era of ecological 
risk. He defines ecological enlightenment as 'taking charge of oneself and living 
through our experiences; "[d] iscovering and overcoming the standardizations in one's 
own life and thought, thinking and living 'against the grain of one's own certitudes', 
become an individual learning 'process" (Beck, 1995b, 57). It entails taking 
16Kant's seminal ideas on enlightenment are contained in a letter to a Prussian newspaper conceived as 
a response to the newspaper's challenge to theorists to produce a definitive statement on what was a 
contemporary burning issue. It is simply titled Was ist Aufklarung? (What is Enlightenment?) 
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responsibility for the self, for 'being-in-the-world', and just as Kant's enlightenment 
demanded a radical break with religious and metaphysical order, so too ecological 
enlightenment requires that an heroic break be made with the certainties and 
securities of industrial society. The heroism of ecological enlightenment requires 
breaking the faith with science and technology as the only possible sources of 
solutions to the problems that confront humankind. It also means responding to the 
challenge of developing a radically new understanding of what it means to live in an 
era of ecological uncertainty and acknowledged biophysical limits. 
Taking responsibility may be defined in part as the application of reason to 
the conditions of contemporary reality, that is, the use of critique. Thus, just as 
Kant's treatise was a contemporary reflection on his enterprise (the bringing of 
enlightenment), so too it can be argued that the environmental critique is a 
contemporary reflection on the legacy of that enterprise. Kant was of the opinion that 
once freedom was granted, enlightenment was sure to follow. Unfortunately we are 
neither free nor mature. 
However, Beck does interpret glimmers of enlightenment in the subcultures, 
where experimentation with non-traditional roles and forms of self-expression 
indicates that "a consciousness of freedom is forming" and a politics based on the 
defense of encroachments on one's personal experience. He divines in these moves 
"the beginning of a new ethic, one that relies on the principle of duty to oneself - ... as 
the expression of an effort to bring the individual and the social back into harmony, 
in flowing projective, social identities" (Beck, 1995b, 57). Beck's ecological 
enlightenment involves humanity's transcendence of its prevailing image ("which is 
built into thought and action and which grows out of social roles and circumstances") 
to one that is "open and changeable". By extrapolation, this is a humanity that gives 
up on certitude, opens itself to the "ubiquity of the finite" 17 and then is in a position 
to approach maturity. 
So much for the heroic aspects of ecological enlightenment, but Beck has not 
addressed the ironic, which Foucault suggests is also part of attaining maturity. 
Again it is in the practices of the subcultures, and I am particularly referring to new 
social movements, where we might find hints of new possibilities of acting. It is 
their symbolic politics, unconventional forms of political action, participatory forms 
of political organization, and postmaterial value systems, what Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1986, 117) refer to as "an abandonment of traditional seriousness while preserving 
17For the origin of this phrase, see White (1990, n.45). 
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active engagement in the concerns of the present", that constitutes the ironic stance of 
the new social movements. Chapter 2 will further explore these aspects of the new 
social movements and their contribution to a new political and social consensus. 
1.12: The Biological Metaphor 
The modern social order had as its model of organization the mechanistic 
notions of Newtonian physics. Thus for Hobbes the solar system provided the model 
for his Leviathan state with the king (the seat of centralized power) akin to the sun at 
the centre of the planetary system around which the planets, akin to the different parts 
of society, revolved in their precise elliptical orbits. This model promised stability of 
institutions, an unambiguous social structure with different races, classes and genders 
occupying fixed positions, centralized power and sovereign states. As Toulmin 
(1990) remarks, it might have been a useful social structure for restoring order after 
the Religious Wars, but its rigidity, hierarchy, standardization and uniformity are not 
appropriate to problems which are global in extent and highly differentiated in 
nature. 
1.12.1: The Challenge of Ecology 
This is precisely why some writers perceive the ecological model with its 
notions of diversity and connectivity as a more appropriate model for organizing 
social order and understanding our problems. However ecology does more than 
provide a model for social organization. It also raises some fundamental issues about 
cosmology, that is, about the order of nature and our place in it. The fact that the 
activities of humankind are having such a far-reaching impact at both local and 
global levels implies that we can no longer view nature as nothing more than the 
"fixed, causal backdrop" (Toulmin, 1990, 191) to an unfolding human drama. 
Evolutionary biology has taught us that nature has its own evolutionary history and 
the challenge for modern humanity is to see itself in this longer-term context. 
Additionally and most importantly, ecology raises questions about how to 
restructure the scale and functioning of human practices and institutions (Coles, 
1992, 194). It offers a way of understanding and building social order based on a 
biological rather than a mechanical understanding of structure. The Newtonian 
model was grounded in concepts like atomism (as in individual rights and consumer 
sovereignty), independence, linear progress, closed systems, and equilibrium 
conditions. It was a model of order and stability. By contrast, ecology is 
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underpinned by notions of systems, interdependence, parallel progress, open systems 
and mutability. Systemic behaviours are characterized by adaptability, diversity and 
differentiation, recognize multi-factorial causes, and pay attention to the particular 
and to interrelatedness (Mulgan, 1997, Ch.9). 
The machine metaphor begins to lose its purchase in a world where systems 
of governance and organization clearly are no longer bounded - the idea of the 
nation-state with its fixed geographical boundaries is now discussed in terms of its 
demise (Ali Khan, 1996) - and there is increasing multiplicity of connections. "The 
multiplication of connections makes for greater uncertainty and speed of change, 
which requires adaptability rather than only efficiency" (Mulgan, 1997, 174). The 
most effective organizations encourage rich information flows, as a result of which 
there is no longer the need for centralization of information along the lines of the 
military model. As I shall discuss in Chapter 2, these developments in understanding 
are significant for the organization of democratic politics. 
The atomistically organized society consisting of independent, relatively 
homogeneous units is replaced in the biological metaphor with the notion of the self-
organizing or self-creative society, where habits of obedience and respect for power 
are replaced by "a high ethical premium on truth (since misleading information 
would blunt the system's capacity to adapt) and on responsibility (since distributed 
intelligence must also mean distributed responsibility, culpability and worry)" 
(Mulgan, 1997, 180). The main principle governing interaction at all scales of 
organization is that of reciprocity, not the dependence which characterizes the 
machine order. One of the attractive intuitions of the self-creative society is that the 
good of the individual parts is consistent with the good of the whole. This therefore 
relieves the tension, which is heightened in modern societies, between individual 
freedom and the collective good. 
In sum then, the uncertainties generated by industrial modernity - risks, 
ecological hazards, time-space compression, information overload and dispersal - 
cannot be addressed by the rigidity and centralized power structures of the 
mechanical model which were more appropriate to simple modernity (Beck, 1994, 
32). What is needed of human systems in this particular era is adaptability, flexibility 
and tolerance. Under these conditions the biological metaphor is seemingly more 
appropriate and more consistent with the realization of human possibility. 
1.12.2: The Dangers of the Biological Metaphor 
Notwithstanding the attractions of biological metaphors, there are dangers - 
"transaction costs" (Hodgson, 1993) - in appropriating biological/ecological concepts 
to the understanding of human systems. We need to be watchful that we do not 
replicate the errors that resulted in the mechanical model becoming a straitjacket to 
understanding for we could be similarly saddled with "an oppressive rhetorical 
model" based on ecology (Toulmin, 1990, 194). In the modern period the earliest use 
of biological concepts to explain human organization was that of Bernard Mandeville 
in the eighteenth century (See McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb, 1982). Mandeville's 
treatise on the productivity of a beehive was used to justify the pursuit of self-interest 
and individual greed and was in a sense an apologia for early capitalist interests. His 
utilization of the beehive metaphor supported his argument that public virtues could 
spring from private vices and that social good was the result of each individual 
pursuing his own selfish interest. 
Darwin's notion of natural selection has had a history of selective use in 
economic theory, largely related to maximizing notions - to support the neoclassical 
hypothesis of profit maximization; later as an argument for efficiency; and ultimately 
for the idea that the process of natural selection should lead to 'rational economic 
man' (Hodgson, 1993, 29). Hodgson (1993, 29) notes the lack of fit between 
maximization and evolutionary history, with its "imperfect, incremental 
adjustments". He goes on: "Rather than unrelenting competition and improvement, 
organisms 'satisfice' rather than maximize: they find niches to protect themselves 
from competition". Competition and survival are not necessarily synonymous as 
assumed by sociobiologists. 
One unfortunate outcome of drawing parallels between the natural and human 
worlds is that perpetrated by the Social Darwinists, who made an error of profound 
and long-lasting significance. This was a case of understanding in the economic 
sphere being translated to the natural world. The Social Darwinists assumed that the 
individualism and greed of modern competitive capitalism was universal in both 
spheres and "by seeing capitalism in nature, the capitalist system was deemed to be 
'natural'. It was hence regarded as both inevitable and superior to all systems" 
(Hodgson, 1993, 31). This supposed naturalness of competition and individualism, 
which has been used to legitimate social and economic inequality and hence 
oppression, has been revealed as only one of many survival strategies used in nature. 
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Cooperative strategies both within the same species and between different species are 
equally valid strategies. 
Ecological concepts, too, have had a chequered history. The eugenics 
movement, which had its origins in 'survival of the fittest' notions, reached its apogee 
in the Jewish exterminations (Bauman, 1989). Eugenics was married to the 
Germanic sense of 'yolk' - blood and soil - and formed the foundation of fascist 
Nazism. The case of Martin Heidegger exemplifies the double-edged sword that is 
ecology. He has much to offer contemporary ecological thought, but his work and 
ideas have also been implicated in the horrors of Nazism (Bramwell, 1989). Values 
derived from ecology have the capacity to inspire a fundamentalist, reactionary and 
nationalistic Romanticism as well as a progressive, environmental politics (Harvey, 
1993, 16-19). The trick is to remember the "Nietzschean presumption of resistance", 
that in every human enterprise there is "an element of resistance and recalcitrance" 
(Connolly, 1988, 169). Nietzsche's primary contribution in this respect is the insight 
that modern thought has two inclinations, mastery and resistance. The corollary of 
any will to power, such as the mastery-of-nature project or the search for harmonious 
community, implicitly harbours a discordant impulse. Any set of standards or norms 
will have contrary suppositions because existence is inherently ambiguous. 
Progressive social change can only occur when this "persistent strand of recalcitrance 
in human beings and the world to every consummate project of mastery and 
realization" is recognized (Connolly, 1988, 173). 
1.13: Changing Frames: Thinking Dangerously 
Nature as ecology is engaged in the project of unsettling "the settled patterns 
of thought" (Connolly, 1988, 6). The modern framework for understanding nature 
has focussed around "how to master it" rather than "whether to do so" (Connolly, 
1988, 4). Ecology challenges the thoughtlessness of modern thought by 
problematizing its underlying understandings and values - including questions of 
individual freedom and responsibility, utility versus the intrinsic value of nature, and 
rationality versus reasonableness among other assumptions. In questioning received 
truths about the mastery-of-nature project, ecology functions to retrieve those 
normative aspects of thought so occluded, that is, the "whether to do so". 
Moreover, problems of ecology - the greenhouse effect, ozone depletion and 
nuclear accidents - have assumed a global dimension which itself engenders a 
different way of thinking; what Moscovici (1990, 17) calls a "practical universalism". 
54 
Although the causes of global problems may have local origins, their global 
dimensionality means that no one is immune from them and they must be confronted 
on a global scale. Practical universalism is distinguished by "a common set of 
emotions across a range of publics" and a "universal intelligibility". The implications 
for individual disciplines of thought are potentially quite profound. 
The order achieved through the mechanical metaphor in early modern 
societies was achieved at considerable cost, in that all that did not fit into its narrow 
confines was treated as a source of disruption, including women, foreigners, the 
mentally ill and nature. These categories constituted the other, "matter out of place in 
need of punishment, reform or destruction" (Moscovici, 1990, 14). The natural unity 
of the clockwork model has been shattered by the emergence of social movements, 
representing the interests of various categories of otherness. Ecology movements, for 
example, have been responsible for returning unruly nature to ethical thought, thus 
undermining the utility myths of modern society. Moreover, they are also 
responsible for demonstrating that the mastery framework of thought is on "a self-
defeating trajectory", for its project "demands too much from nature, from the self, 
from the collectivity or from the world outside the charmed circle of highly 
modernized states" (Connolly, 1988, 173). 
The role of ecology and ecology movements is to highlight the dangers of the 
current trajectory and its systems of organization. To do this they must expose the 
paradoxes, ironies and contradictions of modern existence and of the thought 
frameworks which shape our understandings. The tradition of thought prefigured by 
Montaigne and carried on by Hume, and by Nietzsche and Foucault in their 
genealogies represents a rich resource. 
1.14: The Ecological Order and Sustainability 
The mechanical/rational order was fashioned around systems which 
emphasized stability, predictability and security. The form of politico-economic 
system which evolved to satisfy those criteria, liberal democratic capitalism, is a 
strategy of transcendence, which is now being revealed in its vulnerability. Its 
assumptions of continual expansion of its resource base and of market demand are 
revealed as unsustainable, while its capacities to respond to perturbation - that is, 
market adjustment of individual preferences and incremental political reform - are 
being exposed as limited responses (Dryzek, 1987). 
55 
In response to the perceived deficits in its value assumptions, its categories of 
understanding and its organizational forms, alternative epistemologies, value 
constructs and organizational forms are being pursued in order to address that quality 
which seems most pressing in this era of general crisis, sustainability. The stability 
which most concerns the present era is that associated with ecological integrity, 
minimizing ecological disturbance and potential catastrophe. However, as Blake 
(1990, 80; see also Pierce, 1992, 312) shows, sustainability not only refers to the 
condition of the biosphere. It has a crucial social dimension, for, he argues, "a 
sustainable society can only exist if its constituent social structures are capable of 
limiting biophysical change within the thresholds of ecological stability, while also 
providing adequate opportunities for meaningful human existence''. 
A number of writers, such as Daly and Cobb (1989), have differentiated weak 
and strong forms of sustainability, the dimensions of which and their normative 
content will be more fully explored in Chapter 3. Strong sustainability is indicated 
when risky actions prejudice the welfare of future generations, even though these 
actions yield benefits to future generations (Howarth, 1995). Strong sustainability is 
an appropriate ethical stance when risk-producing behaviours are productive of 
uncertainty. The ideology of growth is just such a stimulus to risky behaviours and 
therefore to the creation of uncertainty. "This arises from the fact that the 
development process involves changes in the size and quality of, and relations 
between, natural and human-made capital. With these changes, the margins of 
resilience change and in turn so does the system's susceptibility to surprise events 
from external or cumulative shock" (Pierce, 1992, 308). 
There is a strong consensus that sustainable systems embody resilience as a 
principal quality, although there is some disagreement over its exact meaning. 
Dovers and Handman (1992), for example, perceive resilience as that characteristic 
which sets sustainable systems apart from the rigid systems of industrial modernity. 
The main difference between rigid and resilient systems is that while industrial 
systems exhibit "high levels of information and system and subsystem control in the 
face of low levels of change" (Dovers and Handmer, 1992, 276) and are resistant to 
change, resilient systems have the capacity to adapt to changing conditions. Pierce 
(1992, 308) argues that the effect of growth has been to reduce the resilience of both 
natural and social systems. Hence we are confronted with declines in margins of 
resilience through land degradation, desertification, loss of biodiversity, ozone 
depletion, and global warming to the point where some ecosystems, particularly in 
Africa, are threatened with imminent collapse. 
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The differences in meaning turn on whether resilience is considered a 
necessary or contingent criterion of sustainability, whether it refers to the ongoing 
maintenance of system conditions or whether it applies only under conditions of 
severe disequilibrium. Dovers and Handmer (1992, 266) describe resilience as "the 
ability [of a system] to absorb changes to key variables and parameters and persist", a 
definition which appears to overlap Dryzek's concepts of robustness and flexibility 
with regard to social choice mechanisms. Robustness consists in the "ability of a 
mechanism to perform well across a wide variety of conditions", that is, its 
steadfastness, while flexibility refers to the ability of a mechanism "to adjust its own 
structural parameters as changing conditions demand", in other words, its 
adaptability (Dryzek, 1987, 51-52). Adaptive mechanisms have the capacity to 
absorb new feedback devices in order to respond to novel signals and to establish 
new forms of co-ordination, a capacity in which some self-perpetuating, modem 
organizational forms, that are resistant to change, are singular failures. Markets, for 
example, are highly robust, but only in the sense of being resistant to change. Their 
main elements, exchange relationships (competitiveness, self-interested behaviour, 
and consumer sovereignty), private property, interest rates, and the positive feedback 
stimulus of economic growth, act to reinforce expansionary tendencies at the expense 
of ecological integrity. _Capitalist markets are flexible in the sense that they can adapt 
quickly to changing market conditions by varying the mix of goods and services, but 
their inherent logic precludes reductions in growth. 
For Dryzek resilience is a criterion which applies only after severe 
perturbation. It is "the ability of social choice mechanisms to steer human and 
ecological systems back to normal operating range" (Dryzek, 1987, 52-53) under 
conditions of severe ecological stress. In ecosystems, resilience refers to the ability 
of the ecosystem to steer itself back to equilibrium. 
Whether it is interpreted as a maintenance function or a contingent criterion 
of sustainable systems, the preoccupation with resilience suggests that human and 
natural systems are in extreme disequilibrium and the present unsustainable trajectory 
of modern societies makes the consideration of their resilience that much more 
pressing. It is also a recognition of limitations to knowledge, of the need to enfold 
uncertainty into institutions and practices and of the need to build capacities to 
respond to unanticipated shocks. 
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What is clear is that conditions of rapid change are becoming the norm. 
Under these conditions the objective of any system should be to reduce its 
vulnerability. Dovers and Handmer suggest that the type of resilience which would 
afford this capacity is characterized by openness and adaptability. Resilience 
premised on either resistance to change or on incremental change as a response to 
ignorance and uncertainty would not serve any system well in the face of external 
shocks or substantial internal disorder. A society that was open and adaptable would 
exhibit a high degree of flexibility, that is, be able to vary its basic operating 
assumptions and thus adopt more appropriate institutions and practices. As Dovers 
and Handmer point out, societies have always adapted to changed circumstances, but 
often slowly and painfully. However, adaptable societies would minimize the pain 
and move quickly to more sustainable operating conditions (Dovers and Handmer, 
1992, 270). 
Interdependence is another of the categories of understanding that authors 
have borrowed from biological systems, superceding the mechanical understanding, 
which favours sovereign, independent and self-sustaining individual units. The 
notion implies a multiplicity of connections and the recognition of interconnection 
has taught us that technological problem-solving has distinct limits, that problem-
solving in one sector of a system can very well lead to the generation of externalities 
in other sectors or other systems, a phenomenon known as problem displacement. It 
is because of interconnections within and between systems that human and natural 
systems both require co-ordination among actors and across actions (Dryzek, 1987, 
48). 
By the same token it is as a result of the technological facilitation of 
interconnection that we are now more aware of our interdependencies; that we are 
connected through our common dependence on global climatic systems, through 
information flows, through the possibility of nuclear disaster, through global money 
markets and through global tourism, and that the world's systems are no longer self-
contained (see Mulgan, 1997, Ch. 1 on burgeoning interconnection). Mulgan (1997, 
33) sees the openness resulting from connexity and greater information flows as an 
adaptive advantage similar to that conferred on humans in the early evolution of the 
human brain, "which grew and grew because of the cumulative adaptive advantage it 
conferred, an advantage that was different in nature from having bigger teeth or 
muscles". It is only an advantage however if greater communication means more 
mutual understanding and trust, the basis of openness. 
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Value systems inherited from earlier times of relatively plentiful resouces and 
the unsustainable behaviours that they sanction are also under question. The moral 
order of modem society, which concerned itself principally with individual rights and 
therefore revolved around questions of justice rather than morality, has been found 
wanting. It is a moral order relevant only to the immature, egocentric individual, not 
to wider concerns of inter- and intragenerational equity or to ecological integrity. 
The morally relevant stance of a mature modernity is ecological responsibility. It is 
the reverse of self-assertive transcendence. Ecologically responsible behaviours 
acknowledge both "transcendence" and "immanence", that humans as a species 
impact on ecosystems, creating their own ecosystems and being created by them; they 
are modest with respect to human rational capacity and respect the limits of human 
knowledge; and they exhibit humility and foresight with respect to the consequences 
of human projects. Ecological responsibility transcends the false humility of 
immanence-nature knows best, which, in the absence of human interests, would be 
true. But, as (Dryzek, 1987, 45) observes: 
While the protective and waste-assimilative aspects of 
anthropocentric ecological rationality may be best served by 
leaving nature well alone, the productive aspects will not be. 
Production for human use demands artificial suppression of 
ecological succession. 
Ecological rationality in the human interest demands some 
compromise between productive artificiality and waste-
assimilative/protective "naturalness". 
In this case humans co-operate with biophysical processes, making use of "the 
spontaneous self-organizing and self-regulating qualities of natural systems" (Dryzek, 
1987, 46). 
The ecologically responsible society incorporates self-reflective and self-
critical capacities, monitors its values and assumptions, and is mindful that human 
potential consists in more than economic rationality and mastery of nature. 
Individual ecological responsibility is about taking charge of oneself and for one's 
being in the world. Ecological responsiblity is both an individual and a collective 
requirement to choose the means of fulfilling our needs which "take account of the 
interests of life on our planet and the rights of future generations" (Lipietz, 1995, 45). 
CHAPTER 2 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE RECONSIDERED: 
ITS REPOLITICIZATION AND REMORALIZATION 
59 
The invasion of the natural world by abstract systems brings nature to an end as a 
domain external to human knowledge and involvements. The tremendous 
extension of human control over nature (which, as in other areas of control, 
yields new unpredictabilities) comes up against its limits, however. These 
consist not so much in the environmental degradation and disruption that is thus 
brought about, as in the stimulus to reintroduce parameters of debate external to 
modernity's abstract systems. In other words, repressed existential issues, related 
not just to nature but to the moral parameters of existence as such, press 
themselves back on the agenda. The process is not an automatic one: on the level 
of everyday life, as well as in collective struggles, moral/existential problems are 
actively recovered and brought forward into public debate (Giddens, 1991, 241). 
2.1: Introduction 
The complexities and inherent contradictiOns of industrial modernity have 
opened up the space for the repoliticization of many spheres of existence and for the 
reintroduction of moral/existential questions to political agendas. This space is being 
occupied by the new social movements which have emerged during the last thirty 
years, largely as a result of disillusionment with the unfulfilled promise of modern 
life. They include nuclear disarmament, peace, feminist and ecology movements, 
although more recently, other, more regressive movements have also consolidated in 
this space. The feminist movement, in particular, has concerned itself with 
challenging the exclusive nature of the arena of labour and politics known as the 
public sphere, from which women have been systematically excluded while 
simultaneously being confined or, more correctly, relegated to the domestic or 
familial sphere since the emergence of a critical public in the eighteenth century. The 
inequity of the public/private split for women and its oppressiveness for both men 
and women has occupied much feminist theorising over the last several decades. 
Ecofeminists, in particular, have been concerned to problematize the 
intrinsicality of the domination and oppression of women and others in the dualisms 
of modern life and to expose their inextricable relationship to the domination of 
nature (King, 1981; Plumwood, 1993; Warren, 1990), while demands for the 
promises of the Enlightenment to be made good and the promised rights and 
entitlements extended to all citizens encompasses claims for the full democratization 
of the political domain. Thus the concern for ecological devastation and degradation 
has functioned to reopen moral/existential questions for public debate, such as how 
one should conduct one's life, thus making the personal political, or as Giddens 
(1991, 224) would have it, making for "a remoralising of social life". I intend to 
argue that, as social movements have been the principal vehicle in opening up the 
political by reintroducing moral considerations to the political domain, they are the 
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descendants of the 'critical public' which Habermas (1989, 260) described as 
emerging during the Enlightenment. However, in extending the meaning of the 
political and applying it to all arenas of existence, not simply confining it to the 
formal arena of public debate beyond the workplace, the economy, the administrative 
apparatus of the state, and the domestic sphere, it could be argued that social 
movements, as products of Beck's (1992) reflexive modernity, are engaged in a 
radical reconstitution of the public sphere and hence are agents of profound social 
change. 
In arguing for social movements as agents of radical social and political 
change, I initially examine Habermas's case for the criticality of the bourgeois public 
of early modernity and its subsequent transformation in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, wrought largely through its flawed and contradictory nature, which was 
revealed by the inequities of nineteenth century industrial capitalism, when those 
systematically excluded from this elite public sphere, women, workers and the 
colonised, demanded an extension of its inherent rights of freedom and equality for 
themselves. It is paradoxical that while this century has witnessed the formal 
extension of the claimed freedoms, the critical public exists in reality only as an 
ideal. However the excluded and oppressed still view the public sphere as the arena 
for emancipatory politics and hence for achieving freedom from their oppressions. 
For Giddens (1991), emancipatory political spheres are critical arenas in which to 
openly debate life politics issues, while for Beck (1992, 186), it is here that the non-
political is politicised and the political is repoliticised. I also explore how 
contemporary radical movements are helping to reconstitute the public sphere 
through its repoliticization and by extending the meaning of the political to add 
moral/existential questions to the political agenda, including many issues once 
thought only relevant to the private sphere of domesticity and economy. 
2.2: The Critical Public 
The public sphere has been theorised since its inception during the 
Enlightenment. Kant, for whom the public sphere was the means of enlightenment, 
both for the individual and humanity as a whole, provided the first full philosophical 
apologia of the bourgeois public, while Hegel, in recognising its contradictions and 
the lack of substance in its claim to be free from domination, was its first critic. 
Marx advanced Hegel's critique further and, in showing that the old authoritarian 
relations of power had been simply replaced by a new set between owners of capital 
and wage earners, demolished the fictive freedoms on which the ideal of the public 
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sphere of civil society was based. The critical theory project of the Frankfurt School, 
exemplified by the work of Adomo and Horkheimer, continued the Marxist critique 
in the twentieth century but ran into a pessimistic impasse, no doubt provoked by its 
emergence during the dark times of Nazi fascism. As an antidote to their pessimism, 
Habermas set out to recover what was of value in democratic public life - the 
potential for the coordination of human life through public discourse - framing his 
theory in a full consideration of the changes that had been wrought in the public 
sphere by capitalism and by state structures since the beginning of modernity. 
The 'critical public', which emerged in European cultural and political spheres 
in the seventeenth century reaching its apogee in the late eighteenth century, was an 
arena defined outside the courtly life surrounding the monarchy, outside the familial 
sphere of family and friends and supposedly separated from the arena of economic 
production. Its appearance coincided with the rise and institutionalization of the 
liberal ideals of equality and liberty and in fact it was a key institution in the 
liberalizing process. Habermas's important work, The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere, has been this century's most significant contribution concerning 
this particular historically situated sphere of political action. Habermas's task was to 
define the emergence of a particular public, the bourgeois public, more specifically 
the liberal model of it, and to chart its transformation. He acknowledged the brief 
appearance of a plebeian public sphere at around the same time but chose to ignore it 
as simply a variant of the more dominant form which, with the exception of various 
workers' movements, was largely eclipsed and, as he observes, "remains oriented 
towards the intentions of the bourgeois public sphere" (Habermas, 1992a, xviii). 
From such a critical appraisal he hoped to recover its inherent emancipatory 
potential, despite the flaws introduced by its subsequent historical transformation. 
This emancipatory potential was to be found in the use of practical reason in public 
decisionmalcing and in democratic politics, the health of which is dependent upon 
"both quality of discourse and quantity of participation" (Calhoun, 1992a, 2). 
Habermas's view was that the quality of discourse declined over the intervening 
period. 18 
Habermas's bourgeois public had its origins in the High Middle Ages, and 
probably it could be said to be a logical outgrowth of the humanism which the 
I 8This conclusion has been recently disputed by Schudson (1992). 
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Renaissance had spawned several centuries earlier 19 . It made its appearance at the 
same time as mercantilism created a new sphere of regulative authority separate from 
court and monarch, occupying the interstices between state and society (Habermas, 
1989, 30). In this sense it differed from the earlier classical Greek public, where the 
public included the apparatus of state (Calhoun, 1992a, 8). It consisted of private 
individuals who had come together to generalize their interests through the medium 
of public discussion and perhaps to demand state action. Habermas (1989, 27) 
describes it thus: 
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the 
sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon 
claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public 
authorities themselves to engage them in a debate over the general 
rules governing relations in the basically privatised and publically 
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labour. The 
medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without 
historical precedent: people's use of their public reason. 
What was radical about this particular public was its 'critical' nature. Habermas 
locates this criticality in the effects that mercantilism wrought, as changes in the 
private household economy decreased the importance of local markets and increased 
dependence on extralocal (that is, regional and national) ones. Local economic self-
sufficiency dwindled, whilst the populations of cities such as London and Paris grew 
dramatically. It was these new urban dwellers on whom the widening regulatory 
apparatus of mercantilist policy had the most direct effect, that is, by increasing their 
dependence on extralocal markets and in the taxes and duties on their daily rations 
(McKendrick et al., 1982, 199). The public authority was inevitably going to be 
called upon to legitimate itself: 
Because, on the one hand, the society now confronting the state 
clearly separated a private domain from public authority and 
because, on the other hand, it turned the reproduction of life into 
something transcending the confines of private domestic authority 
and becoming a subject of public interest, that zone of continuous 
administrative contact became 'critical' also in the sense that it 
provoked the critical judgement of the public making use of its 
reason (Habermas, 1989, 24). 
l 9See Carroll (1993, 102-116) for a description of the cultural and historical background to the 
emergence of the bourgeois form, a product of the fusion of humanism with its ideals of reason and 
free will and secularized Protestantism. 
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Although, obviously, there would have been a great deal of juggling of 
interests among the participants in this realm of public debate, what was significant 
was that it established a rational-critical discourse on matters of public interest in 
areas in which the quality of the argument rather than the quality or the status of the 
arguer was the essential criterion. The critical essence of the bourgeois public was 
directly related to increasing levels of literacy, a product of the formation of 
bourgeois culture which placed a high value on education as the means to improve 
the world "by exercising and training man's highest and defining faculty, his reason" 
(Calhoun, 1992a, 108). The members of the critical public were first of all readers 
drawn from the ranks of the propertied and the educated, who gathered together in 
the various coffee-houses and clubs to debate and to read (both of these activities 
being advanced by the explosion of critical journals and periodicals) and, in the 
process, to attain enlightenment. Thus "in the Tatler, the Spectator, and the 
Guardian the public held up a mirror to itself" (Habermas, 1989, 43). 
2.2.1: The Transformation of the Critical Public Sphere 
For Habermas the full potential of this eighteenth century public was never 
realized and its critical moment lost. In fact it was subverted from within When the 
tensions inherent within it inevitably surfaced. Firstly, as individual freedom was 
construed synonymously with property ownership and its accompanying rights, its 
underlying principles of equality and freedom became intimately linked with and 
subservient to emerging capitalism. Freedom thus assumed a negative rather than a 
positive form; it was a freedom from constraint and so it largely remains. By the 
nineteenth century its flawed nature, particularly its various exclusions and 
inequalities involving the franchise and ownership of the means of production, were 
revealed as the inequities of industrial capitalism. Yet those who had been 
systematically excluded - women, workers and the colonized - persisted with their 
claims for the rights guaranteed to members of the bourgeois public sphere, rights to 
its various freedoms and to equality. 
Secondly, the progressive widening of the boundaries of the public sphere 
resulted in a decline in the quality of rational critical debate, its supplantation by the 
consumption of culture, and equally importantly, the replacement of objective 
general interest with negotiated interest. The public sphere largely lost its rational-
critical function and the exercise of political power became confined to behind-the-
scenes horse-trading between bureaucratic organizations, political parties, special 
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interest groups and governing executive elites. It has thus become depoliticized; its 
sole political function is as a sphere of public acclamation. 
The potential of the public sphere was also undermined by the smudging of 
the once distinct boundaries between public and private, that is, between state and 
society, as private organizations assumed public power and the state intervened in the 
private sphere, for example, in the promulgation of labour laws. Simultaneously, the 
relationship between the private intimate/familial and the private economic spheres 
underwent polarization as the family became divorced from its close relationship 
with the realm of production and reoriented towards consumption. This coincidence 
of the replacement of rational critical discourse by an orientation towards 
consumption and of general interest by negotiated interest meant that the members of 
the public sphere were no longer able to discern a common ground. Rational critical 
debate has become more difficult in a public sphere generated by the mass media, 
which, in concentrating on personalities andpersonal attributes, finds it impossible to 
bracket personal qualities as required in the critical public 20. In sum, what Habermas 
has charted is "the depoliticization of the public sphere and its impoverishment by 
the removal of critical discourse" (Calhoun, 1992a, 24). 
Working from a base in psychology, Richard Sennett (1976) portrays a 
similar decline in public character, suggesting an association between strong public 
spheres and times of uncertainty. Thus the eighteenth century bourgeois public 
sphere grew in response to "material changes in population and demography" and 
persisted in modern times as "a tool for attempting to preserve order in the midst of 
much greater material shifts in the city", but by the end of the last century, when 
material conditions had become more certain, the public world had become less 
stable (Sennett, 1976, 141). He too attributes the erosion of public life to the rise of 
industrial capitalism with its homogenizing tendencies, to increasing secularity, and 
to the persistence of ancien regime forms of publicness: "The legacy of the ancien 
regime city was united to the privatizing influences of industrial capitalism" (Sennett, 
1976, 23). 
The economic upheaval and uncertainties generated by industrial capitalism 
caused people to look for ways of protecting themselves from the resulting traumas. 
Increasingly the family was seen as a source of idealized refuge, a refuge that 
20Habermas does not distinguish sufficiently between his ideal and the actual eighteenth century 
bourgeois public. From a reading of Sennett (1976), it could be concluded that the early capitalists 
and mercantilists were very definitely engaged in attending to their own interests. Habermas (1992, 
463) has acknowledged this criticism in recent years. 
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nurtured a higher moral character than the public realm, whose legitimacy was thus 
called into question. Public life became more and more emaciated so that by the end 
of the nineteenth century people had become merely spectators in the public sphere. 
Participation with strangers through critical discourse for social ends had degenerated 
into "passive culture consumption" and "apolitical sociability" (Calhoun, 1992a, 23). 
Both Habermas and Sennett see the legacy of nineteenth century industrial 
capitalism and secularism reflected in the weak public sphere of this century: 
The obsessions with selfhood are attempts to work out these 
conundrums of the last century, by denial. Intimacy is an attempt to 
solve the public problem by denying that the public exists. As with 
any denial, this has only made the more destructive aspects of the 
past the more firmly entrenched. The nineteenth century is not yet 
over (Sennett, 1976, 27). 
Habermas's conclusions on the transformation of the public sphere are similarly 
paraphrased by Calhoun (1992a, 26) thus: 
By means of these transformations, the public sphere has become 
more an arena for advertising than a setting for rational critical 
debate. Legislators stage displays for constituents. Special interest 
organizations use publicity work to increase the prestige of their 
positions, without making the topics to which those , positions refer 
subjects of genuine public debate. The media are used to create 
occasions for consumers to identify with the public positions or 
personas of others. All this amounts to the return of a version of 
representative publicity to which the public responds by 
acclamation, or the withholding of acclamation, rather than critical 
discourse.... The public sphere becomes a setting for states and 
corporate actors to develop legitimacy not by responding 
appropriately to an independent public but by seeking to instill in 
social actors motivations that conform to the needs of the overall 
system dominated by those states and corporate actors. 
Habermas (1989, 201) refers to the institution of this new version of 
representative publicity (the ancien regime form of publicness) as the 
"refeudalization" of society: "The public sphere becomes the court before 
which public prestige can be displayed - rather than in which public critical 
debate is carried out". 
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As a result of -these modifications in the public realm, the role of political 
parties has been transformed to that of bureaucratic organizations whose sole aim is 
to attract votes rather than to inform their adherents. Legislators are no longer able to 
freely participate in public debate; they are bound by the party line and have thus 
become agents of those political parties: "Parliament is degraded to the status of a 
committee for the airing of party lines" (Habermas, 1989, 205). To bolster their 
image, parties contend for the support of special interest groups whom they offer to 
represent at the negotiating table. These groups, which have their base in the private 
sphere while operating in the public sphere, also contribute to the interpenetration of 
state and society. It is this combination of party-dominated politics and the fuzziness 
of the state/society boundary that makes it seemingly impossible to resurrect the 
critical public sphere. 
What Habermas has demonstrated is that the inclusion of the unpropertied 
masses in the bourgeois public sphere, that is, the expansion of its democratic base, 
has not been matched by greater democracy in the way that people have control over 
the decision-making that effects their lives. 
Indeed, what has precisely characterized capitalist development is 
that, although the franchise has been extended and the standard of 
living of most of the population has been raised, more and more 
aspects of life have become moulded by and subject to the control 
of abstract anonymous forces over which citizens exercise very 
little control (Postone, 1992, 165). 
It is the new social movements that I intend to examine for the possibility of 
resurrecting the "kernel" of potential in the liberal public sphere 21 , for the issues that 
they raise are in effect logical outgrowths of inconsistencies unresolved in the early 
liberal public sphere. 
21 1 have purposely avoided a critique of Habermas's concept of the bourgeois public sphere, as that 
has been more than adequately achieved by the contributors to the volume edited by Calhoun (1992), 
although from the standpoint of the present discussion, his neglect of social movements and their 
importance for public discourse and democratic politics is of some concern. See Calhoun's 
Introduction to this volume (pp.36-39) for a comprehensive critique of Habermas's failure to accord 
social movements their due as active agents in the making and remaking of the public sphere, firstly, in 
tabling new issues on the public agenda and secondly, by restructuring identities, that is, by serving to 
legitimate new voices in the political public sphere. 
2.2.2: Social Movements in Context 
Social movements should be seen as part of a socio-historical dialectic. John 
Galtung (1986) has delineated successive social transformations in the West 
beginning with the feudal period of the Middle Ages. The first transformation 
accompanied the revolt of the aristocracy against the Church, which resulted in 
secularisation of the social order and separation of Church and State. The second 
transformation was instituted when the mercantilists, merchants and others 
challenged the absolutist rule of the monarchy and its aristocracy on the basis that the 
new bourgeois publics which they had created were the sole legitimate foundation for 
a system of government. The third transformation was generated by workers who 
had been excluded from the rights contained in the bourgeois publics and from 
fairness in the distribution of the social product for which they were largely 
responsible. 
However, as Jean Cohen (1983, 103-104) points out "by the time access to 
public spaces was no longer restricted to the propertied or educated, the institutions 
of the public realm - parliaments, parties, the press - became functionalized to serve 
the integrating needs of the economic and political systems. They no longer 
ambiguously served as the media' of self-expression of freely associated individuals". 
The social movements of this era are thus aligned against a "society defended by 
nineteenth century economic liberals" and seek to "reconstitute society this time 
against both economic and political deformation." 
Galtung defines a fourth transformation, which he labels the "Green Wave" 
and in which all those marginalised by the previous transformations - women, ethnic 
groups, itinerants - similarly claimed a share in the society constructed on those 
transformations. Contrary to earlier transformative movements, they do not demand 
a complete revolutionary break from the past. They do however seek to break from 
those elements of bourgeois and socialist society that emphasize growth and progress 
at all costs. They are highly politicised with complex networks of local groups and 
self-help organizations, yet they operate outside the established political structures. 
In this sense they are radical rather than revolutionary. In Cohen's words: 
They are creating public spaces alongside a political system that has 
become too rigid or too cynical. The anti-institutional bias of 
social movements must be seen in the context of the degeneration 
of institutionalized public spaces into frameworks for elite 
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competition or pure struggles of interest and influence (Cohen, 
1983, 107). 
Alberto Melucci (1985, 789) argues that contemporary movements represent 
a symbolic challenge and that the field of collective action has shifted from the 
"political" to the "cultural", to "fields previously untouched by social conflicts (age, 
sex differences, health, relation to nature, human survival)". However, the challenge 
to cultural codes has profound implications for the political. According to Cohen 
(1983, 107): 
one might assess the focus and locus of contemporary movements 
in terms of the creation from below of a new political culture which 
could reintroduce the normative dimension of social interaction 
back into political life. In this sense the new movements are 
continuous with the first such movement for society against its 
annihilation by an amoral state (ie., the Enlightenment), described 
by ...Habermas, and with the movement against an amoral economy 
(the socialist movement). 
The question of meaning - increasingly relegated to the private 
sphere by a quasi-technocratic, quasi-corporatist political/economic 
system - is reemerging in the social sphere. It is carried by 
movements that seek to produce new collective symbols and 
identities and that could potentially contribute to a revival of 
political institutional life. 
One might therefore characterize the current wave of movements as a challenge 
against an amoral polity, state and economy for the restoration of civil society. 
Claus Offe (1990, 233-234) has similarly categorized the history of social 
movements as movements about axes of socio-political conflict. He draws an 
analogy between the situation that confronted labour movements in the late 
nineteenth century, that is, one of disappointment at the maldistributions and poverty 
that reflected the limitations of the liberal-bourgeois model based on a market-
directed economy, and the state of affairs that now faces late twentieth century social 
movements, that is, disappointment at the combined achievements of the liberal-
bourgeois and socialist movements, which have created a flawed process of 
modernization that has wide-ranging negative, if unintended, side effects. The axis 
of conflict has shifted from concerns with freedom, social justice, and economic 
security to "fear, pain, and (physical or symbolic) destruction vs. integrity, 
recognition, and respect" (Offe, 1990, 234). What differentiates the latest wave of 
collective action from previous movements is that it has no ideological basis. Instead 
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the nature of the critique relies upon "an eclectic application of certain demands and 
values from the liberal and socialist traditions which are now used as a critical 
standard against the processes of modernization" (Offe, 1990, 234). 
In discussing the mobilizing conditions for collective action, Karl-Werner 
Brand (1990) similarly identifies three constellations under which "modernization 
critique" or "cultural criticism" has been generated. He interprets the rising levels of 
'crisis and alienation' as a wave of cultural criticism, (Brand, 1990, 41), and, in so 
doing, is able to discern possibilities for "alternative models of development and 
social life". 
Jean Cohen (1983, 112) also envisages a cyclical process of cultural criticism, 
in which "the creative acomplishments (of social movements) can be traced in the 
institutions, socialization processes, and political culture of a society". Indeed 
movements "raise once again the hope of a post-bourgeois, democratic civil society 
organized not around market and property or around the state, but in free associations 
and public spheres penetrating and institutionalizing both economy and polity". She 
argues that not only do social movements signify a healthy society, but also that 
healthy movements produce discourses that are capable of being institutionalized and 
at the same time they contribute to the enlargement of the public realm. 
It is my contention that the bearers of this latest wave of cultural criticism will 
most likely provide the model for a new consensus of political and social life. Before 
exploring the discernible impacts on the established political, economic and social 
institutions, it is important to elaborate on the role that contemporary movements 
play in complex modern societies and what this might mean for the new consensus 
conceived by Brand. In particular, I intend to explore the potential of the Green 
Movement to progress the issues that are raised by the current phase of 
modernization critique and how it might assist in the achievement of a new 
consensus of political and social life. 
2.2.3: Social Transformation and Cultural Challenge  
Contemporary social movements are extremely complex phenomena. They 
are not discrete entities; they have no distinct boundaries; indeed, supporters and 
adherents may belong to or support more than one movement (Kriesi, 1988, 353). 
They are not only products of the complex series of social changes that has occurred 
in the postwar period but they also construct reality through the production of new 
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cultural codes and the creation of collective identities (Melucci, 1988) 22 . 
"Movements are both the parents and the children of social change" (Pakulski, 1990, 
82). 
One has to examine the ways in which contemporary movements differ from 
earlier social movements, such as the workers' movement or the early feminist 
movement, in order to gain some appreciation of their significance in social, political 
and cultural terms. Historically social movements have been principally implicated 
in the struggle for the extension of citizenship and its accompanying rights and with 
the relationships of domination inherent in the class structures of industrial 
capitalism, this later concern resulting in the struggle for access to state power. 
Contemporary collective action is organized around new cleavages of conflict, the 
focus of social and political conflict thus having moved from industrial work to 
challenge the dominant social codes which underlie all social relationships in highly 
complex societies. The new social movements present alternative ways of making 
sense of the world in contradistinction to the dominant technocratic rationality that 
increasingly invades and organizes individual and collective life. Their critique of 
instrumental reason and rationality is a self-reflexive one that employs the arguments 
and technological forms of the very hegemonic culture that they seek to question. 
This challenge, which, as we have seen, Melucci (1985) argues is symbolic in nature, 
has the express effect of "rendering power visible, ...a power that hides behind the 
rationality of administrative or organizational procedures or the 'show-business' 
aspects of politics" (Melucci, 1988, 250). He has identified three forms of symbolic 
challenge. Firstly, by prophesy, new social movements, in practising alternative 
world-views in every day life, challenge the dominance of the existing codes of 
rationality and thereby suggest the possibility of more than one rationality. Secondly, 
by means of paradox, movements reveal through exaggeration and extreme 
provocation the irrationality and contradictory reasoning of the dominant discourses. 
Thirdly, through representation, by means of various kinds of visual imagery and 
expressive use of language (video, theatre, written language), the dominant codes are 
compelled to face their own contradictions. 
For Melucci, one of the primary functions of collective action is to create 
public spaces, in which power can be made visible and therefore negotiated. Power 
in complex societies is continually shifting and must be continually renegotiated. 
22Melucci (1989, 190) argues that other theoretical approaches to new social movements such as 
Tilly's resource mobilization theory or Smelser's theory of social movements as pathological reaction 
to crises of modern life obscure their multidimensional character. Cohen and Arato (1992) provide a 
thorough-going analysis of each of these contributions to new social movement theory. 
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Thus collective action which makes possible this kind of political discourse is 
essential for the maintenance of political democracy in complex modern societies. 
Accordingly, I argue that new social movements not only reflect the complexity and 
contradictions of modern society but that they also open up possibilities for coping 
with the contradictions and the uncertainty generated in complex social systems 
undergoing rapid change. 
2.2.4: Complexity: Contradiction and Uncertainty 
Complex modern societies are characterized by a high level of differentiation 
based on abstract systems, but also a high degree of ambiguity and contradiction, of 
uncertainty and risk, and of rapid change23 . Central to these tendencies is an 
explosion of knowledge, particularly technoscience, which has not only brought with 
it human mastery of both human and nonhuman nature, but also several dilemmas. 
The most salient of the dilemmas identified by Melucci for the purposes of this 
discussion is that between responsibility and omnipotence, "between the urge to 
extend society's capacity to operate on itself, and the need for responsibility, for 
recognizing the constraints of survival that bind society to its ecosystem" (Melucci, 
1989, 176). Society's unlimited capacity to intervene in both external and internal 
human nature to the point of self-annihilation through genetic engineering and 
nuclear science now means that there is a choice for survival rather than a chance of 
survival. 
The function of collective action has been to expose these dilemmas or 
contradictions to society. It is no accident that many of the supporters of 
contemporary movements are located in those areas of the system "which are 
connected to the most intensive informational and symbolic investments and exposed 
to the greatest pressures for conformity (Melucci, 1985, 796). Offe (1985, 831-832) 
has identified them as the new middle class, particularly those who work in human 
service-oriented sectors - education, community services, and health. These actors 
expose the power structures that control and regulate individual meaning and 
identity. In complex societies power is often hidden in "the formal rationality of 
procedures", which suppress from open discussion and societal control many of the 
questions that affect the everyday lives of individuals, the survival and evolution of 
23Giddens (1991, 17-18) prefers the term 'disembedding' rather than 'differentiation', because the 
former term better captures "the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts and their 
rearticulation across indefinite tracts of time-space" or what David Harvey (1989) calls "time-space 
compression". 
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the species, and of the planet (Melucci, 1988, 251; 1989, 177) 24. The effect of 
making power visible is to make it negotiable, thus converting previously 
authoritarian regulations into political relationships, which has, as one of its 
consequences, the reduction of uncertainty permeating modern systems 25 . 
Uncertainty as a phenomenon of complex modernising societies is a subject 
area which has preoccupied Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990; 1991), 
both of whom argue for the demolition of the myth that scientific rationality will one 
day bring the contingencies of human existence under human control (Beck, 1992, 
71, 156-157; Giddens, 1991, 28). As overspecialization and differentiation in 
scientific disciplines produce more and more unseen side-effects, the unpredictability 
of the practical consequences of science increases. The abstract systems of 
modernity force individuals to divest themselves of traditional notions of fate and to 
accept risk as an integral aspect of modern life (Giddens, 1991, 31). Thus, "[hiving 
in circumstances of modernity is best understood as a matter of routine 
contemplation of counterfactuals" (Giddens, 1991, 29). Moreover, in the domestic 
and economic spheres there are similar confusions and uncertainties. In the former, 
the clear separation of productive and reproductive roles based on the nuclear family 
is being dissolved, while in the latter, the "interwoven influences of ecology, new 
technologies and a transformed political culture" (Beck, 1992, 215) produce not only 
extreme insecurity in the workplace, but also its politicization. On the one hand, an 
awareness of 'quality of life' issues stimulates workers to negotiate conditions that 
account for family responsibilities. On the other hand, economic actors are pressured 
by various actors in the public sphere to justify their organizational and productive 
processes, thus propelling them into the public arena to engage in "non-economic, 
discursive justification of their measures" (Beck, 1992, 221-223). 
The rising levels of uncertainty that beset complex modern societies are 
reflected in the multiplicity and increasing complexity of the issues that emerge 
under conditions where established political agents corresponding more closely to 
cleavages that earlier developed around political rights and social justice are losing 
some of their relevance and are no longer capable of articulating the interests that 
attach to these new issues, which are survival or quality of life issues, sometimes 
24This is not to say that all forms of power are inherently harmful, for as Giddens (1990, 162-3) 
observes, power is inevitable and "in its broadest sense, is a means of getting things done". 
25Ironically, collective action may also have the effect of increasing uncertainty, because it is 
impossible to predict what may result from it (Melucci, 1985, 790). Indeed, orthodox political actors 
view the tension which movements create only as a destabilizing influence, not as commentators such 
as Jan Pakulski (1991, 83) do, as "a constant systemic irritant, a source of conflict and innovation". 
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referred to as postmaterial concerns. Max Kaase (1990, 96) contends that this is 
"probably one of the most influential conditions for the emergence of contemporary 
social movements", since they more nearly reflect the reality of these "issue publics", 
arguing that the dominant ideologies have lost some of their "unifying force" and 
individuals have shifted their involvement to a more varied network of relationships. 
With the enlargement in the number of issues facing society comes the 
problem of how "to mediate and represent a plurality of interests" for the "central 
problem of complex systems is the maintenance of equilibrium" (Melucci, 1988, 252, 
254). Political relationships assume a new and more crucial role. Thus the 
politicization of previously authoritarian relationships in the family, the work-place 
and between government and citizen is "linked to the complexity of information 
systems, the need to cope with a changeable environment and the multiplying 
requirements of balance within the system itself' (Melucci, 1988, 252). The last 
requirement is linked to a shift from what Offe (1987b, 65) calls the 'old paradigm of 
politics', in which the central problem of democratic politics was the mediation of a 
variety of interests, whose main concerns were distributive justice claims, to a 'new 
paradigm of politics' in which the mediation of conflicts over values or cultural codes 
becomes the central problem overlaying interest concerns (Offe, 1987b, 65). The 
sphere of political action thus shifts to a new space, that of noninstitutional politics, 
in tandem with the institutions of liberal democracy and the welfare state. The values 
espoused by the actors in this political sphere are concerned with autonomy and 
identity (Offe, 1987b, 74). 
In attempting to represent the multiplicity of issues in contemporary societies, 
radical movements have not only exposed the problem of balance in complex 
systems, they have also challenged the myth of linear progress. They see 
conventional progress as completely antithetical to the values and identities which 
they espouse. The survival of humankind is not to be found in economic growth and 
the progressive realization of some idealized social and moral order through 
technical-bureaucratic modernization, but in the establishment of social and political 
arrangements less conditional on the technical and bureaucratic apparatus of the old 
paradigm. 
The reaction of collective movements to the destructive penetration of 
systemic rationalization into, what Habermas (1981) calls the "lifeworld" 26 , has been 
26Habermas defines those areas of life outside the spheres driven by the steering mechanisms of 
money and power, the administrative and economic spheres, as the "lifeworld". 
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interpreted by him as a defense of society "against instrumental rationalization that 
has become irrational, against over-differentiation and over-complexity" (Cohen, 
1983, 109). But as Cohen points out, this is not the only function of radical 
movements. They also fulfill an active role in reshaping and creating democratic 
structures or, as Melucci (1988, 254) would have it, the conflicts generated by 
contemporary movements function to "prevent the system closing in on itself by 
obliging ruling groups to innovate, to permit changes among elites, to admit what 
was previously excluded from the decision-making arena and to explore the shadowy 
zones of invisible power and silence which a system and its dominant interests 
inevitably tend to create". Before I explore the creative potential of movements, I 
think it would be useful to look at the inadequacy of existing political structures in 
light of the proper functioning of complex societal systems, for the role and the 
promise that social movements have in democratization processes will thereby 
become clearer. 
2.2.5: Structural Inadequacy 
As noted previously, the conflicts that new social movements symbolise have 
shifted to concerns about values of autonomy and identity. They "no longer arise in 
areas of material production; they are no longer channelled through parties and 
organizations; and they can no longer be alleviated by compensations that conform to 
the system" (Habermas, 1981, 33). Western political systems based on parliamentary 
parties and bureaucratically-structured governmental institutions are no longer able to 
cope with rapid change and complexity and simultaneously maintain some level of 
certainty and predictability. A number of theorists, including Claus Offe, have 
elaborated on these inadequacies as a factor in the rise of an alternative site of 
politics. 
The period of cultural criticism that began in the 1960s, revealing the dark 
side of capitalism and the side-effects of economic growth and "blind progress", met 
with little response from the dominant political institutions. Indeed, theorists of the 
time, such as Smelser (1962), interpreted social movements merely as symptoms of a 
breakdown in the system, which could be repaired with appropriate public policy 
procedures. However, as Offe (1990, 246-250) maintains, it is the "poverty of public 
policy" that explains the persistence of "fundamentalist" (read: radical) tendencies in 
contemporary social movements. The means available to governments for 
intervention, including regulation, surveillance, and the use of state sponsored 
violence, fiscal policy, and persuasion, are limited in their effectiveness in the areas 
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that social movements raise as issues, because the latter are areas of concern outside 
the economic interests of social actors. 
The proliferation of value-conflicts and their agents, social movements, 
illustrate the inadequacy of strategies of structural reform in addressing the kinds of 
issues they raise. The use of these structural reform measures, characterized by Offe 
as 'crisis management', is dependent upon sustained growth to diffuse contradictions 
inherent in capitalist systems. The frustrated expectations which result from funding 
reductions in the areas of health and education following the sustained growth and 
full employment years of the postwar period have exposed the weaknesses in welfare 
capitalist arrangements and contributed to the crises of legitimacy which now afflict 
western democracies. This 'crisis of crisis management' is marked by the "fiscal 
crisis of the state and the decreasing ability of the mass party or [trade] union to 
provide social identities and integrate mass participation" (Cohen, 1982, 24). Cohen 
summarizes the shortcomings of structural reform thus: 
In short, the crisis of crisis management refers to the inability of 
welfare state type reform to compensate dysfunctional social 
consequences of capitalist production without (a) infringing on the 
capital relation; (b) transferring contradictions into the 
administrative system (overburdened with demands); or (c) 
undermining the legitimation necessary for the functional capacity 
of the state. 
Indeed, Pakulslci (1990, 62) makes the additional point that the crisis also brings into 
question the "very ideological raison d'etat, the ability of the system to live up to its 
foundational values" 27 . The situation is one where the rigidities of the established 
political institutions prevent them from being able to intermediate the variability and 
types of issues raised by collective actors, while parliamentary institutions have lost 
their role as the locus of control. It is a 'legitimacy crisis' brought on by their 
challenge to the principle of exchange as the dominant organizational principle of 
capitalist societies which is the source of the radical character of contemporary 
movements. 
Political parties have also suffered a loss of legitimacy through their inability 
to respond to these new conflicts centred around the burdens imposed by 
modernization on everyday life and identity (Brand, 1990, 32). Suzanne Berger 
27For a feminist critique of the inadequacies of the liberal state in responding to the fragmentation and 
plurality of postindustrial societies, see Balbo (1987) and Fraser (1989). 
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(1979, 27) has pointed the finger at Left and Right and parties generally for their 
failure to respond to these crises; to "the Left's failure to link its transformative vision 
• to contemporary social conflicts and to define alternative strategies and outcomes; to 
the Centre-Right's failure to replace the worn-out formulas of the fat years of growth 
with reformist strategies for the lean years; in general to the parties' incapacity to 
translate new aspirations into political projects". The ideologies of the dominant 
political interests have therefore lost their "unifying force" and new and more varied 
channels of political interest have been created (Kaase, 1990, 96). 
The specific structural problems that have prevented the traditional political 
parties from relating to the issues and value-conflicts raised by new social 
movements have been explored by Birgitta Nedelmann (1984). The individualistic, 
diffuse and long-term nature of the demands articulated by movements could not be 
translated into specific demands that would be attractive to particular categories of 
voters. Issues such as equal pay and the provision of child-care centres can be 
relatively easily satisfied but species depletion and conservation of biodiversity or the 
defense of locality or cultural diversity are not easily translated into quantifiable 
demands. Secondly, the traditional parties are unable to mediate the type or the 
intensity of the values advocated by the new movements. Since they are essentially 
ethical/moral issues which cannot be solved by compromise, the parties' decision-
making processes which are predicated on compromise prevent them from mediating 
between the demands of movements and the political arena. Thirdly, the 
unconventional instruments of political action employed by them are discounted as 
illegitimate means of political action by political parties because they do not fit neatly 
with their own "routinized forms of political action" and because they present both 
threat and challenge (Nedelmann, 1984, 1043). The most significant challenge to 
political parties is the demand for more participation in decision-making, since direct 
participation is a threat to the principle of representative democracy, the basis of elite 
power in liberal democracies (Nedelmann, 1984, 1044). 
Transformation of mass milieu parties appears a distant prospect for they 
would need to adopt the more flexible forms of organizational structure identified by 
Kaase (1990, 98) as being attractive to new social movement adherents. Additional 
impediments exist in the close economic alliances between the established parties 
and their constitutencies. The influence of trade unions on democratic socialist 
parties in times of economic downturn is such that it is impossible to accord a high 
profile to environmental concerns when the parties rely on the electoral support of 
trade union membership, which perceives green concerns as job-threatening (Miller- 
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Rommel, 1990, 210). Similar considerations apply between parties of the Right and 
their corporate and small business constitutencies, while governments of all 
persuasions are often hostage to the imperatives of transnational capital and the threat 
of capital flight. 
The emergence of contemporary movements not only reduces the legitimacy 
of political parties but in organizing politically through the formation of green and 
peace parties they directly work to "lower the centrality of political parties in the 
networks of interest intermediation" by developing new modes of participation and 
collective decision-making (Kitschelt, 1990, 180). Green parties envision a political 
system in which political parties are only one of a number of decision-making bodies, 
that is, where there is a multiplicity of democratic structures. The post-industrial 
framework party is characterized by the devolution of party organization in 
contradistinction to the strongly centralized party organizations of the mass apparatus 
parties, whose electoral success is enabled by their ability to galvanize voters and 
achieve effective policy formation simultaneously (Kitschelt, 1986). The New 
Politics parties introduce an alternative set of values and programmes which 
challenge the conventional parties' policies of unrestrained growth and security 
through military might. They adopt radical issue positions that parties of the 
dominant ideologies are unable to countenance (Muller-Rommel, 1990, 230). 
The developments outlined above are reflected in an increasing 
unpredictability in politics (Beck, 1992, 190). The last several decades have 
witnessed a weakening in the rigid ideological sympathies of voters and a rise in 
unpredictability in voting behaviour. Commentators in Australia and New Zealand, 
for example, have noted a considerable decline in the two-party vote over the last two 
decades from close to 100 percent to around 80 percent. In addition, party 
hierarchies in western democracies find themselves expending more and more 
resources in pursuit of the support of a growing proportion of swinging voters. Beck 
notes that in Germany the proportion had grown from 10 percent in 1963 to 
somewhere between 20 and 40 per cent in the 1980s. The gap, which the 
phenomenon of a large proportion of swinging voters represents, between the 
expectations of the electors and the ability of the established parties to respond to 
those expectations, is taken up by the parties of the New Politics and by a resurgent 
ultra-Right, which have been shown to be maintaining their share of votes and seats 
in representative democracies throughout Western Europe (Miiller-Rommel, 1990, 
216). 
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2.2.6: The Crisis of Legitimacy and the New Political Culture 
• I have described how more issues have become political; how the boundaries 
of the public and private domains have been blurred and reconstituted through the 
efforts of feminists and peace and environmental activists (Maier, 1987, 20-21; 
Palculslci, 1990, 41). The dominant political institutions have been shown to be 
incapable of responding adequately to the crisis of environmental degradation and 
other value conflicts, a situation which has engendered a distrust and cynicism in 
political institutions and ideologies. The kinds of policy and structural reforms 
available to the liberal capitalist state fall far short of the response required, while 
political parties likewise are unable to mediate the nature of the demands, nor the 
type and intensity of the values that radical social movements represent. What this 
situation demonstrates is that human needs and the needs of the planet are far richer 
and more complex than liberal democratic capitalism allows (Maier, 1987, 14). As a 
consequence, the legitimacy of the core institutions of parliamentary democracy is 
under threat (Pakulski, 1990, 40-41). The conditions for "sociopolitical blockage" 
(Pakulski, 1990, 53-55) are established when "normal measures" fail to handle 
developments which "threaten collective values and identities". Such a legitimacy 
crisis is likely to generate mass mobilizations. 
The years since the 1960s have witnessed significant changes in the political 
culture and in the institutions of politics or, as Maier (1987, 2) would have it, "a 
change in the substance of politics interacted with a change in the instruments of 
politics". The traditional tasks of politics - security and distribution - have been 
found wanting and the institutions unresponsive to the new tasks demanded of 
politics that emerged after this period. The issues raised concern the quality of life 
and human survival, wherein politics has been called upon "to protect the 
environment from despoliation, [and] to create a milieu for authenticity and 
participation" (Maier, 1987, 9). However, as we have seen, the traditional 
institutions are incapable of progressing the "new agenda" and new collective 
movements, unfettered by established political constraints, have acted to reshape the 
political agenda and its institutions. 
The new political culture has been characterized by Giddens (1991) as one of 
life politics, which he describes as a "politics of life decisions". Because personal 
decisions now have global ramifications, social relations are more intimately 
connected to the project of the self. Thus, because one's life-style choices are 
intimately related to the survival of the planet, life politics raises questions of an 
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existential/moral nature concerning how one should live one's life and "brings back 
to prominence precisely those ... questions repressed by the core institutions of 
modernity. ... Life political issues supply the central agenda for the institutionally 
repressed. They call for a remoralising of social life and they demand a renewed 
sensitivity to questions that the institutions of modernity systematically dissolve" 
(Giddens, 1991, 223-224). In the domain of existence and human/nature 
connections, the novel question of the responsibilities of humans to nature is placed 
on the political agenda. 
To recapitulate, I have detailed how the substance of politics has changed to 
include questions of values which the instruments of politics are ill-equipped to 
address, while fewer and fewer issues can be described as non-political and hence 
non-controversial. As Offe (1987b, 64-65) observes, the traditional instruments - 
"etatism, political regulation, and the inclusion of ever more issues on the agendas of 
bureaucratic authorities" - cannot resolve the burgeoning number of conflicts facing 
advanced industrial societies. In this context, Beck (1992) discerns an unbinding of 
politics, in which the concept of a central focus to politics is being challenged by the 
formation of citizens' action groups and social movements outside the umbrella of 
orthodox institutions (Beck, 1992, 190). He also sees a second, simultaneously 
occurring trend wherein "the potential for structuring society migrates from the 
political system into the sub-political system of scientific, technological and 
economic modernization" (Beck, 1992, 186). The political is transferred to the 
sphere of the non-political. However the changes are more complex than a simple 
migration of power. At the same time, the side-effects engendered by the systems of 
techno-science and economics become the. subject of discourse and require 
legitimation before a public increasingly critical of the risks to public wellbeing. The 
role of justifying the socially-transforming decisions taken in techno-science and 
business falls to the politicians, who have no part in those decisions, yet must assume 
responsibility for them. And still the fixation with the political system as the centre 
of politics persists, even though the decisions which transform society have moved to 
the sphere of sub-politics28 (Beck, 1992, 186). Beck (1992, 193) further argues that 
this process of disempowering and unbinding of politics ensues from the process of 
democratization, when "rights are protected, social burdens redistributed, 
consultation made possible, wherever citizens become active". Politics becomes 
generalized and decentralized with the possibility for a multiplicity of democratically 
28Beck designates that arena of socially transformative decision-making which is separate from the 
formal political sphere as the sphere of "sub-politics". It includes the technical/scientific and business 
spheres. 
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organized structures. These clusters of democratic activity may be organized around 
"issues, categories, persons, or basic dynamics of the larger society" (Calhoun, 
1992a, 38). 
What would such a conception imply for the traditional instruments of 
politics? The perception of politics as the central locus where decisions are made is 
yet to catch up with the reality, for as Beck (1992, 233-234) argues, modernity has 
opened up a "scope of action" of far greater breadth than the orthodox understanding 
permits. It is already being taken up and used by various groups in society. If, as I 
suggested above, the fiction of a centralized politics and political institutions is 
discarded, the reality that socially and environmentally transforming decisions are 
being made in board-rooms and the research establishments of techno-science 
without democratic legitimation (such as those by genetic engineers on the future of 
the human species and by major logging companies on the utilization of native 
forests) can proceed more clearly into view. 
Hand in hand with the generalization of politics, political relationships 
themselves have acquired renewed importance in the functioning of complex modern 
societies. Melucci (1988, 251-252) contends that "never before has it been so 
necessary to regulate complexity by means of decisions, choices and 'policies', the 
frequency and diffusion of which must be ensured if the uncertainty of systems 
subject to exceptionally rapid change is to be reduced". He attributes this process of 
'politicization' to the complexity of information systems, to rapid change in society's 
systems and to an increasing need to maintain balance within the system itself. 
The dilemma that arises with the migration of decision-making to the area of 
sub-politics is how to •allow freedom of enquiry and appropriate knowledge 
acquisition without the restrictive effects of bureaucratic regulation and centralized 
decision-making. Beck's answer is to encourage and institutionally protect self-
criticism within organizations as an essential ingredient in a system of self-control. 
The preconditions for self-control consist of the establishment of alternative 
evaluations, practices, discussions about the consequences of technical and scientific 
practice, and avenues for expression of repressed scepticism. Techno-science does 
not have all the answers and it certainly cannot ask the appropriate questions of its 
own practice, when it acts as if it has a monopoly on truth and knowledge. A strong 
and independent judiciary and media are seen as crucial underpinnings for a system 
of sub-political control (Beck, 1992, 234). 
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Although the last several decades have witnessed increasing politicization of 
the non-political sphere (that is, in the multiplication of autonomous decision-making 
centres at one level and at another the reappropriation of everyday life matters by 
collective movements), as yet "we are still acting out the play according to the script 
of industrial society" (Beck, 1992, 233). There has not been any widespread 
penetration of democracy into the spheres of everyday life, although the monopoly of 
politics on policy is collapsing. The "democratization of everyday life" is occurring 
at that level of the non-political where society, through the actions and demands of 
contemporary movements, is encouraged to "assume responsibility for its own issues, 
demands and conflicts [subjecting] them openly to negotiation and to decisions and 
transform[ing] them into possibilities of change" (Melucci, 1988, 259). This is not to 
say that the traditional political instruments and the organizations of business and 
science lack effective means of blunting the demands of radical groups who 
challenge the formers' decision-making and practices (Crowley, 1994). Indeed, there 
has been a concerted rear-guard response from business and related interests (Beder, 
1997). 
It is not clear whether contemporary movements foreshadow the forms of 
sociopolitical organization of the future. Giddens (1991, 228) is sceptical, although 
he does concede that life politics might stimulate "the development of forms of social 
order on the other side of modernity itself' and these would probably be different 
from those that predominate now (Giddens, 1991, 214). Melucci (1988, 1989) on the 
other hand does perceive indications for future political forms in the contradictions 
between contemporary movements and the established system. The zones of contact 
between political institutions and collective demands are envisaged as developing 
public spaces, whose main function is to highlight the concerns raised by the 
movements and thus to enable complex societies to acknowledge and address the 
'quality of life' issues confronting them, precisely because in such societies "no one 
appears to be responsible for the goals of social life" (Melucci, 1989, 79). These 
public spheres of representation should operate in areas that are oriented towards 
expressing the demands and contradictions of society, such as the knowledge-
producing institutions and the communications media, as well as the area of 
collective consumption - health, transport, housing, and community services. 
Melucci (1989, 79) envisages that they 
would provide social actors with the opportunity to appear and to 
make themselves heard, without losing their particular character or 
autonomy. Through these channels, the questions raised by 
collective action could become the subject of policy-making 
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negotiations, thereby having effects on the social system as a 
whole, without institutionalizing the actors of movements. 
This may only be the case where social movements are accorded an authentic social 
role, but where they are perceived to be no more than ephemeral irritants by the 
dominant interests, there is little likelihood of such an innovation. Most potential for 
social transformation exists in those spheres of public life less directly impinged 
upon by the imperatives of state and transnational capital, namely at the local 
government level (Dryzek, 1995). 
Yet Melucci thinks that there is good reason to view contemporary 
movements, not as a failure of politics, but as essential actors in the process of social 
and political life of complex societies. They contribute to the reform of society by 
obliging dominant groups to innovate; they compel changes among elites; and they 
press for the admission of previously excluded issues to decision-making agendas, 
while also exposing relations of power, often obscured behind the objective 
constraints of techno-scientific decision-making (Melucci, 1989, 79). 
It is possible to envisage a plurality of independent public spaces whose 
principal function is to encourage responsible decision-making among all actors in 
society. The effect of accepting responsibility for the side-effects produced by their 
actions would be to reduce the uncertainty and perhaps ameliorate the complexity of 
modern life, for as Beck (1992, 227) observes, denial of risks can have the opposite 
of what is usually intended, instead causing general destabilization. 
2.2.7: The Critical Public Reconceived 
The crises of the late twentieth century have rekindled interest in the concept 
of the critical public sphere and the role of social movements as critical elements in 
the functioning of complex modern societies. However, systemic legitimacy crisis 
and the failure of democratic institutions to generate common purpose necessitates a 
rethink of liberal democracy's discursive spheres. To recapitulate, in the eighteenth 
century, the bourgeois public sphere operated as an area of debate and opinion 
formation between the realm of public authority (the state) and the private domain of 
civil society (which included private economic relations and the sphere of intimate 
familial relations). Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the public sphere 
degenerated into a stage for public acclamation of special interest group actors and 
politicians, while the public was effectively excluded from public debate and 
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decision-making, essentially as a result of the coupling of the state and the public 
sphere. In the late twentieth century the nature and the function of the area of critical 
debate is undergoing further transformation, for the depoliticization and 'unbinding' 
of politics necessitates a reconception of the critical public sphere. Melucci, Giddens 
and Beck are of the opinion that the complexities and contradictions of modernizing 
systems of advanced industrial society furnish the conditions for the repoliticization 
of many spheres of existence and the reintroduction of questions of a 
moral/existential nature. 
A reconceived arena of critical debate would differ in both form and function 
to the early liberal public sphere. The idea of one public sphere would be replaced 
with a network of overlapping critical publics operating at different levels of society, 
perhaps as envisaged by Calhoun (1992b, 37), as a "field of discursive connections 
[consisting] of clusters of relatively greater density of communication within the 
looser overall field". These new areas of representation should mediate the spaces 
between the market, the state, parliamentary institutions, techno-science and business 
organizations, and spheres of social existence. In turn the formation of self-critical 
publics within the spheres of sub-politics may be stimulated and professional groups 
in these areas brought closer to the socially and environmentally transforming effects 
of their interventions, thus shifting responsibility for legitimation from the formal 
political institutions. 
Critical debate for the formation of public opinion would not be the 
preeminent raison d'être of these spheres, although it would remain an important 
function, but rather self-criticism, both at the level of sub-politics and in wider 
society at the points of contact between the demands of everyday life and the 
established institutions of government and bureaucracy. A strong and independent 
media would be crucial to the effective functioning of the principle of self-criticism 
and to allow the assumption of responsibility through the exposure of risks. An 
effective media should be "neither wholly controlled by the state nor concentrated in 
the hands of large-scale commercial organizations" (Thompson, 1990, 119). The 
potential of media barons to control important societal processes such as the outcome 
of elections is inimical to the proper functioning of a democratic society. Similarly, 
the right to criticism must be protected. In this respect, "whistleblower" legislation is 
essential and a new culture that rewards rather than despises whistleblowers is a 
necessary development. Scientists, engineers, bureaucrats and other professionals 
would then be able to report on the risks and side-effects that they see in their own 
and others' work with impunity: 
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The right to criticism within professions and organizations, like the 
right to strike, ought to be fought for and protected in the public 
interest. This institutionalization of self-criticism is so important 
because in many areas neither the risks nor the alternative methods 
to avoid them can be recognized without the proper technical 
know-how (Beck, 1992, 234). 
Presently neither science nor business takes full responsibility for the side-effects of 
their decision-making and their interventions. Instead, politics shoulders the 
responsibility for practices and decisions over which it has no control and as long as 
this remains the case the generation of side-effects will continue (Beck, 1992, 227). 
Legitimation for these socially transforming actions, which are not subject 
to democratic scrutiny, is provided by faith in the doctrine of 'progress'. It is 
'progress' which allows science the privileged position of non-responsibility for the 
social and environmental changes which it engenders, thereby subverting the 
fundamental demands of democracy (Beck, 1992, 214). The problems of social and 
environmental change come as an afterthought, trailing full employment, the 
primacy of the market, international competitiveness and so on. There is always 
faith that, whatever the risks of a proposed intervention, there will be a technological 
solution available to ameliorate the side-effects. But too many side-effects means 
too many risks and therefore too much insecurity and uncertainty. The possibility of 
an authoritarian politics emanating from calls for 'strong political leadership' when 
voters lose faith and become apathetic and cynical about the ability of political 
institutions to address the insecurities that beset them is not to be ignored. As Beck 
(1992, 228) warns: "The hunger for order and reliability would revive the spectres of 
the past. The side-effects of a politics that ignores side-effects would threaten to 
destroy politics itself'. To avoid the disaster of an authoritarian solution to the 
uncertainties and risks that surround us, a revised and revitalized institutional 
framework such as that proposed above is a necessary precondition. 
I have outlined the case for a different model of socio-political organization; 
one that recognizes trends towards a generalization of democracy and the reality of a 
decentralized politics; that has, as its constitutive elements, spheres of discursive 
deliberation aimed at clarifying the general interest; and that is directed towards 
encouraging all actors, collective and individual, to assume responsibility for the 
consequences of their own decisions and practices in the light of the discursively 
decided common good. The role of a strong and independent media as a vehicle for 
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the reinforcement of the principle of self-criticism in this new model of associational 
life is viewed as crucial. Self-criticism should be encouraged and institutionally 
protected for, as Beck (1992, 234) observes: 
Enabling self-criticism in all its forms is not some sort of danger, 
but probably the only way that the mistakes that would sooner or 
later destroy our world can be detected in advance. 
2.3: Contemporary Collective Criticism 
I have situated contemporary collective action against a background of 
increasing societal differentiation, complexity and contradiction, of growing 
uncertainty and rising ins'ecurity resulting from exposure to the risks and side-effects 
generated by industrial society's seeming inability to take responsibility for its 
contribution to the degradation and devastation of the biosphere. The current round 
of collective action has been interpreted as a renewed wave of cultural criticism in 
response to the negative side-effects - reflected in ecological, economic and social 
crises - resulting from the period of rapid industrial and technological change that has 
followed World War 2. The crises that beset western societies have been 
demonstrated as not amenable to the existing reform measures available to liberal 
capitalist political institutions. Neither can public policy solutions diffuse the crisis 
of legitimacy facing the dominant political interests, nor can the established 
instruments of interest intermediation adequately represent the number and types of 
issues and value conflicts that the proliferation of interest groups, voluntary 
associations and new social movements represent. 
In the political sphere, the crises facing western societies and the inability of 
the systems of governance to respond adequately to them results in a high degree of 
elector apathy, cynicism and unpredictability, reflected in the breakdown of voter 
loyalty to the established parties and a movement towards parties which more nearly 
represent the values of the postwar generations, the parties of the New Politics 
(Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984b, Ch. 15). This new political cleavage cuts across 
preceding issue cleavages - democratic rights and social justice - and introduces 
valence issues to the forefront of the political agenda (Inglehart, 1984; Papadalcis, 
1988; Poguntke, 1993). The "social roots" of the old milieu parties have become 
blurred and politics is no longer the politics of class but of values (Inglehart, 1984; 
Scott, 1990, 29; Veen, 1989, 32). More specifically, the new cleavage is a conflict 
about interpretations of values; between the dominant core values of materialism and 
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an alternative set of postmaterial values 29. Linked to this fundamental value clash is 
disagreement about whether market forces should override public interest and 
whether political structures should be expert-directed or should operate with the 
active participation of citizens. There is debate over whether society should be 
centralized or decentralized; and also over the use of knowledge, between infinite 
faith in science and technology and a perception that there are social limits to science 
(Papadalcis, 1988, 442). Above all it is the conflict over nature, whether resources 
are ample or limited together with the ecological contradictions that are manifesting, 
that is the catalyst for the mobilization of the wave of green movements against the 
negative side-effects of industrial modernity (Eder, 1990a, 21). 
A number of long-term changes in socioeconomic spheres have been 
recognized as factors contributing to the emergence of the new politics orientation 
(Poguntke, 1993, Ch. 3). These include an increase in the level of affluence that 
accompanied the period of postwar economic growth; the restructuring of the labour 
force from its predominantly industrial base to the tertiary or service sector; and 
expansion in the urbanized population with its concomitant weakening of traditional 
social networks and institutional/party loyalties (Dalton, Beck, and Flanagan, 1984a, 
5-7). Parallel with these changes came expanding educational opportunities resulting 
in higher levels of cognitive mobilization and hence in increasingly sophisticated 
electorates (Dalton et al., 1984a, 470; Inglehart, 1990, 44). 
Improvements in education have been accompanied by better information-
handling skills and, with that development, an explosion of information resources, 
which has resulted in the increasing democratization of access to a rapidly expanding 
body of complex and sophisticated knowledge, particularly for the middle classes 
with most access to the educational facilities that are necessary for participation in 
the information society. These developments in political sophistication and the 
dissemination of information signal changes in the class structure of western 
societies, and particularly the role of the new middle class, as identified by Offe 
(1985). It is this particular section of industrial society that is most clearly aligned 
with the postmaterial values that have spawned the new politics parties of the last 
two decades. Moreover, it is these two factors that have facilitated the emergence of 
the most recent collective movements, movements which challenge the core 
291t should be noted that these criteria fit not only the progressive new politics groups referred to here 
but also social movements of the populist right. The single characteristic which differentiates 
progressive social movements from the latter is their commitment to democratic politics. Groups 
belonging to the right are more usually concerned with issues of power and control - eg. law and order 
is usually a high priority - and therefore they are susceptible to autocratic forms of organization. 
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assumptions of industrial modernity. With the expansion in information resources 
and technology, new ideas can be widely and rapidly disseminated to a larger 
proportion of the population. The process of public opinion formation, once largely 
the province of elite groups, is thus open to other actors with the required capacity to 
access information resources and technology. This development has wrought 
considerable change in the level of public influence on decision-making processes 
(Dalton et al., 1984a, 7; Papadalcis, 1989, 78). It constitutes a significant factor in the 
emergence and persistence of new social movements and their associated political 
arms. In addition, partly as a consequence of higher levels of cognitive mobilization, 
disenchantment with the restricted role of citizens in the elite-directed, representative 
model of democracy has precipitated a "participatory revolution", which in turn has 
opened up new channels of political influence (Kaase, 1984). Contemporary 
collective movements represent one such alternative to the traditional avenues of 
interest intermediation and political influence. 
2.3.1: The Challenge to Modernist Ideology 
Modern societies have experienced a century of conflicting and contradictory 
social progress and gradual democratization through the application of reason, as 
well as the irrationality of total war, fascism, genocide and repression. Alexander 
(1990, 26) refers to this tendency of modern life as the "nightmare of reason", and, as 
he soberly concludes, "even when the darkest shadows of antimodernity have been 
avoided, the twentieth century has been haunted by a sense of disappointment with 
modern life". The emergence of new forms of collective action in the latter half of 
this century, as I have argued, is a response to this disillusionment and to the side-
effects of a modernity driven by an instrumental rationality that treats nature as other, 
as another factor or force of production. New social movements, as representatives 
of the most recent wave of cultural criticism, challenge industrial society on both 
ideological and systemic levels. At the level of ideology they dispute the core, 
normative assumptions of modernity, while at the systemic level they query the 
structures and organizational styles of the various spheres of society - social, political 
and economic. 
The new social movements are not only a response to modernization 
processes; they are indeed active participants in their own creation. Paradoxically it 
is the conditions of "stability, prosperity and consensus" engendered by the postwar 
bureaucratic capitalist welfare state that have provided them with the instruments 
(that is, education and cognitive development) for their ideological and systemic 
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critique of the goals of modernity (Crook et al., 1992). I contend that they are the 
progenitors of that alternative modernity prefigured in the writings of Montaigne. In 
the following sections I discuss the core assumptions of the dominant modernization 
processes; I consider what is problematic about those assumptions for the future of 
the planet; and I also elucidate the conception of modernity that ecological 
movements might articulate. I also attempt to identify the challenge that new social 
movements, particularly green or ecological movements represent and, most 
significantly, their creative, transformative capacity. 
The core assumptions of the modern age are predicated on a specific symbolic 
code which societies since the age of Enlightenment have conceived as the 
foundation for a modern society. The body of thought underlying the modern era is 
founded on two concepts: 
• that society should be distanced from all earlier premodern cultural traditions 
and 
• that society should be constituted independently of the vagaries of nature (Eder, 
1990a, 26). 
The urgent necessity of erecting a radically different society meant that modern 
societies were constituted in the breach (Moscovici, 1990, 8). Society is thus 
conceived in the negative - negative to cultural tradition and negative to nature. 
This is the theme that underlies all modern rationalist thinking and action systems 
and gives rise to a "general anthropomorphism" in which "the model of human action 
and interaction is the standard of comparison for the interaction between men and 
nature" (Eder, 1990a, 27). 
The key issues of modernity centre on the notion of progress and its 
realization through the application of science and technology. The project of the 
mastery of nature which would liberate society from the limitations of nature and 
hence lead to its moral progress has come under increasing pressure. As Berman 
(1981, 189) observes however, this project is only a "partial response in the human 
being". Underlying this particular conception of modernization is a model of 
rationality that ironically excludes moral considerations from humanity's connections 
with nature. With nature as object, the relationship to nature can only be an 
instrumental one. It is a one-way relationship that results in the increasing 
subjugation of nature to the criterion of greater and greater efficiency in its use. Eder 
(1990b) argues that there is an alternative tradition of rationality that derives from a 
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different cultural tradition in western societies' relations with nature. Its origins are 
to be found in the Jewish code of "ritual purity", which "implied a harmonious or 
peaceful relation to nature, where nature is defined in such a way that limits its use by 
human beings" (Eder, 1990b, 73). This tradition has been largely latent in modernity, 
periodically surfacing with various Romanticist movements and more recently with 
movements concerned with animal rights and vegetarianism. However, its most 
significant expression, Eder (1990b, 73) contends, is the emergence of the ecological 
movement, which is both a social and cultural movement. Thus "as a social 
movement it continues the conception of 'material' rationality of the old movements, 
the working class movements and the bourgeois movements", in that equal rights and 
social justice remain significant notions, but "as a cultural movement it goes beyond 
this rationality and pleads for a rationality that puts into question not only the social 
relations of production, domination and consumption, but also the symbolic forms 
serving as the medium of these social relations" (Eder, 1990b, 73-74) 30. The 
utilitarian version of practical reason excludes a moral connection with nature. In 
modern societies, it is insufficiently counterbalanced by a form of practical reason 
largely restricted to modern family life and only partially actualized into the political 
sphere as human rights, that is, communicative reason. Communicative reason is 
"based on the rationality of equality and discursive argumentation", while 
encompassing a moral approach to nature and recognizing limits to the human use of 
nature (Eder, 1990b, 75). 
Given the negative social and environmental consequences so far manifested 
from sole reliance on the instrumental mode of rationality, Eder argues, firstly, for a 
version of rationality and progress based on a fusion of the two traditions that 
integrates the strategic/utilitarian with the communicative, and secondly, for a 
different interpretation of moral progress which is not exclusively related to 
technological progress. Ecological movements are the principal vehicles for 
dissociating the idea of moral progress from technological progress by identifying the 
irrationality and self-destructiveness of the technological subjugation of nature. In 
the process they furnish alternative rationalities, an alternative model of moral 
progress, and an alternative social construction of nature. 
The ecological crisis has served to thematize and problematize the 
society/nature relationship. Ecological movements are engaged in the process of 
redefining this connection and, in so doing, they are developing a competing model 
30Eder (1992, 336ff.) further develops the idea of an alternative rationality using Weber's "material" 
rationalization as distinct from the "formal" rationality of the dominant code of modernity. 
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of modernity. They have a vision of society that "to be sure secures individual rights 
and material wellbeing but within nature, not beyond it and in harmony with nature, 
not in spite of it" (Eder, 1990a, 39). Further, the problem of reproducing society in 
nature, which, under the approach of technological progress, was a problem of 
"controlling the political and economic reproduction of modern social systems", has 
become the problem of "ecological reproduction" (Eder, 1990a, 42). The problem of 
nature is not only a technical one; it is an ethical problem that demands a 
reconception of the moral basis of modernity, in order to reconceive "another 
modernity, a society that is able to question not only its social relations of production 
and the institutions endorsing them but also its relations with nature" (Eder, 1990a, 
43). Ecology movements, in seeking to redefine the culture/nature boundary, strive 
to direct society's attention to the fragility of its relationship with nature and to 
modify how society sees itself in relation to nature. 
Collectively, ecological theorists and activists articulate a vision which 
challenges the prevailing anthropocentric, patriarchal and hierarchical relations, 
assumptions and world-views and endeavours to replace them with an ecocentric 
culture, which Eckersley (1992a, 188) contends is "crucial to achieving a lasting 
solution to the ecological crisis [since] it is only in those political communities in 
which an ecocentric sensibility is widely shared that there will be a general consensus 
in favour of the kinds of far-reaching, substantive reforms that will protect biological 
diversity and life-support systems". The 'interconnected web of relations' view of the 
world espoused by ecocentrists challenges anthropocentrism by redefining what is 
morally relevant (Eckersley, 1992a, 49). The belief that moral value can only reside 
in human nature, that the rest of nature has little or no moral value other than an 
instrumental one, is not tenable in an ecocentric culture. Such insights ground the 
actions of green movement activists and supporters in their networks of everyday life 
and in their reformist attempts to remoralize social and political life by reinstituting 
the notion of the common good on the political agenda and by persuading society to 
take responsibility for the side-effects of its actions and for the ecological health of 
other cultures, other species and ecosystems. 
2.3.2: The Challenge to Modernist Institutions: The New Politics 
It is the dual character of new social movements, that is, their defensive and 
offensive dispositions, which underlies the challenge that they represent to existing 
sociopolitical and cultural codes. This duality has been linked to the 
system/lifeworld distinction by Cohen and Arato (1992, 524), who find in 
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Habermas's formulation of an incomplete modernity a basis for understanding why 
contemporary movements seek to operate in the political and economic spheres (the 
system). In their view, previous theories of collective action inadequately explain 
why some movements are constrained to act in both the system and the lifeworld. By 
developing elements of resource mobilization theory and the 'identity-oriented 
paradigm', they propose instead a dual logic of collective action. Thus the defensive 
aspect of movements is not restricted to defense of the lifeworld against the 
expansion of "steering mechanisms", but also involves the development of "the 
communicative infrastructure". Habermas's insight that movements are "the carriers 
of the potentials of cultural modernity" is indispensable to an understanding of 
movement attempts to redefine identities and norms, and to democratize 
associational structures in the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987). His thesis of the 
"selective institutionalization" of the potentials of modernity in the various spheres of 
existence furnishes the basis for an understanding of the 'offensive' orientation of 
contemporary movements and why they target political and economic spheres, "the 
realms of 'mediation' between civil society and the subsystems of the administrative 
state and economy" (Cohen and Arato, 1992, 531-531). 
According to Habermas, modernization of the various spheres of society has 
been achieved through different processes. Thus strategic instrumental rationality is 
the principal modernizing agent in the subsystems of state and economy, while 
cultural modernization has enabled increased opportunities for self-reflection and for 
"decentred subjectivity", accompanied by the development of democratic 
communicatively organized institutions in the lifeworld. 
Societal rationalization has been dominated, however, by the 
imperatives of the subsystems; that is, the requirements of capitalist 
growth and administrative steering have predominated over 
lifeworld concerns. The "selective institutionalization" of the 
potentials of modernity has thus produced overcomplexity and new 
forms of power on the system side and the impoverishment and 
underdevelopment of the institutional promise of the lifeworld. 
The "colonization of the lifeworld" related to capitalist 
development and to technocratic projects of administrative elites 
has blocked and continues to block these potentials (Cohen and 
Arato, 1992, 525). 
The combination of the potential for increased self-reflection about all 
spheres of action resulting from cultural modernization and the "selective 
institutionalization" of the potentials of modernity (self-reflection, autonomy, 
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freedom, equality, and meaning) therefore gives us the how of new social of 
movements (Cohen and Arato, 1992, 524). It explains how they are able to perceive 
differentials in the fulfillment of the promise of modernity and why they press their 
demands for the democratization of both spheres of existence through the political 
and economic spheres. 
It is this dual logic of social movements that similarly facilitates an 
explanation of their double-headed organizational logic, win) they combine radical 
goals with reformist and pragmatic political practice. The formation of radical Green 
parties in the traditional political sphere is illustrative of the need that ecology 
movements have to exert pressure on the political and economic spheres in their 
pursuit of the interests of the lifeworld (where the lifeworld is interpreted to refer not 
only to civil society but to also include the life support systems of the biophysical 
world). By exerting influence on these spheres through public opinion formation and 
therefore stimulating the diffusion of communicatively-organized democratic 
structures, which are created through consensus and the ongoing questioning of 
norms, movements, in their political guise, engage in a form of "self-limiting 
radicalism", which accepts with some ambivalence the reality of parliamentary 
democracy and the market economy even as they attempt to reform these institutions 
(Papadakis, 1988, 436). In their struggle to ensure the penetration of democratizing 
influences into and over the political and economic spheres, that is, to reinstate civil 
society's control over the institutions of social life, they act to modify the pattern of 
linkages between the different spheres of society (Cohen and Arato, 1992, 509, 520). 
What is radical about the new politics of green movements is that it 
articulates a new set of political goals. Where old politics was essentially 
preoccupied with progress through economic growth predicated on consensus and a 
stable economy, the new politics requires that economic decision-making be guided 
by ecological imperatives and is concerned with a far wider range of issues and 
values, including individual autonomy, rights of participation, peace issues and 
environmental rights. Most of these goals "apart from the ecological issue and the 
strong concern with individual self-determination and self-realization ... are not 
recent inventions. It is the specific combination of goals ... as well as their radicalism 
and the higher salience attributed to them which makes the new politics a tendency in 
its own right" (Poguntke, 1993, 10). 
The advent of environmental politics in the sphere of conventional politics 
has had the effect of introducing elements of fluidity and diversity into party politics 
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(Dalton, 1994, 240), a tendency which has occasioned a shift away from the 
established parties to a citizen-based politics and which represents a challenge to the 
dominance of parties in the systems of interest intermediation. The emergence of 
green political parties has also impacted on conventional parties per se, acting as a 
source of reinvigoration for their strategies, ideologies and programmes (Papadakis, 
1989, 77). In attempting to break with the consensual politics which has typified the 
postwar period, green parties have exposed both the ideological weaknesses of 
traditional parties and their programmatic shortcomings, namely the dearth of 
coherency in party policies resulting from their 'catchall' disposition (Papadakis, 
1989, 64-65). Thus in challenging the orthodox view of economic progress, the 
greens confront conventional political parties with inconsistencies between ideology 
and policy and thereby constrain them "to broaden their own understanding: to make 
more specific links between ideology and policy statements, to incorporate concern 
about the environment, democratic rights and technological developments into their 
economic programmes" (Papadalcis, 1989, 64). 
The action style of the new politics, described as unconventional, involves the 
use of direct action techniques which may range from the signing of petitions to 
raising protest banners to blockades and occupations. Such protest techniques are 
aimed at "challenging the elites in order to assume direct influence over specific 
political decisions" (Poguntke, 1993, 10). The "politics of influence", so called by 
Cohen and Arato (1992, 526), targets the sphere of political discourse in order to 
open up the institutions of the political realm to the valence issues articulated by the 
new social movements. This critique of "democratic elitism" is distinguished from 
conventional elite-directed participation which characterizes contemporary forms of 
representative democracy, where electors choose between competing policy packages 
presented to them by party elites. The politics of the new paradigm is therefore self-
limiting in that it is not a revolutionary politics, for it does not aim to overthrow 
existing political, economic or social institutions as earlier movements did, but seeks 
to operate within existing societal structures of parliamentary democracy and market, 
while simultaneously aspiring to reorganize and reform them in a "progressive 
transcendence of modernity rather than its outright rejection" (Eyerman, 1992, 46). 
2.3.3: Green Movements and Sustainability 
The fundamental problem facing the world's societies is the sustainability of 
the planet's life support systems and how to cope with the crises engendered by 
industrial development and economic growth. The essence of the green critique is 
94 
that existing social choice mechanisms are, to a large degree, ecologically irrational 
and therefore impede sustainability. In the context of sociopolitical transformation, 
we should endeavour to assess the transformative capacity of green movements, 
whether they contribute to ecological sustainability and whether green innovations 
and transformative impacts on human systems furnish the latter with the capacity to 
respond to ecological crises. Dryzek has devised a number of criteria for evaluating 
the ecological rationality of social choice mechanisms - negative feedback, 
coordination, robustness, flexibility and resilience - which I use to gauge the answers 
to these questions, firstly applying the criteria to green movements per se and then to 
their role as transformative agents. 
In assessing the role of the green movement, it is possible to argue that as a 
critical public sphere, it performs' the function of a negative feedback mechanism. 
Berman (1981, 243) has identified the importance of negative or self-corrective 
feedback in both human and natural systems, which can exhibit one of three types of 
behaviour: "self-correction (also called steady-state), oscillation, or runaway". Thus 
"in a self-corrective system, the results of past actions are fed back into the system, 
and this new bit of information travels around the circuit, enabling the system to 
maintain something near its ideal, or optimal state. A runaway system, on the other 
hand, becomes increasingly distorted over time, because the feedback is positive, 
rather than negative or self-corrective". The problem facing human systems is that 
some spheres, predominantly economics, science and technology and, latterly, 
politics, are in runaway mode, a characteristic of which is maximizing behaviour; that 
is, the maximizing of one or more variables. In the case of western societies, it is 
"purposive rationality" in the guise of efficiency. Maximizing rationality has resulted 
in a self-destructive neglect of the homeostasis of the planet as a whole and this has 
manifested in various forms of environmental, social, economic and political crisis 
(Dryzek, 1987, Ch.2). As symptoms of extreme ecological disequilibrium, 
ecology/green movements perform a critical feedback function in a number of ways. 
Firstly, in the process of problematizing and seeking to redefine the 
society/nature relationship, these movements have alerted public opinion to the 
connection between biophysical systems and political systems or, to phrase it 
differently, their role has been to .interpret the political implications of ecological 
relationships (Princen, Finger, and Manno, 1994). They have also been responsible 
for making the connection between activity at the local level and the manifestations of 
ecological crisis on the global level, such as greenhouse gas accumulations and ozone 
depletion, and they have drawn attention to the risks of continuing the economic 
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growth model not only for human health and wellbeing but also for the survival of the 
planet as we know it (Beck, 1992, 227). 
Secondly, in querying the sustainability of continued economic growth and 
industrial development, they effectively challenge the primacy of the nation-state and 
its interdependence with liberal representative forms of democracy. They question 
the capacity of the dominant forms of political organization given their inherent 
interlocking relationship with the forces of economic production to deal with global 
ecological problems and world economic and political forces beyond their control 
(Carter, 1993; Princen et al., 1994, 224). 
Thirdly, in response to their critique of modernist forms of political and social 
organization, they have attempted to develop through experimentation alternative 
organizational forms and less harmful ways of relating to the natural world and in the 
process have contributed to societal transformation, particularly their experiments 
with direct and participatory democracy. Expanding the arena of participation can 
only improve the quality of critical debate and hence influence over policy decisions, 
although as Dryzek (1987, 120ff.) points out, to provide effective self-correction, 
debate must be elevated to the level of the common good, otherwise it will remain at 
the level of self-interest and will not generate the kind of feedback on the condition of 
human-nature systems that is required. 
Fourthly, it is green movements which are responsible for articulating the 
general interest at a time and under a culture which encourages rampant self-interest. 
Their emphasis on the common good obliges other social actors to accept 
responsibility for environmentally-damaging activities. They alert public opinion, for 
example, to the connection between the health of workers and the polluting effects of 
the industries in which they are employed and between the health of marine 
ecosystems and the nutrients and toxins washed from agricultural land into river 
systems. This sort of exposure obliges economic and political actors to shoulder their 
responsibilities for the proper provision of environmentally safe workplaces and the 
sustainability of natural systems. 
Lastly, as previously described, adherents of green movements are most likely 
to espouse postmaterial values and to originate in the new middle class, which is 
precisely the societal group exhibiting high levels of cognitive mobilization, including 
high education attainment, articulation capacity and access to information technology. 
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Undoubtedly the generation and provision of high quality information and data is a 
critical factor in the green movement's capacity as an effective feedback mechanism. 
Because the interface between human and natural systems has become so 
complex and its outcomes unpredictable, there is a need for constant high-quality 
"deviation-counteracting" input into processes of collective choice, so that appropriate 
responses can be made, that is, in minimizing the "shortfalls in the life-support 
capacities of ecosystems in combination with human systems" (Dryzek, 1987, 47). 
Green movements and their political manifestations have taken up this role in late 
modern societies, but as yet, for the entrenched systems of money and power, their 
existence is still viewed largely as nuisance value to be bought off with the odd 
concession such as a national park or recycling programme. The critical importance 
of institutionalizing spheres of self-criticism throughout all the arenas of human 
activity under conditions of severe disequilibrium between human and natural 
systems is yet to be appreciated. 
The transnational linkages between nationally-based green movements and 
globally-oriented green non-government organizations, (such as Greenpeace, Friends 
of the Earth, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature) has the potential to encourage the 
kind of coordination required on a global scale by the transboundary nature of the 
disruption to ecological processes (Princen et al., 1994, 218). It has become obvious 
that traditional nation-states and traditional politics are not equipped to deal with the 
transboundary properties of ecological problems (Dryzek, 1987, 28-33; Fuentes and 
Gunder Frank, 1993, 155-157; Princen et al., 1994, 218-220). Traditional state-
centred politics is essentially about domestic mediation of conflicting interests, and 
diplomatic compromise between competing states resting on the foundations of 
economic growth and national security (Princen et al., 1994, 219). But the politics of 
environmental crisis must necessarily be a different one, since the biophysical 
characteristics of global ecological problems - complexity, non-reducibility, 
variability, uncertainty, collectivity and spontaneity (Dryzek, 1987,28-33) - mean that 
compromise solutions within and between states are likely to be inappropriate and 
inadequate. Thus: 
When resources are near exhaustion and waste sinks near capacity, 
when environmental effects are unpredictable and irreversible, 
when further economic growth contributes more to the problem 
than to the solution, there are no compromise solutions in the 
traditional sense of politics. Where a compromise solution is 
inadequate and long-term effects are unavoidable, the politics of 
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global environmental crisis is necessarily a politics that connects 
biophysical conditions and engages a wide range of actors. It is a 
politics that defies traditional compromise solutions among states 
and their industrial partners. And it is a politics that pits state 
industrial interests against community and ecosystem interests 
(Princen et al., 1994, 220). 
While social movement activity at the state level is oriented to the indigenous 
political system, environmental activism at the global level transcends this limited 
sphere. Global environmental organizations and networks of green activists furnish a 
basis for the communities of collective action required to address these crises. In the 
process of devising, inventing and creating innovative, less harmful modes. of 
existence, not grounded on continuous quantitative growth, and in making the critical 
connections among the characteristics of ecological problems, they transcend 
traditional concerns of territorial claims and highlight both the political nature of 
biophysical limits and the link between the local and the global. They provide the 
critical linkages that translate local knowledge of ecosystem demands to the 
transnational level. 
As the imperatives of environmental organizations are not those of nation-
states, which are, rather, industrial development and maintenance of the integrity of 
the state (Carter, 1993), organizations can in fact bypass states; they do not have to 
compromise on either ethical or ecological principles; they do not have an electoral 
constituency to please; and they can prod and push states regardless. Their role at the 
transnational level is to create the conditions that regulate the behaviour of states and 
which the states would not otherwise create themselves, as in the establishment of a 
regime to counter the trade in endangered species or in pushing governments to 
implement sustainable development commitments (Princen et al., 1994, 225). At the 
local level of movement politics they can act as monitors and enforcers of 
international agreements to procure desirable environmental outcomes, as in the 
proper management of World Heritage-designated wilderness. Thus in connecting 
local activity with its global implications, in politicizing the biophysical at both state 
and international levels, and in highlighting the transboundary nature of these 
linkages, globally-oriented green movements provide the basis of coordination not 
possible under a system of nation-states. 
The crucial importance of flexibility in both human and natural systems for 
their continued survival is well recognized and involves the capacity of an organism 
or system to adapt to changing environmental conditions (Berman, 1981, 262-264; 
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Dryzek, 1987, 51-52). The history of human systems and their interaction with 
natural systems, particularly since the seventeenth century, has been one of increasing 
homogeneity and thus rigidity, resulting in monocultures in both thought and practice 
- political systems, agriculture, urban systems, art and so on. Green movements and 
parties introduce a degree of flexibility into these rigidities in that they present 
alternative ways of thinking and acting. As Berman (1981, 263) observes: 
"Flexibility in ... world views provides ... possibilities for change, evolution, and real 
survival". Flexibility is necessary for homeostasis in ecosystems and involves the 
need for constant adaptational change (not the progressive change characteristic of 
complex modernizing systems). 
The flexibility that the environmental movement introduces into existing 
political systems has been identified by Russell Dalton (1994, 243-249) as arising 
from their intrinsic diversity which manifests as a plethora of organizational forms, 
of organizational structures, of political activity, and in ideological variety. Although 
some commentators see this diversity as fragmenting and therefore a source of 
weakness, Dalton, to the contrary, maintains that it generates strength. Because the 
environmental movement consists of a diverse range of groups, it can therefore 
mobilize "a wider array of supporters than would be possible with but a single 
organizational point of view" (Dalton, 1994, 247), while the diversity of orientation 
to social change means that different groups can be drawn on for different facets of 
involvement, from direct to indirect action. Moreover, its diverse foci connote a 
wider social base than a unified environmental movement might support, while the 
diversity of appeal and style of the movement's constituent groups also signifies a 
broader political network and therefore greater opportunities for political alliances. 
The flexibility derived from diversity also gives the movement a greater range of 
political tactics, and, because different groups have different foci and objectives, it 
allows the movement to experiment, "to identify the areas of political change that are 
likely to reap the greatest rewards (for the movement and for humankind)" (Dalton, 
1994, 248). The effect of the environmental movement is to generate societal 
innovation through experiments with alternative practices and tactics, thus acting as 
agents of social environmental learning: 
In sum, by ... setting examples with concrete activities, 
environmental (movements) engage in creative and innovative 
learning processes whose results come to affect society as a whole. 
...[T]hey act as agents of social learning by linking the biophysical 
conditions with political concerns while simultaneously acting 
locally and globally. They frame the issues as both local and global 
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such that actors at all levels begin to understand the local in terms 
of the global and vice versa (Princen et al., 1994, 228). 
Such a process of social environmental learning has implications for the 
sustainability and survival of both human and natural systems (for a comprehensive 
treatment of the relationship between social environmental learning and 
sustainability, see Chapter 5.6). 
Under conditions of fundamental disequilibrium in these systems, the 
problem-solving capacity of the mechanisms of collective choice must exhibit the 
quality of resilience. Resilience refers to their "ability to steer human and ecological 
systems back to normal operating range" (Dryzek, 1987, 54). Ecology movements 
can be interpreted both as symptoms of and responses to extreme disequilibrium and, 
as such, their contribution to resilience (problem-solving capacity) is to be found in 
"their own participatory, self-transforming, trial-and-error approach and adaptability" 
(Fuentes and Gunder Frank, 1993, 155). The organizational style of green 
movements endeavours to eschew hierarchy and centralized authority and to replace 
them with networks reflecting and echoing an understanding of the inter-
connectedness and mutual dependence of all beings. Pakulski (1991, 71-76), 
following Gerlach, has characterized the organizational arrangements of social 
movements as decentralized, segmented, web-like and polycephalous, consisting of 
loosely-affiliated cells coordinated by networks which overlap within and between 
movements. The effect of such an organizational structure is to minimize the impact 
of failures and to increase movement penetration and innovation, in effect, a more 
resilient and flexible form of organization. 
In their role as agents of societal transformation, green movements have 
attempted to improve the quality and adequacy of political debate, a primary referent 
for high quality self-corrective feedback in mechanisms of social choice. Their own 
efforts at participatory, grassroots democracy have also given them a more flexible 
response to new issues as they arise, something not possible for the rigid 
organizational structures of traditional interest intermediators (Kitschelt, 1989, 248). 
Like other social movements, green movements represent a response to 
processes of increasing societal differentiation and of the consequent need to move 
beyond traditional political parties (Kaase, 1990, 98), in which, as previously 
discussed, policy-making is centralized and oriented to short-term, immediate 
possibilities, leading to the short-circuiting of feedback loops (Dryzek, 1987, 123). 
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Because movements articulate values involving the common good and their actions 
are public-oriented (Palculski, 1991, 74), they encourage political actors to look 
towards long-term possibilities and accept responsibility for the consequences of 
their activities. In so doing, they highlight deficiencies in the overall patterns of 
decision-making. Thus in bringing to public attention the long-term environmentally 
degradational effects of old-growth forest logging on stable forest ecosystems, 
movement activism has forced logging companies and supporting politicians to 
justify not only methods and rationales, but has also elevated to the political arena 
wider questions of social concern including declining employment consequent on 
technological innovation. 
As monitors of the outputs from centralized systems of political decision-
making, green movements highlight the distortions in feedback mechanisms in elite-
centred representative democracies, particularly those prone to corporatist tendencies 
(Dryzek, 1987, 120-122). Further, they play a role in not only experimenting with 
sustainable forms of organization and existence, but they also target unsustainable 
practices and promote sustainable ones. Again, the question of clear-fell logging of 
native forests to supply woodchips exports for paper production in Japan illustrates 
the transboundary implications of environmental degradation in one jurisdiction for 
another, when woodchips converted into paper contribute to waste disposal problems 
in the receiving country. 
It is now possible to make some assessment of the contribution of green 
movements to sustainability, to the ecological rationality of social choice 
mechanisms, and their contribution to the latter in coping with conditions of 
ecological crisis. Their role can be summarized as a threefold one: alerting and 
informing, monitoring and enforcing, and exemplifying. 
In raising public awareness and informing public opinion, they have been 
responsible for improving the quality of political debate (Frankland, 1988; Hay, 
1992; Papadakis, 1993a; Pelinka, 1987) as well as removing some of the distortions 
in public discourse which are almost inevitable in elite-centred decision-making 
processes. They have also been responsible for drawing attention to the risks for 
survival from continuing to pursue unsustainable practices and, in alerting citizens to 
the possibilities of ecological catastrophe, they have clarified the connection between 
citizens' actions at the local level and the global consequences of those actions. In 
addressing the political sphere with their concerns they have also politicized 
ecological relationships and their biophysical limits. 
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As monitors of resource exploitation and self-appointed enforcers of 
environmental agreements, treaties and regulations, they oblige decision-takers in 
economic and political spheres to shoulder the responsibilities of their office. They 
are able to take the long-term view and emphasize the common good that the 
structural limits of the systems of money and power often hinder those with 
executive power from taking into account. In this function at the transnational level, 
environmental social movements fill the niche that nation-states with their 
imperatives of industrial economic growth and national security simply cannot, in 
addition to which the coordination necessary to tackle the transboundary and 
multidimensional character of environmental problems is beyond the latter's function. 
In their exemplary role, they provide alternative modes of thought and 
behaviour and exemplify less harmful ways of interacting with natural systems. 
Organizationally the stress on grassroots participation, nonhierarchical and 
decentralized decision-making processes, and loosely-organized overlapping 
networks makes for more flexible and adaptive arrangements which help to minimize 
failure and improve problem-solving capacity. 
In these three roles, it is possible to see improvements in the number and the 
quality of negative feedback loops, that is, through improving the quality of political 
debate, the quality of political information, and the introduction of long-term 
considerations and the common good to the political agenda. The emphasis on the 
political nature of transboundary linkages and on the significance of the local for the 
global contribute to improved coordination both within and across choices, while 
advances in understanding in this area lead to reduction in problem displacement 
(Dryzek, 1987, 16-20). Elements of flexibility are interpolated into the rigidities 
resulting from the monocultures of modern society through alternative practices and 
organizational forms. The alternative worldview of green adherents, which stresses 
working with nature not against it and from which originates an organization and 
practice attempting to recreate in human systems the qualities of sustainable 
ecosystems (adaptability, flexibility, self-corrective feedback, and minimization of 
dysfunction), helps to promote social environmental learning and, in the long-run, 
resilience in human and natural systems. 
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2.3.4 Impediments Facing Progressive Social Movements 
The account presented so far in this research project is, like that of most 
theorizing about new social movements, an optimistic one. Theorists of new social 
movements, for the most part, envisage social movements as progressive agents of - 
social change and consequently ignore those regressive movements that have formed 
on the far right of the political spectrum in opposition to change. As yet there has 
been little theoretical development in this area of scholarship. It is an area that 
ecological theorists need to address as part of developing a more comprehensive 
understanding of social and environmental change. 
What follows is an attempt to provide a realist account of the problems 
confronting green movements both with respect to their internal organization and in 
relation to processes of global restructuring. A survey of the literature detailing the 
experiences of American and European movements reveals a number of 
commonalities and differences in the problems, dilemmas and obstacles that confront 
green movements, particularly when they seek to establish in the formal political 
sphere. 
Globalizing processes and their preconditions present particular difficulties 
for the aspirations of green movements. Both the proliferation of sovereign states — 
or, what Bauman (1998, 67) refers to as "the renewed emphasis on the 'territorial 
principle' — and public authorities' abrogation of political decision-making to free 
market processes have consequences for movement aspirations to influence decision-
making in political and economic spheres. According to Bauman, the political 
fragmentation and disempowerment which has occurred simultaneously with the 
globalization of the economic sphere is not just coincidental. There is an intimate 
relation between disempowered states and highly mobile capital. Where collective 
decision-making processes are weak, there are fewer controls on the fluidity of 
capital movement. Thus just when strong collective decision-making mechanisms 
are needed to confront conditions of mounting social and ecological crisis, they are 
found to have been undermined by processes of deregulation, privatization, 
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liberalization, reductions in business taxes, and windbacks in environmental controls. 
Not only is the capacity of the political sphere (which has become synonymous with 
the state in modern society) to address what are essentially collective problems 
enfeebled by these processes, but so also have they weakened the capacity of the state 
to influence the economy. Against such a bleak outlook, for ecology movements to 
pursue the rejuvenation of civil society as a way of redressing the balance, appears 
the most prospective solution to the difficulty of "reforg[ing] social [and ecological] 
crises into effective collective action" (Bauman, 1998, 69). 
Additionally, not only has collective capacity been weakened by globalizing 
processes, but so also have individual capacities and values been skewed to fit the 
demands of market-driven economic regimes. Radical individualism and heightened 
competition promoted by the dominant neoliberal economic regimes run counter to 
the collective wellbeing_ focus which environmental problems demand. The Italian 
experience suggests that the side-effects of globalizing processes — insecurity, 
unemployment and rising living costs — have the capacity to overshadow voters' 
concerns for environmental problems and to engineer a shift in support to right-
leaning politics or as Martin Rhodes (1995, 307) puts it: to be "seduced by the 
neomaterialist allure of the right". Rhodes demonstrates by means of a breakdown of 
Italian voters by age group that a neomaterialist, individualist ethos is prevalent over 
a postmaterialist ethos, especially among younger voters, a development that does not 
augur well for the reproduction of a green electorate (Rhodes, 1995, 310). 
New social movements are not only confronted with problems generated by 
global processes, there are also difficulties and dilemmas that result from their 
internal ideologies and are peculiar to their organizational form. These features, 
inherent in the social movement as a form of collective organization, while they 
ensure the persistence of the movement as such, are problematic for its penetration of 
and proper functioning in the political sphere. These include the emphasis on grass-
roots principles, their anti-institutional character, and tendencies towards 
fundamentalism and discontinuous patterns of participation. Additionally, a 
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preoccupation with local and national issues among national movements has also 
been identified as a short coming in the global context (Lustig and Brunner, 1996). 
The difficulties of translating the grass-roots project to the formal political 
sphere when green movements seek to organize as political parties has occupied the 
attention of a number of commentators. And not without good reason, since the 
experience of green parties has shown this translation to be particularly problematic. 
There are number of problems that are intrinsic to this project. Firstly, as discussed 
by Pakulski (1991, 209ff.), green parties are subject to divisiveness and 
fragmentation due to an inability to develop the necessary "programmatic 
coherence". As long as they remain as movements, social movements can afford a 
certain degree of "programmatic vagueness" which masks the value intensities felt by 
movement adherents. Disunity among various French green factions and the 
consequent failure to build a coalition for political ecology has been accepted as the 
reason for the poor showing of Greens in the national elections earlier this decade 
(Faucher and Doherty, 1996). Similarly, the failure of the German Greens to gain 
entry to the first all-German parliament following reunification has been attributed, 
not only to their indecisiveness and petty-mindedness in relation to unification, but 
mainly to distrust and therefore disunity among Greens (Wiesenthal, 1998, 177). The 
main consequence of green parties' disunited image is the failure to mobilize the kind 
of support base that they could be expected to enlist (Pakulski, 1991, 209). 
Contrariwise, their better performance in municipal elections can be put down to the 
local nature of issues and the 'not-so-much-at stake' factor (Faucher and Doherty, 
1996). 
Additionally, fragmentation may undermine the capacity of green parties to 
progress the expectations of their supporters resulting in evaporation of movement 
support and ending in over-reliance on the parliamentary party. As a consequence 
movement politics becoming synonymous with the party political organization. The 
weakness in this scenario is that in electorally unfavourable times there is no 
significant extraparliamentary movement for support or as resource for new ideas, 
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topics and strategies. Lustig and Brunner (1996, 137) note the importance of 
building strong grass-roots links for just these reasons. 
A further contributor to the divisiveness appearing to afflict green parties is a 
factor which is likely to beset any radical political grouping and that is a "central line 
of tension" between the need for party leadership and discipline and allowing 
genuine grass-roots input (Hayward, 1994, 192). The fact that the German Greens 
have found it necessary to abandon many of the mechanisms which were intended to 
ensure grass-roots control of the parliamentary party has led commentators to 
conclude that marrying the radical democratic principles of the grass-roots project 
with the demands of party political organization may be inherently problematic 
(Hayward, 1994, 193). 
Secondly, strict adherence to the principle of grass-roots democracy may 
paradoxically subvert the claim to viable democracy. As a precondition for 
intervention in society, Wiesenthal (1998, 174-7) identifies the "well-considered 
balancing" of a number of democratic principles — including representation, 
participation, pluralism and accountability. When grass-roots participation is the 
dominant principle, the desire to participate may be satisfied but the motives for 
participatory involvement may ir emain unsatisfied. Thus, while the participatory 
principle may satisfy self-fulfillment motives, other long-term collective goals, the 
attainment of which is facilitated by other 'principles, remain unrealized. Efficiency 
and effectiveness are then sacrificed for identity and legitimacy. Hayward (1998, 
193) identifies inefficiencies in green parties' openness and the requirement to 
engage in discussion until a consensus is reached, by which time the number of 
people actually remaining to take the final decision may be "only a small and 
unrepresentative sample of party members" (Goodin, 1992, 142). Moreover, 
participants in grass-roots democratic decision-making cannot be held accountable 
for their decisions. 
Effectiveness may also be impaired by the rotation principle which may cost 
in terms of loss of expertise, preventing the accumulation of experience and the 
106 
establishment of "stable informational and communicative links" either inside or 
outside the party with other actors (Wiesenthal, 1998, 175). The American 
experience suggests that institutional memory and accumulated expertise are critical 
factors for strategic effectiveness in social change and that their absence may be 
related to a failure to instantiate effective evaluative and planning mechanisms 
(Lustig and Brunner, 1996, 133). Strict adherence to these principles by the German 
Greens has led Wiesenthal (1998, 177) to conclude that: 
The things that would be efficient, the fostering of creativity, the 
ability to communicate and co-operate, the delegation of 
responsibilities for a fixed term, the acknowledgement and 
corroboration of successful work are considered illegitimate. 
Thirdly, the grass-roots project is paradoxically prone to the 'iron law of 
oligarchy' just as orthodox parties are, although not for the same reasons. The 
German Greens' original desire to exert grass-roots control over the party leadership 
has in fact been subverted by the peculiar composition of its membership. The 
tendency for traditional party organization to develop a division of labour, power 
hierarchies and to concentrate expert knowledge, all of which alienate party leaders 
from the wishes of the membership, is not the case with green parties. Leadership 
oligarchies develop for a different and paradoxical reason. Green party members, as 
Offe (1985) demonstrates, belong to the middle class and as a consequence possess 
high education levels, access to information and the resources necessary to articulate 
their needs within the party. They, therefore, have a relatively good chance of 
influencing party decision-making (Wiesenthal, 1998, 175). As noted previously, 
reasons for participation may involve both self-fulfillment motives as well as high 
expectations of effectiveness in political action. Yet, as Wiesenthal (1998, 175) 
comments, the preconditions for ongoing commitment can hardly be satisfied where 
party life makes excessive demands on individual members — that is, "by having 
meetings dominated by ideological controversies and an excess of formal issues". 
Under these conditions, the commitment of 'average' party members dissipates with 
the result that a characteristic feature of green parties is discontinuous participation 
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and shifting involvement. Wiesenthal (1998, 175) summarizes the oligarchic 
tendencies of green parties thus: 
The formal application of the principle of rotation, of the 
incompatibility rule, and of various other forms of 'grass-roots 
monitoring' of elected representatives produced the same sort of 
tendencies to alienation and detachment as are claimed for a rigid 
ruling hierarchy. Instead of a lively organizational democracy, 
what often developed was a 'culture of distrust'. 
Hayward (1994, 193) also proffers the view that it is likely that the introduction of 
grass-roots principles into the parliamentary sphere cannot be accomplished without 
some modifications to those principles and loss of consistency. As he remarks: 
"whilst the German Greens went into parliament with the aim of changing the 
system, the system also changed them". Dogmatic adherence to grass-roots 
principles is therefore probably inherently problematic under conditions where 
compromise is the essence of political achievement. 
Allied with the centrality of grass-roots principles in ecology movements qua 
parties is a tendency towards fundamentalism which has a number of implications for 
effective political intervention. Firstly, fixation with identity issues generates a 
number of tensions which blunt effective criticism. The resulting fragmentation 
creates competition rather than cooperation within the party and consequently 
produces a disunited image. Both the French and German Greens paid the price for 
failure to address this shortcoming with severely reduced representation at the 
national level. Wiesenthal (1998, 170) also blames the fundamentalist-realist tension 
for the political disadvantage suffered by the German Greens at the hands of social 
democratic parties, which are able to present themselves as concerned with 
environmental and social issues thereby capitalizing on the disarray amongst the 
Greens. 
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Secondly, an ideological fixation with leftist thought has also blocked an 
effective "elaboration of all those proposals which aim at loosening society's 
dependence on economic development and thus damage the vested interests of 
workers as well" (Wiesenthal, 1998, 174). Wiesenthal (1998, 173) argues that the 
contest for voters between the German Greens and the Social Democratic Party 
combined with the leftist background of many supporters ensured the persistence of 
an anti-capitalist stance and a preoccupation with workers' conditions (although 
laudable) with the result that other issues of practicable environmental reform, such 
as energy policy, waste generation and disposal, and transport, were sidelined for 
"radical but politically ineffective criticism". Thus: 
The idea that at the end of the twentieth century capitalism should 
more appositely be thought of as a kind of drug-dependency of the 
whole of society, and no longer as a kind of fist-fight involving 
capital and labour, was one that did not occur to the majority of 
Green politicians (Wiesenthal, 1998, 174). 
A number of authors draw the conclusion that fundamentalism and moral 
reasoning are incapable of sustaining change. To generate alternatives for action and 
solutions to ecological problems requires that fundamentalist tendencies be held in 
check. To allow this end ecology parties must allow for a certain degree of 
ambiguity to be tolerated. Ideological fixation denies the complexity of the world 
and, more practically, excludes potential supporters with a slightly different position. 
To effectively influence society demands a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the 
complexity of conditions such that diverse views can be aggregated into more 
achievable visions for the future while also furnishing the resources necessary for 
effecting their advancement. 
While there are lessons to be drawn from the European ecology movements' 
fixation with identity politics in evaluating their effectiveness in generating support 
for ecological transformation, the preoccupation of American environmental 
movements with practical environmental issues has also had its negative side-effects. 
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The tendency of the latter to be reactive rather than reflective because they are too 
preoccupied with responding to ecological and political crises and because they have 
failed to instantiate self-reflective mechanisms for evaluation and for planning future 
visions and projects has also blunted their effectiveness. The primary factor behind 
this latter shortcoming has been identified as the absence of institutional memory and 
experience (Lustig and Brunner, 1996). Constantly being engaged in reactive mode 
leaves no time or opportunity to gather and retain the information needed for self-
evaluation and to plan future directions. Consequently American movements are 
immersed in the present at the expense of global issues and future planning. As a 
result of their research, Lustig and Brunner (1996, 138) stress the importance for 
green movements/parties to be more proactive in setting the agenda for public debate 
including creating alternative visions of sustainable development. 
In summary, the conclusion can quite rightly be reached that a politics of 
identity and a politics of institutional reform are both necessary ingredients if ecology 
movements are to be effective agents of social change. Strong grass-roots links are 
necessary as a resource for the development of new ideas, topics and strategies but so 
also is a representative leadership and a reform strategy needed for effective political 
engagement. 
2.4: Conclusion 
Ecology movements have been represented as critics of modernization 
processes founded on an instrumentalizing, technocratic world-view, that devalues the 
relationship between human and nonhuman nature. I have endeavoured to show how 
green movements, as agents of social change, problematize and seek to redefine this 
relationship. In assessing the sociopolitical transformative capacity of green 
movements, I have located it in their potential for the invention of alternative 
approaches to the problems confronting western societies and indirectly the 
'developing' world. They have managed to integrate their critique of a modernity 
grounded on economic growth and technological progress with a radicalized 
ecological consciousness. In organizing as green parties they have aimed to represent 
this alternative world-view through the use of a diverse range of conventional and 
unconventional political strategies and organizational forms. In so doing they have 
entrained a process that reduces the centrality of political parties in the systems of 
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policy formation and decision-making and queries the function of established parties 
in the system of liberal representative democracy. They have similarly sought to open 
up the policy-making process, endeavouring to wrest it from the control of ruling 
elites and returning it to the grass roots. The effect has been to upset the balance of 
consensual politics and expose cosy corporatist arrangements that are not in the 
public's nor the environment's interest. 
Their critique of instrumentalizing modernization processes combined with a 
radical ecology imbues green movements with the potential to effect fundamental 
societal transformation. The kinds of innovations and impacts already evident appear 
to presage a new social and political consensus, although whether the potential is fully 
realized will depend, among other factors, on the extent to which green counter elites 
are co-opted and their protest absorbed by encumbent elites and on the resilence of 
the established forms of political and economic control. 
The green movement, like other social movements, has a continuing role to 
play as a creative critical force in late industrial societies. Part of that function is to 
assist the environmentally less aware and less sensitive to reappraise their values and 
their practices, thus to reform consumer preferences and behaviours and promote 
global social environmental learning. Green movements also have a role to play in 
encouraging the institutionalization of self-criticism in all the spheres of human 
endeavour, but they must also recognize and reconcile the tensions between 
pragmatists and fundamentalists in their own organizations. This will entail 
developing structures and mechanisms which facilitate the creativity of self-critical 
tensions and minimize their destructive aspects. It is the kind of example which 
other spheres of society, including the spheres of subpolitics, require in generating 
less harmful relationships with natural systems and forging more sustainable links. 
In problematizing the instrumentalizing, technocratic world-view, ecology 
movements function to reactivate the normative dimensions of politics submerged 
with its elision into economism. They articulate an alternative modernity wherein 
instrumental rationality, objectivist science and technology can be more truly steered 
according to social and ecological purpose. The example that ecology movements 
provide is in their exercise of a practical reason, which encompasses a moral 
connection to nature. 
In short, green movements and parties do contribute to the sustainability of 
human and natural systems and to the design of social choice mechanisms more 
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appropriate for sustainable living. However, to creatively and effectively progress 
the green agenda in the political context, the instantiation of reflexivity mechanisms 
— institutional memory, self-critical scepticism, opportunities for recursive social 
learning and for cooperation — is a necessary precursor for the planning of future 
visions. 
CHAPTER 3 
TOWARDS A REFORMULATION 
OF THE 
ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
Ecological problems disclose just how far modern civilization has come to rely 
on the expansion of control, and on economic progress as a means of repressing 
basic existential dilemmas of life (Giddens, 1994, 212). 
3.1: Introduction 
It was asserted in Chapter 1 that modern economic theory does not do justice 
to the many dimensions of the human condition; nor has mainstream economics yet 
been able to integrate ecological insights into its body of theory, except in a 
peripheral way through the discipline of environmental economics. The narrowness 
of its foundational principles and its imperialistic want are encapsulated in the 
following quote by Berman (1981, 189): 
The idea of mastery over nature, and of economic rationality, are 
but partial impulses in the human being which in modern times 
have become organizers of the whole of human life. 
The foundations of mainstream neoclassical theory are supposedly to be had 
in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, where he purportedly advanced the view that 
social organization is most efficiently achieved by persons pursuing their own 
rational self-interest in a freely competitive marketm. However, in an earlier treatise, 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith had advanced a contradictory view, in which 
he observed that people often act from non-selfish or altruistic motivations: 
How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of 
others, and render their happiness necessary to him (Smith, 
1976[1759], 9). 
This text is recognized by the alternative stream of humanistic economists but largely 
ignored by neoclassical economists. To understand why homo economicus of the 
Wealth of Nations triumphed over homo moralis of the The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, we must have recourse to the social, political and environmental milieu 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
31 A. K. Sen (1987) argues, contrary to the neoclassical interpretation and application of the doctrine of 
self-interest, that Smith recognized the value of self-interest to be confined to certain transactions and 
particularly where trade or production were hampered by bureaucratic or other obstacles. Indeed he 
asserts: "Smith did not assign a generally superior role to the pursuit of self-interest in any of his 
writings" (Sen, 1987, 25). 
112 
113 
This chapter will firstly outline the transformation of the feudal moral 
economy to a self-regulating market economy, and the ensuing relinquishment of 
ethical considerations and political decision-making to the latter; secondly, it will 
trace the beginnings of the alternative tradition of economic theory from the early 
dissenting political economists through to more recent developments in political 
economy, ecological economics, development economics and living economics, 
emphasizing both the ecological and ethical basis of their challenge to the 
foundational assumptions of neoclassical economics; thirdly, it will explore why an 
ethical dimension should be restored to theories which ground systems of production 
and consumption; and fourthly, it will assess the ethical content of sustainable 
development as a strategy for achieving the goal of ecological sustainability. 
3.1.1: From Moral Economy To Self-Regulating Market Economy 
The economic institutions of liberal capitalism - banks, markets, commercial 
and industrial corporations, and consumers - were spawned by a unique constellation 
of historical conditions, but as many commentators argue, its contemporary 
manifestation of welfare state capitalism is manifesting signs of crisis and symptoms 
of inadequacy (Lash and Urry, 1987; Offe, 1984; Pierson, 1991). My argument is 
that these institutions are not capable of addressing the problems which confront the 
late twentieth century and those features of early capitalist markets which were 
virtues have now become liabilities threatening the survival of the biosphere. In the 
clear light of ecological awareness, the assumptions and values of productivist 
market economics appear to be inherently flawed. This section documents the value 
change which occurred when the moral economy of premodern feudal times was 
replaced by the self-regulating capitalist market. 
The emergence of a consumer society in the late eighteenth century and the 
preconditions for a self-regulating market are the subject of a text by McKendrick, 
Brewer and Plumb (1982). McKendrick (1982) details a slowly evolving 
transformation in attitude away from disapproval of self-indulgence as a product of 
circumstances peculiar to the seventeenth century 32 . This attitudinal change formed 
32The influx of cheap Indian calico in the 1690s represented a challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy, 
that is, that self-indulgence was sinful. There developed an acceptance among some sectors that there 
were social goods to be had from "competition, envy, emulation, vanity and fashion" (McKendricic, 
1982, 15), but boundless consumption presented too many political and moral problems to be widely 
accepted. Politically, self-improvement through spending implied a social mobility which represented 
a threat to the ruling classes, while morally the work ethic based on self-discipline and "purposeful 
activity" was likewise threatened by what seemed to be no more than a "calculating hedonism" (p.16). 
The idea of a prosperous economy being driven by increasing consumpton was not really accepted 
intellectually until around 1770 in the new formulation of the economic problem by Adam Smith, 
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the basis for the eventual acceptance of increasing economic output and consumption 
as the vehicle for social progress in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Simultaneously, individual self-interest gained increasing acceptance as the means to 
free the economy from feudal constraints. 
Accompanying this profound change in society's value structure was a parallel 
shift in the study of relations of production and consumption. Under Adam Smith 
the foundations for the study of economics as an autonomous science were laid and 
were further progressed and cemented by Jevons, Marshall and others in the 
neoclassical period of the nineteenth century (Lutz and Lux, 1988). These 
developments together resulted in the divorce of the study of economics from non-
economic ends, that is, the political, social and environmental context of its 
organizing activity, and for the substitution of unlimited economic growth as the 
legitimate ideology of its activity (Kassiola, 1990, 69-70). 
Yet, it is important to note that, when Adam Smith proposed his idea of the 
invisible hand on the basis of each person attending to their own interests as the 
means of ensuring the public good, he did so in the knowledge that there remained in 
place the whole array of 
moral concerns and sentiments which served as the protective and 
guiding social framework within which material self-interests were 
allowed to operate. Capitalism, in its infancy, had inherited 
substantially intact the whole religiously based structure of trust 
and fairness that was the code of feudal (pre-capitalist, pre-
industrial) life (Lutz and Lux, 1988, 314) 33 . 
Still, the adoption of what were previously considered vices as virtues 
represented a challenge to the guiding ethical framework of Christianity and the 
moral economy that had gone before, summarized succinctly by E. P. Thompson 
(1971, 136) thus: "The breakthrough of the new political economy of the free market 
when "the pursuit of luxury could now be seen as socially desirable, for as the growth of new wants 
stimulated increased effort and output, improved consumption by all ranks of society would further 
stimulate economic progress" (p.19). Further, the acceptance of the intellectual justification of 
materialism was being matched by the actual democratization of consumption (p.25). McKendrick 
documents extensive empirical evidence for a significant consumer revolution in the late eighteenth 
century. He sets the attractions of the newly emerging consumer society against a background of a 
poverty-stricken Europe, in which even the average family spent 70-80 per cent of its income on food 
and little remained to satisfy other basic needs, where life was marked by sickness and disease, low life 
expectancy, high infant mortality, poor diet, and few if any comforts (p.31). 
33See also Kumar (1983) on the pre-capitalist, pre-industrial framework underpinning the early 
development of the capitalist economy. 
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was also the breakdown of the old moral economy of provision" 34. The revolution in 
values represented by the emergence of the free market and of a consumer society is 
similarly captured by Lewis Mumford (1966, 277): 
[T]he new capitalist spirit challenged the basic Christian ethics ... 
The capitalist scheme of values in fact transformed five of the 
seven deadly sins of Christianity - pride, envy, greed, avarice and 
lust - into positive values, treating them as necessary to all 
economic enterprise; while the cardinal virtues, beginning with 
love and humility were rejected as 'bad for business', except in the 
degree that they made the working class more docile and more 
amenable to cold-blooded exploitation. 
Those values which in premodern societies had served to justify and limit economic 
activity, values derived from politics and ethics, were replaced by "a motive only 
rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly never 
before raised to the level of justification of action and behaviour in everyday life, 
namely gain" (Polanyi, 1957, 30). Concomitantly, those purely instrumental 
economic means, justified and limited in premodern times according to social ends, 
became intrinsic ends in themselves. 
However, while the poor may have derived some comfort from the constraints 
of the feudal moral economy, the commercial class, which had burgeoned during the 
mercantilist period, increasingly felt and resented the strictures and corruption of the 
client-patronage system. Indeed, the emergence of the free market must be 
understood in the context of aspirations both for material and social betterment and 
accompanying aspirations for political freedom and individual autonomy. In the 
vanguard of the radical political movement was what McKendrick (1982) calls the 
"middling sort", the traders, merchants and shopkeepers who, in the eighteenth 
century, were very much dependent on the client-patronage economy controlled by 
the aristocratic class. In fact, through their purchasing power and patronage, the 
latter exercised almost complete control and the system was thus open to abuse. The 
lack of freedom and resentment is described thus: 
Clients in the client economy were not 'free' but tied, no matter how 
discreetly, to their patrons. 	Moreover the client economy 
compounded one of the greatest problems that faced the eighteenth 
34The moral economy of feudal England was grounded in a consensus about "a consistent traditional 
view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the 
community, which taken together can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor" 
(Thompson, 1971, 79). It was neither political nor unpolitical, but involved definite notions of the 
common weal. 
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century tradesman, namely that of credit and debt. The patricians 
simply passed on their own indebtedness to the trader by taking 
credit and failing to pay their bills promptly, or sometimes, not at 
all. No grievance was felt more strongly than this hidden subsidy to 
aristocratic wealth (McKendrick, 1982, 198). 
Added to this particular grievance was the increasing imposition of taxes and duties 
on basic commodities, taxes which appeared to be propping up a system of graft and 
corruption and idle aristocratic luxury. The attractiveness of an alternative to the 
clientage system, one which would ensure independence from the economic/political 
control of the aristocrats, is therefore easily comprehended. The conditions for the 
emergence of this alternative regime were in place by the late eighteenth century - a 
shift in the structure of wealth (generated by the formation of voluntary associations 
and the regularization of credit), the growth of bourgeois consumerism, the 
democratization of taste, and the advent of a broadly-based home market for the 
products of the newly established manufacturing economy (McKendrick, 1982, 200). 
The vehicle driving the creation of the free market alternative to the client 
economy is to be found in the formation of voluntary associations by various 
commercial interests. Thus: 
Collective action through voluntary associations conferred on these 
organizations a degree of power as well as financial and political 
independence which their members had not previously enjoyed. 
Association became a way of escaping economic clientage whilst 
providing protection against the vicissitudes of the open market; it 
also served to free citizens from the constraints of patrician 
political patronage and control. The opening up of politics and of 
enterprise went in tandem; in the eyes of the predominantly urban 
and bourgeois groups, the two were seen as interconnected 
problems whose solution was mutually reinforcing [my italics] 
(McKendrick, 1982, 200-201). 
Independence from the client economy meant freedom from coercion and 
from irrational state control. In these circumstances, the impersonal master of the 
market economy seemed an eminently more attractive alternative. For the 
commercial interests of the eighteenth century the free market represented in essence 
a form of anonymous control and it is my argument that it is this very anonymity 
together with later developments in economic theory which underlies the 
irresponsibility of liberal democratic capitalist societies. For anonymity plus the 
emphasis on individual rights and self-interest made it possible for individuals 
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(including corporations as holders of private property rights) to hand over their social 
responsibilities to what was perceived to be a non-arbitrary, incorruptible and self-
regulating mechanism for organizing economic life. 
The validity of this particular productive system based on the self-regulating 
market was, moreover, enhanced by the efforts of Adam Smith. Under the influence 
of Isaac Newton's law of universal gravitation, Smith brought the legitimacy of 
science to the new discipline of political economy when he endowed the concept of 
the invisible hand with much the same status as gravitation enjoyed as a universal 
force in Newton's mechanistic science (Lutz and Lux, 1988, 37). 
The replacement of the social purpose of economic activity by the notion of 
economics as mechanism and by the idea that the common weal would be served by 
individuals pursuing their own interests has been explained by R. H. Tawney (1982 
[1921], 15-17) as an understandable reaction to the processes of social and economic 
degeneration which reached breaking point in the mid eighteenth century. There 
were a number of simultaneous and interconnected processes occurring which spelled 
"the disappearance of the idea that social institutions and economic activities were 
related to common ends" (Tawney, 1982 [1921], 17). Firstly, in response to the 
Reformation during the eighteenth century both Church and State abdicated their role 
as guardians of a commonly accepted body of social ethics; and secondly, social, 
economic and political institutions had so degenerated to levels of tyranny, 
capriciousness and corruption in their practical operation (as previously mentioned) 
that people could no longer trust in them as embodiments of ethical criteria. It was 
not surprising then, that, in the course of rejecting such oppressive, arbitrary and 
corrupt institutions, "the individual is emancipated and his rights enlarged; but the 
idea of social purpose is discredited by the discredit justly attaching to the obsolete 
order in which it is embodied" (Tawney, 1982 [1921], 15-16). 
More recently, the emancipation of economics from ethical purpose and from 
politics has been argued by Kassiola (1990, 64) to be a direct outcome of the effort to 
make a science of economics. Although the antecedents were set by Adam Smith, 
the process was not fully developed and concluded until later in the nineteenth 
century with the marginal utility revolution of the neoclassical economists. The big 
questions addressed by the classicists concerning the distribution of wealth and 
income were replaced by the small questions concerning the economic behaviour of 
small decision-makers - households and firms - and the relative prices of goods and 
services. Hence the focus of economic theory shifted from the causes for 
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distributional patterns to the operations of the free market, or as Kassiola (1990, 66) 
describes it, from the "socio-political" to the "purely economic, internal market 
causes of relations of exchange". 
However, the loss of social purpose and the ethical responsibility of economic 
activity in the process of asserting individual rights and political freedom is not to be 
blamed entirely on the eighteenth century philosophers. As Tawney (1982 [1921], 
22-23) also observed, the supreme motivating idea for the liberal bourgeois 
movement was the necessity to attack the tyranny and corruption of privilege: 
The great individualists of the eighteenth century ...shot their 
arrows against the abuses of their day, not of ours. ...When they 
formulated the new philosophy, the obvious abuse was not the 
power wielded by the owners of capital over populations unable to 
work without their permission; it was the network of customary and 
legal restrictions by which the landowner in France, monopolistic 
corporations and the State both in France and England, prevented 
the individual from exercising his powers, divorced property from 
labour, and made idleness the pensioner of industry. ... [The ideal 
of this age of enlightenment was] a society where each man had 
free access to the economic opportunities which he could use and 
enjoy the wealth which by his efforts he had created. That school 
of thought represented all, or nearly all, that was humane and 
intelligent in the mind of the age. It was individualistic, not 
because it valued riches as the main end of man, but because it had 
a high sense of human dignity, and desired that men should be free 
to become themselves. And the vulgar commercialism [which 
subsequently emerged] derived half its strength from the fact that 
the philosophy behind which it sheltered was not that of reaction, 
but of enlightenment. 
Moreover, this was an enlightenment which had crystallized its precepts 
under simpler preindustrial economic conditions, including categories of private 
property and freedom of contract, which were transported uncritically and with their 
effects unanticipated to the era of industrial capitalism. Adam Smith and his 
classical contemporaries could not be expected to foresee the aberrations which 
would grow out of doctrines conceived to better the lot of society. Although in 
hindsight they should have been able to anticipate that the unlimited accumulation 
provisions of property rules would inevitably result in overaccumulation, they could 
not foresee the global power of transnational corporations which presently benefit 
from these reforms of the early modem era. 
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Although we can rationalize and understand the desire of those early liberals 
to attack and escape from the constraints of feudal privilege, this is not to ignore the 
implications of the change from regulated to self-regulating markets for the structure 
of society, and ultimately for the existence of life itself. Karl Polanyi (1957, Ch.6) 
has best described the significance for western society of this particular development. 
The establishment of self-regulating markets in the late eighteenth century 
represented a singular departure from what had been the previous relationship 
between markets and society: "... never before our time were markets more than 
- accessories of economic life [and] as a rule, the economic system was absorbed in the 
social system" (Polanyi, 1957, 68). Even under the mercantile system, markets were 
highly regulated by a "centralized administration which fostered autarky both in the 
households of the peasantry and in respect of national life" (Polanyi, 1957, 68). 
However, the shift to the self-regulating market with its underlying 
assumptions - that all production and distribution of goods was to be controlled, 
regulated and directed by markets alone - was to have implications reaching far 
beyond the organization of economic life. It required not only the separation of 
society into political and economic spheres, but also the subordination of other 
spheres to its demands. Further, not only were the products of industry and their 
distribution controlled by this novel institution but it required the control of the 
elements of industry - land, labour and capital (money): "But labor and land are no 
other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the 
natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the market mechanism 
means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market" 
(Polanyi, 1957, 71). 
This development in social history, Kassiola (1990) has labelled 
"economism", but paradoxically, it is the abstraction of economic thought from its 
social and biophysical context which Daly and Cobb (1989, 51) describe as "the 
greatest threat to a market society". The anonymity and self-regulatory aspects of the 
market mechanism were a powerful attraction for the commercial bourgeoisie of the 
late eighteenth century, but they and the classical economists could not foresee that, 
in surrendering the responsibility for social purpose to the invisible hand, ultimately 
such economic arrangements develop an inherent tendency to erode the moral and 
social foundations which are integral to its proper functioning. 
Albert Hirsch first drew attention to the dependence of the early success of 
market capitalism on the persistence of a "premarket social ethos": 
The social morality that has served as an understructure for 
economic individualism has been a legacy of the precapitalist and 
preindustrial past. This legacy has diminished with time and with 
the corrosive contact of the active capitalist values ... . As 
individual behaviour has been increasingly directed to individual 
advantage, habits and instincts based on communal values and 
objectives have lost out (Hirsch, 1977, 117). 
The social virtues which this "individualist ethos" are seen to undermine and which 
are at the same time central to the proper functioning of the "individualist, contract 
economy" include truth, trust, acceptance, restraint and obligation. Lutz and Lux 
(1988, 84-85) have since described the erosion of truth and loyalty by self-interested 
behaviour and have shown how vital the mutual cooperation based on these traits is 
to large-scale economics. They evidence the widespread and growing use of legal 
procedures and litigation as parties try to protect themselves against being taken 
advantage of, the result being the multiplication of "red tape" in economic 
transactions and ultimately "economic gridlock". 
Daly and Cobb (1989), too, have since reiterated Hirsch's insights; in 
addition, pointing out the connection between the market's tendency to deplete 
"moral capital" and its parallel depletion of "biophysical capital". They contend that 
the dependence of the market on these values and "other virtues ... will not long 
withstand the reduction to the level of personal tastes that is explicit in the 
positivistic, individualistic philosophy of value on which modern economic theory is 
based. If all value derives only from satisfaction of individual wants, then there is 
nothing left over on the basis of which self-interested, individualistic want 
satisfaction can be restrained" (Daly and Cobb, 1989, 50-51). The market does not 
accumulate moral capital; it depletes it. Consequently the market depends on the 
community to regenerate moral capital, just as it depends on the biosphere to 
regenerate natural capital. In effect the individual, the community and the biosphere 
have all been diminished by the "individualist ethos" of the market economy and by 
the maximization of the individual freedoms which accompanied it. As Pirages 
(1977, 9) observed, maximizing individual freedom under conditions of limited 
growth "inexorably lead[s] to a loss of freedom for the collective and even to self-
destruction''. 
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In the late eighteenth century, when a reformulation of the economic problem 
was de'rnandecl,it ,was -.thus achieved through a 'particular set of politico-economic 
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terms, in that the collective wellbeing was deemed to be had in each individual 
looking to their own interests while maximizing individual freedoms: 
[lilt appeared that maximizing individual freedom was the best way 
to maximize gain for the collective. Only a minimal amount of 
mutual coercion mutually agreed upon was essential to progress, 
given the open frontiers and rapid economic growth of the early 
industrial period (Pirages, 1977, 9). 
Limiting environmental conditions were not really at issue and when they appeared 
they were restricted to the local. The limitations of resource availability were not 
really a consideration and under these conditions the economic problem was one of 
maximizing output for any given level of resources. It was not until later in the 
nineteenth century, when the prospect emerged of running out of coal to power 
industry, that Jevons redefined economics as the science of maximizing output under 
conditions of scarce resources. But the problems of distribution and consumption 
which also emerged with the prospect of scarce coal resources were postponed by the 
discovery of an alternative energy supply - petroleum (Lutz and Lux, 1988, 316-317). 
It has become obvious that the consequences of the era which derived from the fossil 
fuel subsidy (the hydrocarbon age), including global environmental degradation and 
global inequalities of wealth, demand a new formulation of the economic problem. 
In the late twentieth century, the limiting conditions revolve around resource 
depletion, waste assimilation capacity, and intra- and intertemporal inequalities, and 
they manifest at local, national and global levels. It is argued that the reformulation 
of the economic problem that is now necessitated involves an explicit redefinition of 
both individual and collective interest. Lutz and Lux (1988, 317) maintain that, at 
each stage of the redefinition of the economic problem through the last two centuries, 
the neglect of ethical issues has resulted in an accumulating legacy of crisis and 
disaster, summarizing thus: 
The big push towards development did not bring us the promised 
social harmony. Furthermore, the vanishing moral foundations of 
society has demanded that an increasingly complex, stifling, and 
inhumane system of rules and regulations be put in place. Through 
the same ignorance we have developed an economy with an 
insatiable appetite that threatens to eat away the thin mineral crust 
of the earth's surface out from under us. 
However, at the end of the twentieth century, the economic problem is more than the 
achievement of controlled growth or a steady-state economy as they suggest. As in 
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the late eighteenth century, it is the politico-economic one of the reformulation of 
what we conceive individual freedom to be under conditions of resource depletion, 
global ecological deterioration, and vast inequalities of wealth. It is therefore the 
inherently existential question of 'How should we live?' and the ethico-moral 
question of 'How should we arrange our systems of production and consumption to 
ensure the sustainability of the earth?' These existential questions, long submerged 
by the neoclassical ideology of unlimited growth and boundless consumption, once 
more press their claims for the reinstatement of a normative dimension to both 
economic and political spheres. Under the ecologically limiting conditions 
articulated above, the normative dimensions of these questions, as I shall 
subsequently argue, must be undergirt by the ethical value of responsibility, also 
obscured under the liberal capitalist order by the emphasis on impersonal political 
power and through economic reductionism, that is, by abdicating responsibility to the 
impersonal mechanisms of the self-regulating market. 
3.2: Ecology And Ethics In An Alternative Economics 
It was not long into the industrial revolution before a dissenting discourse was 
heard in the new science Of political economy. The earliest origins of this dissent 
have been traced to a contemporary of Ricardo, a Swiss Count Jean C. L. S. 
Sismondi, who, motivated by the suffering and misery of the masses in a newly 
industrializing England, developed a view of political economy which, instead of 
emphasizing wealth (which by this time had become an end in itself), "centred his 
New Principles on human welfare, boldly transforming economics to an explicitly 
normative discipline" (Lutz, 1992, 91; but see also Lutz and Lux, 1988, 64-68). It is 
this normative aspect of economic theory with which the remainder of the chapter 
will be largely concerned. Sismondi's work on political economy was to inspire 
Thomas Carlyle and later John Ruskin. Ruskin criticized the abstractionist, scientific 
turn that economics had taken in the nineteenth century and he replaced exchange 
value and subjective utility with an understanding of the value of commodities based 
on the extent to which they satisfied basic human needs. Not surprisingly his "new 
economics" had a place for moral issues. His work was in turn to influence John 
Hobson, Mohandas Gandhi, R. H. Tawney and E. F. Schumacher in this century. 
Hobson and Tawney were both concerned to advance a view of economics as a 
means to further human dignity and welfare and, what is significant for later 
discussion, they both held that the institutions of society - political, economic and 
social - should be regarded as means to an end, not as ends in themselves. That end 
should be directed to the growth of individual human beings. These institutions 
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should have the development and cultivation of human potentiality as their primary 
objective, while economic efficiency should be secondary. And what is most 
pertinent to later discussion, these "instruments of life ... [are] to be maintained when 
they are serviceable and changed when they are not" (Tawney, 1982 [1921], 85-86). 
Gandhi, also profoundly influenced by Ruskin's 'new political economy of 
life', endeavoured to develop an economics that was relevant to basic human needs 
and respectful of the higher values of human dignity, nonviolence and creative work. 
To Tawney's and Hobson's human welfare economics, he added a spiritual element. 
The ethical thread that unites these three thinkers is the stress on human 
welfare, human dignity and self-actualization, and its spinning was to be extended by 
the work of E. F. Schumacher in the mid-twentieth century. Lutz (1992, 101) 
recognizes Gandhi's influence in Schumacher's criticism of the secularity of modern 
life, in his strategy for a development founded on human needs, on rural development 
and in his advocacy of appropriate technology. Schumacher's economics, though, 
added new elements, reflecting the earliest stirrings of fear about environmental 
degradation and resource depletion. As well, following from his emphasis on the 
appropriateness of technology and on village-based development, his other novel 
contribution to an alternative economics is the question of scale and its fitness to 
levels of human activity. A concern with the scale of organization follows directly 
from the orientation to people's needs rather than the production of goods as an end 
in itself and the scale of organization which is most appropriate to human activity is 
small. 
Other contemporary streams of economic thought which endeavour to 
integrate the social and the economic by blending insights from other disciplines, 
including sociology and psychology, into economic analysis include the 
neoinstitutionalists or evolutionary economists, whose work is in the tradition of 
Thorsten Veblen. They attempt to pattern economic reality according to a cultural or 
social view, contrary to orthodox economics which more nearly approximates the 
physical sciences' view of reality (Gruchy, 1972; 1987). This strand is exemplified in 
the work of Myrdal and Galbraith, but more recent developments in evolutionary 
economics explicitly seek to reunite individuals with both their social and natural 
environment. Hodgson (1992, 40-48) has outlined some of the implications of this 
development for conventional economics. It is a development that challenges the 
assumption of global rationality and maximizing behaviour and instead, following 
Freudian insights into the unconscious, argues that actions can take place at different 
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levels of thought, both conscious and unconscious. While some actions can result 
from extensive deliberation, others are habitual. The evolutionary basis of 
neoinstitutionalist economics derives from the work of social anthropologists, which 
suggests that culture and institutions have a significant bearing on individual 
decision-making and action35 . As I shall discuss in Chapter 5.4.1, routinized 
behaviour has significant implications for institutional inertia and thus for social 
change. 
The interdependence of social and ecological systems is even more firmly 
linked in Richard Norgaard's concept of the coevolution of society, economics and 
environment (Norgaard, 1988; 1992). In this coevolutionary framework, Norgaard 
argues that until the modern era societies evolved along with their ecosystems, 
behavioural norms, myths and institutions developing to reinforce interactions which 
were favourable and discourage those which were not. The expanded use of fossil 
fuels in the nineteenth century - coal and later petroleum - allowed western societies 
to stop coevolving with their ecosystems and instead 
[s]ocial systems evolved around the expanding means of exploiting 
hydrocarbons and only later adopted institutions to correct the 
damage this coevolution entailed for ecosystems. ... Our value 
system, knowledge system, social organization and technologies 
coevolved to fit the opportunities which the exploitation of fossil 
energy provided. Our social systems reflect these medium-term 
opportunities rather than the long-run opportunities of 
coevolutionary development with the renewable resources of the 
global system (Norgaard, 1992, 81-82). 
• Further, the shift to hydrocarbons has allowed other cultures to stop coevolving with 
their own unique environments and to adopt the knowledge, values, technologies and 
institutional arrangements of the west. 
In parallel with these contributions to the understanding of economic life 
which integrate the social, economic and the natural is another stream which attempts 
to integrate a normative or ethical dimension. It includes the humanistic economics 
of Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux (1988; but see also Lutz, 1992) and the 
socioeconomics of Amitai Etzioni (1988; see also Etzioni and Lawrence, 1991). 36 
Humanistic economics relies heavily on social/moral philosophy to inform its view 
35See Opschoor and van der Straaten (1992) for a comparison of the assumptions of orthodox 
economics and evolutionary institutional economics. 
36For a full account of the affinities and differences between humanistic economies and 
socioeconomics, see Lutz (1990). 
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of economics. It builds on Maslow's psychology of human needs to generate a more 
realistic understanding of the human self, recognizing that duality of motives exists 
in human beings and that we have both an advantage-seeking, self-interested side and 
a fairness-seeking, mutual interest side (Lutz and Lux, 1988, 15-19). 
Like humanistic economics, socioeconomics has an aversion to the Rational 
Economic Man of neoclassical economics, positing instead a bi-utility approach to 
utility maximization, which is akin to the dual self of the former. Significantly the 
role of values in economic decision-making is accorded validity as well as the values 
of the social collectivity in influencing individual decision-making. Contrary to 
conventional economics, the economy is recognized as a subsystem of society, polity 
and culture, and like the institutionalists, socioeconomics explicitly acknowledges 
that control of the market is closer to reality than control by the market. Thus the 
recognition that "power differences among actors are congenital" adds another 
countering note of reality to the fictions of orthodox economics (Etzioni, 1988, 4-5). 
In the context of this chapter, the primary contribution of Etzioni's "I and We" 
paradigm in developing an alternative to the amoral rational utility-maximizing 
individual of neo-classical economics has been to elevate the role of values 
(normative-affective factors) in influencing the choices people make. These values 
are said to be normative when they prescribe behaviour. In this sense the "I and We" 
paradigm differs from mainstream economics, in that it acknowledges that 
"normative values, as factors that influence the choice of means, help ensure the 
primacy of ends" (Etzioni, 1988, 106). In modem life, the contrary situation obtains: 
"...the preoccupation with means, with enhancing their strength, scope, quantity and 
quality, is the essence of industrialization, market economics and economies, 
technology, and applied science. However, this preoccupation, through a process 
known as goal displacement, tends to lead to the primacy of means over ends" 
(Etzioni, 1988, 107). 
The significance of the socioeconomic strand for the present argument lies 
principally in the concept of the multiple self, derived from deontological 
psychology, and its implications for the question of public goods, specifically the 
commons. Etzioni argues that, rather than relying on inherently faulty price 
mechanisms to internalize the externalities of neoclassical economics, moral 
commitments are a better way of ensuring that the needs of the commons find their 
place in decision-making. Indeed, morality is "a more widely used, less costly and 
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less coercive mechanism for attending to the commons than government inducements 
or public 'incentives' provided by the market" (Etzioni, 1988, 34). 
The last several decades have seen the establishment of a discipline that not 
only recognizes the importance of integrating environmental aspects into economics, 
but specifically relies on ecological insights to inform the discipline. This is the 
discipline of ecological economics, which has a tradition going back to the 1880's 
(Martinez-Alier, 1987), but has become more prominent recently with the publication 
of Herman Daly's work on the steady-state economy (Daly, 1977). Daly was 
responsible for querying the underlying assumptions of the growth paradigm, that any 
deficiencies in the biophysical fabric could be papered over with more technology 
and more growth and that greater consumption was the answer to the existential ills 
of modern society. He urged economic theory to return to its moral and biophysical 
foundations and challenged it "to develop a political economics that recognizes both 
ecological and existential scarcity" (Daly, 1977, 4). 
In the context of the influence of the natural sciences on economic theory the 
work of Charles Perrings (1987) on a jointly-determined economy-environment 
system is particularly relevant. Perrings' challenge to the static environmental 
assumptions of the mainstream model owes much to Georgescu-Roegen's (1971) 
work on the implications of the laws of thermodynamics for energy and entropy, 
specifically the requirement for the conservation of mass. His conclusion that an 
economy cannot function independently of physical laws bears directly on the static 
assumptions of the general equilibrium models of neoclassical theory. Thus he 
argues: "It is the necessity for any system generating residuals in the process of 
production to change over time, to evolve from one state to the next as the residuals 
generated in production are returned to the system in either a controlled or 
uncontrolled way" (Perrings, 1987, 8). Indeed, neoclassical theory rests on the 
invalid assumption of the conservation of energy, from which it follows that any 
inputs (land, labour, capital) can be combined or substituted in any way yet the level 
of output be retained. There is no room in this theory for "energetic (and nutritive) 
requirements, physical connectivity, technological and social learning, emotional 
bonding, and positive feedback dynamics of real world production systems" 
(Christensen, 1991, 79). 
Perrings (1987, 11) also explores the inability of the price system to capture 
environmental resources. But what is most significant for the present discussion is 
his contribution to the understanding of uncertainty in economy-environment 
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systems, particularly in the context of unforeseen side-effects, where uncertainty 
exists in the face of ignorance, novelty and surprise (Perrings, 1987, 11). 
To return to ecological economics: to questions of time and uncertainty, the 
discipline adds a concern for sustainability, equity, dynamics, and the process of 
institutional change, while the notion of the atomistic individual is replaced by the 
idea of 'person-in-community'. 37 Christensen (1991, 80) summarizes ecological 
economics succinctly, thus: "[E]cological economics emphasizes not just the 
dependence of an economy on its environment but also the internal physical 
connectivity and interdependence within an economy". 38 
Embracing many of these contemporary counter currents is Paul Ekins' "real-
life" or "living economics", which emphasizes the interdependence of all the spheres 
of human existence - economic, social, ecological and ethical (Ekins, 1986; Ekins 
and Max-Neef, 1992). It attempts to provide an economic framework by which to 
understand and redress the widespread social, cultural and environmental disruption 
of the last 50 years and is concerned to develop an economy that has human welfare 
as its principle focus. It challenges conventional economics for its failure to provide 
a coherent explanation of economic reality, particularly regarding the flaws of the 
market economy, environmental degradation, persistent poverty, and the existence of 
the informal economy. "Living economics" attempts to coordinate the various•
alternative strands into a larger framework of economic understanding, "a holistic, 
enriched economic discourse", linking concepts such as wealth and growth, needs, 
development, competition, and markets, and reinterpreting them in the context of the 
ethical, social, cultural and environmental dimensions of human existence. 
Ecomarxists and ecosocialists such as James O'Connor (1994b), Martin 
O'Connor and other contributors to the journal, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, are 
responsible for additional insights concerning the globalization of capital, while 
ecofeminists and neomarxists have made valuable contributions to the debate on 
development and global inequalities of wealth and economic exploitation, 
particularly their implications for sustainable development in the Third World 
(Harcourt, 1994; Redclift, 1984; Sachs, 1992; Seager, 1993; Shiva, 1994). 
37The collection of papers edited by Robert Costanza (1991) elaborates on all these concepts, while 
the nOtion of 'person-in-community' is discussed in Daly and Cobb (1989). 
38A recent paper which critiques the conservatism of orthodox economists from the standpoint of 
operationalizing ecological economics is that by Stuart Rosewarne (1995). 
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3.3: The Case For The Reinstatement Of Ethics 
... we have tried to solve our existential problem by giving up the Messianic 
vision of harmony between humankind and nature by conquering nature, by 
transforming it to our own purposes until the conquest has become more and 
more equivalent to destruction (Fromm, 1978, 17). 
Thus far the argument has established how and why economic activity 
became divorced from its wider social/ethical context, and how the production 
principle came to guide ethical considerations in market economies. This section 
will present a case for the reintroduction of ethical values as guiding principles for 
the organization of economic activity, for contemporary environmentally limiting 
conditions necessitate a reappraisal of the human/nature production interface and 
those existential questions which have, for some time, been submerged by the growth 
ethic. Contrary to accepted opinion, these problems have not disappeared; the old 
philosophical questions simply reappear in a new context and their consideration is 
made that much more urgent by the nature of the crises confronting western societies. 
My purpose in this section is to establish a new set of ethical principles as a 
guide for non-destructive productive activity, which recognizes the fundamental 
interdependence of all life forms and responsibility for their future survival, for as 
Hans Jonas (1984, 136) observes: 
A kind of metaphysical responsibility beyond self-interest has 
devolved on us with the magnitude of our powers relative to this 
tenuous film of life, that, since man has become dangerous not only 
to himself but to the whole biosphere.39 
I argue, following Jonas, that under conditions of extensive ecological modification 
and humankind's capacity to effect such change, that the normative value of 
responsibility shifts to the centre of ethical theory. This ethic of responsibility 
embodies associated values of humility, reverence for life, and caution and foresight • 
as the "core of moral action" (p.38). The ethical goal is the sustainability and 
survival of the planet's biophysical fabric. 
39This section owes a great deal to Jonas' The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for 
the Technological Age in the formulation of an ethic of responsibility for economic activity. The 
bracketted page numbers in Sections 3.3-3.3.6 refer to this work. 
129 
3.3.1: Old Questions: New Context 
The ancient moral questions which earlier societies were able to incorporate 
within their institutional arrangements, but which the obsession with development 
and growth has, for a time, enabled western societies to postpone coming to terms 
with, address the relation between the quality of life and material abundance, the 
relationship of societies to nature and technology, and the relations of justice within 
and between societies (Goulet, 1990, 38) What is novel about the context in which 
these questions resurface is that the peculiar modern conditions which give rise to 
them have never before been encountered in human history (Goulet, 1990, 39): 
First there is the vast scale of human activities - the size of our 
cities, bureaucracies and factories, the sheer volume of images and 
fantasies which assault the senses. There is also the technical 
complexity and the specialized division of labour ensuing 
therefrom, so that no single set of skills - manual, intellectual, or 
artistic - is adequate to cope with the needs of unity, integration, 
and openness to change. In a technically complex world it becomes 
nearly impossible to answer such simple questions as, 'what is a 
good life', and the relation between goods and the good. A third 
feature of modern life, the web of interdependence, transforms 
local happenings into global events and causes international 
conflicts to impinge on local destinies. Finally, and most dramatic, 
there is the ever-shortening time lag between changes proposed to 
human communities and the deadline they face for reacting to them 
in ways which protect their integrity. Mass media, modern 
medicine, and technology constantly affect the consciousness, 
values, and destinies of people, leaving them scant time to take 
counsel with their traditions or their images of the future so as to 
shape a wise response. 
Because the crises of modern existence - threatened ecosystems and planetary 
systems, and inequalities of wealth- occur on a global scale and because they present 
a threat to the life chances of future generations, current ethical arrangements are not 
up to addressing these issues, simply because humanity has not had to confront these 
issues previously. Certainly mainstream economic theory has no ethical capacity in 
this regard. Indeed, the ethical content of even the welfare strand of mainstream 
economics has been described as "rather modest" (Sen, 1987, 35). 
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3.3.2: Responsibility, Knowledge, and Power 
In the context of ethical novelty, it would be useful to examine why 
responsibility was not important in earlier ethical theory, for this will serve to 
highlight the links between knowledge and power and responsibility. Firstly, the 
conditions of human existence did not require an ethical stance toward the nonhuman 
world. Horizons of time and space were confined; ethical concern was with the 
present and with actions directed towards contemporaries. The setting for any sphere 
of action was immediate, as were the consequences and accountability for one's 
actions. Secondly, the degree of knowledge appropriate to such a limited sphere of 
action was therefore also limited. No need for experts here. Earlier societies had 
neither the technological means (power) nor the knowledge to effect significant 
ecological disturbance. Because ethical concern was with the present, no one could 
be held responsible for any long-term or unintended consequences (p.6). 
But the relationship between power and knowledge and the ethical 
significance of responsibility has changed: 
Modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, 
objects and consequences that the framework of former ethics can 
no longer contain them. ... To be sure, the old prescriptions of the 
"neighbour" ethics - of justice, charity, honesty, and so on - still 
hold in their intimate immediacy for the nearest, day-to-day sphere 
of human interaction. But this sphere is overshadowed by a 
growing realm of collective action where doer, deed, and effect are 
no longer the same as they were in the proximate sphere, and which 
by the enormity of its powers forces upon ethics a new dimension 
Of responsibility never dreamed of before (p.6). 
This new dimension of responsibility encompasses a radical new set of moral 
problems. In the first place, humanity's technological prowess and enormous 
capacity for ecological modification has enlarged the sphere of responsibility from 
one's immediate neighbours and environment to the whole planet: "The containment 
of nearness and contemporaneity is gone, swept away by the spatial spread and time 
span of the cause-effect trains, which technological practice sets afoot even when 
taken for proximate ends" (p.7). Traditional ethics dealt with noncumulative 
behaviour, but cumulative effects have become the essence of modern technology. 
The result is that "the situation for later subjects and their choices of action will be 
progressively different from that of the initial agent and ever more the fated product 
of what was done before" (p.'7). Add to this foreclosure of possibilities the 
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irreversibility of technologically-induced actions and what results is a situation where 
no individual could possibly undertake any action in the fullness of knowledge and 
know with certainty that their actions were morally responsible. 
Secondly, the potentialities of the scale of human action demand a 
commensurate level of knowledge which is not really achievable. In other words, 
"the predictive knowledge falls behind the technical knowledge that nourishes our 
power to act [and this fact in] itself assumes ethical significance. The gap between 
the ability to foretell and the power to act creates a novel moral problem. ... 
[R]ecognition of ignorance becomes the obverse of the duty to know and thus part of 
the ethics that must govern the evermore necessary self-policing of our out-sized 
might" (p.7-8). 
3.3.3: A Future-oriented Ethic 
Humanity's "novel powers and range of prescience" thus entail a 
correspondingly new set of ethical imperatives, which transcend the anthropocentric 
and contemporaneous focus of previous ethical systems. Because technology has 
become an end in itself, because it has assumed a dominant place in human purpose, 
it also attaches to itself an ethical significance not required of it in previous times. 
The ethical import manifests both at the personal and collective levels, there being a 
direct connection between individual behaviour and technological success. Although 
technology and science have become the primary shapers of the human condition, it 
can be argued that this mode of progress does not in fact lead to moral betterment. 
Technological progress is a self-reinforcing process, for the success of technology's 
products in the competitive market-place is the spur to further innovation. The old 
adage: "Nothing succeeds like success" is most applicable here. However, the 
positive feed-back effects of development processes not only compound the 
accumulating effects of technology mentioned above, they also serve to reinforce the 
utilitarian, making/doing, self-interested, egoistic aspects of the human character at 
the expense of the ethical, altruistic, transpersonal self: 
... the expanding artificial environment continuously reinforces the 
powers in man that created it, by compelling their unceasing 
inventive employment in its management and further advance, and 
by rewarding them with additional success - which only adds to the 
relentless claim. This positive feedback of functional necessity and 
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• reward assures the growing ascendancy of one side of man's nature 
over all others, and inevitably at their expense (p.9) 40 . 
At a time when the activation and exertion of the higher self has never been 
more needed, "the preponderant vulgarism of the technological blessings alone 
renders this more than unlikely" (p.169) and leads to a poverty, not of material 
wellbeing, but of the higher self. The accumulating effects of technological success 
demand a rethink of what is a good human life. John O'Neill (1993) makes recourse 
to the Aristotelian account of a flourishing human life and reinterprets it in the light 
of these changed circumstances. The Aristotelian account embraces a much broader 
view of human wellbeing or the 'good life' than the satisfaction of individual 
preferences. Indeed, the goods of an individual human life are to be had in 
developing the individual's characteristically human capacities. The market ethic 
presupposes a particular conception of human wellbeing - a narrow, want-regarding 
one - which is "institutionally fostered by the market itself, [indeed] the 
environmental problems engendered by the market stem in part from the forms of 
self-understanding it develops" (O'Neill, 1993, 3) The culture of self-interest, 
predicated as it is on material wellbeing, is delusory and stunting to the development 
of human capacities and blinds the modern individual to another more satisfying, 
more fulfilling kind of richness in human existence. 
The poverty of the ethic of self-interest lies in its promotion of a very narrow 
view of the good life and the goods that it involves (O'Neill, 1993, 24-25). Under 
market imperatives, the moral requirement to develop one's capacities, to live the 
ethical life to the best of one's ability, is submerged by that very limited self-
understanding fostered by the market (that is, wellbeing through consumption). At a 
time when the crises that confront late twentieth century societies require of 
individuals the application of their full human capacities, we are ill-equipped both in 
40See also Lutz and Lux (1988, 17) for their delineation of some characteristics of the dual-self model 
of the human character. 
Higher self 	 Lower self 
Growth needs Deficiency needs 
Self-actualization 	 Ego-aggrandizement 
Truth seeking Self-interest seeking 
Reasonable 	 Rational* 
Principled behaviour 	 Instrumental behaviour 
Altruism and love Selfishness 
Objective 	 Subjective 
Transpersonal 	 Personal (individual) 
*Economic rationality 
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our individual and our collective capacity to tackle the enormity of social and 
environmental problems. 
Further, in the light of the fact that the future of existence has become 
problematic, the Aristotelian understanding of a 'flourishing human life' takes on a 
much broader meaning. The flourishing of human life is not only dependent on the 
development of human capacities, it is also dependent on promoting the flourishing 
of other "individual living things and biological collectives as an end in itself, simply 
because the flourishing of nonhuman nature is constitutive of human flourishing. 
...The best human life is one that includes an awareness of and practical concern with 
the goods and entities in the nonhuman world" (O'Neill, 1993, 24). This claim can be 
justified on the basis that a good human life entails a "breadth of goods". 
It is becoming clear that the unvarying questions of human existence can no 
longer be suppressed or ignored, that material abundance does not guarantee general 
happiness (we seem unable to come to grips with the problems of youth alienation 
and suicide for example), that progress does not serve the ends of justice and equality 
within and between nations (we are unable to address problems of increasing gaps in 
the distribution of wealth, globally or nationally, nor injustice to minorities), that 
technology as an end in itself serves not to ensure social progress or moral 
betterment, and the subjugation of nature to humankind's ends serves not the cause of 
individual freedom but enslavement through physical and psychological collective 
compulsion (p.169). 
The implications of such an expanded view of the good life for the social, 
political and economic institutions of modern societies are quite profound and will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. It is sufficient to say that public policy must 
provide for the inclusion of the moral relevance of the future at a more profound 
level than the level of rhetoric, while it is encumbent on societies to design the kinds 
of institutional arrangements which will encourage the cultivation of those 
submerged aspects of human capability and human flourishing, for they, like the 
future, now assume renewed ethical significance. 
I have alluded to the contemporaneity of responsibility under previous ethical 
regimes, contrasting it with the conditions of uncertainty concerning the fate of future 
generations, both human and nonhuman, which characterize modern existence. The 
role of technology in the creation of that uncertainty means that there is needed an 
"ethics of long-range responsibility, coextensive with the range of our power" (p.21- 
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22). Jonas argues that because our capacity for wisdom, which we need to exercise 
now more than at any other time, has been dulled by our technological and 
productive successes, and because we exist in ignorance of their ultimate 
implications, then the next best course is "responsible restraint". Responsible 
restraint is akin to humility, "a humility owed, not like the former humility to the 
smallness of our power, but to the excessive magnitude of it, which is the excess of 
our power to act over our power to foresee and our power to evaluate and to judge" 
(p.22). As well as the ethical value of humility, a future-oriented ethic of 
responsibility would also demand foresight, and appropriate policy instruments to 
ensure its inclusion in decision-making. 
The situation of future uncertainty together with the irreversibility of 
technology's products which now confronts modern societies, develops from modern 
technology's tendency to compress the many small, "playing safe" steps of evolution 
into a few big ones. Natural evolution, because it works with small things in many 
steps, can afford a few small mistakes. Modern technology does not have this luxury. 
To the causal extent is thus added the causal tempo of 
technological interference with life's systems [and thus are injected] 
new elements of insecurity and hazard ... and in forcing this time 
contraction on evolutionary change he [technical man], by the same 
token, forces a vastly lengthened radius on his own actions (p.31). 
The ethical imperative that arises from the uncertainty generated by the magnitude of 
humanity's technological capacity in combination with its future-determining ability 
is the command of caution. "[T]he prophesy of doom is to be given greater heed than 
the prophesy of bliss" (p.31). The duty of caution is further extended by the tendency 
of technologically-induced developments to adopt a runaway mode, to overtake 
themselves, leaving no opportunity or time for self-correction. 
3.3.4: Obligations and Duties 
This future-oriented ethic of responsibility, with its imperatives of humility, 
foresight and caution, is grounded in a reverence or respect for life and the duty to 
ensure the continuance and the quality of life. Just as the novel conditions of human 
existence demand a new ethical stance, so a new set of obligations and duties flows 
from these imperatives, for the traditional ground of moral behaviour in rights and 
duties is no longer sufficient. In traditional ethics, responsibility is the reciprocal 
duty of another's right, but in a future-oriented ethic, that which does not yet exist has 
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no claim or right to be respected. But if as argued, it is the future not-yet-existent to 
which we owe responsibility, then any ethic of responsibility to future generations 
"must be independent of any idea of a right and therefore also of a reciprocity" (p.39). 
Jonas proposes an ethic of futurity founded on two principles, the second 
flowing from the first. The first is in fact metaphysical - to ensure the existence of 
future life - and the second is ethical - that the assurance of future life being given, 
we have a duty to ensure the quality of that future life. "Our cardinal duty toward the 
future of humanity ... is to stand guard over this onerous endowment of theirs" (p.42). 
3.3.5: Ontology and Ethics: From Being to Becoming to Being-in-the-World 
The future-oriented ethic of responsibility is an ethic for an era of crisis and 
emergency. It is an ethic oriented towards ensuring the future of existence. The 
ontology of premodern societies was grounded in the external - the objective of life 
being the attainment of personal perfection in this life to position oneself for a 
favoured place in eternal life. The impulse of existence was towards simply being, 
and stability and immutability were the states to be striven for. The ontology of 
modern life changed all that - the temporal component shifted from the hereafter to 
the present; change itself became the essence of social and moral progress and 
perfection became the object of change. Becoming became the ethical quest. But it 
was a flawed objective; it was a 'becoming' restricted to the level of the individual 
and it was a question of the individual becoming through 'having' (Fromm, 1978). 
Now the ecological and social crises generated by the 'having' mode demand a 
new ontology of being in the world. The temporal component again swings to the 
future, but it is a future that is uncertain and cannot be defined in the certain 
knowledge of an eternity: 
"[T]he ontology has changed. Ours is not that of eternity but of 
time. No longer is immutability the measure of perfection; almost 
the opposite is true. Abandoned to 'sovereign becoming' 
(Nietzsche), condemned to it after abrogating transcendent being,- 
we must seek the essential in transcience itself. It is in this context 
that responsibility can become dominant in morality" (p.125). 
With eternity transcended, all we have is our own mortality and we alone are 
responsible for it, while the magnitude of our power over it thus makes our 
responsibility that much greater. The ontological foundations of the ethic of 
responsibility are not rooted in the pursuit of individual spiritual perfection or in 
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perfection through material accumulation. The essence of being-in-the-world is 
conceived as an emergent process of participation by the individual in the world's 
becoming. The ontological framework shifts from the individual entity to the 
individual-in-relationship. Individual wellbeing becomes explicitly rather than 
implicitly connected to collective wellbeing and moral conduct becomes a function 
of one's relationships. 
3.3.6: Summary 
The conditions of modem existence and the crises they generate demand an 
ethic that fits those conditions. Earlier ethical systems were appropriate to the 
immediacy and contemporaneity of concurrent human relationships, but they no 
longer fit conditions of dynamism and the capacity of human power and prescience to 
effect widespread ecological modification. The power and prescience of human 
activity creates conditions of uncertainty, the consequence of unknown and long-
range side-effects, which earlier ethics, grounded in the stability and immutability of 
nature, are unfitted to address. A suitable ethic has to be future-oriented and capable 
of being applied to the magnitude and scale of technology's effects, their cumulative 
and self-reinforcing character, and their tendency to compress evolutionary processes. 
The moral obligations which flow from such an ethic involve both caution and 
foresight, and the establishment of institutions and mechanisms which encourage 
those virtues. 
The implications for the practice of politics, for economic theory and for 
public policy are far-reaching. The ethic of responsibility is associated with two 
fundamental shifts in human organization and orientation. Firstly, the sphere of 
action switches from the individual to the collective. The scale and the nature of the 
crises confronting societies of the late twentieth century can only be addressed at the 
collective level, although, as I shall argue in the following chapter, individual 
responsibility remains important. Secondly, "the relevant horizon of responsibility" 
moves from the immediate context of action to the indefinite future (p.9). The need 
for collective action on technologically-induced environmental problems means that 
systems of economic activity largely predicated on the supremacy of individual self-
interest and largely existing as ends in themselves must once again be justified 
according to political and social values. As well, the objectives of economic activity 
must once again be determined in the political sphere; in other words, the return of 
the normative dimension to decision-making in the spheres of production and 
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consumption. Economic theory no longer has the luxury of remaining ethically 
neutral. 
As for the political sphere, an ethic that acknowledges the demands of future 
existence is a challenge to the capacity of liberal representative democracies to take 
future interests into account. Under current arrangements, only the interests of 
present generations can be adequately represented. Who then will represent the 
interests of future generations? How will we in the present take account of the 
interests of the future? Who will be accountable to them for our mistakes? There are 
of course no concrete answers to these questions. All that we can provide for is that 
the possibilities of future generations will not be foreclosed. In this respect the 
magnitude and causal extent of modern actions and their capacity for novelty and 
surprise demands a politics normatively grounded in farsightedness, while an 
acknowledgement of the inherent dynamism of modern systems and the gap between 
human knowledge and technological capability requires that spontaneity be accepted 
and institutionalized as a crucial element of the political process (p.118-119). 
Further, those philosophical questions of old reassert themselves and demand 
a wisdom of the body politic that is not to be found in the doctrines of self-interest, 
nor in the parallel ethic of progress through economic growth. They call for a 
reconciliation between the interests of the individual and the collective. That will be 
the task of ethical-moral thought, to provide a normative dimension for ecologically 
sound productive activity. We could do worse than return to Adam Smith for a 
reinterpretation of the ethical dimensions of economic theory. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, Smith confined the importance of self-interest to certain transactions 
where trade or production was hindered by bureaucratic or other obstacles. The 
burden for the extrapolation of his observations on some self-interested behaviour in 
specific situations of exchange and the division of labour to cover all aspects of 
human behaviour must really be laid on subsequent classical and neoclassical 
economists and on the commercial practitioners of the day. It was prudence, the 
combination of the two qualities of reason and understanding with 'self-command', 
which Smith saw as the virtue most useful to the individual. Indeed, the essence of 
good behaviour lay in man regarding himself: 
"not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the 
world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature, ... [and] to 
the interests of this great community, he ought at all times to be 
willing that his own little interest should be sacrificed" (Smith, 
1976[1759], 140). 
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The public-spirited individual should exhibit 'humanity, justice, generosity, and 
public spirit' as the virtues most useful to others'". 
I have argued that the objective of an economic system grounded in an ethic 
of responsibility and its associated virtues is the survival and sustainability of the 
planet's biophysical and cultural systems. Sustainable development has been 
proposed as an economic strategy which would achieve this goal as well as serving 
the needs of social justice. To satisfy these ends, sustainable development must also 
be ethically sound. It is this question which the next section will address. 
3.4: Sustainable Development: Rhetoric Or Ethical Ideal? 
If sustainable development is to succeed as a new way of life on Earth, its moral 
content must be thoroughly debated and understood (Engel, 1990, 2). 
The purpose of this section is to assess the ethical capacity of the concept of 
sustainable development, as a strategy for integrating economy and ecology, to fulfill 
the task of ensuring ecological integrity and social justice. With reference to the now 
formulated ethic of responsibility, does sustainable development embody the ethical 
principles of caution, humility and foresight? Will sustainable development 
constitute the ethical values framework required to guide individual and collective 
behaviour towards what is considered good and right in this era of human and 
environmental crisis? And further, does it articulate an ethically sound 
understanding of what is a good life? In this respect, does it reconcile the age-old 
question of human autonomy and the demands of the common good? 
These are the questions which will occupy my attention in the remaining 
discussion, but first there are salient points which are germane to the argument and I 
shall address these at this juncture. They concern the normative dimension of 
sustainable development. 
1. Sustainable development is both means and end in itself (Goulet, 1990, 34). 
2. It is an inherently contested concept, like other political terms, such as 
democracy, liberty or social justice (Jacobs, 1995a, 4). 
3. It implies a time perspective. 
41 See Sen (1987, 22ff.) for a discussion of Smith's actual treatment of self-interest. He points out that 
Smith in reality criticised the tendency of some philosophers, such as Epicurus, to reduce the whole 
discourse of life to a single principle. 
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In all these senses the concept involves a normative dimension. In the first instance, 
sustainable development designates the goal of a set of economic processes which are 
themselves the means to the objective of sustainability (Goulet, 1990, 39). It is both 
new morality and new economic strategy (Engel, 1990, 1). As discussed earlier, the 
conditions of modern existence resurrect existential considerations largely ignored 
since the beginning of the modern industrial era. Sustainable development, Engel 
(1990, 1) argues, "is but the latest attempt to answer the perennial question of the 
purpose of human activity on the face of the Earth-the elemental moral question of 
what way of life human beings ought to pursue". The question of how we should live 
was recognized by Weber to be an inherently political concern. For Weber, it was 
the question which distinguished politics from science and therefore one that could 
not be resolved through applications of science and technology. 
Whether sustainable development is conceived as mere rhetoric, a cloak for 
business as usual (The Ecologist, 1993; Kothari, 1990, 27), or as an ethic which 
forms the basis for restructuring human productive activity and its relationship to 
ecological integrity, involves its contestability as a political subject (Jacobs, 1995a, 
4-5). Jacobs (1995a, 1) maintains that, now that the objective of sustainability has 
been generally accepted by radical greens, technocrats and capitalists alike, the 
contestation revolves around how it should be interpreted and implemented in 
practice. This "contestation constitutes the political struggle over the direction of 
social and economic development" (Jacobs, 1995a, 5). In this sense, sustainable 
development is normative in that it can set the parameters, discursively decided upon, 
which will determine to what extent we can restructure our systems of activity to 
meet the needs of both human and nonhuman nature. 
Sustainable development is also normative in that it implies a time 
perspective. "A sustainable environmental strategy implies a time perspective that is 
careless of neither future interests nor past experience" (Perrings, 1987, 160). If one 
accords any degree of intertemporal equity, as the now accepted interpretation 
purports to do, then one is making a moral judgement, in the sense that when making 
decisions which impact upon the welfare of future generations, one must weigh up 
the good of the present generations against the good of the former. The issue is 
"what responsibility the collectivity of the moment feels for the wellbeing of those 
who follow" (Perrings, 1987, 118). The rate at which the future is discounted, the 
choice of a positive or nil social discount rate, is dependent upon the extent to which 
current generations feel that the future can look after itself or accept responsibility for 
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the wellbeing of those to come. A positive discount rate implies that present 
generations accept little or no responsibility for the future's "impoverishment" or for 
their own "profligacy". Conversely, where there is no future discounting, the 
implication is that the present accepts responsibility for the future, but also that the 
outcomes of economic activity "are only optimal if they yield a constant stream of 
income in all periods. ...[T]he choice of a social discount rate involves matters of 
ethics and judgement and ...different ethics will result in the choice of different 
programs of production" (Perrings, 1987, 118-119). What is certain is that the self-
regulating market and its price system is incapable of recording these time-dependent 
effects (Perrings, 1987, 111), for as John Passmore (1974, 85) noted, "the market 
places great emphasis on certainty and propinquity, both of which qualities are 
irrelevant under the circumstances that now confront humankind". 
3.4.1: Sustainable Development: Interpretations 
As a further prelude to assessing the ethical capacity of sustainable 
development, we need to establish just what is meant by the term, and if, as Jacobs 
(1995a) maintains, it is a contested subject, what this means for an ethic of futurity. 
Jacobs has delineated 'radical' and 'conservative' interpretations which constitute 
competing conceptions about either pole of a continuum of interpretations. He 
recognizes in the sustainable development discourse four 'faultlines' about which 
contestation occcurs. These include the degree of environmental protection required 
by the concept, the degree of intergenerational equity, the approach to participation, 
and the breadth of the subject area. The 'weak' version adopts the position that the 
benefits of environmental protection have to be balanced or traded off against those 
of economic growth, that is, environmental conservation, while the 'strong' version 
holds that economic activity is subject to environmental limits. The latter is based on 
the notions of 'carrying capacity' and 'maximum sustainable yield', which find their 
expression in the general understanding that society should live within its limits. The 
notion of equity, which involves a commitment to ensure the basic needs of those 
living now and in the future (intra- and intertemporal equity), plays a large part in the 
discourse about sustainability in the 'developing' South, but is very largely ignored in 
the wealthier 'developed' North. The discourse in the South adopts an egalitarian 
stance concerning the distribution of global resources, a position which is less 
attractive in the industrialized North because of the fundamental challenge to levels 
of production and consumption and patterns of global economic relations. The 
redistribution of global resources implied by the egalitarian interpretation means that 
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Fault Lines of 
Contestation 
Conservative Sustainable 
Development 
Radical Sustainable 
Development 
Degree of 
Environmental 
Protection 
'Weak' 
Trade-off between economic 
growth and environmental 
protection 
'Strong' 
Accords priority natural values 
Equity (intra- 
and 
intergeneratio 
nal) 
Nonegalitarian 
Limited global redistribution 
Egalitarian 
Recognizes global 
maldistribution of wealth and 
responsibilities to future 
generations 
Participation 'Top-down' 
Participation is limited to the 
implementation stage 
Of instrumental value only 
'Bottom-up' 
Directed to both objective-
setting and policy-
implementation 
Of intrinsic value 
Breadth of 
Subject Area 
Narrow interpretation 
Restricted to the maintenance of 
the resource base 
Broad interpretation 
Includes both the maintenance 
of environmental integrity and 
sound human development-
'quality of life'issues 
Figure 1: Sustainable Development: Alternative Interpretations (from Jacobs (1995a, 
9-15) 
Northern countries are open to the charge of confining their interpretation of 
sustainable development to an 'environmental' one and ignoring its 'developmental' 
implications; thus demonstrating little commitment to the equity provisions inherent 
in the concept. 
Concerning the intergenerational equity provision, the constraints of the 
growth paradigm and of liberal representative democracy mean that governments are 
restricted to looking after the welfare of present generations. It is easier for most 
liberal democratic governments to give the appearance of attending to equity 
concerns by such manoeuvres as the designation of wilderness areas, rather than 
acknowledging this limitation and addressing the fundamental contradictions of the 
growthist paradigm. 
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The 'top-down' version of participation is that favoured by governments 
because they can retain control of the sustainable development agenda. This strategy 
is furthered by limiting participation to major stake-holders, including business, local 
government, and interest groups and other non-government organizations. It is also 
technocratic in that objectives are set by governments using experts, participation 
being limited to the implementation stage of policy formation. Thus issues such as 
waste reduction, recycling and energy conservation are more amenable to the reform 
strategies available to governments. By contrast, the 'bottom-up approach involves 
public participation in both objective-setting and implementation. In the former 
approach participation has extrinsic value; it is a means to implementing sustainable 
development. In the latter, participation has intrinsic value; it is a good in itself. 
The interpretation of the subject area covered by the concept varies from 
environmental protection as the dominant motivation to a much broader set of 
concerns including health, education and social welfare. This broader understanding 
flows from the notion that environmental protection is not possible without sound 
human development (Goulet, 1990), a development which is not synonymous with 
income growth. The expansion of the 'quality of life' criteria of sustainable 
development to include not just environmental quality but also basic human needs for 
meaningful work, equal opportunity and access to education and information, 
participation, protection of local and indigenous culture, human-scale development 
and so on has enormous implications for all areas of human activity: "[S]ustainable 
development is not just an environmental concept, but a general one, describing a 
new goal of economic and social (and by implication, political) life" (Jacobs, 1995a, 
14). 
The radical conception of sustainable development tends to be held by many 
greens, environmental activists, and by some public sector bureaucrats, particularly at 
the level of local government, while the conservative view tends to be the preserve of 
governments and business. In the light of the argument so far, the conservative view 
would appear to be the ethically weaker, because it clings to the modernist view of 
progress with its assumptions of scientism, technocratic managerialism, etatism, and 
economic growth. It is the ethical strength of sustainable development that I now 
consider. 
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3.4.2: Sustainable Development and Ethics 
The ethic of responsibility articulated above is a future-oriented ethic which 
calls for values of caution, humility and foresight in the human-nature production 
interface. Futurity is one of the core ideas identified by Jacobs (1991; 1995a) in the 
sustainable development discourse. The question is: what does such an ethic demand 
of present generations with respect to the future? And what do these values mean for 
the operationalizing of sustainable development? The uncertainties - and risks42 
generated by modern humanity's immense technological power and prescience 
demand in the minimal case at least the minimization of "unsustainable outcomes" 
(Baines and Peet, 1992, 82) or "the avoidance of environmental catastrophe" (Jacobs, 
1991, 72). Under this interpretation there is no positive responsibility for what kind 
of future (that is, quality of life) current generations should bequeath their 
descendants. The ethical requirement is confined to risk avoidance. The maximal 
case, by contrast, demands somewhat more: "that future generations are left the 
opportunity to experience a level of environmental consumption at least equal to that 
of the present generation" (Jacobs, 1991, 72). The implications for the current 
generation's treatment of the claims of generations to come are different for each 
case. The weak case might allow considerable environmental degradation whereas 
the demand to pass on at least "the same degree of environmental capacity" in the 
strong case may mean that not only is environmental capacity held constant but even 
lower levels of degradation than now obtain may be required (Jacobs, 1991, 73). 
Thus a cautious environmental policy is one that, at the very least, maintains 
environmental capacities, if not improving them. 43 
The ethical value of foresight, defined as 'caring for the future', is linked to 
the degree of certainty, that is, the degree to which future effects originating in 
present actions can be known. Perrings (1987, 116-117) had this to say about time-
dependent effects and their relationship to foresight: 
The assumption of certainty applies to the environmental short 
period, the period in which there is no environmental change 
associated with a particular action. The assumption of uncertainty 
is equivalent to the assumption that we are interested in the 
environmental long period, during which the process of 
environmental change has generated at least some external effects. 
42Perrings (1987, 112), drawing on Shackle and Georgescu-Roegen, has characterized 'risks as a 
function of a situation where the range of possible outcomes is known in advance, while 'uncertainty' is 
a function of 'novelty' or 'surprise', that is, when the range of possible outcomes cannot be known in 
advance. 
43See also Pearce (1993, 51-53) on the measurement of 'weak' and 'strong' sustainability. 
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The environmental short period may be thought of as the period in 
which it is legitimate to assume perfect foresight. The 
environmental long period is any period in which the assumption of 
perfect foresight does not hold. 
Under conditions of runaway technology and rapid environmental change, the 
imperfect foresight case must be conceded. 
The economic instrument used to anticipate the effects of current investment 
decisions in the future is the discount rate, which is a measure of the preferences for 
income earned in one period relative to income earned in the next. "A low discount 
rate (which implies that income generated in the future generates a high rate relative 
to the present) admits a greater degree of uncertainty in a given program than a high 
discount (which implies a low weight on future incomes)" (Perrings, 1987, 117). In 
trading off the interests of future generations and nature with the demands of 
economic growth, the 'conservative' version of sustainable development would 
favour positive discount rates and would rely on the market for relevant signals. But 
market prices can only reflect the economic situation as it currently is, not as it will 
be.44 The 'radical' version would support a nil or negative discount rate. In fact, 
environmentalists who recognize the intrinsicality of nature and the entitlements of 
future generations would find social discounting ethically unjustifiable. Daly and 
Cobb (1989, Ch.7) would say that it was a case of 'misplaced concreteness' to confuse 
the value of money with the value of environmental goods. 
On questions of equity and discount rates, Norgaard and Howarth (1991, 94) 
are particularly critical of neoclassicists' treatment of equity matters as simply a 
question of applying the appropriate rate of discount on the assumption that the needs 
of future generations can be "treated as investment decisions yielding returns to this 
generation". This incidental way of thinking about future needs has to be replaced by 
more systematic measures: 
Questions which are fundamentally matters of equity should be 
treated as such. If we are concerned about the distribution of 
welfare across generations, then we should transfer wealth, not 
engage in inefficient investments. Transfer mechanisms might 
include setting aside natural resources and protecting environments, 
educating the young, and developing technologies for the 
sustainable management of renewable resources. Some of these 
might be viewed as worthwhile investments on the part of this 
44Beder (1993, 82) cites the view of the Business Council of Australia that "uncertainty about the 
impacts of a development on biological diversity is not a reason for stopping a development". 
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generation, but if their intention is to function as transfers, then 
they should not be evaluated as investments. The benefits from 
transfers, in short, should not be discounted (Norgaard and 
Howarth, 1991, 98). 
The problem with wealth transfers to future generations, however, is that we 
have no way of knowing their preferences. Imperfect foresight notwithstanding, it is 
certain that we should do better than plan for their mere survival. We can at least 
make provision for future societies to realize and enjoy all those social ideals which 
we now hold (Passmore, 1974, 91). 
Moreover, with respect to sustainability, the strong case would see value in 
collective participation for the setting of anticipatory limits which acknowledge the 
uncertainties and surprise of long period effects and are based on ecological and 
ethical insights (Daly and Cobb, 1989, 152). 45 Norgaard and Howarth (1991, 98) 
similarly conclude that it would be more preferable for decision-making about wealth 
transfers to future generations to be entrusted to "politically functional societies" 
rather than that environmental constraints be bureaucratically imposed. 
The moral significance of humility for the sustainable development discourse 
lies in its implications for the role of science and technology. Science can no longer 
rest on the illusion that its function is to develop nature in the service of humanity. It 
can no longer conflate value-freedom with ethical freedom: 
This must give place to the original purpose of science, namely, 
seeking to understand the mysteries of nature with a deep sense of 
humility and wonder. True science is practised by persons with a 
fundamental philosophical scepticism about the scope and limits of 
human knowledge, who never for a moment assume that all is 
knowable and that secular knowledge provides the key to 
'mastering' the universe. ... The scientist will have to take a more 
modest role as a participant in a total system of relationships [my 
italics] (Kothari, 1990, 34-35; see also O'Neill, 1993, 156-158). 
Sustainable development is still fundamentally a modernist programme in the 
sense that it has not yet accepted that there are limits to human knowledge and 
understanding and it retains the control myths of earlier modernity, that is, that 
human society is capable of controlling and managing the world. "The ends are 
450n the possibilities for setting limits based on current knowledge, see Dietz and van der Straaten 
(1993, 131, 15). 
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different-to live within environmental limits, not to expand as if there weren't any-but 
the means are the same" (Jacobs, 1995b, 8). 
The notion that carrying capacity, which is a critical element in the 
sustainability discourse, can be objectively determined, has been criticized by some 
sociologists of science, who argue that scientific knowledge cannot be constructed 
independently of its social and cultural milieu and that different cultures may furnish 
different understandings and ways of knowing (Redclift, 1984). Jacobs (1995b, 5) 
demonstrates that even so-called objectively determined limits are often arbitrary and 
involve some degree of political negotiation, concluding that "there are no 
objectively 'scientific' ways of resolving these questions; while different 
understandings of nature can inform them, they must ultimately be arbitrated with 
reference to 'subjective' socially constructed values. ... [The] simple scientistic 
notion of these concepts [carrying capacity and environmental limits] must be 
discarded and replaced with a more conditional, socially-informed one" (Jacobs, 
1995b, 5). 
Some environmentalists would argue that it is the hubris of modem 
technology and managerial techniques which have brought the planet to the brink of 
environmental disaster, and that humankind should relinquish control of large areas 
of the nonhuman world. This would involve immense reductions in population 
numbers, in production, and in standards of material wealth. It is doubtful whether 
such a transformation is achievable, certainly not in the short-term. It is clear that 
choices have to be made and some form of environmental management appears 
unavoidable. Science and technology will still be required to play a role in both the 
choices and the implementation, for the latter will need to be informed by an 
adequate and reliable science and an understanding of the interactions between 
humankind and nature. Decisions will need to be taken in the clear understanding of 
the fallibilities of scientific knowledge and in the realization that technologies can 
produce unforeseen side-effects. 
Under these circumstances, what is required is "scientific humility: 
acceptance of the fact that the biosphere is more complex than we thought and 
human understanding of it more limited" (Jacobs, 1995b, 9). Along with theorists 
such as John O'Neill (1993, 147), we can acknowledge the shortcomings of 
objectivist science and its inadequacy in rational environmental policy, but accept 
that science is still a reliable way of knowing. It must be seen as a tool that requires 
the guidance of ethical principles and political judgements in its application to 
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environmental problems under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty. 
Environmental policy guided by the values of humility and caution would ensure that 
applications of technology avoid any major changes to ecological processes as well 
as avoiding the implementation of any projects which have the potential for inducing 
environmentally irreversible consequences. 
It is obvious that humankind's enormous capacity to influence the future is 
such that we cannot withdraw from making decisions about the future. The 
conservative model of sustainable development would see the continuation of 
economic growth within ecological limits, with little change to the kind of science 
and technology employed or the economic institutional framework underpinning it - 
in other words, 'business as usual' (Kothari, 1990; The Ecologist, 1993). The 
openness of the radical version to bottom-up participation in processes of social and 
political choice allows for the possibility of the replacement of hubristic scientism 
and top-down managerialism. Participation processes open up opportunities for the 
inclusion of local knowledge as a complement to expert scientific knowledge. In 
theory, this should make for ecologically sound decision-making, but this is not 
guaranteed (Saward, 1993). 
In this respect, Jacobs (1995b, 6) sees a further advantage in participative 
processes in that they can constitute a method for the formation of knowledge about 
the world and therefore of deciding on the kinds of environmental limits that apply 
and where they lie. Under circumstances where the validity of other ways of 
knowing or local knowledge is accepted, and where judgements on scientific 
knowledge are made with the recognition of the downside of objectivist science and 
with the guidance of the ethical principle of humility, then we should expect 
relatively benign environmental and social outcomes. In this regard, the radical 
position can be said to have more potential humility towards the capacity of 
objectively determined knowledge to deal with environmental problems and that 
environmental management on this basis would operate in full acknowledgement that 
it can only command a partial understanding of the workings of the natural world and 
human impacts on it. 
In summary then, the radical version of sustainable development is in an 
ethically stronger position to conform to those values of caution, humility and 
foresight articulated above. Its stance on the maintenance of environmental capacity 
would demand environmental policy based on caution, while its disdain for social 
discounting, a disdain founded on a recognition of the prior value of other nature and 
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the entitlements of future generations, would imply the use of mechanisms other than 
competitive markets for relevant signals about future needs. Such mechanisms for 
caring for the needs of future generations (foresight) would acknowledge the 
imperfections of human knowledge organizations. Modesty concerning the limits of 
secular knowledge (humility) involves accepting that, under conditions of 
uncertainty, science requires the guidance of ethical principles and political 
judgements. Setting limits to the extent of human activity has to be achieved through 
participative processes which recognize the complementarity of local and expert 
knowledge systems. For this to occur, some overarching framework or generally 
accepted consensus of what constitutes the good life has to be negotiated. Indeed the 
emphasis is on negotiation, for there will always be some disagreement on what 
constitutes a good life t hough this is not to say that there cannot be some generally 
agreed upon understanding of a good human life and the common good which 
permits that flourishing.46 
3.4.3: Sustainable Development, Ethics and the Good Life 
Those basic existential questions long repressed by the doctrine of economic 
progress: How shall I live? What kind of life should I live? and What is a good life 
for me to lead?, as I have earlier argued, once again claim our attention in an era of 
unprecedented ecological hazards and uncertainty. As this is also an era of high 
social reflexivity, Giddens (1994, 226) argues that how an individual constructs him-
or herself is directly related to these larger questions of social and environmental 
renewal: 
'How shall we live?': that question can no longer be answered in 
terms of the control of external risk, or left to the remaining 
elements of tradition. Facing up to it means deliberating, in an 
open and public way, how social and environmental repair might be 
connected to the pursuit of positive life values (Giddens, 1994, 
226). 
As a strategy for human development, the relinquishing of productivism "implies a 
recovery of positive life values, guided by the themes of autonomy, solidarity and the 
46Spragens (1990, 115-123) argues for "an open-textured conception of the good", one which is 
attendant to historical existence, to human experience, with its capacities and fallibilities, and open to 
emendation in response to the change of circumstance. The pursuit of the common good should 
"function as an intelligible framework for solving the problems of our common life". It is not an end-
point which can be postulated in advance and then enforced. "We seek to know and create our 
common good by solving the difficulties that afflict us" (p.120). 
149 
pursuit of happiness ... [and] an attitude of respect towards nonhuman agencies and 
beings, present and future" (Giddens, 1994, 227-228, 253). 
The resurrection of positive life values - the sanctity of human life, the 
universal right to self-actualization and happiness, and respect for all nonhuman 
agencies and beings - and the associated understanding of the good citizen living the 
good life as a prerequisite for the common weal flies in the face of what has been the 
dominant consensus on the role of the liberal state for some centuries. This is the 
tradition rooted in Hobbes that the function of the state was merely to arbitrate 
between the self-serving desires of its citizens, for which only understanding was 
required of it, certainly not virtue. In the Hobbesian conception of the liberal state, 
the state was expected to maintain a strict neutrality between competing individual 
goods, simply supplying the legal and constitutional framework within which 
individuals could construct their own individual goods (Weale, 1992, 151). Adam 
Smith's invisible hand would see to it that these individual goods would add up to the 
common good. 
The notion that the health of a society depends not only on the physical 
wellbeing of its citizens but also on their moral health has its roots in the classical 
democracy of Aristotle with later echoes in Rousseau, Jefferson, J. S. Mill and T. H. 
Green. But the problems that beset us now are not only those of relationships 
between citizens - we need to be good citizens also in relation to nature. A recent 
attempt to look at human/nature relationships in this sense has been that of John 
O'Neill (1993). The significance of O'Neill's interpretation of the Aristotelian 
understanding of a flourishing human life, that it is constituted by the flourishing of 
"the goods and entities of nonhuman life", is that it provides an alternative 
foundation for an ethically good life, a replacement for the ethically limited one 
inspired by the ideology of the self-regulating market (O'Neill, 1993, 24). Within the 
framework of such an understanding of the good life, again it is the radical 
interpretation of sustainability, with its recognition of the intrinsic values of other 
nature and that 'quality of life' issues are intimately connected to environmental 
protection, which has the capacity to encourage that flourishing which is constitutive 
of a good human life. Moreover, participation processes that encourage input into 
both policy formation and implementation are more likely to be directed at creating 
just those conditions. As O'Neill (1993, 42) concludes: "Success in our own lives 
needs to be clearly bound up with those of future generations". The problem of our 
obligations to those generations yet to come has social, political and economic 
dimensions linked to the relationship between the individual and the community. It 
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is a problem of "developing forms of community which no longer leave the 
individual stripped of particular ties to others, but which are compatible with the 
sense of individual autonomy and the richness of needs that the disintegration of 
older identities also produced" (O'Neill, 1993, 42-43). 
3.4.4: Sustainable Development, Autonomy and the Common Good 
The age old question of the reconciliation of individual autonomy with the 
wider social good is being asked anew in the context of sustainable development. It 
is Ronald Engel's contention that the question of the interdependence of human 
freedom and the freedom of nature must be faced and dealt with if sustainable 
development is to be the "ethic that recognizes and promotes the mutuality of 
ecological and social values in concrete living communities ...[and if it is] to serve as 
the basis for significant social change - if it is to help define specific, practical 
development goals and provide guidance in the inevitable conflicts that arise when 
social and ecological obligations are considered within the framework of action" 
(Engel, 1990, 19). 
Over the last several centuries, the relationship of humanity to nature among 
certain world views has become unbalanced, taking the form of human domination 
over the natural world to which humans belong. "Nature and human liberty have 
come to be perceived as opposing poles in a dichotomy" (Goulet, 1990, 43). This 
oppositional stance has become paradoxical in that "human beings are not physically 
compelled to respect nature but they need to do so if they are to survive and preserve 
the existential ground on which to assert their freedom. Since this is so, there can be 
no ultimate or radical incompatibility between the demands of nature and the 
exigencies of human freedom" (Goulet, 1990, 43). Further Goulet (1990, 45) states: 
"[T]hings have gone wrong not because humans held an anthropocentric view of the 
universe (they could not do otherwise) but because they erred in defining the value 
content of their own development and freedom". They made the mistake of believing 
that freedom from the constraints of nature is an absolute value, when it really 
constitutes a negative view of freedom. Freedom from the constraints of nature is 
only a positive value in the sense that it allows freedom for human fulfillment or 
actualization or for what John Gray (1993) calls "the positive liberty of autonomy". 
The autonomy of which Gray speaks is clearly not the individualism of the self-
seeking, profit-maximizing behaviour of the neoliberal market model. In its purest 
individualist form, it is that which he defines as: 
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the condition in which persons can at least be part authors of their 
lives, in that they have before them a range of worthwhile options, 
in respect of which their choices are not fettered by coercion and 
with regard to which they possess the capacities and resources 
presupposed by a reasonable measure of success in their self-
chosen paths among these options (Gray, 1993, 78). 
The preconditions of autonomy in the late industrial age encompass a "broad 
diversity of institutions" and "a rich and deep common culture containing 
choiceworthy options and forms of life" (Gray, 1993, 82). 
Both Gray (1993, 81) and Giddens (1994, 13) shy away from claiming that 
autonomy is a universal good, arguing rather that it is an essential element of the 
good life at this juncture in the history of those societies which espouse an 
individualist form of life: 
In a world of high reflexivity, an individual must achieve a certain 
degree of autonomy of action as a condition of being able to 
survive and form a life (Giddens, 1994, 13). 
and : 
No inhabitant of a modern pluralistic, mobile and discursive society 
can fare well without at least a modicum of the capacities and 
resources needed for autonomy. Most modern societies are such, in 
other words, that the constitutive elements of autonomy - the 
capacity for rational deliberation and choice, the absence of 
coercion by others and the possession of the resources needed for a 
life that is at least partly self-directed - are among our most vital 
interests. They are, indeed, vital ingredients in our wellbeing as a 
whole (Gray, 1993, 81). 
My own intuition suggests that autonomy conceived as the freedom to actualize one's 
evolutionary potential, whether an entity be human or nonhuman, may indeed be a 
universal good, and rather, that it is the conditions of autonomy that are historically 
situated and culturally specific. But that is not necessarily at issue here. Rather, the 
question is whether sustainable development as economic strategy can reconcile 
personal autonomy and the interdependence of all life forms. In other words: Can 
sustainable development constitute the basis for a "wider and more satisfactory 
conception of the goods of life" (O'Neill, 1993, 171)? 
To return to autonomy and its implications. The question of reconciling 
individual autonomy with the common good is essentially about the relationship 
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between the individual and the collective. The breakdown of community ties and the 
parallel emergence of an egoistic individualism is much lamented in both academic 
literature and the popular press. Giddens (1994, 13) optimistically maintains that the 
disintegration of the conditions of individual and collective life provides 
opportunities for new forms of solidarity, while the autonomy essential to the good 
living of an individual in a highly reflexive society implies reciprocity and 
interdependence. Reciprocity is grounded in the obligations of the individual to other 
members of the collective and to the collective itself. These obligations are 
constituted by the need for individuals to interact with others as they "construct their 
own biographies". In interacting with others, they create new solidarities, which are 
founded on mutual obligation. This "is not only important because it implies a 
vertical connection with the needs of others; it matters because it refers to the 
sustaining of ties with others over time" (Giddens,. 1994, 126-127). At the personal 
level, the sources of solidarity, that is, the trust mechanisms involved, depend on the 
recognition of personal integrity; at the level of abstract systems, the state and global 
relations, they involve the guidance of themes of visibility and responsibility 
(Giddens, 1994, 131). 
The importance of sustaining ties over time and obligations to future 
generations has only really become a problem now that it has become obvious that 
the economic order that was set in place by the liberal revolution is the source of 
social and environmental disintegration. O'Neill (1993, 38-43) has clearly 
demonstrated the role of market economies in disrupting the sense of present 
generations' connection with both past and future. The requirements of the self-
regulating market for the mobilization of both land and labour undermine that sense 
of continuity and community obligation to past and future generations. By severing 
ties of place, kin and occupation, the market undermines those institutions which link 
future harms or wellbeing to present actions. In highlighting "this temporal myopia 
of modern society", neither O'Neill (1993, 42) nor Giddens (1994, 126) advocate a 
return to traditional forms of community, both acknowledging the oppressiveness of 
some traditional communities. Rather, they advocate forms of community which 
foster individual ties and obligations, "that allow an extension of our sense of identity 
over time [and that are] ... compatible with the sense of individual autonomy" 
(O'Neill, 1993, 42, 43). 
The key normative idea which expresses the notion of human autonomy and 
welfare being constituted by community wellbeing is that of the 'individual-in-
community' (Engel, 1990, 15) or variously Daly and Cobb's idea of 'person-in- 
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community' (Daly and Cobb, 1989, Ch. 8) and Etzioni's 'I and We paradigm' of the 
responsive community (Etzioni, 1988; 1992). The ideal of 'person-in-community' in 
which the individual is constituted by his or her relationships is contrasted with that 
implicit in the market economy where the good of society is identical with the sum of 
the goods and services accruing to individual society members. This view says 
nothing about the quality of social relationships; indeed, there is no recognition that 
unlimited production can actually damage those constitutive social relationships: 
"Since relationships among human beings are not part of the model with which the 
theory begins, the damaging of these relationships is not signalled by the theory. The 
destruction of existing societies does not count against the success of policies 
designed to increase aggregate goods and services" (Daly and Cobb, 1989, 163). 
The model of 'person-in-community' recognizes the needs of individual 
autonomy, which, as Daly and Cobb (1989) note, can be taken care of in large 
measure by market transactions, but that the wellbeing of social relationships 
constituting the community cannot be addressed by increases in output of 
commodities. Nor can they be exchanged in the market, though they can be damaged 
by it. Hence the need for "an economic order that supports the pattern of personal 
relationships that make up the community" (Daly and Cobb, 1989, 165). Moreover, 
as we have also extended the field of relationship and obligation to the nonhuman 
community, the economic order should support not only personal relationships but 
human/nature connections. 
To answer those questions posed earlier concerning the capacity of 
sustainable development to provide for conditions of human autonomy and 
flourishing consistent with biosystemic sustainability and a broader conception of the 
goods of life, for Goulet (1990, 43-44) the values underpinning these questions - 
individual autonomy, social justice and nature preservation - must have equal moral 
standing: 
The reason is simply that any long-term, sustainable, equity-
enhancing combat against poverty requires wisdom in the 
exploitation of resources, just as the preservation of species cannot 
be persuasively held out as a priority goal if the human species is 
threatened with degrading poverty or extinction (Goulet, 1990, 44). 
Sound human development is consistent with ecological wisdom. 
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Concerning these values, we now have some idea of what is required of a 
sustainable system of production and consumption. Firstly, it must ensure sound 
human flourishing, by furnishing those goods which ensure human autonomy 
(survival, opportunities for participation, and a good life); secondly, it must preserve 
and foster forms of community wellbeing, which ensure connection with past and 
future time perspectives; and thirdly, it must preserve and foster ecosystem viability. 
Sound human development consistent with ecosystem viability is really only possible 
with the radical interpretation of sustainable development. This has been variously 
relabelled 'authentic development' (Goulet, 1990), ecodevelopment (Crocker, 1990), 
reverential development (Skolimowslci, 1990) and alternative development (Giddens, 
1994) in attempts to underline the essentially normative character of the concept and 
to distinguish it from the limited, instrumental, conservative view of environmental 
conservation and development. 
These are the criteria which define sustainable development as an ethical 
ideal and which suggest that the transformations required of the economic sphere 
cannot be restricted to simple economic restructuring in order to contain economic 
growth within environmental limits. When sustainability is conceived as an ethical 
ideal, it raises profound questions about the profligacy of western life-styles and 
consumption patterns, and their role in the extreme poverty and ecological decline of 
much of the 'developing' world. The existence of humankind is no longer simply a 
matter of avoiding external risks. The sources of risk have changed. It is rather 
manufactured risk, which results from human intervention in social processes and in 
nature (Giddens, 1994, 4). As it has become obvious that the futures of humankind 
and the biosphere are intimately connected, so too has it become clear that only 
humans can be responsible for the future of existence: 
• The exploitation of planet Earth has gone beyond the threshhold 
where nature can defend and replenish itself. The urgently needed 
symbiosis between nature and the human species can only result 
from placing human responsibility at the centre of the task of 
conserving nature [my italics] (Goulet, 1990, 45). 
3.4.5: Summary 
I have argued that if sustainable development is to prove both the source of 
moral action and the economic strategy which ensures ecological integrity and social 
justice, then it must be conceived as an ethical ideal with human responsibility as its 
moral core. In its radical version, sustainable development integrates a strong 
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normative dimension in that, firstly, it involves the setting of parameters for 
economic restructuring; secondly, it implies a time perspective and thus some degree 
of intertemporal equity; and thirdly, it sets down the objectives of economic activity. 
The discourse of sustainability revolves around four poles of contestation, the 
two versions - radical and conservative - assuming opposing positions on the degree 
of environmental protection, on their approach to participation, on the extent of intra-
and intergenerational equity and on the relevant spheres of action. I contend that the 
radical interpretation is the ethically stronger based on its acceptance of intrinsic 
values in nature, equity provisions, bottom-up participation and its recognition that 
sustainability implies attention to 'quality of life' issues and is not restricted solely to 
environmental conservation. 
Assessment of sustainable development for its integration of the ethic of 
responsibility outlined earlier reveals that attention to the values of caution, foresight 
and humility demands at the very least the maintenance of existing environmental 
capacities, if not their restoration and enhancement. Moreover the practice of 
discounting the wellbeing of future generations for the benefit of those presently 
living is unjustifiable and unethical. Economic policies must be oriented to take the 
environmental long period into consideration. Similarly the hegemony and hubris of 
modern science and technology together with expert-based managerialism is 
antipathetic to the value of humility and the validity of non-scientific knowledges. 
Further, sustainable development as ethical ideal challenges the view of the 
liberal state as neutral umpire between different conceptions of the good. In its 
ethically strong form it demands a conception of human flourishing that recognizes 
the intrinsic value of other nature, whose own flourishing is constitutive of a good 
human life. 
The issue of human flourishing in the context of sustainable development 
raises the age-old question of the reconciliation of individual freedom or autonomy 
with the common good. In this context the question revolves around the 
interdependence of human freedom and the freedom of nature. For some centuries 
human freedom has been defined negatively in relation to nature, as freedom from 
nature, and as an absolute value no less. The continued existence of humankind can 
no longer countenance such a radical discontinuity between these values. 
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A flourishing human life which furnishes the conditions for autonomy in a 
highly reflexive society implies reciprocity and mutual obligation in relationships and 
new bases for solidarity. Since traditional forms of community and ties to past and 
future generations have been undermined by market mechanisms of labour and land 
mobilization, the fostering of new solidarities which encourage a sense of identity 
over time is a requirement of any sustainable economic strategy. 
The notion that the wellbeing of a society is constituted by the wellbeing and 
virtue of its citizens is recognized in the concepts of person-community, which 
acknowledge the symbiotic balance between individual and community needs. A 
sustainable economic order would support the relationships of community by 
recognizing their significance for social and ecological integrity. 
CHAPTER 4 
TOWARDS ECOLOGICALLY RESPONSIBLE 
PROPERTY RULES 
It is clear today that the foundations of Locke's political theory - individualism 
and private property - presuppose very specific ecological conditions. Locke's 
theory depends upon the existence of a New World with an endless supply of 
spaces and resources ripe for colonization and plunder. ...Today the inviolability 
of individual rights and private koperty has been undermined by population 
growth and advances in technology. ...The question is whether individualism can 
have the same meaning, or should remain an ideal, in a world with over five 
billion human beings. ... [T]hese conditions [Locke's New World] no longer 
prevail. Because there are no more elsewheres - all the spaces are filled; all 
countries are settled - the question of the common good is reasserting itself with 
renewed force (Frodeman, 1992, 316-317). 
4.1: Introduction 
Private property rights as presently conceived had their. origins in the social 
revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They evolved in response to 
the social and environmental conditions of this period, a time of immense social and 
economic upheaval, yet of seemingly unlimited resources. The exclusive and 
inalienable rights of property proposed by theorists such as John Locke can be 
interpreted as the contemporary defense against absolutist monarchy and religious 
intolerance. However, the original trust placed in property rights to preserve 'Lives, 
Liberties and Possessions' against the imposition of arbitrary control has been 
betrayed and the situation now arises where those absolute and unlimited rights still 
associated with property ownership have become both a threat to liberty and to 
ecological integrity. 
It is my contention that property rights together with the free market as the 
system of co-ordination, which was intended to efficiently allocate material 
resources, are now generating negative externalities of such a magnitude that they 
can be said to be failing in that primary allocative function. Private property rights 
were originally a response to the externality costs of the feudal system of land tenure. 
But they in turn have become too costly and the illiberal facets of the institution are 
now becoming patently transparent. The distribution and management of land and 
resource entitlements under the present system of private property entitlements has 
become problematic. In mounting the case for rethinking property rights, I illustrate 
their functional failure by drawing attention to, firstly, the degeneration of the 
material basis of property, secondly, the undermining of its social utility, and thirdly, 
the challenge of indigenous people's native title claims to an ideology of property 
rooted in exclusive and inalienable rights. 
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In rethinking property rights, I want to explore the kinds of limitations and 
responsibilities that are necessary for an environmentally sound theory of property. 
The restrictions involved apply to those legal rights of ownership encapsulated by 
Honore (1961) in his list of 'incidents', namely the rights to possess, use, and manage, 
and the rights to the income, capital, and security, and to the power of 
transmissibility. The responsibilities concerned are not those abstract obligations 
generated from an abstract understanding of the interdependence of a community or 
an ecosystem. Rather they are a function of our relationships to other members of our 
community. To this end, recourse is made to contextual ethical theories where 
responsibilities are defined by relationships and since environmental concerns become 
ever more pressing, the possibilities of extending the boundaries of the moral 
community to include our relationships with other nature are also canvassed. 
It is not my intention to concern myself with the problems of general 
justification, that is, why there should be property rights at all, for I accept that 
property rights in Western liberal societies are a fairly entrenched if slowly adaptive 
institution, as I hope to demonstrate 47 . In arguing for a more ecologically responsive 
concept of property, my concern is with what Lawrence Becker (1977, 3) refers to as 
the problem of specific justification, that is "what sorts of people should own what 
sorts of things and under what sorts of conditions". 
An ethically and ecologically sound system of property entitlements would 
elevate care and responsibility as key norms of ownership and would also seek to 
ensure the balance between individual needs and ecological wellbeing. Addressing 
the present imbalance between private rights and public benefits will involve 
correcting the weighting against social and environmental responsibility. I look to a 
contextual ethic, such as developed by some ecofeminists, for the appropriate ethical 
richness. This ethic stresses care and responsibility over a procedural ethic of rights 
and justice. In acknowledging the communal and biophysical origins of property, 
property rights would no longer be seen in isolation but as integral components of a 
property regime whose institutional arrangements comprise an authority structure to 
confirm and protect entitlements and a social value set which encourages both 
socially and ecologically responsible activity. 
47A human needs based approach was adopted by Becker (1980) in his study of the moral basis of 
property. 
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4.2: The Case for Rethinking Private Property Rights 
The system of private property rights is one of the cornerstones of the liberal 
capitalist order, but in recent decades it has become increasingly obvious that not 
only has it failed to provide equality of access to and a fair distribution of the 
material resource base (that is, just social outcomes) but also it have not furnished 
desirable environmental outcomes 48 . Throughout the modern period, theorists and 
commentators, including Rousseau, J. S. Mill, Marx, Proudhon, T. H. Green, R. H. 
Tawney, and Morris Cohen among others (Macpherson, 1978), have expressed 
concern about the unequal distribution of wealth and the plight of the propertyless, 
but of late, writers, such as Joseph Sax (1983; 1993) and Mark Sagoff (1988), have 
also drawn attention to the increasingly incontestible environmental externality costs 
of the system of private property ownership. Indeed, Sax (1983: 484) contends that 
the institution of private property is failing in its primary allocative function and is 
therefore in decline. 
Functional failure of the system of private property is evidenced in a number 
of respects. Firstly, the material basis of the property system is being undermined by 
increasing environmental deterioration and degradation as a consequence of 
increasing pressure on land and resources (including the waste absorptive capacity of 
the biosphere). This development is reflected in the loss of productive farmland to 
urban sprawl, soil erosion, salinisation of irrigated farming regions (often 
exacerbated by tree removal), in disruption to ecosystem processes (through pesticide 
and herbicide contamination of waterways, infilling of wetlands for more 'useful' 
purposes, excess nutrient and sediment loads in marine and aquatic environments 
resulting in toxic algal blooms and loss of sea grass beds important in fish generation, 
and land clearance to name just a few sources), and on the global scale in climatic 
change and ozone depletion (Australia State of the Environment Advisory Council, 
1996). The response of the liberal state to increasing environmental decline has been 
to significantly extend the regulation of rights-holders' activities 49, a development 
which in itself suggests the failure of the system of private property entitlements to 
ensure acceptable environmental outcomes. Brubaker (1995), on the other hand, 
interprets increased environmental regulation not as an effect of the functional failure 
of private property rights but as the cause of the common law's failure to protect 
48Some will counter that the former Communist bloc members were responsible for enormous 
environmental damage, but it can be argued that the West's record is only better in relative terms. 
49Each Australian state, for example, has now over two hundred environmental statutes. A perusal of 
the statutes enacted prior to the 1970s reveals little reference to environmental quality. 
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private property rights as enshrined in laws of trespass and nuisance and riparian law. 
She argues that it is the erosion of common law rights by governmental legislation 
designed to protect the interests of industry and further growth at any cost based on 
the doubtful premise of protecting the common good that generates the scale of 
environmental degradation now being experienced. 
Secondly, the social utility of private property as an institution is also being 
undermined by the exposure and accentuation of those inconsistencies and 
inequalities of property relations which have always existed, but which have been 
largely submerged by the continuing economic growth of the postwar period. In the 
last two decades, especially in those western democracies which have followed an 
economic liberalist path, the discrepancies between the richest and poorest sections 
of the community have become wider and more conspicuous. The concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a few is illustrated by the statistic that one per cent of the 
population of the US controls 40 per cent of the nation's wealth. Even in Australia, 
supposedly one of the world's twelve most equal societies (Travers and Richardson, 
1993), in the period 1976 to 1991, the total household incomes of the higher status 
neighbourhoods in Australian cities (five per cent of households) increased by 23 per 
cent, while those in lower status households (again five per cent) declined by the 
same percentage. Although the concentration of wealth is not as marked as in the 
US, still one per cent of the population owns twenty per cent of all private wealth, 
while thirty per cent has no wealth at all (Australia State of the Environment 
Advisory Council, 1996, Sect. 3: 18, 19). These trends bode ill for both social and 
ecological sustainability. Moreover they are replicated at the global scale where there 
is an increasingly wider disparity not only within but also between the richest and 
poorest nations (The Ecologist, 1993: 103-104). 
I argue that these two developments, the retreat from social justice provisions 
and deteriorating environmental quality, together constitute a fundamental challenge 
to the liberal democratic order itself. The interests of the corporate sector are 
presently being allowed to override those welfare provisions established to 
compensate for the inequalities of the property system manifested in a previous era of 
corporate dominance. The specific incident of property which privileges corporate 
interests is the right to the unlimited accumulation of resources 50 . Gus diZ,erega 
(1996a) argues that those rights of property which have the potential to allow the 
arbitrary exercise of power are in fact a perpetuation of the absolutism of the 
50See Honore, A. M. 1961. 'Ownership', in A. G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, for a list of the "incidents" of property. 
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premodern age. The increasing concentration of wealth in the control of fewer and 
fewer individuals and corporations at a global scale together with the imperatives of 
the capital accumulation process provide ever more opportunities for the exercise of 
despotic power through corruption of the democratic process, for increasing 
exploitation and degradation of the physical environment, for imposing cultural 
homogenization and for intensifying social injustice. Thus, just as losing the right to 
own slaves and the extension of democratic rights to women, minorities and 
indigenous peoples constituted progressive reductions in the 'realm of arbitrary 
power', so should removing those rights of property which allow the extremes of 
inequality in the distribution of resources presently emerging and the associated 
environmental decline. It is questionable whether liberal democracy can any longer 
sustain the illiberal facets of this key institution. 
A third sphere which in recent decades has begun to present a challenge to 
western notions of property, but which also represents an opportunity for those of 
western heritage to reexamine their attitudes to property, consists in the conflict 
between native title claimants and other competing land users in the formerly 
colonial nations of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Western 
liberal notions of property are defined by exclusive possession and utilitarian values, 
which are contrasted with an indigenous sense of belonging to the land embodying a 
multiplicity of values. According to Eugene Hargrove (1989, Ch. 2), exclusive use 
rights and the present-day attitudes engendered by them have their origin in prefeudal 
Celtic and Saxon societies. These attitudes originated in the class of freemen or 
freeholders of land, whose status entitled them to occupy as much land as each could 
use, while commanding complete dominion over the holding free of any obligations 
to an overlord or to neighbours or to care for the land, since, if the fertility of the 
holding declined, the freeholder was entitled to relocate to other unoccupied land in 
order to graze his animals or raise crops. Hargrove argues that it was these prefeudal 
attitudes to land use which John Locke enshrined in political philosophy in the 
seventeenth century following the disintegration of the feudal order. 
Moreover, it was Locke's arguments originating in the utilitarian, economic 
values of land which were most supportive of the expansionary policies of the 
colonial occupiers. Thus for Locke, land could only be contributing to the social good 
if it was improved by some kind of agricultural pursuit, the corollary of which was 
that unused land was considered waste land (Locke, 1960, Sect. 42; 43P 1 . This 
5 IThe references to Locke in this paper refer to the second of his Two Treatises on Government. 
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understanding, that the landscape has to be used and improved by its transformation, 
continues to colour present-day attitudes to land use, for there is a sense that leaving 
land in its original state has no value and therefore does not contribute to the social 
good. Wetlands are particularly noteworthy victims of these attitudes for they suffer 
doubly from appearing to have no human utility whatsoever and therefore must be 
transformed by draining or infilling to provide a foundation for some "better" human 
use. As Sax (1993) demonstrates, this largely results from lack of recognition of the 
other values inherent in land, namely, that land is already in use providing 
ecosystemic services. In the case of wetlands, they may function to filter sediments 
and ensure water quality, recycle nutrients, absorb flood waters, act as fish nurseries 
and provide habitat for birds and waterfowl. 
The value of exclusive possession similarly continues to resonate, so much so 
that it has been transformed into a harmful ideology. Rose et al. (1976) have 
elucidated the ideology of property by making a useful distinction between property 
for one's own personal use (that is, householder's land and material possessions) and 
property which is used for capital production. The predominant ideology is that 
which surrounds the rights relating to the former. As they rightly point out, exclusive 
rights of possession and use should apply to personal possessions, but the ideology of 
'personal private appropriation' has been extended to the means of capital production 
and property used for capital gain has been accorded the same rights. 52 But, as Rose 
et al. (1976, 710) also demonstrate, to extend the justifications from one form of 
private property to all other forms of private property is to "[blur] very real 
differences between the character of two distinct types of private property, serving to 
legitimise one with reference to the other". In effect this amounts to using arguments 
which justify the entitlement to one's personal possessions as a defense for the 
ownership and control of the capital means of production. 
The consequence of this damaging combination of an ideology of property 
which privileges exclusive rights and the unlimited amassing of resources with 
utilitarian land use values together with an escalating technological capacity to 
modify environments is the loss of the capacity to recognize and to respond to 
biophysical limits. Those who subscribe to this ideology have difficulty conceiving 
of other values which might be inherent in land or of the responsibilities which attend 
ownership. Private property rights which are careless of attendant responsibilities 
52Corporate property has been described as a 'mutation of private property'. For a discussion of why 
corporate property should be regarded as a subset of the private property system, see Waldron (1985: 
346-348). 
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and ignore ecosystemic limits constitute an instrument of both social and 
environmental oppression. 
4.3: The Social Evolution of Private Property 
The relationship between the nature of justificatory theories of property and 
the social circumstances in which they are generated has been explored by a number 
of writers on property. Becker (1977, 112-113) has noted in general terms the 
variation in property rights justifiable within different historical and social settings. 
Socialist thinkers such as C.B. Macpherson (1978, 10, 201) have argued for an 
interpretation that sees a liberal theory of property serving the interests of a particular 
section of society. Under MacPherson's version, the development of the concept of 
private property was essential to the rise of modern capitalism in the eighteenth 
century. With the emergence of the market economy and the expectation that it 
would function as the principal mechanism for the allocation of resources among 
members of society, the situation demanded that rights to resources reside in defined 
parcels of land and material objects. Hence the owners of those material resources 
required absolute rights to their use and disposal, as well as unlimited rights to their 
accumulation, unconditional on the sort of moral or social obligations which operated 
prior to the seventeenth century. 
Earlier in this century, in a somewhat different interpretation, Morris Cohen 
(1933) had conceived of the development of absolute, inalienable rights as the 
product of an extreme struggle to assert the rights of the individual against the 
absolute rights of privileged interests, backed by the divine right of kings. Included 
were rights to property unencumbered by the injustices and restrictions of feudalism, 
but the classical conception of property rights that emerged from this encounter was a 
negative and narrowly conceived one and has remained largely so. The rights that 
became central to the liberal conception of property were exclusive in nature, 
embodying the right of exclusive possession, use and management, that is, the 
individual's rights against others. It is a narrowly individualistic conception, which 
does not define one's responsibilities to the wider community. Additionally, 
inasmuch as, in this conception of private property, ownership is seen as a condition 
for freedom, "the concept of freedom with which it is associated is negative freedom 
or freedom from constraint [my italics]" (Gould, 1988, 175). It fails to provide the 
conditions of freedom for individuals both in human and nonhuman nature to 
develop and use their capacities, that is, "the ethical goal of free and independent 
individual development" (Macpherson, 1978, 200). 
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Through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, the Lockean notion of 
absolute, inalienable rights inherent in private ownership was increasingly modified 
by social interest concerns which followed from the inequalities of unlimited 
accumulation manifested during the Industrial Revolution. With the full emergence 
of the welfare state in this century, the allocatory functions of the market were in part 
transferred to agencies of the welfare state itself and the traditional conception of 
property rights was modified from property in things or material possessions to a 
conception of property as a bundle-of-rights (Grey, 1980). Macpherson (1978, 206) 
further refined this conception to include exclusive rights to the consumables 
necessary for life and rights not to be excluded from the common capital of society, 
which he termed non-exclusive rights. These rights would guarantee equal access to 
the accumulated capital of society and its natural resources, and to an income 
sufficient for full human realization. 
Paradoxically, in the late twentieth century, it has been the incapacity of the 
market to take account of its own externalities that has favoured a further expansion 
of the concept of "common" or "social" property to include the rights to the essentials 
for human life on earth: clean air and water, as well as other environmental goods53 . 
Simultaneously, the concept of rights to property held in common is being enlarged 
on another front in response to the privatisation of publically-owned resources. 
Concern for negative social and environmental consequences has generated questions 
regarding the authority by which governments alienate common resources for the 
exclusive advantage of private individuals and corporations, while signalling the 
need for greater participation in decision-making concerning the common use and 
benefits of these resources. Consequently, as Macpherson (1978, 20) foreshadowed, 
the economic problem of the allocation of resources, originally central to the liberal 
tradition, has become a political problem, "a problem of democratic control over the 
uses to which the amassed capital [and resources] of a society is put." 
Thus far, theories of property have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with 
the question of 'rights'. This is an inadequate approach for societies facing increasing 
pressure on land and resources and problems of an environmental nature, such as the 
quality of the atmosphere, the oceans, local environments, biodiversity loss and 
ecosystem deterioration. Although the Lockean conception of property with its 
53Carol Gould (1988, 178-189) has proposed an alternative conception of "social" property that is a 
refinement of the liberal view in that some of the traditional rights of property are modified to prevent 
the inequalities that enable the domination of others and subversion of the democratic process. 
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exclusive and inalienable rights lingers on in the popular perception, it has, in reality, 
undergone modifications necessitated by social interests concerns. At this time, the 
environmental imperative raises the need for a further redefinition of the rules of 
property that not only incorporates rights, but also defines their limits and possessors' 
responsibilities. Such a theory should inhere a duty of care for the management of 
private possessions and for property held in common. 
4.4: Theories Of Property: Rights And Duties 
In this section, my intention is to explore the historical development of duties 
appending to property rights.54 The 'ethic of care' which is in process of refinement 
in feminist moral philosophy would appear to have some potential for a contribution 
to the present discussion. 
Prior to the seventeenth century, the Christian and common law traditions 
emphasised the property owner's duties and obligations rather than his rights (Ryan, 
1984, 19). As discussed previously, the emergence of absolute individual property 
rights in this century marked a change in the social functions of property. Lockean 
property rights removed the notion of social obligation adhering to ownership. 
Locke's only concessions to proprietorial responsibility were the non-spoliation and 
sufficiency conditions (Locke, 1960, Book II, Sect. 31, 27; see also Ryan, 1984, 36- 
37). 
Since this time, with the exception of Kant (1991[1797], 511), the emphasis 
has remained squarely on the rights aspect of private property considerations. Kant's 
interest in duties was a limited one and related rather more to the pursuit of virtue in 
the property owner than the welfare of the object of those duties. Subsequent 
challenges to traditional theory have customarily focussed on the unlimited 
acquisition provision and the resulting inequalities of distribution. Rousseau, in the 
eighteenth century, in his Discours sur l'origine et les Fondements de l'Inegalite 
Parmi les Hommes, raised these sorts of questions, reflecting his disquiet over the 
relationship between property and political rights, particularly those of the landless, 
for it was he who was most responsible for imputing a direct relationship between 
genuine political equality and economic equality (Discourse, 81). His concern for 
the human condition caused him to adopt an ambivalent attitude to property, seeing 
in it the means for cementing individuals to society and to their fellow humans but 
54In this I largely follow Alan Ryan's (1984) account of the contributions of Locke, Rousseau,Kant, 
the Utilitarians, Marx and Mill to the theory of property. 
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also as the vehicle for their enslavement and alienation. His interest was thus 
overwhelmingly a moral one but he had little to say on the kind of relationships 
people should have with their property (Ryan, 1984, 69). 
In the early nineteenth century, utilitarian arguments added to Rousseau's 
concern with humanity in general, focussing on the greatest good of the greatest 
number or the maximisation of happiness. Utopian socialists such as Godwin and 
Owen advocated the notion of 'stewardship' attaching to ownership on behalf of 
mankind generally (Ryan, 1984, 93). Bentham extended the theme, arguing that the 
extent of one's property should be determined on utilitarian grounds, but neither he 
nor Mill's revised and humanised utilitarianism could resolve the inequalities 
inherent in the system of private property. Like Rousseau, Mill's concern with 
private property was of a moral nature, involving the justice of the institution (Ryan, 
1984, 146, 148, 149). He modified the doctrine of utilitarianism to include 
considerations of individual liberty as well as general welfare. Any duties that were 
incumbent on private ownership were to ensure individual freedom and welfare 
(Mill, 1909[1848], Book II, i and ii). 
Similarly, a preoccupation with individual freedom and welfare characterised 
Marx's treatment of property relations. His concern was to abolish bourgeois private 
property as the root of worker exploitation and alienation. Although there was no 
overt interest in the duties attaching to property ownership, it would be fair to 
conclude that Marx's belief that many of the ills of capitalism could be attributed to 
the private ownership of property supplied the foundation for the presumption by 
some critics a century and a half later that the excesses of capitalism are chiefly 
responsible for current environmental crises. 55 
Private property survived Marx's onslaught, but the concept also underwent 
modification such that in the late nineteenth century through into the early twentieth 
century, moderate liberals such as T.H. Green and moderate socialists like R.H. 
Tawney and Morris Cohen made theoretical contributions that enabled the state to 
establish limits and/or impose duties that were consistent with the general welfare 
(Macpherson, 1978). Green introduced a moral quality to the liberal theory of 
property, although like Mill he was unable to resolve the contradiction of unlimited 
accumulation. An individual should have the moral freedom to shape his own 
circumstances, unlimited by ancient custom. This involved the liberty to appropriate 
55Marx's thoughts on the relationship between the miseries of capitalism and private property are 
contained in his Early Writings. 
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as much property as necessary for his moral freedom, to "be at once secure and 
controlled in it by the good-will, by the sense of common interest, of a wider society" 
(Green, 1885-88, 109). 
In criticizing the exploitative capabilities of capitalist property, (Tawney, 
1982 [1921], 49-79) saw the small land-holder as the valid owner of property. One's 
personal possessions and property should be limited to those necessary for a "healthy 
and self-respecting life". The obligations implicit in ownership were of a personal 
nature, involving the conduct of the proprietor's profession and the maintenance of 
his household. 
Just prior to the Great Depression, in explicit recognition of the inequalities • 
of unlimited accumulation, Cohen (1933) established the principle that property is a 
relationship of power between persons, from which he deduced the right of the state 
to set limits and impose duties consonant with the general welfare. Hence limits are 
to be set to protect not only the interests of other property owners but also for the 
sake of public safety, health, peace, morals and the general welfare of the 
community. The major advance of Cohen's contribution in the context of duties and 
responsibilities was to enlarge the theory of property, which he recognized as 
embodying negative rights of exclusion and inalienability, to one which incorporated 
duties enforceable by the state. 
It was not until 1961 that Honore (1961, 113), in listing the "incidents of 
property", specifically alluded to "the prohibition of harmful use". Ownership of 
property involves "the right (liberty) of using as one wishes, the right to exclude 
others, the power of alienating and an immunity from expropriation", but, what is 
singular in the present discussion, is that he also recognized the possibility of 
deleterious effects that could be wrought by property owners. The importance of his 
insight notwithstanding, his interest in harmful use reflected an ongoing 
preoccupation with social welfare concerns and although he recognized that "the 
positive duty to exploit one's property in a socially beneficial way, as opposed to the 
prohibition of a harmful exploitation, has not been generally imposed or its 
implications fully worked out", the concept and its implications remained 
undeveloped (Honore, 1961, 146). 
It took the threat of rapidly depleting natural resources, occasioned by the oil 
price shock of 1973, to kindle a redefinition of the extent of private property rights. 
This was provided in the work of Lawrence Becker (1977, 2), who anchored his 
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redefinition in an explicit recognition of existing constraints on acquisition and rights 
and, what is perhaps more relevant in the present context, of increasing scarcity of 
natural resources. In Becker's work we find the first definitive attempt to develop the 
question of positive duties towards others along the lines that Cohen had called for a 
half century earlier (Becker, 1977, 108-9). It is noteworthy that the notion of positive 
duties attaching to property rights did not yet extend beyond one's fellow humans to 
the natural environment. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, Becker's major 
contribution was his recognition of the anachronistic nature of the present system of 
ownership: "[T]he justifiability of the full, liberal ownership of land under the social 
conditions which existed in seventeenth century North America does not guarantee 
that such property rights can be justified" (Becker, 1977, 110). His rationale for 
limitations on property rights is grounded in arguments of exhaustibility, 
accumulation and harmful use. In the first case, arguments from the exhaustibility of 
resources demonstrate that goods may be depleted either through appropriation or 
misuse. Hence the need for restrictions that limit the use and management rights of 
owners, with the goal of preventing exhaustion. Arguments against unlimited 
accumulation can be based on the loss of competitive advantage, restrictions of 
material liberty, or the possibility of significant social instability. The importance of 
his analysis of the possibilities of restrictions on unlimited acquisition is the 
recognition of the perils of undue influence on political and social institutions to be 
had from accumulations of corporate wealth. He notes that the advantages accruing 
to such corporate accumulations of power "tend to snowball" and that the 
implications, not only for the misuse and exhaustion of resources, but just as 
importantly for the democratic ideal, are immense. 
The ramifications of the prohibition against the harmful use restriction, listed 
by Honore as an incident of property some years earlier, were explored by Becker, 
who saw that it provided a basis for legal limitations in areas where the problem was 
not one of exhaustion or accumulation. Thus it would cover the use of pesticides and 
herbicides and their seepage into water supplies, for example. In an even more 
environmentally sensitive era it would cover the drainage of nutrient-laden effluent 
into receiving water bodies, negatively impacting on marine and aquatic ecosystems. 
Becker's development of arguments for limitations on property rights and his 
exploration of the forms that those limitations might take constitute a major advance 
in the development of a concept of property that is sensitive to social and 
environmental limits. In a social context, he foresaw the need to vary forms of 
ownership and their relevant use and capital rights between heavily populated and 
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highly industrialized urban areas and less densely populated rural regions. 
Politically, he advocated new restrictions on accumulation given the implications for 
democracy stemming from the inordinate political power and influence garnered by 
accumulations of corporate wealth. And environmentally, the conservation of 
essential depletable resources (clean air, water, fossil fuels) having become a 
necessity, it could mean the restriction of rights or indeed the "management, use, and 
possession [of these resources] effectively under public control" (Becker, 1977, 116- 
7). Although Becker's work is still firmly anchored in the ethical milieu of rights and 
justice, nevertheless, it does signal a shift from an almost complete preoccupation of 
property theorists with human welfare to an interest in the larger environment. 
During the 1970s, realization of the value of the built and natural heritage 
understandably led to perceived tensions between property rights and what Goodin 
(1990; 1992) calls 'preservationist duties'. It was inevitable that a theoretical attempt 
would be made to reconcile apparently conflicting rights and duties and to justify the 
protection of 'irreplaceable assets' (Goodin, 1983). Goodin's aim, in demonstrating 
that property rights do not embrace a 'right to destroy', was to establish that duties to 
protect heritage values proposed by conservationists do not violate property rights. 
Indeed, the 'right to use' something implicitly entails a 'duty not to destroy'. Thus, 
"use rights are always bounded by preservationist duties, and in some cases that 
might mean that in effect there are no use rights at all....[T]he duty to preserve which 
is implicit in the right (merely) to use will prevent us from availing ourselves of the 
right to use (and hence use up) consumable, irreplaceable assets" (Goodin, 1990, 
412). Goodin argued for a 'trustee' basis for property, at least with regard to 
irreplaceable objects. 
In grounding his arguments for preservationist duties in the accepted 
justifications for property rights, that is desert- and utility-based justifications, 
Goodin remains predominantly grounded in the rights and justice ethic. However, 
the up-dating of his negative 'duty not to destroy' to a positive 'duty to preserve' 
indicates a shift in the ethical emphasis to a concern with the responsibilities 
accompanying the rights of ownership. This is a timely shift considering the 
potential that technology now provides for humans to modify and indeed to destroy 
environments. However, I would contend that a much stronger justification for 
dealing with the natural environment than a duty to preserve is required. 
Goodin's contribution to a developing theory of property rights and duties is 
the product of a particular era of environmental consciousness when attention was 
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centred on the conservation of particular objects and end-states. Accordingly, 
concern was concentrated on conserving specific historic buildings or particular 
species - panda bears, whales and seals - rather than on the urban systems or 
ecosystems of which they were but a part. Duty was couched in legal terms, in the 
language of animal rights, for example. However, growing understanding of the 
complexities and interconnectedness of natural and human systems demands further 
redefinition of the relationship between property rights and responsibilities. Such a 
redefinition would combine Becker's limitations on property rights and Goodin's 
duties of preservation with a rather more positive ethic of thoughtfulness and care in 
humankind's relationships with physical nature and between fellow humans. 
• 	My goal in this section has been to demonstrate that in the relationship 
between property rights and duties there has been a subtle shift from an emphasis on 
absolute and individual rights to a concern for social justice and in recent decades to 
an emerging focus on the duties and responsibilities of property ownership. 
Ostensibly there should be little impediment to the development of a theory of 
property more appropriate to the social and environmental pressures of the late 
twentieth century, although, as yet, there is little evidence either by mainstream or 
environmental theorists of any significant attempts in this direction, despite the 
centrality of property to modern life and to these crises. One exception is Gary 
Varner (1994), who goes so far as to argue that environmental regulation has so 
weakened land as private property by specifying more and greater nuisances that its 
eclipse is imminent (see also Beatley, ,1994, 196-196 on the changes wrought by 
environmental considerations on the bundle of rights). 
4.5: Foundations For A New Theory: Extending Our Ethical Horizons 
In this section, I endeavour to argue that the crises identified above 
necessitate a different philosophical basis for property rights, one that transcends 
individual rights and anthropocentrism. Environmentalists have been critical of the 
narrow ethical basis of western societies, which has so far limited our thinking on 
ethical issues specifically to individual rights and generally to human welfare, for 
several decades now. They have been saying that we need to broaden our ethical 
horizons, that it is just not human welfare with which we should have an ethical 
concern (Devall and Sessions, 1985; Eckersley, 1993; Leopold, 1949). Ecofeminists 
in particular have made a significant contribution to moral theory by proposing an 
expanded ethics which goes beyond a narrowly focussed rights-based ethic to one 
which is contextual in nature (Warren, 1990). Feminists, using Carol Gilligan's 
171 
(1982) seminal work on gender-based differences in moral development, have 
counterposed an 'ethic of care' to the prevailing 'ethic of justice', while Iris Marion 
Young (1990) has attacked the nature of contemporary theories of rights and justice 
for their emphasis on rights to material possessions, an emphasis which restricts the 
scope of justice. Widening the scope of justice was also the objective of Agnes 
Heller's (1987) proposal for an ethico-political concept of justice, in which moral 
goodness is an essential component, an element lacking in modern theories of justice 
with their bias towards distributive fairness. 
4.5.1: Reconceiving Justice 
A discussion of a more appropriate theory of property cannot be conducted 
independently of a discussion about justice. Agnes Heller (1987) has critically 
described the philosophy of traditional and modern concepts of justice. She has 
explored the disintegration of the traditional concept of ethico-political justice and its 
final split in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into a philosophy of morality and 
a socio-political concept of justice. During this period the latter concept was 
substantially modified, such that justice came to be construed as 'fairness', the 
"shabby remnant of the 'sum total of virtues' that was once called justice ... [and] the 
question of the best possible social world was centred mainly on the problem of just 
distribution" - (Heller, 1987, 93). Moral principles lost their guiding import and 
questions of justice and injustice are now evaluated according to an instrumentally 
rational view of society (Heller, 1987, 153). 
The inadequacy of the socio-political concept of justice to respond to the 
questions raised by advanced industrial society educes the need for a more 
appropriate ethico-political concept of justice. The socio-political concept of justice 
does not provide the kind of yardstick that is required for evaluating what is valuable 
in our society. In response to the crisis of moral consciousness facing western 
society, Heller proposes an incomplete ethico-political concept of justice, incomplete 
because it eschews universalism by not providing a single 'ideal' pattern for a way of 
life, nor a single ethics. It allows for the existence of any number of ways of life and, 
what is relevant in the present context, it "excludes relations of superordination and 
subordination, hierarchy and domination. It includes social intercourse, 
communication, mutual understanding, co-operation and the like" (Heller, 1987, 
222). The normative foundation furnished by her incomplete ethico-political concept 
of justice provides just socio-political norms which have moral goodness as an 
essential component. 
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In constructing her normative theory of justice, Heller employs Habermas's 
concept of the fundamental principle of universalization, which she reformulates as 
the universal maxim of dynamic justice, and his discourse ethic, which is modified to 
become value discourse. Value discourse must have recourse to the two universal 
values of life and freedom. The optimum socio-political world is one where the 
universal value of freedom does not contend with the universal value of life: "The 
telos of the best possible socio-political world is inherent in all actions in which 
people live up to the universal maxim of dynamic justice [and] the best possible 
socio-political world is the condition of the best possible moral world" (Heller, 1987, 
256). All norms should be validated by reference to the universal values of life and 
freedom. 
Thus Heller's theory of justice contains more possibilities than existing 
theories which restrict themselves to claims about distribution and fairness, because 
she internalizes the universal values of freedom and life as the essential moral 
authority. As well, socio-political norms are not static but dynamic, because they are 
open to testing through practical reason, where the means to achieve their validation 
is through the process of value discourse, as the only just procedure. 
On a similar tack with her analysis of modern theories of justice, but with a 
slightly different approach to its reconception, is Iris Young's formulation of an ethic 
based on 'doing' rather 'having', on justice as 'empowerment' rather than justice as 
'distribution' (Young, 1990, Ch.1). Current theories of justice emphasise material 
possessions and, in doing so, limit the scope of justice, because they are unable to 
place any value on intangible nonmaterial aspects such as rights, opportunity and 
self-respect. Treating such values as quantifiable and capable of being distributed 
ignores the fact that individuals are as much constituted in these aspects by social 
processes as they are by the possession of goods. Expanding the scope of justice to 
encompass a process-based ethic that focusses on 'doing' as well as 'having' has the 
potential to shift our thinking and attitudes towards others from what they have to 
what they are. Like Heller, Young (1990, 9) sets forward an expanded concept of 
justice resulting in a much wider meaning to politics and in the introduction (or 
reintroduction) of other facets of justice, including collective decision-making 
procedures, the social division of labour, and culture. Together with many other 
critical theorists, she argues that the distributive paradigm of justice tends to assist 
and accentuate the depoliticization of public life that has occurred under welfare 
capitalism by making decision-making the province of experts. By extending the 
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concept of justice to also include "action, decisions about action, and provision of the 
means to develop and exercise capacities", she seeks to repoliticise the social 
structures and processes that produce both material and nonmaterial distributions 
(Young, 1990, 16). 
Contemporary ethical theories, in emphasising the rights of the individual, de-
emphasize relationships between humans and between humans and other nature. An 
enlarged conception of justice, in expanding the meaning of the political, would 
reinvigorate and revalue such relationships. The implications for the theory of 
property of such an enlarged ethic of justice are considerable. The limitations of 
prevailing theories of property reside in their emphasis on the individual entitlements 
inherent in possession or ownership. These are incapable of providing the foundation 
for an adequate set of relational practices of ownership that are sensitive to the needs 
of other humans or indeed of nonhuman nature. The current situation with regard to 
relationship is one of individual to individual; who is entitled to what. Because the 
kind of ethic of justice proposed by Heller and Young expands the meaning of the 
political, communities of individuals would collectively decide, for example, what 
use rights were appropriate, which should be curtailed and who should have what 
rights in the context of contemporary social, economic and environmental conditions. 
Use rights, including the management of one's property and possessions, would be 
determined by responsibility to the relationships with other community members, 
both human and non-human. 
4.5.2: Expanding Moral Theory 
Several feminist philosophers, in their endeavour to achieve women's 
emancipation and human liberation, have similarly attacked modern moral theory for 
its restriction to just a single moral orientation, the ethics of justice and rights, while 
attempting to demonstrate that women's experience reveals another aspect of moral 
judgement, that of an ethics of care and responsibility. Carol Gilligan (1982), in 
response to Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, has argued that moral 
development is different in males and females. Hence men generally comprehend 
morality in terms of rights, entitlements and obligations founded on the demands of 
fairness and impartiality, while women's moral judgement is more contextual, arising 
from the particular needs of others in particular relationships. The moral categories 
that underpin these relationships are care and responsibility: "Morality is seen... as 
arising from the experience of connection and conceived as a problem of inclusion 
rather than balancing claims" (Gilligan, 1982, 160). 
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Notwithstanding subsequent criticisms of an unproblematic application of the 
ethic of care (see Card, 1988; Flanagan and Jackson, 1987; and Tronto, 1987), the 
significance of Gilligan's contribution lies in its querying of the narrow focus of 
modem moral philosophy and, by means of her "different voice", introducing for 
consideration previously ignored moral qualities of care, responsibility, sympathy and 
empathy. Indeed, these are the qualities which the liberal philosophers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, Smith, Hume and Ferguson, thought would balance the 
interests of others against the interests of the self. This was not to be and the latter, 
expressed politically as rights and justice and backed by the zealous application of 
instrumental reason, have come to predominate in liberal capitalist societies (see also 
Chapter 6.2 on empathy in the tradition of evolutionary liberalism). 
Christine Cuomo (1992), writing with ecoferninists insights, has also 
explored the moral problem of an unqualified 'ethic of care'. She notes that caring is 
not always a "healthy and ethical choice for a moral agent"; that, for example, many 
women have suffered abuse and oppression because of their caring capacity (Cuomo, 
1992, 355). In opposition to some feminists, she warns against reclaiming aspects of 
women's experience that have been devalued by patriarchal culture and maintains the 
need to thoroughly examine and recontextualize those aspects of caring which are the 
product of women's socialization within that culture of oppression. She also takes 
issue with those feminists who recommend ego denial as a necessary prelude to 
empathy with other beings, proposing instead that one's own experience and interests 
should be "the point of departure for any ethical decision-making and theory 
building" (Cuomo, 1992, 355). What is most ethically useful in the present context 
is that she establishes the necessity of defining both the object of care and the caring 
context. Thus the ethical relevance of caring is rooted in the context of care and in 
appropriate objects of care. This raises ethical questions concerning the human 
stewardship of land and other nature, whether "caring for, or caretaking, land and 
nonhuman individuals and species is in the best interests of those objects of care" 
(Cuomo, 1992, 357). Nevertheless, an ethic of care that encompasses both 
nonhuman nature and the human world as well as defining the appropriate objects 
and contexts of care is a more than useful contribution on which to ground an 
ethically enlarged conception of property. 
In her endeavour to define an ecofeminist ethic, Warren (1990), borrowing 
from Cheney, shifts the primary focus of ethics from a predetermined set of rules, 
principles and rights that is applied to competing moral agents to a view that 
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conceives of ethics as growing out of one's "defining relationships' - where our 
relations with others are central to our understanding of who we are" (Cheney, 1987, 
122). Rights therefore become contextual and "what makes them relevant or 
important is that those to whom they apply are entities in relationship with others" 
(Warren, 1990, 141-2). The moral community is prior to any considerations of 
justice, fairness and equality. "Considerations of obligation, fairness, and so on grow 
out of an analysis of the nature of friendship, care and love" (Cheney, 1987, 136). 
Such considerations have generally been of secondary importance in moral theory 
for, as Tronto (1987, 654) observes, "the requirements of justice have traditionally set 
the boundaries of care." 
Contextual moral theory has been further developed by Cheney (1987, 144) to 
extend the boundaries of the moral community to include the nonhuman, "the limits 
of moral regard [being] set only by the limitations of one's own (or one's species's or 
one's community's) ability to respond in a caring manner, which, in turn, are a 
function of the depth of one's own understanding of the human moral community and 
the clarity and depth of one's understanding of, and relationship to, the nonhuman 
world or elements of that world." From such a different ethical perspective, a 
system of rights and justice is seen as a technique for dealing with situations in which 
the web of moral relationships has failed or is not yet in place, that is, in limiting 
cases. Thus "care may set the boundaries of when justice concerns are appropriate" 
(Tronto, 1987, 659). 
4.5.3: Summary 
The expansion of moral theory has significant implications for the present 
discussion of property rights. Firstly, the recognition that moral considerations are 
constituted not only in the ethical space of justice and rights but that they also 
involve an ethics of care and responsibility has the effect of relationships assuming 
the centrality that instrumental rationality now exercises over questions of justice and 
rights. Rights then become contextual and dependent for their relevance and 
importance on the relationships between the entities involved. Problems of land use 
and property management thus come to be defined within the web of relationships 
and the obligations that are derived therefrom, whether they be to fellow humans, to 
other species or to ecosystems. 
Secondly, recognition of a care ethic in human relations has provided the 
foundation for an expansion of the boundaries of the moral community to the 
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nonhuman world. Analyses of the care ethic have also raised questions concerning 
the appropriate kinds and contexts of care, and what is in the best interests of the 
objects of care. Acceptance of these innovations in moral theory enables us to begin 
asking the appropriate kinds of questions concerning the management of our material 
possessions and our relationship to both the human and nonhuman worlds. If we are 
to recognize Cheney's advance in moral theory, that depends on no less than a deep 
and "richly textured" understanding of what it means to be human. 
Lastly, I have attempted to reground property in an expanded conception of 
moral responsibility, which would guide both interhuman and human-nature 
relationships. Such a relational ethic of responsibility becomes ever more essential 
as our capacity to modify ourselves and our environment progresses apace. As I have 
earlier noted, current concepts of property with their emphasis on individual rights 
and entitlements lack the capacity to furnish a basis on which to ground a set of 
relationships between society and nature appropriate to the social and environmental 
conditions of the late twentieth century. The reawakening awareness of human 
contingency and fragility that follows mounting environmental crises establishes the 
conditions for the recognition that preoccupation with individual rights is an 
insufficient ground for sustainable relationships with each other and with nature. 
Qualities of care and responsibility possibly assume greater significance in moral 
judgements about such relationships, in which our responsibility to ensure life and 
freedom to all those entities with whom we are in relationship becomes the ultimate 
moral responsibility. Such an ethic of responsibility, as Melucci (1989, 160) says, 
could have the effect of invigorating the relationships of the individual to fellow 
humans and to the rest of nature. It would not "evade the risks of choice [and would 
be] capable of meta-communication about choices themselves". It would originate in 
the individual's relationships and would ensure the kind of communication necessary 
to maintain all of one's relationships in a sustainable fashion. 
4.6: Alternative Property Regimes 
As the magnitude of environmental issues grows so does the need to rethink 
individual private property ownership as an institution for allocating access to land 
and other resources. There have been a number of responses to rethinking private 
property rights ranging from those which advocate the reinstatement and 
strengthening of common law provisions to protect environmental quality to those 
which would modify private property rights such that they would reflect their 
biophysical and communal context to a greater degree. 
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Among the first group are the arguments of Elizabeth Brubaker (1995) who 
would strengthen the common law provisions of trespass, nuisance and riparian law 
on the basis that they adequately protected environmental quality prior to their 
legislative and legal erosion by governments and the courts for the purpose of 
promoting economic growth and the interests of industry. She is of the view that the 
common law can still perform that function and, like Hardin, she argues that it is the 
absence of property rights and additionally the preponderance of government 
regulation that allows resource companies to trample on the ownership rights of 
others by overextracting and/or polluting with impunity. Moreover, she argues, 
ownership both facilitiates and promotes stewardship while environmental resources 
are more likely to be protected when those individuals and communities having a 
strong interest in their preservation are assigned property rights in them. This may be 
so, but only under the absence of external pressures to overexploit. Graziers in 
Australia's semi-arid zones, for example, may be forced to overstock their lands by 
any combination of circumstances beyond their control such as unpredictable prices 
for primary products on world markets, the lending policies of banks, the rescinding 
of fuel subsidies and so on (Webber, 1994). 
Prior to the advent of industrial-scale production in the nineteenth century, 
the common law provisions of trespass, nuisance and riparian law were relativley 
easy to apply to gain redress for environmental damage, whether to air, water or soil. 
Technologies were of a relatively small-scale so that damage was usually localized; 
and perpetrators and victims fairly easily identified. The use of the courts to protect 
rights to a clean environment is of necessity limited to geographically and temporally 
proximate owners and where the resources of owners to pursue grievances through 
the courts are also roughly equal. Until the nineteenth century this was largely the 
case and, as Brubaker (1995, 30-63) discusses, there were many successful 
prosecutions. The emergence of the industrial economy in the nineteenth century and 
associated concentrations of wealth and power has made court action that much less 
likely. As well, many environmental effects have a long lead time or they may be felt 
in far distant places with little if any connection, such as those caused by exposure to 
nuclear radiation or acid rain respectively. They may also be impossible to attribute 
to particular individuals. The skin cancer sufferer has no particular person or 
corporation to blame for the ozone depletion which facilitated the development of 
his/her cancer. 
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Brubaker's advocacy of private property rights ignores the question of the 
scale of technology available to present day owners. To rely on the courts to protect 
critical or particularly vulnerable habitats, such as wetlands, is unrealistic. With the 
kinds of technology now available to effectively destroy habitats in a very short time, 
it may be too late by the time concerned persons have recognized a particular threat 
and sought a court injunction. Moreover, Dobson (1998, 154-5) (after Nozick) points 
out that reliance on court action per se is problematic, since people are often deterred 
by the potential transaction costs of seeking redress through the courts. Transaction 
costs are a direct result of the inequalities of power and resources. 
There are other limits to privatizing environmental assets. There are some 
assets which cannot be privatized, such as the global oceans and the atmosphere, 
although regimes of tradeable quotas have been developed for some fisheries and 
environmental economists favour granting shares in the waste absortive capacity of 
the atmoshere. While shares can be allocated in particular species in the ocean and 
ceilings applied to air pollution through emissions trading (notwithstanding the 
problems inherent in these particular privatization strategies of limited and imperfect 
knowledge and enforceability — see Dobson, 1998, 154), I cannot see any way in 
which the global weather systems could be privately owned and it is these critical 
systems which are being compromised by current levels of fossil fuel use and 
biomass burning. In addition the difficulties of assigning boundaries to assets such 
as genetic resources are particularly complex. The amount of knowledge required to 
assign rights to all plant materials, for example, simply makes such an assignment 
nonfeasible. 
Dobson has specifically identified the inherent inequality of private property 
rights regimes as a factor which severely limits their application in protecting 
environmental quality. These inevitable inequalities generate transaction costs which 
must always constitute "a sustantial defect in private property approaches to 
environmental problems" (Dobson, 1998, 155). And relatedly, with respect to global 
environmental assets such as germplasm, an equitable distribution of wealth has been 
similarly specified as a precondition for the assignment of property rights. The 
environmental assets of poor countries are likely to be exploited by wealthy 
countries, firstly, because poor countries will compete with each other thus forcing 
prices down and, secondly, because what is a high price to the poor is a low price to 
the rich (Dobson, 1998 156-7). The ultimate outcomes are further transfers of wealth 
to the developed world and further environmental degradation in the poor countries 
because the low prices they receive for their assets are no incentive for stewardship. 
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The inherent problem of the status quo system of property entitlements, in 
• which individual property owners are legally independent but in actual fact 
ecosocially interdependent, is the generation of externality costs (Bromley, 1991, 
68ff.). These externality costs are presently translating into novel social and 
environmental scarcities, which a Lockean property regime with its underpinning of 
exclusive rights and utilitarian values has limited capacity to capture. Similarly, the 
Kantian system of rights and correlative duties, such as proposed by Bromley (1991) 
can only partially internalize these externality costs in so far as individual property 
owners recognize their obligations to other rights holders who must be 
geographically and temporally near56. It cannot ensure the collective wellbeing of all 
existing and future communities both human and nonhuman, because the interests of 
those without a voice of necessity are not taken into account. 
To address the needs of those outside our immediate community and of future 
generations, if we are to maintain ecological integrity, we need an alternative means 
of ensuring fair access to the stream of environmental benefits both now and in the 
future. Property entitlements must necessarily recognize both contemporary social 
realities and ecological limits. An ecologically sound regime of property would 
embody institutional arrangements which include a value system and an authority 
structure which steers rights holders in the direction of the socially and ecologically 
responsible exercise of their entitlements as well as confirming and protecting 
property claims. It would encompass planning and decision-making mechanisms for 
coordination across boundaries at different bioregional scales. 
A number of alternative property regimes, which acknowledge the 
biophysical and communal origins of property to varying degrees, has been proposed. 
Using the Kantian principle of rights and correlative duties, Daniel Bromley (1991, 
Ch. 9) has identified the potential of a property regime which incorporates values 
other than economic values in the changing preferences currently being observed in 
western democracies. This shift in social value sets involves a change in how rural 
landscapes are valued, from a rural economy wherein land is seen as a factor of 
production in agriculture to a situation where agriculture is regarded as an economic 
activity which invests rural communities with a particular character. In this schema, 
land-holders' activities are determined by the demands of rural amenity, which 
includes maintaining environmental quality, wildlife habitat and aesthetic appeal. 
56Elsewhere, Bromley (1989) proposes overcoming the intertemporal bias of Kantian rights and 
correlative duties by protecting the rights of future generations by a rule-based entitlement structure. 
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The level of environmental quality is specified at the collective level, leaving farmers 
the right to manage their properties as they see fit within the parameters set by the 
community. Under these arrangements the burden of proof shifts from the collective 
to the farmer, who must justify that any proposed development on his land does not 
prejudice the community's amenity standards. 
Another schema which privileges the biophysical basis of property is that 
proposed by Joseph Sax (1993), who postulates an "ecosystemic" model of property 
founded on an ecological perspective which "views land as consisting of systems 
defined by their function, not by man-made boundaries" (Sax, 1993, 1442). Land is 
regarded as part of an ecological community, where the landowner assumes a 
stewardship role over ecological functioning. Property lines are reduced in 
significance as connectivity assumes greater importance. Use rights are determined 
by the physical nature of the land and its ecological services rather than all land being 
equal in use rights. Wetlands, for example, perform crucial ecological regulatory 
functions and it is difficult to argue their transformation to some better human use. 
Thus some natural systems may be judged to yield greater benefits to the collectivity 
by remaining in their natural state and consequently development would not be an 
automatic entitlement of ownership. As under Bromley's Kantian framework, the 
onus shifts to the potential developer but is deepened to require that not only is the 
developer's private benefit compatible with community preferences but also with 
ecological goals. As a consequence the line between public and private realms of 
ownership which is clearly drawn under the status quo system becomes much less 
distinct. However responsibilities become more explicit as the field of care shifts 
beyond the self and the claims of other rights holders to the maintenance of 
ecological functions and the long-term quality of the land. 
While Sax's model addresses the need to factor the biophysical substructure 
into property arrangements, it is deficient in that there are no explicit institutional 
arrangements for decision-making and coordination within and between 
communities. It ignores the communal milieu, which should be an integral part of 
any property regime. The communal is implicitly acknowledged in Bromley's 
proposal, although the institutional framework by which community preferences are 
shaped and converted into ecologically sound collective decision-making and social 
values is not necessarily assured 57 . 
571 have confined the discussion to private property rights regimes although there are good 
justifications for some goods to be owned as common property as Elinor Ostrum (1990) has proposed. 
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4.7: Private Property Reconceived 
As a central social institution in western democracies, private property is 
clearly in trouble, the emergence of environmental limits bringing the legitimacy of 
private property and acquisition into serious question (Wissenburg, 1998, 2). In the 
context of ecological limits and widening wealth disparities, Lockean property rights, 
though they have been modified over the last century, remain overly generous. The 
paradox of exclusive rights, though originally intended as protection for the 
individual against authoritarianism and arbitrariness, is that an increasingly greater 
proportion of citizens is excluded from any property whatsoever (Heller, 1988, 138). 
Property can only be legitimate when all citizens have the stake in society which is 
their just desert (Hirst, 1994, 10) or when ownership is generalized (Heller, 1988, 
140) and the bias against ecological sustainability is reversed. 
What is most troublesome about the full conception of exclusive property 
rights is the justification it gives to the use of property for social domination and 
economic exploitation (Gould, 1988, 175) and the threat that the amassing of 
resources and power presents for the democratic process (Hawken, 1993, Ch. 7). The 
principal agent of domination is the capitalist corporation, which has the same rights 
as the individual property owner but which is absolved from the conventional 
responsibilities of ownership (Stillman, 1977, 222-224). Stillman attributes 
corporate irresponsibility to bifurcation of control from ownership and blames 
corporate irresponsibility in large measure for the ecological problems of the present. 
As he remarks, corporations, with their tendency for growth and with the present 
constitution of rights, are "not suited for ecological responsibility nor for a society 
with limited growth" (Stillman, 1977, 233). Responsibility could be reconnected to 
control and growth restricted, for example, by annually requiring shareholders to 
specify what proportion of their net profits can be reinvested in the company instead 
of company managers reinvesting all profits to grow the company and for their own 
aggrandizement. Recently, too, there has been discussion concerning the possibility 
of revoking the charters of those corporations which are consistent violators of social 
and environmental standards (Hawken, 1993, 106-107). 
As well as reining in the extent of property rights, the realities of looming 
social and environmental crises also mean that the moral basis of property in rights 
and justice must be modified and, indeed, shifted to care and responsibility. Priority 
has to be given to the ecosystemic and communal bases of property, which have 
largely been ignored by the Lockean system. Property would then be redefined to 
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reflect a broad range of individual and community rights and responsibilities. 
Morrison (1995, 176-178) proposes referring to such property as 'personal' property 
rather than private property, because, he says, it "recognizes an essential connection 
between the use of property and community wellbeing". Ownership includes not 
only personal possessions but also extends to the ownership that involvement in 
community associations confers. Social and ecological responsibility are key ethical ' 
components of this revised notion of ownership. Where the communal and 
biophysical bases of property are implicit in property regimes, the implication is that 
there are "limits on the ability to use, to dispose of, and despoil property and the 
commons" (Morrison, 1995, 177), while the freedom to use is balanced by 
responsibilities to maintain the community and commons. Personal property gives 
priority to stewardship, whereas private property valorizes acquisition and control. 
The approach of ecological limits has also had the effect of changing our 
notion of wealth, to focus away from that which is privately accrued and towards that 
which is shared. In 1983, Joseph Sax (1983, 494) noted that there was a transition 
occurring "in which an ever greater proportion of our wellbeing is realized in the 
form of shared wealth, or things that are non-exclusively consumed, rather than in the 
form of privatized or exclusive-consumption wealth". Moreover, ecological concern 
has served to remind us of the fact, obscured by the preoccupation with private 
property rights in modern times, but long ago recognized in Roman law, that there 
are some goods which simply cannot be owned by individuals. These are truly public 
goods: "They cannot be captured or reduced to possession; they can only be used. 
And as no individual can own them, they are by right available to all" (Varner, 1994, 
157). These are the commons elements of air, the oceans, wildlife and ecological 
processes generally. Indeed, the realization that all land contributes to some degree 
or another to ecosystemic processes may eventually mean that private property will 
cease to exist (Varner, 1994, 158) and the preoccupation with boundaries supplanted 
by connections across land units (Sax, 1993, 1445-1446). To protect the rights to 
these public goods, property must have a communal rather than an individualistic 
setting58. 
58Existing methods for the communal regulation of property are to be found in community land trusts, 
in the splitting off of development rights to preserve rural land and communities (Morehouse, 1989; 
The Institute for Community Economics, 1982). 
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While we are coming to view wealth differently, we also need to find 
different ways of valuing land. On the basis of the labour theory of value, the value 
of land is that which it takes to improve it, measured as the value of its produce. To 
be sustainable, the environmental quality of the land should also be factored in (Orr, 
1994, 197). This might prove logistically difficult, but a start could be made with 
defensive expenditure, the sum expended to restore, recover or maintain 
environmental quality. There may need to be incentives offered, such as tax rebates, 
as an encouragement for such expenditure and for good land use practice 59 . 
The blurring of the boundaries between public and private spheres, which is 
the direct result of the realization that wellbeing is derived from shared as well as 
private wealth, has profound implication for the identification of members of 
democratic polities. The citizen in the early public sphere was first and foremost a 
property-owner and, although the franchise has since been extended and the notion of 
property entitlements expanded to a 'bundle of rights', nevertheless, identification 
today is largely through one's consumption and ownership patterns. In liberal 
society, the responsible citizen is he who protects his private interests by acting in the 
public sphere to preserve the "stability of the property order" (Habermas, 1989, 87). 
In the ecologically sustainable society, it is encumbent on the responsible citizen to 
preserve the public property of ecological processes. This innovation is likely to be 
driven by increasing recognition of the value of these processes and their increasing 
scarcity (Wargo, 1988). To ensure sustainability, identification must shift to non-
consumption values and other virtues, such as responsible use, maintaining 
environmental quality, or contributing to socioecological wellbeing. The citizen is 
neither private nor public, but responsible, acting to maintain communal property and 
defend public rights, because individual wellbeing and ecosystemic wellbeing are 
interdependent. The responsible citizen acts according to the "principle of propriety", 
the principle that "action should be appropriate to the nature of all parties involved in 
the transaction" (Rodman, 1977, 109) rather than according to the principle of 
property, which implies control. 
4.8: Conclusion 
I have attempted to show that current rules of property are inadequate for the 
kinds of environmental problems that now beset the planet. As we develop a deeper 
understanding of the complexities of natural systems and of the dramatic and far- 
59See Webber (1994) on the institutional discouragement to good land use practice among Australian 
farmers. 
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reaching effects that human systems can have in their interface with natural systems, 
our rules of property must begin to reflect such complexity. I have set out the 
elements of a theory of private property more appropriate to the kinds of ecological 
conditions that confront us in the late twentieth century, which, as has been 
demonstrated, are vastly different from those obtaining in Locke's seventeenth 
century. Moving away from a theory with an exclusive emphasis on rights to one 
that encompasses an element of moral responsibility is an essential component of any 
innovation in theory. The work of feminist theorists furnishes the kind of theoretical 
basis that could enable the development of a theory embodying a positive ethic of 
care and responsibility beyond egoistic individualism. The concept of equal positive 
freedom demands an alternative conception of property that signals a needs-based 
approach to property rights and a system of property that takes account of all needs, 
both human and non human60 . 
Extension of the moral community to include nonhuman nature as well as 
humans is also a necessary prelude to defining our responsibilities, which, in a 
contextual moral theory, are set by our relationships to other humans, other species 
and ecosystems. Such an expansion of moral theory has enormous ramifications for 
how we handle these interconnections, which, I have argued, must be guided by an 
ethic of responsibility. 
60Eckersley (1993, 121), after Benton, has observed that there are no ontological difficulties in 
extending the needs-based approach to justice beyond the species level to include all nature. 
PART II: 
THEORIZING THE TRANSITION: 
CONCERNING THE PRAXIS OF SUSTAINABILITY 
CHAPTER 5 
TOWARDS A RADICAL ECOPRAXIS 
5.1: Introduction 
Modernity has always had its critics, beginning in a recognizable form with 
the Luddites, and followed by the Romantic movement in the nineteenth century. In 
this century, modernity's theoretical resources and their practical consequences have 
become the subject of profound criticism from the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt 
School, from theorists of the postmodern, and most recently from new social 
movements (peace, feminism and ecology). The ecological critique is the most 
radical because it is a civilizational critique. 
However necessary critique is though, it is insufficient in itself to initiate 
processes of societal transformation. Like the philosophes of the early modern 
period, environmental theorists must also furnish the means of going on. 
Environmentalists have developed a more than adequate understanding of 
ecologically desirable endstates but have so far inadequately addressed the processes 
of getting there, that is, praxis. And this is precisely the criticism that both Peter Hay 
(1992, 223) and Andrew Dobson (1993, 192-193) make, the former describing the 
green movement as "strategically inept", while the latter criticizes the 
undertheorization in green social thought of the strategic facets of social change and 
its embeddedness in material human practice. In response to these criticisms, it will 
be the task of this chapter to set out the elements of a possible ecological praxis. If 
sustainability is to be the object of a radical ecopraxis (and I intend to argue at a later 
stage of the discussion that it is a fitting subject), then, firstly, some of the obstacles 
to sustainability and to societal transformation (at the system level, at the institutional 
level, and at the individual/personal level) should be identified and, secondly, 
possible sites for relearning the art of earth-dwelling (Orr, 1994) similarly so. 
As a prelude to outlining the dimensions of a radical ecopraxis I present an 
overview of Aristotelian and Marxian understandings of praxis and indicate how they 
might inform our understanding of ecological praxis, including the implications for 
existing understanding of autonomy and agency. In this respect we will need to map 
out not only possibilities for exercising agency but also constraints imposed by 
contemporary political-economic media. Like Marx we should consider autonomy 
and the possibilities for removing the distortions resulting from modern forms of 
existence. 
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The central problem of a radical ecological praxis is to set out for this 
historical era the conditions under which humans and other nonhuman entities might 
realize their 'species-being'. Its moral/ethical core is thus responsible action, which 
may involve reformulating foundational myths and knowledges, and constructing 
institutions and inventing technologies which work with nature rather treating it as 
instrumental backdrop. It will also entail reconfiguring the debased ideals of the 
Enlightenment within the much broader context of ecological sustainability, for it has 
been observed that: "Emancipation cannot be thought outside of a link through 
habitat" (Serres, cited in Conley, 1997, 65). The principle objective of such a radical 
praxis will be to lighten the impact of human communities on the planet by inventing 
new ways of dwelling (perhaps resurrecting old ones or reevaluating existing ones), 
which will take the form of learning to live sustainably. 
A related objective will to be to throw off the dominations and 
oppressions/burdens which prevent humans from exercising their capacities and thus 
realizing their humanness. As Crocker (1990, 161) remarks: "Praxis occurs if and 
only if we engage in activity that realizes our highest capacities. Among these 
capacities are intentionality, self-determination, creativity, solidarity and rationality". 
Marx delineated similar human capacities towards which practical action should be 
oriented with the purpose of overcoming constraints on their flourishing. These 
include the capacities for creative self-development, control of one's environment, 
and loving and equal relations with one's fellow humans. A radical ecological praxis 
would therefore address questions of human capacity in the context of the flourishing 
of all life forms. 
The pre-conditions for responsible action should also constitute a realm of 
concern. I argue that a precondition for sustainable flourishing is a society with the 
capacity for learning to live sustainably and, further, that ecological sustainability and 
civic competence cannot be pursued independently. A truly sustainable path, as 
David On (1992, 1, 2) observes: "requires a rejuvenation of civic culture and the rise 
of an ecologically literate and ecologically competent citizenry who understand 
global issues, but who also know how to live well in their places". Further, he 
contends: "environmental degradation and the decay of our concept of citizenship 
occurred simultaneously and as mutally reinforcing ends". 
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5.2: Praxis: Theoretical Background 
If we accept the ramifications of the ecological critique, we need to ask 
ourselves: What should we do? How can we proceed? These are largely political and 
ethical questions; they are questions of praxis. Bernstein (1971, xi) makes the point 
that praxis is a concept that, at certain particular junctures in western thought, has 
had the capacity to focus thinking about a particular cluster of issues and problems 
confronting society. For this reason it is particularly apposite in this era of seemingly 
interlinked social, political, economic and ecological crises. 
To understand praxis we should refer to the two theorists who have had most 
influence on the concept, Aristotle and Marx. For the former, praxis referred to "the 
disciplines and activities predominant in man's ethical and political life" (Bernstein, 
1971, x). The term is not to be interpretted as "practice", which more correctly refers 
to the practical/material things of life. The disciplines of Aristotelian praxis are 
based on knowledge and understanding (not technical know-how) and practical 
wisdom. As the object of praxis is living well, it contains a large component of 
virtue. In the case of the Greek philosopher, faced with issues involving the political 
organization of society, praxis represented "that form of truly human activity 
manifested in the life of the polis" (Bernstein, 1971, x). 
In modern times Marx is the theorist most responsible for developing a 
comprehensive understanding of praxis. He enlarged upon and extended Aristotelian 
praxis and, although these days Marx' ist thought is under a cloud, Marx's insights into 
the workings of the capitalist political economy have maintained their resonance and 
are relevant for a praxis of ecological crisis. Indeed, Hay (1992, 229-231) argues 
that, although there are some aspects of Marxist thought that greens should ignore, an 
effective green praxis mandates the incorporation of Marxist perspectives; namely 
Marxism's insights into the political economy of capitalist production and its 
appreciation of the importance of structure in social/historical change. Thus, 
theorizing and writing at a time when the disbenefits of capitalism were becoming 
increasingly manifest (the first of capitalism's great depressions occurred in 1848), 
Marx theorized praxis both as human productive activity and human alienation, as a 
means of overcoming the contradictions of capitalist production and therefore of the 
alienation resulting from it in order to build a truly humanistic society where man 
could reappropriate his own essence, his true 'species-life'. 
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Marx's understandings of praxis and subsequent developments of the 
paradigm have profound implications for any society where crisis is generalized 
throughout all the spheres of life. There are a number of saliencies in Marxist praxis 
for the project of this thesis of outlining a radical ecopraxis. These are principally to 
be had in the different understandings of praxis that can be distinguished in Marx's 
writings. One sense in which he uses the term is to define human productive activity. 
Thus a man's nature is determined by what he does, his praxis, and "his products are 
concrete embodiments of his activity" (Bernstein, 1971, 44). Alienation results when 
man has no control over the products of his labour and he is unable to express his 
particular potentialities or ideal nature, with the result that he is dehumanized by the 
products of his activity. Alienation, however, is not a universal human condition. It 
is specific to a particular social system, capitalist political economy. Thus praxis, in 
its present historical form, is alienating activity. 
For Marx the key to overcoming alienation is the reform of consciousness 
through some form of criticism. As relentless activity, criticism is also a defining 
moment of praxis. It is not, however, a utopian enterprise; it is concerned with 
understanding present institutions and the contradictions inherent in them through a 
correct theoretical analysis rather than with condemnation or speculation about the 
future. The measure of the radical criticism of social reality is its capacity to bring to 
self-consciousness genuine human problems. To do so it must reveal a critical 
understanding of what people are suffering. 
One of the most significant aspects of Marx's theorizing about praxis is the 
revelation that the various social forms taken by praxis are historically contingent. 
Thus capitalist political economy is simply one historical tendency, one of the forms 
that human praxis has taken. By interpreting political economy as a "congealed" 
form of praxis, a crystallized form of human activity, Marx enables us to envisage 
other possibilities and returns to the alienated a sense of agency. He raises the 
possibility of pursuing other futures. But to achieve any real possibility of humanity 
mastering its destiny, what is required is a critical understanding of the forces of 
capitalism (Bernstein, 1971, 58). Marx interprets capitalism as simply the 
culmination of the progressive separation of humans from the rest of nature 
throughout the history of western societies. He anticipates that with the passing of 
capitalism what will be possible is the production of man's "totality", "his needs, 
capacities, enjoyments, productive powers" (Marx, 1964, 84-85). 
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He bases this conclusion on his analysis of capitalist political economy as a 
social system which stunts the development of human capacities and renders human 
nature unidimensional. The implication of this insight is considerable, for the 
development of human cognitive abilities is then seen to bear a direct relationship to 
the prevailing social reality. Marx was attempting a radical transformation in 
consciousness and therefore in the social praxis of capitalism, for he believed that the 
only hope for a "humanized world", in which human potentiality could be fully 
actualized, is through revolutionary praxis. Thus praxis for Marx also signified a 
revolutionary project. 
In addition, it is through praxis as critical understanding that we can discover 
the nature of true human potentiality. Here Marx's view parallels the Aristotelian 
view "that it is only by understanding what man is - his actuality - that one can 
appreciate what he can become - his potentiality" (Bernstein, 1971, 70). Marx's 
advance was to comprehend that potentiality changes as actuality changes, that is, 
that human potentiality is grounded in history. It is as a result of human praxis that 
new potentialities emerge and thus in praxis as critical understanding resides the 
possibility of agency and autonomy. 
It is clear that the praxis paradigm can again be brought to bear on the 
seemingly insurmountable problems of our age, an assertion which will be clarified 
as I proceed with a discussion of twentieth century contributions and their 
significance for understanding the unidimensionality of modem humanity. In 
Chapter 1.9, it was argued that modern society has developed an assemblage of 
institutions and organizational forms which allow responsibility to be evaded. 
Modern technology, it was reasoned, constitutes one of the principle sources of 
estrangement from the moral order. In a related vein, Habermas (1974) has 
illuminated the implications for praxis of a science which has become a 
technological force, where the ends of technology have become the ends of society. 
The core of Habermas's argumentation is that thought and action are rationally 
related but in modern society the purposive/instrumental elements of reason have 
become divorced from commitment with the result that technology exerts a 
controlling influence over the ends of society while science as reason has lost the 
capacity to address questions of practical importance. Reason is thus appropriated to 
productive ends and, so debased, becomes understood as "decision" (Habermas, 
1974, 263). The danger in this process of scientification is that citizens lose the 
capacity to "attain a rational consensus ... concerning the practical control of their 
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destiny" (Habermas, 1974, 255) and, I would argue, society collectively loses its 
capacity for responsible action. 
For Habermas then, alienation resides in society's dissolution by technological 
reason into its particular parts and the consequent loss of its rational capacity. To act 
as "coherent total consciousness", society needs "politically enlightened", responsible 
citizens, a foundation which becomes an impossibility in a technologically controlled 
society, whose members are ironically at once captive of it and yet alienated from it: 
The paradox of this state of affairs will, of course, only be 
recognized by a theory oriented towards praxis. ... The more the 
growth and change of society are determined by the most extreme 
rationality of processes of research, subject to a division of labour, 
the less rooted is this civilization, now rendered scientific, in the 
knowledge and conscience of its citizens (Habermas, 1974, 256). 
And the less the chance of responsible action being undertaken. 
Overcoming the debasement of reason and the corresponding burgeoning of 
irresponsibility can only be achieved by a change in the state of consciousness, 
accomplished by the "penetrating ideas of persistent critique" (Habermas, 1974, 256). 
Just as Enlightenment thinkers perceived reason as the antidote to ignorance and 
prejudice and their manifestations, religious intolerance, dogmatism and despotism, 
so for Habermas reason is the remedy for the false consciousness of this "congealed 
society" (Habermas, 1974, 262). However, where Habermas differs is that this is a 
rationality reconnected to commitment and grounded in an understanding of nature 
and in practical experience. It is reasoned thought reconnected to responsible action 
as praxis. It is the basis for actualizing what Habermas terms "adult autonomy". 
Integral to progress towards adult autonomy is the cognitive function of 
critical reflection, from which industrial society, wherein the technical aspects of 
knowledge dominate science, protects itself by appropriating the resources of reason 
and subordinates it to production. For a civilization where praxis is thus 
technologically dominated, the outcome can only be insanity, since, Habermas 
maintains, "being devoid of the interconnection between theory and praxis ... [it is] 
threatened by the splitting of its consciousness and by the splitting of its human 
beings into two classes - the social engineers and the inmates of closed institutions" 
(Habermas, 1974, 282). 
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The essential difference between Marx and Habermas with respect to the 
place of technology in social praxis is that, while Marx envisaged technology as the 
means to surmount the alienating impediments to autonomy, Habermas clearly lays 
the blame on technological reason as the single alienating force of modern society. 
In this "crisis of rationality", where science and technology have become sanctified 
into another form of dogmatism (Orr, 1992, 12-13), praxis must necessarily be 
reconceptualized apart from technological reason in order to retrieve some coherence 
and unity in the world. However, Habermas retains a modern faith in rationality, 
reflecting that "science as a productive force can work in a salutary way when it is 
suffused by science as an emancipatory force" (Habermas, 1974, 281). 
Subsequent practice of Marxism has revealed its praxis to be a double-edged 
sword; it has the potential both for emancipation and for repression. Marx's 
shortcoming, according to Bernstein (1971, 308), was his failure to provide norms of 
criticism because he lacked "a firm understanding of what ought to be the norms of 
critical inquiry by which it can continually refine and correct itself'. And this despite 
the fact that Marx himself engaged in continuous self-criticism. What was attractive 
about Marxism was also its undoing: its appearing to provide the final explanation 
for the world as it is and should be, a totality. Bernstein finds in the pragmatists 
Pierce and Dewey, and their understanding of science and scientific inquiry, the 
possibility of transcending the dogmatising inclinations of Marxist praxis. For Pierce 
the essence of reasoning lies in constant self-criticism within a social context, a 
community of inquirers. Thus one continuously essays to distinguish the real from 
the unreal, the true from the false. Moreover, because for the pragmatists all truths 
are infinitely revisable, the search for absolute certainty, whose only possible 
outcome can be dogmatism, is unsustainable. In their conceptualization of scientific 
reason they furnished one of the norms of critical inquiry lacking in Marx, that no 
position has any final or fundamental hold on the truth, thereby enabling a more 
adequate account of human cognitive and practical activity, while restoring the sense 
of human agency denied by the structuralist account. In addressing this deficiency, 
the pragmatists enriched and enlarged the praxis paradigm, demonstrating that norms 
of critique are integral to praxis and therefore progress towards the "full ideal of free 
human activity" (Bernstein, 1971, 316). 
In the postwar period Cornelius Castoriadis (1987) has also sought to 
augment the paradigm but at the same time to transcend some of the deficiencies of 
Marxist praxis. It was his intention not to dismiss the tendency for totality inherent 
in praxis but rather to reinterpret totality (here the social totality) not as the essence 
192 
of reality as it is or will be, but as "an open-ended unity in the process of making 
itself' (Castoriadis, 1987, 89). Praxis must take the totality into consideration but is 
not obliged to reach a completion. This totality is constantly engaged in taking itself 
into consideration, that is, it is engaged in ongoing self-reflection. Because this 
praxis "begins with the explicit acknowledgement of the open character of its object" 
(Castoriadis, 1987, 89), it can only ever have a partial grasp of its object. However, 
this is not a deficiency, because such a praxis sets out to avoid the blueprints or 
detailed models which underpin the totalizing discourses which have so far plagued 
modernity. Nor does this revolutionary praxis have to: 
provide an absolute guarantee that this society could solve all the 
problems that could ever arise. It is enough that it show that there 
is nothing inconsistent in what it proposes and that, as far as can be 
seen, its realization would greatly increase society's capacity to face 
up to its own problems (Castoriadis, 1987, 90). 
Just as Marx saw praxis as the revolutionary social project of securing 
individual and collective autonomy, so too for Castoriadis is autonomy at the heart of 
the contemporary political and social problem (Castoriadis, 1987, 107), for the 
conditions of alienation can be found only in the social domain. Thus alienation does 
not reside simply in workers' incapacity to control the products of their labours, but 
rather it originates in the "oppressive structures" of modern society and the 
"collective anonymity" that they generate. It is heteronomous, not autonomous, rule 
that originates in "the impersonal nature of the 'economic mechanisms of the market' 
or in the 'rationality of the Plan', of the law of a few presented as the law as such" 
(Castoriadis, 1987, 109). Castoriadis concludes that the institutional frameworks of 
modern society and their supporting ideologies and power structures render futile the 
pursuit of individual autonomy so that not only are producers (read:workers) 
alienated but also the members of the capitalist class themselves. The essence of 
contemporary alienation then is that it is characterized by a situation in which 
institutions become autonomous, no longer serving the needs for which they were 
instituted. They develop their own inertia and their own logic: "The apparent plain 
truths are turned upside-down: what could have been seen 'at the start' as an ensemble 
of institutions in the service of society becomes a society in the service of 
institutions" (Castoriadis, 1987, 110). 
The contemporary revolutionary project has its roots in "the crisis of 
established society" (Castoriadis, 1987, 95) or, more specifically, in the internal 
contradictions of capitalist society. Just as for Habermas overcoming alienation 
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constitutes a project in which rationality is reconnected to responsible action in the 
service of actualizing autonomy, so for Castoriadis praxis is a creative process in 
which understanding or clarifying the world as it is (here exposing the irrationalities 
of capitalism) is a necessary precondition for changing it. Contemporary praxis 
should attempt to clarify the institutional basis of alienation, investigating why 
institutions suffer from inertia and become ends in themselves. It should also 
concern itself with the institutional basis of irresponsibility and the impediments to 
autonomous and responsible action. 
5.3: Ecopraxis 
Having outlined a refurbished praxis paradigm, what remains to be done is to 
bring some of its insights to bear on the ecological crisis of the late twentieth century. 
Such a radical ecopraxis, as I see it, should furnish signposts for proceeding further (I 
forebear to use the word 'progress' as that is now too heavily stigmatised and in need 
of reformation); it should indicate possible pitfalls; it should provide a critical 
understanding of the present crises, including the identification of deficiencies to be 
addressed; it should define possible norms for action; and it should identify 
constraints on responsible action 61 . A radical ecopraxis would also address questions 
of autonomy and agency. 
It is now clear that contemporary problems of ecology and society are 
interlinked and have their roots in the production paradigm, which is underpinned by 
ideologies of economic growth and mass consumption (Kassiola, 1990). The 
presently dominant mode of production, capitalism, which, the Marxist geographers, 
Smith (1990), Harvey (1989) and others have demonstrated, is prone to contradiction 
and therefore crisis, is not, as Marx argued, an eternal social form. It is these 
contradictions which must be elucidated and it is in the crises that they produce that 
we may look for sites of institutional innovation (Dryzek, 1992; but see also Dryzek, 
1996b). Moreover, it is in a critical understanding of present-day actualities, the 
contradictions and associated crises of capitalism, that one must search for 
possibilities of agency. Castoriadis (1987, 79) divines the conditions for action at the 
intersection of the rational and the irrational. In order to understand constraints on 
agency, Castoriadis's autonomous institutions and their supporting ideologies and 
power structures must be critically deconstructed. Moreover, responsible action 
61 Similarly, Eckersley (1988, 59) establishes the path of desirable social change as one which 
develops an "adequate theoretical understanding of the historical development" of possible agents of 
change, of constraining institutional structures, and of patterns of thought and practice resistant to 
ecological ideas and goals. 
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would be premised on the understanding that the loss of human agency cannot be 
understood apart from the loss of habitat (Conley, 1997, 199). It follows then that the 
realization of human potentiality cannot be pursued in isolation from the 
actualization of the potentiality of all other entities, human and nonhuman. 
Consequently, it may be said that the goal of a radical ecopraxis mirrors 
contemporary crises of social/economic sustainability (quality of life) and ecological 
sustainability (ecological integrity). 
5.3.1: Ecotopia as Regulative Ideal 
Contemporary political theorists are averse to utopian thinking since the 
failure of the Enlightenment's "rationalistic visions" (Benhabib, 1992, 229), fearful of 
totalizing grand narratives, the actuality of which has tended to favour undemocratic 
and authoritarian practices in the present for some anticipated ideal in the future. 
However, the concept of utopia retains its value as a "regulative principle of hope" 
(Benhabib, 1992, 229) and it is as a normative ideal that the principles of ecology can 
be used to outline possible ecotopias. The practice of earlier utopian visions can but 
serve to remind us of the dangers of an uncritical acceptance of such principles. 
Although utopian thinking has become tarnished, as long as what is to come 
is perceived to be better than that which already exists, there will be a need for 
utopian thinking. Benhabib (1992, 229) interprets such thinking as a "practical-moral 
imperative". She avers: "Without such a regulative principle of hope, not only 
morality but also radical transformation is unthinkable". Yet, while conceding the 
concerns of opponents of utopias, she maintains that the only way to deal with 
problems of undemocratic-authoritarian practices in the name of future ideals is to 
locate social transformation in "the normative principles of democratic action and 
organization in the present". Of the need for political imagination, Ruth Levitas 
(1993) also argues that utopias are politically important, since, as a vision of a good 
society in the future, utopia may act as an agent of social change. And conversely: 
"The absence of utopian thinking may then be construed as a problem because it 
paralyses political action or prevents it from cohering into a force capable of 
effecting fundamental change" (Levitas, 1993, 257). 
If the ecological principles inhering in the ecotopian vision — peace and non-
violence, democratic participation, ecology and feminism — are to constitute the kind 
of regulative ideal that Benhabib and Levitas argue is essential to transformative 
thought and action (praxis), environmentalists must take steps to ensure that they 
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avoid the failings of earlier utopian visions. If sustainability is accepted as the goal 
of ecopraxis (at least, for the forseeable future), the experience of utopian thinking in 
the modern era suggests a number of guidelines to which thought and action should 
adhere. Firstly, the complexity and extent of emerging interdependencies indicates 
that goals for future sustainable societies must be far less grandiose than the material 
plenty ideals of modern societies, for which the economic growth paradigm has been 
particularly damaging. Re-adopting and re-orienting the early modern goal of 
'improvement' to mean 'a better quality of life' would be a more appropriate and more 
modest goal in view of the global inequalities alluded to previously. Indeed, 
according to Wackernagel and Rees (1996), a satisfactory quality of life is one of the 
two poles of tension inherent in sustainability planning; the other is ecological 
sustainability or long-term ecological security. The tendency in modern societies has 
been to interpret the former as material wellbeing and hence for material welfare to 
conflict with the latter. The goal of sustainability is to reinterpret 'quality of life' and 
therefore to overcome the antagonism between socioeconomic sustainability as 
presently construed and ecological security. 
In view of the unidimensionality of modern life, it is clear that, if improving 
quality of life is a goal of sustainability, its meaning must be enlarged to capture the 
full range of human potentiality. The human needs frameworks of Abraham Maslow 
(1968) and Manfred Max-Neef (1985) can be utilized to inform policy-making in this 
regard. What is also clear is that sustainability planning must also attempt to 
overcome the tendency in attending to quality of life concerns in the present to 
discount the needs of future generations, thus compromising long-term ecological 
integrity. 
Secondly, given the over-confidence unleashed by the Cartesian cogito and 
the obvious threats from the technological optimism thus generated, hopes for the 
future must be tempered by a sense of the immense responsibility that its 
technological capabilities bestow on the human species (Jonas, 1984, 201). With the 
acceptance of ecological limits: "Promethean immodesty - and utopia is the 
immodest goal par excellence - must yield to the modesty of goals that we and nature 
can afford". Indeed, Jonas (1984, 1) makes the point that to preserve the natural 
environment and the human species is not so much a utopian goal but rather a "not so 
very modest ... task of responsibility". 
A third norm which might apply to an ecological ideal involves avoiding the 
dangers of its uncritical acceptance so that it becomes ultimately an unchallengeable 
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article of faith. Proposals with an ecoauthoritarian bias are prone to the same failing 
as earlier utopias wherein citizens have been willing to surrender hardwon 
democratic privileges in the name of some postulated greater good, driven by an 
uncritical faith in its rightness. Indeed, Eckersley (1988, 59) argues that the cardinal 
principle of ecopraxis resides in the "need to maintain consistency between ends and 
means". 
At the root of this tendency to be swayed by utopian blueprints is what Saul 
(1997, 31) calls a "Western weakness for ideology", wherein the illusion of reality is 
underpinned by "highly sophisticated rational constructs". Ideology creates illusions 
which tend to unbalance the order of things. This congenital disequilibrium of 
modern life is one of the reasons why the future is always more attractive than the 
present. It is the reason why the future is idealized and the present regarded as 
incomplete or unfulfilled. Freeing ourselves from ideology, Saul says, will enable 
humankind to make more reasonable approximations of reality and therefore define 
more reasonable, perhaps more modest, aspirations and hopes. The problem with 
ideologies is that they purport to provide the ultimate answers to the perpetual 
conditions of existence and the certainty which comes with having those answers. As 
uncertainty is the paramount condition of human existence, this can only be an 
illusion. A utopian ideal based on Socratic doubt would be more realistic about 
possible human achievements and it would help check the kind of system runaway 
produced by the maximizing strategies which are an inevitable consequence of 
ideological adherence. It would also counteract the tendency, when ideological 
promises remain unfulfilled, to administer more of the same medicine on the basis 
that the conditions for achievement are yet to be satisfied. The contemporary fixation 
with free market ideology ignores the fact that markets are simply incapable of 
supplying some social and environmental goods while privatization and competition, 
its mates in the neoliberal stable, can only serve to deepen prevailing ecological and 
social crises. 
Having accepted that the perennial human condition is uncertainty, any 
regulative ideal proposed for the future conduct of human affairs should also be alert 
to the inevitable contradictions and paradoxes of human existence. Any side-effects 
or externalities which manifest during the course of any programme would then be 
seen for what they truly are, contradictions inherent in the programme or its 
theoretical framework rather than problems resulting from deficiencies in its 
application and therefore in need of renewed vigour in progressing the programme as 
is the case with ideological fixations. It is appropriate to call attention to the 
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distinctly salvationist overtones in some of the supposedly secular thought 
frameworks which presently guide modern societies. 
Relinquishing the search for certainty of existence and for human perfection 
also means that we can avoid a further modern shortcoming, the rationalist's belief 
that, when received ideas and practices become contradictory and thus ineffectual, 
the decks of tradition should be cleared, their constraints transcended and a new 
beginning made. The French Revolution is the example par excellence of the 'clean 
slate' approach to social transformation. The tendency for social transformation 
processes in modem societies to operate on the 'clean slate' principle has been 
attributed by Stephen Toulmin (1990, 178) to the rationalist philosophies of 
Descartes and Locke, which: 
had no room for given ideas and practices to change continuously 
into other different ideas or practices. Once one questioned the 
claims of any social or intellectual system, the only thing left to do 
was to raze it, and construct another different system in its place. 
However the hope of cutting oneself off from inherited traditions and beginning anew 
has proved to be an illusion. It is now accepted that whatever practical and 
intellectual purposes we pursue, they are culturally and historically conditioned 62 : 
All we can be called upon to do is to take a start from where we 
are, at the time we are there: i.e., to make discriminating and 
critical use of the ideas available to us in our current local situation, 
and the evidence of our experience, as this is read in terms of those 
ideas. There is no way of cutting ourselves free of our conceptual 
inheritance: all we are required to do is to use our experience 
critically and discriminatingly, refining and improving our inherited 
ideas, and determining more exactly the limits of their scope 
(Toulmin, 1990, 179). 
The danger for radical ecologists is that in their perception of the urgency of 
the ecological crisis, given increasing rates of biodiversity loss, increasing signs of 
climatic change, and increasing social injustice, they may ignore the lessons of the 
revolutionary experience and embrace more abruptly transformative and authoritarian 
solutions. What is required of this historical era is an ecopraxis with the intellectual 
and practical space where the best of our ideas and practices can be refined and 
62See also Castoriadis (1987, 113) on the inevitability of psychosis in subjects and societies which cut 
themselves off from their cultural and historical ground. 
198 
• adapted to the imperatives of our age, the need to protect diversity and adaptability 
(Toulmin, 1990, 183). 
To avoid the charge of the totalizing blueprint (Castoriadis, 1987, 89), a 
radical ecopraxis cannot countenance any defined endpoints for its projects. It can 
only pursue movements towards its ideals. In the broadest terms these may be 
envisaged as a radical shift to ecological consciousness among a threshold proportion 
of human populations and the emergence of institutional arrangements which 
encourage ecologically responsible values and practices. Moreover, the ideal and its 
intrinsic worth and rightness should be subject to ongoing internal scrutiny (Jonas, 
1984, 191), grounded in the concrete realities of human experience and possibility. 
A modest scepticism, such as advocated by the Renaissance humanists, is open to 
other possibilities and modest about the limits of human cognitive and practical 
capacity. A humanist account would also allow that there will be diverse means of 
pursuing ecological ideals and even a diversity of goals. It would avoid depicting 
concrete forms of life but rather it would seek to "indicate the necessary conditions, 
which would have to be fulfilled in order for emancipatory life forms to emerge - 
whatever they may be" (Habermas, 1992b, 145). 
A radical ecopraxis is thus grounded in human actuality. The task of critical 
intellectual activity is to illuminate the present - its discourses and practices - and to 
furnish a critical understanding of what stands in the way of self-creation. As it was 
for Marx, radical ecocriticism should bring to self-consciousness, and therefore 
render transparent, those institutional arrangements of liberal capitalism which are 
exploitative and oppressive. It is only then that possibilities for sustainability 
through practical-critical activity can be realized. Indeed, according to Levitas (1993, 
264), it is only "when we have analyses of the present which identify possible points 
of intervention, paths and agents of change" that we will be in a position to map out 
the future. However, this avenue of social change is not as straightforward as it 
seems. Levitas suggests that the present seeming failure of the utopian imagination 
and apparent inability to see past the present is the consequence of an increasingly 
complex social and economic structure and its attendant fragmentation which hinders 
the identification of possible agents and paths of social transformation. Late 
capitalism is characterized by diversified sites of oppression which are easily 
identified, but what is not so readily defined are "points of intervention in the system 
which might lead to transformation or groups of people capable of making those 
interventions" (Levitas, 1993, 264). This latter difficulty has also been canvassed by 
Dobson (1996), who, with serious reservations, divines in the increasing number of 
199 
people marginalized from consumption, the post-industrial proletariat so-called, a 
possible revolutionary political subject. Dobson concedes that there are serious 
difficulties in diverting this group from the consumption paradigm, not the least of 
which is persuading the marginalized that their problems are structural and that 
current production and consumption processes "actually reproduce, rather than 
alleviate, its marginalization" (Dobson, 1996, 163). The role of radical greens in this 
case is to make the marginalized class aware that its interests lie in a different kind of 
society and not in remaining wedded to the present disabling schema, "because the 
limits imposed by the Earth on the production process and the accumulation of 
capital make it impossible for this marginalized class ever to have access to the 
system's material benefits" (Dobson, 1996, 163). However, even if this change in 
consciousness could be effected, there remains the problem, for greens at least, of 
conceiving of this group as a revolutionary subject. This is also a difficulty for an 
ecopraxis which is explicitly defined by its opposition to the clean slate approach of 
the revolutionary project. 
Notwithstanding these problems, a radical ecopraxis should embody as a 
defining objective an improved capacity for society to both confront and address the 
problems generated by and reflected in ecological crises. But before the objectives of 
a transformative project and its agents and possible paths can be determined, what is 
needed is an understanding of societal constraints and how they restrict agency, 
namely, institutional biases against sustainability and deficiencies of the self. 
Additionally, in order to map trajectories, we must be able to identify potential sites 
of political innovation. What is therefore needed is a political economy account of 
sustainability, which can assist in the articulation of such biases against responsible 
action for sustainability as well as identifying possibilities for transformation. 
5.4: Towards a Political Economy of Sustainability 
A political economy approach to sustainability is likely to be the most 
conducive to the purposes outlined above because it encompasses a broad range of 
perspectives - political, economic and social/cultural - giving primacy to the social 
production of existence and hence to the social (rather than technical) foundations of 
ecological problems. It also recognizes the dynamic nature of society, emphasizing 
processes of change and transformation and, because it captures the inevitability of 
inequalities under a capitalist system, it can help to explain the inter- and 
intragenerational inequities which are a primary concern of sustainability theorising. 
It can also grasp the import of power and of ideology in the maldistribution of 
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environmental goods and bads. In the context of ecological crises, a political 
economy of sustainability may then be defined as the study of the processes and 
structures (technologies, institutions, values and patterns of economic and social 
development) associated with and emerging from peoples' transformations of their 
biophysical and sociocultural environments (Gare, 1995, 157). The following 
discussion canvasses questions both of structure and agency. 
5.4.1: Biases against Sustainability 
I have previously argued that conservative approaches to sustainable 
development, ecological modernization processes, are unlikely to progress societal 
restructuring to the extent that is necessary for securing long-term sustainability. In 
view of the growing gap between what appears to be achievable and what needs to be 
achieved, there is required an understanding of the impediments to more equitable 
and liveable existences, in particular, why obviously unsustainable development 
paths continue to persist. In this respect we should seek to understand how systems, 
institutions and individuals become locked into entrenched and hence unsustainable 
paths of development, practices and behaviours. 
Richard Norgaard (1992; 1994) has developed a theory of coevolution to 
explain why modern economic systems are unsustainable and why they persist in the 
face of increasing externality effects. His theory catches the interrelatedness of 
values, knowledges, social organization, technologies and ecosystems and explains 
why the sustainability of both social and natural systems is dependent on their 
concurrent evolution. He argues that the growthist model of development is 
unsustainable because modern economies have developed as closed systems in 
ignorance of the interdependencies of social and natural systems. The separate 
development of social and natural systems in modern times is attributed to the switch 
to hydrocarbons, the 'fossil fuel subsidy' or, put another way, in the shift from flow 
(wind, water and sun) to stock materials (fossil fuels and minerals/metals). 
The era of hydrocarbons drove a wedge between the evolution of 
social and ecological systems. ... Our value system, knowledge 
system, social organization and technologies coevolved to fit the 
opportunities which the exploitation of fossil fuel provided. Our 
social systems reflect these medium-term opportunities rather than 
the long-run opportunities of coevolutionary development with the 
resources of the global system (Norgaard, 1994, 81; see also Dietz 
and van der Straaten, 1993). 
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A coevolutionary interpretation of sustainability places value on the 
maintenance and enhancement of the overall diversity and productivity of all these 
systems, while recognizing their dynamism and interrelatedness. From this 
standpoint: 
development has been unsustainable, not simply because the use of 
hydrocarbons has been destroying the environment, but because 
there has been a cultural implosion. Value systems have been 
collapsing. Knowledge has been reduced to western understanding. 
Social organization and technologies have become increasingly the 
same around the world. The cultural implosion and environmental 
transformation have been closely interconnected. The switch to 
hydrocarbons allowed cultures to stop coevolving with their unique 
environments and adapt the values, knowledge, technologies and 
organization of the west (Norgaard, 1994, 82). 
The exploitation of fossil fuels has endowed the complex economic/ 
technological/bureaucratic institutional apparatus which developed as a result with a 
quality of robustness which enables it to persist despite obvious threats from social 
and ecological dysfunction. To account for the tendency of technological systems to 
become locked into particular development paths, Geoffrey Hodgson (1993, 205, 
256) describes how the notion of chreodic development (chre, meaning fated or 
necessary, and hodos, meaning a path) has been borrowed from evolutionary biology 
and used as a model for technological development in an industrial economy. Briefly 
a chreod is a relatively stable trajectory of change, its stability achieved by constant 
incremental change. Even though environmental influences may operate to dislodge 
the system from its trajectory, the very stability of the system (resulting in part from 
its hierarchical control sequences) will return the system to its ordained path. Thus 
once systems of technology, which are characterized by hierarchical control 
mechanisms, become established, it is difficult to switch to other possibly more 
viable or sustainable technologies. By way of example, early motor vehicles were 
designed to run on steam, electricity or petrol. We could imagine that an entirely 
different kind of society would have been the consequence if steam-power had 
prevailed. Because initial conditions can be instrumental in influencing the particular 
path that development takes, the implication is that there is a case for intervention 
either to establish or change the contours of development in its early stages 
(Hodgson, 1993, 207). 
The nature of chreodic development also bears on the possibilities for social 
transformation. Chreodic systems are transformed by constant and incremental 
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innovation occurring at the micro level while the macro level is characterised by 
rigidity and invariance. This observation may explain why, in response to ecological 
problems, changes have been observed occurring at the personal level - the adoption 
of green consumption habits, recycling programmes and energy efficiency measures, 
but at the level of government and business, economic growth remains the primary 
goal. The chreodic model suggests that redirection of the goals of western societies 
towards more sustainable ends is likely to occur only through major perturbation or 
redirection of the system and, concomitantly, that the incremental change 
characteristic of polyarchic liberal capitalism is unlikely to produce sustainable 
modes of living. It also explains why particular, suboptimal development paths have 
the capacity to persist in spite of obvious disturbances in the external environment. 
However, the stability of the chreod cannot be relied on forever: 
[D]evelopment along a stable path can sometimes lead to 
catastrophe. Institutions change, and even gradual change can 
eventually put such a strain on a system that there can be outbreaks 
of conflict or crisis, leading to a radical change in actions and 
attitudes (Hodgson, 1993, 258). 
It is possible therefore to envisage long periods of stability in values and habits, but 
eventually the very ossification of stable systems can lead to sudden and rapid change 
prompted either by internal or external influences. By understanding system change 
in this way, we can conclude that, although small marginal adjustments are generally 
ineffective, there may be room for planned transition to more optimal or sustainable 
development paths - although Hodgson (1993, 259) comments that later interventions 
may demand considerable investment in resources to effect the appropriate 
realignment. Prospects for a painless diversion of the presently dominant economic 
growth paradigm through ecological modernization policies are not that encouraging. 
The situation in which institutions become autonomous has previously been 
mentioned. The perpetuation of unsustainable institutions has much to do with the 
reinforcement of routinized behaviour. When certain behaviours be -come routinized, 
institutions (described by Thorsten Veblen as 'outgrowths of habit' - cited in 
Hodgson, 1993, 131), like systems, can become locked into a particular level of 
cultural development, which through "cumulative reinforcement", may persist into an 
era of changed material conditions. Lock-in at this level is known as 'institutional 
inertia'. The mechanism, which appears to play a large role in perpetuating 
unsustainable institutions and the values and routinized behaviours sustaining them, 
203 
is positive feedback. Simply put, positive feedback is an undesirable tendency 
because it involves deviation-enhancing input into a system, thus reinforcing 
negative processes and behaviours. Dryzek (1987) has elucidated the positive 
feedback effects operating within market economies - the profit motive and 
continuous growth imperative - which operate to promote unsustainable economic 
growth, while other aspects of markets - interest rates, future discounting and market 
morality - weaken desirable negative feedback. 
Under such conditions, possibilities for institutional change may present at 
the intersection where friction occurs between the habits of thought generated by an 
earlier set of cultural conditions and the habits emanating from a more recent suite of 
cultural conditions. The contemporary ecological crisis manifests as just such a 
conflict where the habits of thought, practices and entrenched value systems 
characteristic of an optimistic economic growth paradigm collide with the more sober 
ecological values and realistic expectations derived from a changed understanding of 
the culture/nature relationship. The institutions of neoclassical economics - free 
markets and private property rights - and the values that they embody appear directly 
antithetic to the values contained in an ecological paradigm. Given the 
incompatibility of value systems, polarization of communities (over the logging of 
old growth forests, for example) can probably be resolved only by the emergence of 
economies which are co-operatively rather than individualistically based (Kemmis, 
1990, 104-105), a movement which would constitute a radical challenge to 
neoclassical economic understanding. 
Impediments to individually sustainable existences have been identified as 
"social traps" (Costanza, 1991, 332-333; Orr, 1992, 5-6). Individuals may become • 
trapped into unsustainable or damaging practices when local incentives reward what 
is individually rational behaviour in the short-term but collectively irrational in the 
long-term. The "Tragedy of the Commons" is the pre-eminent example here, but 
other addictions, such as drug abuse, overuse of pesticides, and the ongoing use of 
motor vehicles, are also indicative of individual unsustainability. Robert Costanza 
(1991) posits the origin of social traps in the bifurcation of human behaviours from 
long-term natural constraints through the development of a tool-using capability 
consequent on an expanded brain capacity. This adaptation enables humans to at 
least partly ignore the constraints of sustainability but also makes them susceptible to 
social traps (Costanza, 1991, 332). He contends that conventional economic models 
of human behaviour are inadequate under conditions of uncertainty and complexity 
and that more realistic policy design would seek to make individual or local goals 
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and incentives consistent with the long-term, collective goals of sustainability. It 
must be said, however, that conventional economics does have the capacity to modify 
consumption behaviour for interim environmental improvements, such as incentives 
for improving fuel efficiency or using less environmentally degrading fuel sources, 
through upfront payments for the use of resources or incentives to recycle. However, 
the degree of consumption reduction and radical redistribution of resources envisaged 
as sustainability goals is beyond its theoretical resources. The point at issue is to be 
able to recognize social traps for their unsustainability and then to avoid them in the 
future, and, most importantly, that the radical individualism which is at the root of 
social traps is inimical to the goals of long-term social and ecological viability. 
5.4.2: Transformative Possibilities 
In its radical critique of the sustainability of existing institutions, a political 
economy of sustainability should provide indications of possible points of 
interdiction. To this end I draw upon existing theories of crisis and containment of 
crisis in capitalist modes of production on the basis of insights furnished by Anthony 
Giddens' (1984) theory of the structuration of society. Gidden's theory is a theory of 
agency which circumvents the structural determinism of historical materialism 
without allowing unqualified freedom to the human agent. In the context of social 
transformation, it is the potential which he locates in contradiction and crisis that is 
of most interest. 
According to the theory, all human agents are confronted with all manner of 
constraints in the exercise of their agency. Even so, all constraints are complemented 
by enabling conditions. In commenting on the theory, Cohen (1989, 214-215) 
explains the relationship thus: 
No matter how severe constraints may be they always establish 
opportunities for some more or less extensive range of activities 
which enables actors to intervene in social life. ... All constraints 
must be complemented by enablements in order for the constitution 
of life to occur. 
The possibilities for action always involve both opportunities which are foreclosed or 
obstructed and opportunities which enable other forms of activity and outcomes to be 
produced. It is the contradiction between these two types of possibilities which 
establishes the conditions for social change. Where Giddens' account differs from 
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Marx's is that he recognizes that contradiction can underlie both progressive and 
retrograde movements for change (Cohen, 1989, 259). 
If contradiction is perceived as the relation between incompatible and 
irreconcilable sets of conditions, then tension is unavoidable. Possibilities for 
resolving such tension include, firstly, one set of conditions taking over the other and 
the abolition of the latter; secondly, accommodation between contradictory tensions 
and stabilization of societal systems for greater or lesser periods of time; but thirdly, 
where contradictory tensions cannot be reconciled, destabilization of societal systems 
occurs, accompanied by the likelihood of conflict and social change. Where 
contradictions are structural in origin, inevitably they cannot be reconciled and thus is 
established the conditions for episodes of social change. 
To date, attempts to respond to the contradictory tensions resulting from the 
advent of the 'conservation imperative' (Dryzek, 1996b) have been largely confined to 
a compromise trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection with 
the purpose of maintaining economic growth within environmental limits. However, 
as I shall argue, confining capital's accommodation to environmental problems to 
economic restructuring simply amounts to a deferral of the inevitable. Unless 
fundamental structural imperatives regarding the interdependence of ecosystem and 
social viability are addressed, radical destabilization of both systems is more than 
likely, developments for which there is growing evidence (see the contributions to 
O'Connor, 1994b on this aspect). 
5.5: Structural Change in Capitalist Societies 
So far I have been concerned to outline in general terms the conditions for 
social transformation stimulated by contradiction and crisis. I would like now to 
apply this general understanding of the relationship between crisis and social change 
to an understanding of the possibilities for social progress towards sustainability 
latent within capitalist societies. The most important point to be made here is that 
such societies are inherently crisis-prone. So-called crisis theories (Harvey, 1982; 
O'Connor, 1973; and Offe, 1984 among others) have identified the origins of 
contradictory tendencies inherent in capitalist production regimes, namely the 
tendency to overaccumulate, the tendency to undermine their own social foundations, 
and a more recently recognized inclination to undermine the biophysical base (Daly 
and Cobb, 1989). And yet, in spite of such seeming fragility, capitalist systems 
nevertheless have the capacity to persist. This is the conundrum which has exercised 
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the attention of the regulation theorists, whose work is useful for understanding the 
dynamics of change in capitalist societies. 
Regulation theory provides a valuable theoretical framework for 
understanding how a crisis-prone system of production is able to attain and maintain 
some semblance of order which allows it to function coherently for a period of time. 
It "provides a conceptual framework for understanding processes of capitalist growth, 
crisis and reproduction. The approach focuses on relationships ... between the 
process of accumulation and the ensemble of institutional forms and practices which 
together comprise the mode of social regulation (MSR) [my italics]" (Tickell and 
Peck, 1995, 359-360). The MSR produces a temporary solution to the crisis 
tendencies which are inherent in the accumulation process. The postwar coalescence 
of values and norms, legislative activity and general societal support about the 
ideology of development is one such temporary MSR or grand compromise (Lipietz, 
1992), and one which has been in the process of unravelling since the early 1970s. 
When systems of accumulation and MSRs are coupled together in a stable fashion for 
a period of time they are termed regimes of production. Being incapable of 
neutralizing crisis tendencies indefinitely, however, MSRs are eventually subject to 
"institutional exhaustion" and the compromise collapses, a development which 
presently manifests in western societies as increasing social disaggregation, political 
disenchantment and voter volatility. Capitalism, as a mode of production, has been 
characterized by a succession of such institutional fixes, although the theory does not 
predict its infinite reproducibility. 
The postwar consensus between capital and labour, centring around the 
maintenance of mass production while protecting labour from exploitation, has been 
in crisis since around 1973. It may be argued that sustainable development is but the 
contemporary attempt to work out another mode of social regulation to avert this 
latest crisis of capitalism. 
5.5.1: Regulation for Sustainability 
Regulation is a useful framework for understanding social change particularly 
in this era of sustainability crisis. Several theorists have attempted to link regulation 
theory to the sustainable development discourse with the aim of progressing 
understanding of possible sustainability forms. Ian Drummond and Terry Marsden 
(1995) and David Gibbs (1996) have endeavoured to spell out the sustainability 
issues in Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck's (1995, 320) reading of the contemporary 
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crisis of capitalism, namely, that any attempt to construct "a new compromise under a 
new MSR must involve a central commitment to economic, political, ecological and 
social sustainability". This reading is also clear about the futility of relying on 
market-driven solutions prescribed under the influence of neoliberal ideology to 
furnish the conditions for a sustainable mode of social regulation. Drummond and 
Marsden explicitly draw a relationship between the unsustainability of the postwar 
MSR and the current crisis of capitalism, which Tickell and Peck hold, is 
exemplified and exacerbated by the fixation with neoliberal policies. 
Interpreting contemporary regulation regimes in terms of their sustainability, 
both socioeconomic and ecological, has the effect of problematizing both the object 
and the nature of regulation. Drummond and Marsden argue for a redefinition of 
both of these variables in order to transcend particularly unsustainable regimes of 
accumulation. The revolutionary nature of this proposal suggests that any system of 
reregulation that simply restricts sustainable development to economic restructuring 
in order to create new uses for capital, only defers the inevitable crisis of 
overaccumulation and is nothing more than an extemporization measure. Eventually 
friction must develop between the modes of social regulation, those institutions 
which provide support for capital, and those forms of regulation oriented towards 
system sustainability, such as environmental protection legislation, because the 
unsustainable assumptions of the former are inconsistent with long-term 
sustainability goals. 
The incorporation of sustainability concerns into the regulation discourse also 
has the effect of highlighting the true preconditions for capital's viability, which until 
recently have been taken for granted or, rather, have been narrowly defined as purely 
economic. The prime imperative of established regulatory regimes is to maintain the 
value of capital even, it seems, at the expense of undermining the social, ethical and 
natural conditions of production. The integration of ecological and ethical 
dimensions, through a concern for the preservation of ecological integrity and for 
generational justice, into regulation for sustainability, would necessitate the 
redefinition of both the object and the character of regulation such that these key 
elements of sustainability would override unsustainable regimes of accumulation. 
Drummond and Marsden (1995, 58) conclude that the object of regulation "must 
extend beyond a singular concern for the value of capital. ...[In fact] there may well 
be a superior logic and some utility in strategies which objectify and facilitate the 
devalorization of capital". This may involve a parallel valorization of other sources 
of value or "system currencies". 
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Because sustainability is a whole-system problem, Drummond and Marsden 
suggest that such system-wide factors and indicators must be identified in order to 
understand system behaviour and identify policy options. It is system currencies 
which act to regulate systems towards normative equilibrium. What must also be 
identified are factors which militate against sustainable regimes of production, 
which, at this time, implies ecologically viable forms of development. In order to 
understand regulating influences within capitalist systems and thereby discern 
intervention points, these authors draw upon the Dovers and Handmer (1992) model 
of self-regulation in environmental systems. 
In environmental systems the key controlling mechanism is the flow of energy 
through the system. Understanding energy as a system currency represents a means 
of transcending the complexity and heterogeneity of ecosystems, which, in spite of 
these characteristics, have the capacity to proceed towards some normative 
equilibrium unaided by the purposive actions of any of their constituent parts. If this 
notion is transferred to capitalist systems of social and economic organization, flows 
of capital assume the role of system currency, thus furnishing a means of 
transcending the complexity and uncertainty of these regimes of production. It is 
"system-wide currencies ... which offer the possibility that complex systems, albeit in 
a 'grey-box' manner, be understood and purposively managed" (Drummond and 
Marsden, 1995, 55). hl ecosystems the most effective intervention is "at those 
locations where flows of energy are most concentrated and possessed of the greatest 
influence on (ie. power over) the overall pattern of system dynamics: either at the 
level of inputs to the system or in the higher trophic levels of the system". By 
analogy then, in systems of capital flows, "the key to effective agency lies in 
understanding interventions as adjustments to flows of capital through the system" 
(Drummond and Marsden, 1995, 55). Such an approach overcomes one of regulation 
theory's deficiencies, namely, its failure to account for international capital 
movements, which, as Drummond and Marsden observe, play a significant role in 
patterns of uneven development and, as others (for example, Altvater, 1993) 
maintain, in global environmental degradation. 
System currencies may take different forms, however. It is also necessary to 
delimit and expose those ideologies which act as system-wide currencies in defining 
perceptions of reality in particular terms conducive to the maintenance of what are 
now unsustainable modes of social regulation and accumulation. A utilitarian 
ideology in relation to land, for example, can no longer be countenanced, for it 
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absolves landholders of responsibility for stewardship of its ecological quality. As 
the sole value of land is its usefulness, there is no room in this ideological schema for 
ecological purpose. 
However, simply identifying system currencies is an insufficient precondition 
for effective agency. An understanding of unsustainable practices must also be 
established, although such possibility resides in defining their causal mechanisms 
rather than "in attempts to control the specificity of unsustainable events" 
(Drummond and Marsden, 1995, 59). Thus measures to reduce private vehicle use 
by improving public transport will always fail until it is understood that personal 
transport actually affords many people, particularly women, a considerable measure 
of personal freedom. It is really to restrictions on autonomy that we must look for at 
least a partial answer to this vexing problem, as well as to social norms which 
promote individual consumption. Causal mechanisms therefore may include 
impalpable social forms like norms, values and conventions, as well as concrete 
social structures such as laws and institutions. As consumption is as much a part of 
the problem of unsustainability as production, we need to know how consumption 
norms are legimated and sustained, and, perhaps more to the point at this juncture, 
how to circumvent nonviable norms. 
The judgement has consequently been made that intervention for 
sustainability must be undertaken at all levels and scales of regulation (Gibbs, 1996, 
7). The authors mentioned above have drawn upon a typology of social regulation 
forms outlined by Peck and Tickell (1992) which extends from concrete forms of 
regulation such as environmental legislation to the abstract form of the MSR 
experienced in individual nation-states. As Gibbs (1996, 7) concludes, "[t]he  value 
of taking a regulation approach lies in identifying the need for this totality of 
approach rather than upon any individual form or scale". 
A further advantage of integrating regulation theory and sustainable 
development is that it constitutes a realist approach to social transformation - it starts 
with what is. For Drummond and Marsden (1995, 53), the solution to contemporary 
environmental problems does not lie in the overthrow of capitalism, even though 
capitalism is heavily implicated in their generation. A realist programme takes the 
transformational character of capitalism as a given with the result that sustainable 
development is "conceived and promoted within the reflexive progression of 
capitalism and the conflict and struggles which sustain and renew the dynamism of 
capital accumulation" (Drummond and Marsden, 1995, 62). 
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Regulation theory can also reveal a great deal about the potential 
sustainability or otherwise of current trajectories of development and the modes of 
social regulation that sustain them. It can be used to demonstrate that ecological 
modernization, the contemporary institutional fix most attractive to business and 
governments, can only amount to a temporary postponement of the crisis tendencies 
now manifesting in social and natural environments. Technical and procedural 
innovation for more efficient energy and material resource use and its management 
through environmental legislation is unlikely in itself to achieve sustainable modes of 
production. As long as existing institutional structures and social values favour 
materialist, individualistic and competitive behavioural forms, the demand side of the 
equation remains untouched. 
Moreover to maintain a sole reliance on technology, albeit ecologically 
benign, is to remain imprisoned by the myth that social progress can be engineered by 
technological development. It also implies a continuing susceptibility to 
technologies which exceed "the human capacity to predict and control the 
consequences in time and space" (Altvater, 1993, 224) and hence to the unintended 
side-effect. What is required is the institutional capacity to be able to ask searching 
questions of, for example, biotechnology, such as who benefits, to what degree and at 
what cost. 
If technology has limits so too does the managerial approach to correcting the 
consequences of unsustainable practices. If the focus of sustainable development is 
restricted to environmental problems and their solution through, for example, 
environmental legislation, the dynamics of social process and action and the 
reproducibility of unsustainable human practices and behaviours is ignored. For 
Drummond and Marsden (1995, 52) there is little future in managerialist measures: 
It is difficult to see how sustainable development can be singularly 
concerned with measures to ameliorate the consequences of 
unsustainable practices through concrete forms of regulation which 
address specific problems, be they prohibitive legislation, fiscal 
measures or whatever. Such a project is flawed in its conception, 
and it is probably untenable. The effective articulation and 
operationalization of such an approach is almost certainly beyond 
the scope of human agency, for it would require the management of 
what is in practice the unmanageable. 
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Similarly, there is little point in remediation of environmental damage, 
through, for example, soil conservation and water quality measures or reafforestation 
or rehabilitation of mine sites (though these are laudable projects in themselves), if 
the practices and values which generate the damage are not addressed 
simultaneously. Moreover, the danger is that the reconstruction of the environment 
simply becomes another "field of capital accumulation" (Altvater, 1993, 213). To be 
sustainable, any new regime of production/consumption must minimize the amount 
of entropy discharge or environmental degradation. Nevertheless, both 
environmental restoration and reuse of waste products involve the use of fresh energy 
and materials: 
The repairs thus become a constitutive part of the problem. There 
remains only one answer: namely, from the outset to organize the 
transformation of energy and materials in such a way that the 
unavoidable entropy increase is kept as low as possible; to build 
into the functioning of the economic system a series of imperatives 
which prevent ecological damage (Altvater, 1993, 213). 
Yet, imperatives which are capable of changing individual behaviours, have 
to be more concrete than ethical imperatives. These demand too much of the 
individual, for whom rational free-rider behaviour is likely to outweigh moral 
injunction. Granted the collective character and global spread of many 
environmental problems, it is difficult for many individuals to comprehend how their 
individual efforts can contribute to problem-solving. It is therefore more rational to 
free-ride on the efforts of others. Campaigns for reductions in waste production and 
personal motor transport use, for example, are likely to have limited efficacy unless 
the ethical imperatives which they represent are institutionalized and backed by 
sanctions "so that they become behavioural constraints for everyone", or rather 
"institutionalized rules of ecological behaviour" (Altvater, 1993, 209, 208). 
The application of regulation theory to the sustainable development discourse 
thus suggests that, for an ecologically, politically, socially and economically 
sustainable regime of production to emerge, a radical new consensus for the 
contemporary crisis of accumulation is an essential prerequisite. It will involve not 
only ecologically benign technologies, environmental protection legislation and 
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environmental restoration measures, but also the replacement of current forms of 
production/consumption and the values, norms and institutions that sustain them. In 
regulation terms it will entail a reconstitution of both the social regulatory mode and 
the mode of accumulation. 
There has been some debate among regulation theorists (Jessop, 1990; 
Lipietz, 1992; Tickell and Peck, 1995) about whether the neoliberal turn in western 
democracies represents a stable and reproducible institutional fix consequent on the 
breakdown of the mass production/mass consumption Fordist industrial model or 
whether it is part of the crisis. In line with discussion in Chapter 1.9.1, where 
neoliberalism is discussed as a futile 'bailing out' exercise, I incline to the latter view 
(expressed also by Lipietz, 1992 and Tickell and Peck, 1995). Although 
neoliberalism is capable of releasing growth in the short-term, "as a political-
economic programmme it seems incapable of securing the medium-term 
reproduction of that growth, given its susceptibility to cyclical imbalances and short-
term plundering" (Tickell and Peck, 1995, 368). Neoliberal regulation embodies a 
number of contradictory tendencies, including a tendency for social polarization, 
progressive alienation from production and consumption, accentuation of boom/bust 
cycles of business (which have become global in their movement), and international 
instability resulting from global competition and accelerated environmental decline, 
all of which make it "internally crisis-prone and therefore unstable" (Tickell and 
Peck, 1995, 366). Neoliberalism reflects, accentuates and accelerates capitalism's 
contemporary accumulation crisis. This is best encapsulated by Tickell and Peck 
(1995, 370) thus: "Neoliberalism is now, and ever was the politics of the crisis. ...[It] 
is an expression of capitalism's contradictory logic, resurfacing as a symptom of the 
crisis itself". 
It is the politics of intensified restructuring which, because of its reliance on 
particular policy instruments, is unlikely to stabilize into the crisis-attenuating 
regulatory regime required by regulation theory. Its inherent contradictions are 
generated by precisely those policy tools so strenuously promoted by its apologists, 
namely improved competition, deregulation, privatization and market regulation. It 
is precisely these instruments which are so environmentally damaging. Not only can 
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market regulation, for example, not be relied upon to adequately regulate capitalism 
(Lash and Urry, 1987), but the practices and processes encouraged by an over-
reliance on it are incompatible with ecological sustainability. I do not intend to 
rehearse the arguments against markets here (see Altvater, 1993; Kinrade, 1995; 
Eckersley, 1992b), but suffice to say that the principles of 'inter- and 
intragenerational equity' and 'protection of biodiversity' are inevitably contravened by 
the inability of markets to price collective goods or to account for all interests. 
Private property rights as an instrument of environmental protection are similarly 
suspect, because, as Haworth (1994, 111) argues, they cannot be relied upon to 
provide capitalists with sufficient incentives to ensure collective ends. Ineluctably, 
the business rationale of minimizing costs will trump environmental concerns and 
trade-offs for objectives other than equity and ecological integrity will follow. 
Besides, as we have seen (see Kinrade, 1995, 98-99), the evidence for the utility of 
property rights in sustainability is not at all compelling. 
The restructuring of the conditions of production undertaken in recent 
decades under the influence of neoliberal ideology has in fact been 
counterproductive; it has only succeeded in undermining these conditions, as 
identified by Marx, namely labour power, the environment, and communal 
infrastructure (O'Connor, 1994b). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that 
neoliberalism is a dead-end with respect to sustainability, and that its ascendency 
represents "a regulatory hole, one which has elements of market regulation but which 
represents the absence of a new institutional fix" (Tickell and Peck, 1995, 369). 
The coincidence of the end stages of a long wave of capital accumulation (on 
this aspect, see Soja, 1989, 27-28; and Mandel, 1978, Ch.4) and the approach of 
ecological limits presents several formidable challenges for the formation of a viable 
regulatory framework. It is clear that, given the global character of capital circulation 
and the global nature of risks generated by capital accumulation processes, any 
replacement framework must have a significant global component. Individual states 
are likely to be deterred from taking initiatives to regulate global capital through fear 
of punishment from international money markets via capital flight, unemployment, 
and loss of legitimacy. Existing international organizations, such as the IMF or the 
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World Bank, remain too heavily imbued with neoliberal ideology and are likely to 
prove to be destabilizing forces (on the limitations of these institutions, see Harris, 
1992). What must be resolved is whether capitalism is compatible with• the 
principles of ecological sustainability. Arguments presented thus far suggest that 
ecological modernization approaches can only constitute an interim phase in social 
transformation and that adoption of sustainable modes of production/consumption 
will involve much more than the simple restructuring of industry. It will mean 
radical societal transformation and a radical reorientation of societal objectives. The 
challenge is how to achieve this degree of social change while limiting social, 
economic and ecological disruption, a dilemma which I shall address in due course. 
5.5.2: Reorienting Sustainability 
With capital in crisis once again, it is timely to revisit Marx on the question of 
social alternatives, namely the reminder that capital accumulation through the pursuit 
of surplus value is not the only or an eternal social form. Consideration can then be 
given to alternative social imperatives and alternative stores of value. As yet 
theorizing about such system currencies remains tentative, although critics are quite 
clear on what cannot be valued by the free market. Michael Redclift (1992, 41) 
suggests that these stores of value might be founded on the "conservation of the stock 
of natural capital, not the generation of income flows at the cost of natural capital 
stocks", while the stock of social capital might also assume greater importance where 
surplus value is not the primary objective. Relatedly, O'Riordan and Voisey (1997, 
3) envisage that wellbeing may well be the currency of the future, overriding 
efficiency, and that wellbeing could constitute the object of development rather than 
the increasing throughput of energy and materials. Under a sustainability schema, the 
repository of value lies not in the production of surplus but in use-value or, as 
Redclift (1992, 41) prefers, utilization value, which expresses "the value of a product 
throughout its life, rather than at one moment. ...Utilization values should provide 
the signals for market activity, not ephemeral market prices". An economy founded 
on use-value is one oriented to meeting real needs, not manufactured wants. Non-
monetary values, such as those produced in the informal economy by domestic and 
voluntary work, can then be assigned some value, while activities such as waste 
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recycling and minimization become generalized objects of policy rather than optional 
extras. 
5.5.3:  Localization and Agency 
The transition to sustainable modes of social regulation has so far been 
characterized by the absence of "an intrinsic policy focus" in the direction of 
"economic durability, precautionary stewardship and citizen empowerment as a 
unifying transitional engine" (O'Riordan and Voisey, 1997, 13). O'Riordan and 
Voisey's assessment of progress towards sustainability is that the institutional 
response is only "embryonically discernible". They also discern in the politics of the 
sustainability transition a tension between homogenizing globalization forces and the 
cultural heterogeneity being promoted through the development of local self-reliance. 
The forces of global competition and free trade, reinforced by deregulation and 
privatization of formerly state responsibilities - utilities, social services and so on - 
are at odds with movements to protest the contraction of local services, to defend 
local environments and cultural heritage, for self-help - like Local Employment 
Initiative schemes and formalized barter arrangements - largely because such groups 
have lost faith in the capacity of governments and the formal economy to provide for 
their needs. The emergence of ultra conservative political groupings also reflects the 
conflict between these two sets of forces. 
It is in the competitive globalization/empowering localization tension that 
O'Riordan and Voisey (1997, 20) perceive possibilities for "serious institutional 
innovation". Although prospects at the global level are only dimly beheld, "there is 
evidence of the beginning of a serious effort at local governance in the form of 
environmental fora which are involving people and interests in a common vision of 
local areas, and the mobilization of local groups and people to work towards 
achieving these visions" (O'Riordan and Voisey, 1997, 20). Dryzek's (1996b, 44) 
reasoning behind this phenomenon is that there is potential for institutional 
innovation at the local level where the imperatives of the state in ensuring the 
conditions of production are less urgent. What is radical about these groups is that, 
although they are often established to manage local resources for economic 
objectives, because they must include all stakeholders, issues other than purely 
resource management issues are inevitably raised with the result that questions of 
community wellbeing - social amenity, equity (in the distribution of environmental 
bads and goods), local economic viability and political possibility - are being 
integrated with issues of ecological wellbeing. 
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Paradoxically, it is the contraction of central governments in response to 
declining taxation receipts reinforced by the ideology and policies of economic 
fundamentalism, that ushers in potential opportunities for local community 
empowerment and citizen activism. The integration of environmental, social, 
economic and political objectives through environmental fora, such as catchment 
management groups and natural areas protection groups, embodies the possibility of 
real change in norms, values and attitudes and consequently in practices. Such groups 
have the potential to be influential sites of the social environmental learning that is a 
necessary precursor to the modification of values and habits appropriate for 
ecologically sustainable societies. The good citizen in this society will possess a 
degree of environmental literacy or what David On (1992, 92) calls "the knowledge 
necessary to comprehend relatedness", together with a precautionary attitude of 
care/stewardship and practical competence deriving from involvement in activism for 
local environmental protection and community-building. 
So far the discussion has focussed predominantly on structural aspects of 
sustainability. Although regulation allows for a limited degree of agency, it is largely 
concerned with structural constraints in the postponement of crisis. A radical 
ecopraxis also requires an understanding of both the potential and limits of human 
agency, because as Redclift (1992, 42) concludes: 
The tortuous road towards greater global responsibility for 
environmental change ... is likely to be built upon the daily lives of 
human subjects, and the recognition that these lives involve choices 
of global proportions. 
Theories of agency, such as Giddens's (1984) theory of the structuration of 
society and Sztompka's (1990) model of social self-transformation are concerned to 
delimit the potential of agency in terms of constraining and enabling factors, the 
characteristics of actors and opportunities for action. The latter's model is especially 
relevant to the design of institutions which can promote sustainable rather than 
unsustainable practices, because Sztompka is interested in delimiting precisely those 
traits of agency consistent with social progress. His framework takes into account 
(1) the characteristics of actors - their capacity for creativity and innovation and so 
on-which impact on the quality of agency; (2) the characteristics of structures - 
whether pluralistic, heterogeneous, complex and so on - which dictate whether there 
is richness or paucity of options; (3) the characteristics of the natural environment - 
whether harsh or benign; (4) the characteristics of tradition - whether there is respect 
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or wholesale rejection; and (5) the characteristics of the expected future - whether 
expectations are marked by hope and optimism or despair and pessimism. What is 
attractive about the model is that it can be both place and time specific. It can apply 
to any group of actors at any time and however these characteristics combine for 
different groups of actors will influence desired outcomes in different ways. It 
allows for a plurality of different responses to the sustainability imperative, 
dependent upon prevailing constraints and opportunities. It can also be used to 
highlight deficiencies of agency and institutional limitations which may need to be 
addressed in planning for sustainability, for it is clear from the model that agency will 
only be progressive when motivations for action coincide with opportunities 
(Sztompka, 1990, 257). It is important therefore to consider the limits as well as the 
potential of human agency (Drummond and Marsden, 1995, 53). 
Depictions of agents in liberal societies are not at all conducive to the needs 
of sustainability. Throughout modern history, critics from Marx (1964) to Marcuse 
(1964) have expressed a concern for the unidimensionality of the modern individual. 
Particular deficiencies have also been recognized. Thus On (1994, 51) thinks that 
modern ways of thinking encourage cleverness at the expense of intelligence; Daly 
and Cobb (1989) and Mulgan (1997) lament the loss of moral competency; while 
Dryzek (1996b) is concerned about the narrowness of the self-serving individual, the 
rational egoist, promoted by prevailing economic rationalist policies and the 
implications for democratic politics. These inadequacies have been blamed on the 
"mental apartheid" approach initiated by Descartes (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996, 
134). 
The point is that the calibre of agency has been greatly circumscribed in 
modern times, linked as previously noted to the loss of habitat. More particularly, 
On (1994) contends that the homogenization of nature is undermining human 
intelligence and, indeed, that sanity is dependent on biological health. Similar 
arguments had been presented two decades earlier by Geoffrey Bateson (1972), by 
Felix Guattari (cited in Conley, 1997) and by Theodore Roszak (1981). The lesson to 
be drawn here is that the character of institutions and the health of biological 
contextualities bear directly on the quality of agency as well as framing opportunities 
for action. The design and redesign of institutions for sustainability must therefore 
account for these deficiencies of agency while encouraging norms of responsible 
stewardship and providing opportunities for learning and civic engagement. 
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5.5.4: Reorienting Consumption Norms 
Consumption norms, it is recognized (Drummond and Marsden, 1995, 61), 
are heavily implicated in the cycles of environmental decline and generational 
inequity. They are reinforced by an individualistic philosophy which is probably 
more relevant to attempts to modify over-collectivized, totalitarian societies than it is 
to the societies which have already achieved high degrees of individual autonomy 
(Etzioni, 1996, 38). Addressing the problem of overconsumption is not to drop out 
of society and repair to a commune as the counterculturalists of the 1960s did, 
leaving mainstream values and practices largely untouched. Etzioni (1996, 83-84) 
thinks that the problems of throughput and overconsumption and the concomitant 
differentials in the provision of basic needs are better addressed in ways compatible 
with a modern economy if the affluent societies were to embrace sources of 
satisfaction that are not resource intensive at the same time as they adopted forms of 
voluntary simplicity. Consumption would then be limited to those goods which meet 
true needs, while "status goods" (fashion fads and latest technologies) would be 
largely eschewed. Such a movement could be expected to exert far-reaching and 
positive consequences for some of the planet's seemingly intractable problems and 
the dysfunctions of modern life. It would free up resources now appropriated by the 
affluent nations through their greater purchasing power to meet the needs of the less 
advantaged of the world's communities. In addition, for those in the First World, 
who must expend inordinate amounts of time on work for the purposes of 
acquisition, more satisfying activities based around self, family and community 
would then be possible. A movement such as this could be an antidote to the 
narrowly self-interested, economically rational consumer promoted by the neoliberal 
agenda. Status would reside in the extent of one's contribution to community 
wellbeing, defined by a wide range of social and environmental indicators (see the 
various contributions relating to this aspect in Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992) rather than 
in economic stature. The resultant societies would be more secure, because, as 
Etzioni (1996, 84) observes, "social basics are easier to secure than a consumerist 
way of life". 
There are embryonic indicators of such a value change in the growth of what 
Luke and White (1985, 44) refer to as "exurban communities", reflecting a 
"developing interest in the pace, aesthetics, and stability of rural life". Hopefully, the 
frugality characteristic of rural peoples will also be adopted. Etzioni (1996, 84) notes 
the adoption of a moderate version of the voluntary simplicity/other satisfactions 
mode by urban-based professionals and academics in increased attention to sport and 
219 
exercise as palliatives for the stresses and psychic disturbances of high-powered work 
environments. Recently, too, media attention has focussed on the number of women 
who have begun to eschew corporate executive success in order to concentrate on 
family and community. Notwithstanding these nascent indications, the task will be to 
ensure that voluntary simplicity becomes established as a shared core value 
underlying pluralistic conceptions of the good life in all societies aspiring to 
sustainability. 
5.5.5: Autonomy and Creativity 
A programme of praxis, with sustainability as its regulative ideal, 
should be grounded in an understanding of the prospects for responsible autonomous 
development in the context of the autonomous flourishing of all life. It should be 
able to raise to consciousness an appreciation of both the blockages to and the 
possibilities of agency prior to responsible action for the removal of those constraints 
on human capacity. I interpret autonomy, as the key objective of agency, as being in 
command of the opportunities and conditions of creative self-development. 
Autonomy is thus not synonymous with just individual freedom, but also 
encompasses "the needs for self-expression, innovation, creativity and self-
government" (Etzioni, 1996, 24). Creativity and innovation are the capacities most in 
need at this time of civilizational change and, unlike individual freedom, they are the 
components of autonomy most in short supply. Before I consider impediments to 
creativity, I should discuss blockages to autonomous action generally. 
Blockages to autonomous development can be said to be synonymous with 
the loss of capacity for responsible action. Capitalism, as the dominant social form, 
is deeply implicated in the erection of impediments to autonomy. Castoriadis (1992, 
20) places "the unlimited expansion of 'rational mastery' of the capitalist project" 
behind the weakening of the critique of reason and creativity's subordination to 
certainty for the "complete atrophy of political imagination". This condition is 
reinforced by the deregulation/privatization/depolitization policies of the neoliberal 
discourse, itself responsible for a "widespread and rising collective amnesia". 
Moreover, its instrumental rationality distorts self-development by limiting the range 
of acceptable and valued human activities to those which are profitable (Berman, 
1988, 96, 94). Berman (1988, 93) ironically observes that, although capitalism 
encourages a frenetic activism, its actors are closed off from "its richest 
possibilities": 
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[Its] "desperate dynamism ... destroys the human possibilities that it 
creates. ... It fosters ... self-development for everybody, but people 
can develop only in restricted and distorted ways. ... [E]verything 
non marketable gets draconically repressed, or withers away from 
lack of use, or never has a chance to come to life at all" (Berman, 
1988, 96). 
The value of communal ties, for example, does not rate in market economies. But, 
paradoxically, autonomy is threatened by the loosening of these binding ties, 
promoted by atomising market forces (see Chapter 3.5.4). Communitarians such as 
Etzioni (1996, 26) argue that the "social fabric sustains, nourishes and enables 
individuality rather than diminishes it". Indeed, sociability is crucial in the building 
of moral competency in the individual. With the dissolution of the social fabric, a 
phenomenon common to many western societies, sociability declines and with it 
human moral potential and consequently the capacity for responsible action: "The 
greatest danger to autonomy arises when the social moorings of individuals are 
severed" (Etzioni, 1996, 26-27). Atomization invites totalitarianism, or at least 
anomie, alienation, withdrawal, and antisocial behaviour, not individual liberty as 
promised by free market proponents. 
A further assault on autonomous capacity is to be found in the explosion of 
electronic innovation in the last several decades, resulting in the electronic 
compression of space and time (Harvey, 1989; Virilio, cited in Conley, 1997). 
"Electronic dazzle", so called by Virilio, ensures temporal and spatial disconnection 
and a "blindness to the 'real' (p.84). Movement is dominated by the speed of light 
via the medium of electronic technology with the result that sensory faculties become 
dulled, distance annulled and the various scales of time - seasonal, tidal, ecological 
and geological - ignored. Time is focussed on the present alone and humans become 
disconnected from a sense of the past and the future. According to Virilio, it is 
electronic dazzle and its disconnections which blind humans to persistent ecological 
problems-naturally in climatic upheavals and socially in civil unrest, ethnic strife and 
collapsing nation-states (Conley, 1997, 84). These manifestations of social crisis are, 
in fact, blind responses to disconnection rather than the reasoned recognition of their 
true origins. The loss of natural knowledge combined with enfeebled sensory 
faculties is thus heavily implicated in a depleted capacity for responsible action in 
attending to obvious problems. 
While human autonomy generally is blocked, the quality of autonomy that is 
of most concern is creativity, because it is that quality which is most in need at this 
time of crisis. If humans are to have some measure of autonomy, they will need a 
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clear understanding of impediments to the creative function. That creativity and 
novelty are integral both to human freedom and to evolutionary processes and that 
human freedom cannot be conceived independently of the latter is the conclusion 
reached by Fritoj Capra (1998, 12-13) in his review of Ilya Prigogine's reformulation 
of classical physics. Prigogine's new dynamics solves the long-standing 
contradiction between the reversibility notions of classical Newtonian mechanics and 
the irreversibility theorems of the second law of thermodynamics. In so doing, Capra 
claims, Prigogine "unifies our understanding of several key characteristics of the 
world in which we live: the evolutionary nature of reality (the arrow of time), the 
diversity of the living world, the continual emergence of novelty, and the human 
experience of creativity and freedom" (Capra, 1998, 13). If Capra's reading is 
correct, both human freedom and ecological sustainability are dependent on 
dissolving contemporary blockages to creativity. 
These blockages are implicit in dominant modern social forms and their 
validating rationalities. Hans Joas (1990, 186), for example, credits progressive 
philosophies of history with effecting a "dichotomy between rational, e.g. utility-
oriented, and normatively-oriented modes of action, making the creative dimension 
of action inconceivable". Dryzek (1990, 5) similarly argues that instrumental 
rationality bifurcates the creativity/freedom linkage by furnishing the power and 
technology to create the material conditions of human freedom, but paradoxically 
suppressing the playfulness and creativity needed for humans to realize that freedom. 
Blockages to creativity have been traced by John Maguire (1996) to a fear of 
the creative dimension and the caution which is a necessary consequence. Although 
Maguire does not explain it as such, I locate the origin of a fear such as this in the 
need to control the irrational, the wild and the emotional, the same need which 
prompted the early modems to opt for stability and certainty and thus to valorize 
instrumental rationality. This pervasive fear of modern life, figuring as problems as 
diverse as domestic abuse to global ecological problems, has crippling implications 
for responses to both social problems and ecological threats. Fear and caution 
account for our seeming inability to care for ourselves, others and the environment; 
for our apparent incapacity to respond to unequivocal danger signals; or to make use 
of the huge banks of data on poverty, inequality, the debt crisis or ecological threats 
in order to address the incongruities and absurdities of modem life; for our 
acceptance of disaster and catastrophe, including episodes of spontaneous violence, 
as abnormal events rather than the normal reflection of the absurdities of the modern 
condition; and consequently for our inability to act constructively. Paradoxically, it 
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also accounts for the overconfidence of our leaders and for the evasion of 
responsibility which has characterized the modern age. This "emotional illiteracy" 
(Maguire, 1996, 176) is a factor which must be accounted for in ecological policy 
efforts. 
Notwithstanding the impediments to creativity outlined above, the present 
crisis in the belief in progress (discussed in Chapter 1.5.2) represents an opportunity 
for the "new connection of responsible action to progress" (Joas, 1990, 185) through 
the "emergence of novelty". Indeed Anne Buttimer (1993, 214) observes that 
creative or Phoenix periods (see pp. 41-45) in western intellectual history have 
generally been contiguous with periods of transcendence of constraining structures 
following on critically reflective, Narcissistic phases in search of "new levels of 
understanding humanity and its terrrestrial home", driven by the need to "solve 
problems and improve the human condition" (p.65). That modern life appears to be 
beset with seemingly intractable problems and irreconcilable contradictions, and is 
now subject to a chorus of critique from postmoderns, environmentalists and ultra-
conservatives alike, is indisputable, but, as yet, indicators for a transcendence of the 
productivist model are little more than embryonic. 
If creativity is to be integral to ecopraxis, there is needed some understanding 
of the conditions under which the creative impulse is likely to flourish. But firstly, 
some attention should be given to how the flourishing of creativity can coincide with 
responsible action. In this respect, Joas (1990, 188-189) utilizes the typology of 
creativity defined by Abraham Maslow, who delineated primary creativity, involving 
"the release of 'primary processes' of fantasy and imagination, of the playful and 
enthusiastic" from secondary creativity, "the rational production of something 'new' 
in the world, be it technical or scientific". Under ideal circumstances these two types 
of creativity are amalgamated to become 'integrated creativity'. Joas (1990, 188) 
contends that modern progress has released secondary creativity as technological and 
economic improvement in abundance but that evidence of growing dissatisfaction 
with the failure to progress other sectors of society presents us with two alternatives. 
The first option is an irrational retreat to primary creativity through Romanticism or 
Fascism, or alternatively, an integration of the two aspects, which would lead to a 
"higher form of action ... not indifferent towards the normative evaluation of the 
products of creativity" (p.188-189). As it is now, secondary creativity aligned with 
instrumental rationality ensures material abundance for some, but lacks the steering 
capacity of primary creativity's normative dimension to align production with real 
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needs or to guide the uses to which its products are applied (see Berman, 1988, 27-28 
and Poole, 1991, 30-31 on the destructive creativity of capitalism). 
Having established that responsibility is integral to true creativity, what is 
now needed is some conception of the conditions under which creativity may 
flourish. In opposition to conditions of closure, stability and control, the relevant 
state is more likely to be characterized by openness, flexibility and diversity, which 
also constitute the characteristics of viable ecological systems. In relationships 
between social and natural systems, this will mean that, because ecosystems' signals 
constantly change, communities must have the capacity to adapt to changing signals. 
To be adaptive, communities must have forms of organization which are open to new 
interpretations, new types of signals, and open to changing their organizations in 
order to respond effectively (Norgaard, 1994, 166). Creativity is thus dependent 
upon the recognition of ecological embodiment (Maguire, 1996, 186). Moreover, as 
Mulgan (1997, 36), in his optimistic account of a connected world, concludes, the 
"capacity to innovate or create depends on dissonant and complementary ways of 
thinking, not on consensus". 
Having identified the conditions under which creativity is likely to flourish, 
where we may search for creative potential should also be determined. In particular 
it is the potential for "integrated creativity", which must be identified and fostered. 
Romand Coles (1992) draws on the notion of ecotones or 'edge effects' to illuminate 
creative possibilities. In ecology, edges, as the "intersection between differently 
constituted regions" (p.1), are zones pregnant with evolutionary potential. Our 
civilization, Coles contends, has essentially attempted to eliminate edges by 
obliterating difference via the totality of Reason, or at least places little value in 
them. He posits potential richness and creative freedom in these areas of intersecting 
differences. It is this innovative potential that Dryzek (1996b, 47-53) recognizes in 
the interaction between the state and new social movements. The latters' freedom 
from the imperatives conditioning state action allows them a degree of autonomy, 
which further permits them to experiment with democracy in different forms. For 
these oppositional movements, "institutional innovation is always on the agenda [and 
as] their own identity is always in the process of recreation, concepts such as 
autonomy, freedom and democracy can come to be defined in new ways" (Dryzek, 
1996b, 52). They therefore represent the most obvious sites of creative potential with 
their non-instrumental rationalities and democratic organizational innovations. 
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Secondly, as integrated creativity is a characteristic of collective (not 
individual) action, attention to blockages has to be focussed at the level of systems. 
It is the absurdities of modern existence which can be used as reference points to the 
systemic blockage of responsible creative action. Thus spontaneous violence and its 
numerous manifestations - abuse of women and other species, youth suicide, serial 
killings, and massacres - all of which are suggestive of moral regression and 
communal dissolution, constitutes one starting-point where communities might 
"discover or create ways of life which challenge the rationalized structures of 
mainstream social life" (Poole, 1991, 151). The essential criterion for any such 
movement is that it be forward-looking, not harking back to some mythical golden 
past. 
5.5.6: Sustainability and Ecological Competency 
Having earlier outlined the deficiencies of agency, I now address the qualities 
or competencies which might be required for an individual to live responsibly and 
well on a finite planet. I have alluded to the connections between the loss of moral 
fluency, the loss of natural knowledge and enfeebled sensory faculties, while others 
(Orr, 1992; 1994) lament the erosion of a vibrant civic culture, and indeed, directly 
link the decline of civility and citizenship to environmental decline (Leopold, 1949; 
On, 1994). In this section I discuss the relationship between ecological sustainability 
and a viable civic culture and why ecological modernization as a technical-
institutional fix will do little to further responsible citizenship. 
The argument centres around the contention that healthy, sustainable 
communities require their citizens to be not just democratically literate but 
ecologically literate as well. David On (1992; 1994) is the theorist who has done 
most to develop the notion of 'ecological literacy', prefigured in Aldo Leopold's 'land 
ethic', where Homo sapiens assumes the function of "plain member and citizen" of 
the land-community. It is the land-community to which respect is owed as well as to 
fellow members of it (Leopold, 1949, 204). Leopold had bemoaned the failure of 
education to foster an understanding of ecology and the tendency of modern urban 
lifestyles to disengage citizens from ecological processes (Leopold, 1949, 223-224). 
Briefly, ecological literacy may be defined as "rooted knowledge" (Prakash, 
1995, 10) which encompasses the theoretical/practical, moral and aesthetic 
dimensions of the experience of responsible dwelling. It is an understanding derived 
from a knowledge of and attachment to particular natural localities. It is an 
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understanding borne of the acknowledgement of the existence and interests of other 
entities, and of "patient disciplined study of the natural world" (Orr, 1992, 90-91). It 
requires an ability to think broadly, "a breadth of experience with healthy natural 
landscapes", a capacity for aesthetic appreciation and a sense of responsibility for the 
other (Orr, 1992, 87). The development of these competencies is obstructed, firstly, 
by specialization, secondly, by confining learning to written texts and desks, thirdly, 
by acceptance of ugliness as normality, and fourthly, by the encouragement of 
modem institutions to evade responsibility. 
It has been argued that ecological literacy is a precondition for sustainability 
(Orr, 1992). An ecologically literate population with an understanding of the 
environmental facts of energy, resources, land, water and wildlife is a precondition 
for wise public choice. The intimate knowledge of landscapes is also crucial to good 
thinking and development of the capacity to discern healthy from unhealthy natural 
systems (Prakash, 1995) and is in turn critical to development of the capacity to 
critique the absurdities which result from misuse of those landscapes. 
The most pressing and obvious reason to improve environmental literacy is to 
avoid the production of further risks. Late modem society is beset with 
environmental risk, largely, as earlier discussed, produced out of ignorance and often 
resulting from the best intentions of scientific and technological endeavour. The 
problem of experts and specialization now makes specific novel demands on the 
literate citizen with respect to environmental policy debates. It is impossible for 
citizens to fully grasp the scientific/technical merits of any development proposal. 
What is additionally required of the ecologically literate citizen under these 
circumstances is "familiarity with the social processes that accompany most 
environmental issues" (Schneider, 1997, 457). This implies familiarity with policy-
making processes and the capacity to ask questions of a normative nature to do with 
possible outcomes, risk and justification. The skill needed is an evaluative skill to 
assist in assessing the relative merits of scientific claims and development proposals. 
It has also been suggested that participants in ecological issues will also need to be 
educated about the relationship between environmentalism and political values 
(Press, 1994, 110). 
However, wise public choice is dependent not only on ecologically literate 
individuals. It is also, as suggested by John Dryzek (1997, 198), related to 
institutions and discourses which have the "capacity to facilitate and engage in social 
learning in an ecological context". The requirement that institutions should be able 
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to assess their own shortcomings (that is, be critically reflective) becomes more and 
more urgent as the intensifying interaction between social and natural systems 
generates higher and higher degrees of uncertainty and complexity. Such a capacity 
is likely to be encouraged by the strong sustainability discourse, which contains a 
potent reflective element; that is, it is self-monitoring and self-critical and therefore 
conducive to social environmental learning (Dryzek, 1997, 199; Jacobs, 1995a). 
The corollary of this conclusion is that any programme which seeks to 
respond to ecological limits purely through technological adjustment lacks the 
necessary normative capacity to address the inevitable limits on throughput and waste 
production or questions of equity which remain outstanding (Christoff, 1996, 481). 
The technical fix approach of ecological modernization also assumes that social, 
political and economic life can continue as usual. In behaving thus "it completely 
underplays the civic and moral education of modern publics. It ignores the necessity 
of teaching the communal skills to live and learn again in ecologically literate and 
morally responsible communities" (Prakash, 1995, 4). 
Even more crucially, ecological modernization allows modern societies to go 
on avoiding responsibility, to avoid facing up to the reality that we are responsible for 
our ecological dilemma. It allows us to go on pretending that we are "beyond the 
laws of ecology, thermodynamics or even morality" (On, 1992, 139). In addition, 
being obsessed with the "hardware of sustainability" has meant that little attention 
has been paid to the "software of sustainability", on the characteristics of the people 
who will be needed in the arduous process of building sustainable societies (Orr, 
1992, 139). As the ecological crisis is clearly not only a technical problem but also a 
challenge to existing modes of learning, working and dwelling, the transition to 
sustainability will make quite specific demands of individuals and of institutions. It 
is my contention that those skills and virtues can only be fostered within a viable 
civic culture and that the good or virtuous citizen must necessarily also be an 
ecologically literate one. 
Real or authentic citizenship - so called by On (1994, 124) - is both political 
and ecological. The notion of citizenship in liberal democracies is a debased one 
with limited expectations exerted on citizens - to pay one's taxes, obey the law, and to 
vote periodically. The declining rates of voter turnout in constituencies where voting 
is not compulsory suggests that voters no longer take their citizenship rights 
seriously. On (1994, 124) reasons that dependence on technology as an escape from 
ecological responsibility has been a factor in cheapening citizenship, because it has 
227 
absolved citizens from the need to exercise moral judgement in matters of the public 
good. The decline in this facility has been further compounded by the mindset of life 
as lottery; that what one gets out of life is "only a matter of luck, chicanery, or 
happenstance, not hard work, skill and obligation" (On, 1994, 124) One takes what 
one can get; one is not required to give. The result is that few citizens in western 
democracies are prepared to make the sacrifices necessary for resources currently 
consumed in excess in the affluent countries to be transferred to satisfy the basic 
needs of those in the Third World, nor are they prepared to contemplate the full costs 
of consumption-oriented lifestyles, either for global equity or for ecological health. 
Much of the blame for our ecological dilemma is laid by On (1992) on the dominant 
systems of knowledge/education, because in neglecting to teach those in their care to 
be caring stewards of the earth and its inhabitants, they have failed to impart either a 
sense of civic/moral responsibility (Prakash, 1995, 13) or to build ecological 
awareness. 
By analysing the deficiencies of citizenship in relation to the sustainable 
organization of democracies, we have developed some idea of what will be required 
of the environmentally literate citizen and the kind of polity which is likely to foster 
those particular qualities. The ecologically literate citizen will have, as Brennan 
(1994, 5) suggests, firstly, "a blend of ecological sensitivity", fostered by institutions 
and developed through practical experience in natural environments; secondly, an 
"informed awareness of natural processes" and of what might constitute 
environmentally benign or detrimental actions; and, thirdly, a "moral maturity", 
developed and fostered by active participation in authentic democratic discussion 
(Dryzek, 1997, 199). It is only through such participatory processes that citizens can 
fashion the normative/evaluative skills which Schneider (1997) argues are necessary 
for the assessment of competing scientific/technical claims. 
As authentic citizenship can be grounded only in particular places, so neither 
can the authentic polity be an abstract arena of discussion. Politics, too, has to be 
rooted in particular places. Daniel Kemmis (1990, 41) argues for a politics and civic 
life that fits the places we inhabit: 
If in fact there is a connection between the places we inhabit and 
the political culture which our inhabiting of them produces, then 
perhaps it makes sense to begin with the place, with a sense of what 
it is, and then try to imagine a way of being public which would fit 
the place. 
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The story of modern existence is the surrender of control and responsiblity of large 
parts of our lives to distant centres of power with its associated dependence. 
Economic and political concentration is not conducive• to vital communities or 
healthy democracy. That voter apathy is appearing simultaneously with a 
diminishing sense of place and the disappearance of community-scale economies is 
no mere coincidence (Orr, 1994, 168). Viable democracy will depend, in large 
measure, on citizens reclaiming responsibility for public decision-making. 
5.6: Social Environmental Learning 
Throughout the discussion, several allusions to social environmental learning 
in processes of sustainable development have been made. Social environmental 
learning has its roots in the social learning paradigm and it is therefore appropriate to 
canvass the relevance of the paradigm for a praxis of social reconstruction with 
ecological sustainability as its objective. According to John Friedman (1987, 406), 
social learning is "the theory of knowledge underlying radical practice [where] action 
is always primary. ... The imperative of action always has priority over the equal 
imperative of knowing". Its theoretical origins are located, firstly, in the pragmatism 
of John Dewey and its epistemological tenet of 'learning by doing' and, secondly, in 
the basic Marxist proposition concerning the unity of thought and action, that is, 
appropriate praxis. Social learning, it is argued, is the most fitting epistemology in 
an era of multiple crises where all previous certainties are being undermined, since 
"only an epistemology ... based on the unity of practice and transformative theory 
within the context of a continuing process of action and inquiry can give us grounds 
for hope" (Friedmann, 1987, 416). 
The central concerns of the social learning paradigm are instrumental ones 
which make it particularly congenial to programmes of transformative action. These 
include (1) how to make use of social learning processes to effect social change; (2) 
how to motivate reluctant actors to modify their values and ideologies; (3) how to 
connect expert knowledge with local or informally acquired knowledge for change-
oriented action; (4) how to facilitate relations of trust between professional experts 
and non-professional actors; and (5) how social learning relates to democratic theory 
and therefore how it can facilitate personal autonomous actualization. Because social 
learning is concerned with process rather than static relationships, it is a most 
appropriate paradigm for understanding change in highly dynamic social systems. 
Parson and Clark (1995, 430) proffer the hope that "learning about long-term social 
learning processes may help some agents better understand how to play a 
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constructive role or may suggest ways of structuring institutions, organizations or 
negotiations to make effective learning more likely". 
One of the most impelling reasons for having recourse to the social learning 
paradigm is for precisely those reasons we are now beset with crises, namely the 
failure of conventional theoretical and semantic frameworks in addressing our 
present circumstances. The task will be to learn new ways of thinking and modes of 
language which supercede the familiarity and certainty occasioned by models 
premised on linearity, simple cause and effect, and the atomism of events, places and 
ideas. The new ways will be more appropriate to a "reality of systemic interactions, 
circular feedback processes, nonlinearity, or multiple causation and outcomes" 
(Michael, 1995, 463). Because social learning is a recursive model of thought and 
action or, as Friedman (1987, 304) says, "it feeds on its own practice", it is 
particularly suited to conditions of strangeness and unpredictability, where learning 
must be a continuous process. Under conditions of relative certainty and social 
stability, it is enough for the learner to know the right answer or to master particular 
bodies of knowledge. Under conditions of rapid change, learning must be an 
ongoing process involving the development of capacities for reperception, 
evaluation, implementation, and openness to continual revision (Michael, 1995, 464). 
Sustainability and the conditions which have initiated a concern for 
development to be sustainable, namely the inadequacy of established myths, norms, 
values and practices, raise novel questions about the 'long term' and the 'larger 
interest', which existing thought and action frameworks, adjusted to atomistic and 
pluralistic social arrangements, are ill-suited to address. As Michael (1995, 465) 
remarks, "humans have had much more experience (ie., learning) in attaining and 
maintaining diversity than in creating systems integrated across boundaries". In spite 
of the emergence of obvious interdependencies, the conventional myths, norms and 
values, which provide feedback to regulate social processes, remain locked into 
atomistic and individualistic thought frameworks, so that emerging tensions between 
individual rights and communal wellbeing are not interpreted as they should be, as 
signals of fundamental societal dysfunction. Thus acknowledgement of ecological 
limits on production is approached, not as a problem of social/ecological dysfunction, 
but as a technical problem, which can be overcome through efficiency improvements 
and technological innovation. Sustainability requires recognition of the systemic and 
dynamic nature of the interconnections between economic production, human ethical 
and belief systems, and ecological processes. Work reviewed by Michael (1995, 
468ff.) outlines constraints of a socio-cultural, cognitive and emotional nature, which 
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may act to obstruct desirable normative and behavioural transformation. However 
these same constraints offer opportunities for learning to perceive and act differently 
and to create new ways of being in the world (Michael, 1995, 474ff.) 
A number of authors have concluded that social transformation is unlikely to 
originate in the state or in the private economic sphere (Dobson, 1996; Dryzek, 
1996b; Friedmann, 1987) and have consequently looked to civil society for possible 
agents of change. If civil society is to be the site of transformative learning and 
practice, the social learning paradigm, with its emphasis on "dialogic processes, non-
hierarchical relations, a commitment to experimentalism, tolerance for differences, 
and radical openness to communication" (Friedmann, 1987, 82), represents a 
theoretical resource which is particularly congruent with a programme of 
restructuring for sustainability. Radical sustainability, it was argued, is premised on 
democratic participation, bottom-up in preference to top-down decision-making 
processes, egalitarian and equitable relations with existing and future generations and 
other species, and the inclusion of local as well as scientific knowledges. There are 
thus numerous points of intersection between the social learning and sustainability 
paradigms, although the problem of long time scales is a novel one for social learning 
and may necessitate further development of the latter's evaluative elements to cater 
for this imperative. Certainly a prerequisite is a thorough understanding of 
evolutionary and ecosystem processes. Indeed, Parson and Clark (1995, 428-9) 
perceive social learning as the theory of social dynamics which can "complement the 
emerging theories of ecosystem dynamics to produce real understanding of the long-
term, large-scale interactions of environment and development". 
So far I have been concerned to demonstrate the congeniality of the social 
learning paradigm to a praxis of sustainability. As social learning is informed by a 
number of disciplines, it represents a considerable theoretical resource for policy-
makers and educators who would seek to structure appropriate conditions for social 
environmental learning. It is its possibilities in this respect that I wish to explore. 
Some theorists of ecological change subscribe to the view that attitudes and 
behaviours can be modified by simply raising awareness of issues (see Pepper, 1996 
on idealist versus materialist approaches). Social learning reveals this to be a naïve 
stance, for attitudinal and behavioural change are extremely complex processes. 
They are constrained by any number of factors (Michael, 1995, 468ff.) and made 
even more difficult under conditions of novelty and unpredictability. This is 
especially so with sustainability, which demands the radical cognitive and affective- 
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behavioural reconstruction (Friedmann, 1987, 186) of deeply-held world views and 
their associated entrenched habits and routines (Parson and Clark, 1995, 440). 
Moreover, contrary to the conventional understanding, cognitive dissonance 
theory demonstrates that attitudes do not necessarily determine behaviours (Parson 
and Clark, 1995, 434). In fact, behaviours can influence actors to adopt different 
belief systems. There are obvious implications here for the structuring of sustainable 
practices. For example, the provision of recycling facilities by local authorities could 
theoretically influence residents to ultimately modify their consumption values and to 
voluntarily adopt other sustainable practices, such as composting household waste, 
reusing waste water, or indeed reducing waste overall. 
Notwithstanding the reconstruction of individual values, norms and practices 
as a critical component of sustainability, a companion prerequisite is the redirection 
of collective goals. Friedman (1987, 187) supposes that such a redirection "may 
involve a long and painful process of "double-loop" learning", so called because it 
requires more than a "simple change in tactics or strategy ... to solve a given 
problem". It entails an "adjustment of the norms governing the action process and, 
specifically, a change in the actor's theory of reality, values, and beliefs". Such a 
major cognitive restructuring would have radical implications for the society-nature 
dichotomy, development and progress myths, production and consumption norms, 
and the patriarchal relations on which the social production of industrial society is 
presently founded. 
If there is one area in which the social learning paradigm is inadequate with 
respect to sustainability it is that research has so far largely been confined to 
individual and organizational learning processes. As the novel components of 
sustainability are the long term and the communal good, collective learning processes 
also need to be addressed, especially the processes which lead to the formation and 
dissolution of collective norms and values. Parson and Clark (1995) have reviewed 
the application of evolutionary models to learning on the basis that they are both 
dynamic processes. Evolutionary concepts have been applied to ideas and 
behaviours at both the individual and organizational learning levels in order to 
explain processes of adoption, propagation and stability of novel ideas and values, 
although, as they note, "existing work in this area scarcely goes beyond provocative 
analogy" (Parson and Clark, 1995, 57). They conclude that the applicability of the 
various constituent concepts of evolutionary theory - origination of variation, 
propagation, selection, speciation, and species stability - needs more thorough 
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investigation. Nevertheless, there are some general conclusions that can be made 
using the evolutionary analogy, namely that any "presently ascendant ideology or 
thought system" necessarily has a provisional character to it and that in any pluralistic 
society there will be small populations of marginal ideas, which, as they persist in the 
face of unfavourable conditions, represent an "important reservoir of cognitive 
variability that can increase society's resilience to extreme environmental change" 
(Parson and Clark, 1995, 454). 
In summary then, this section has attempted to flesh out the utility of the 
social learning paradigm for a praxis of sustainability. It is argued to be a most 
appropriate thought framework for conditions of emerging systemic effects, circular 
feedback and multiple cause and effect, the conditions responsible for 
unpredictability and uncertainty. As a dynamic process, it can further understanding 
of the dynamic interaction of social and natural systems, thereby facilitating 
processes of social environmental learning, which are crucial to sustainability 
objectives. As a theoretical resource, it can provide useful guidelines for structuring 
such learning experiences, while countering the naIvety of the idealist approach to 
ecosocial transformation. 
5.7: An Ecological Restructuring Model of Social Transformation 
The model of social change which best fits the guidelines discussed above is 
the ecological restructuring model. It also the model that Marius de Geus (1996) 
favours over piecemeal engineering and radical utopianism. The former is a 
conservative model of change given to small incremental adjustments even for the 
most acute problems. It can be characterized as an over-reaction to a misplaced 
confidence in radical utopian blueprints and the ills that their employment has 
inflicted on modern societies. The effect of the piecemeal adjustment approach is 
that public policy becomes enmired in crisis management, in the neverending 
extinguishment of brush-fires, simply because there is little capacity for creative 
innovation. 
The green movement, in its far-reaching critique of modern society, seeks a 
fundamental reconstruction of society along ecocentric lines. Consequently it can be 
prone to the shortcomings of radical utopian blueprints: "the uncertainties and 
dangers that are inherent to all-embracing imperatives: unforeseeable 'new' problems, 
unintended consequences, discrepancies between theory and practice" (de Geus, 
1996, 198). de Geus therefore opts for the transformative model in preference to the 
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wholesale renewal or 'muddling through' approaches because of the high risks 
involved with both. The ecological restructuring model encompasses far-reaching 
changes, but leaves room for adjustment in case things go wrong. Like Dryzek and 
Eckersley, he favours the metaphor of rebuilding, the former two theorists preferring 
to rebuild the ship while still at sea, while de Geus opts for reconstructing a house 
and in the process endeavouring to maintain its liveability: 
It is not that a completely new house is erected - in order to prevent 
the annihilation of capital, the usually high costs, the unpredictable 
problems, disadvantages and setbacks - but the existing house is 
more or less thoroughly altered, rebuilt, reconstructed, to comply 
. with the newly formulated demands. ...In large part the house stays 
the same, yet simultaneously it undergoes a structural change (de 
Geus, 1996, 199-200). 
The reconstruction process is less concerned with remediation of the house's 
obsolescence than with altering its structure. The implication for environmental 
policy is not simply to prevent any further environmental deterioration but rather to 
encourage the adaptation of institutions like the free market to the demands of 
ecology. Just as the house can be made more energy-efficient and water-saving with 
little cost, so too can the free market be brought into line with financial incentives 
and legal measures, such as penalties, internalizing costs, and environmentally 
benign production. However, bringing the free market into line is only the 
beginning. In the context of the house reconstruction analogy, such an interim 
accommodation could be compared with the situation where a run-down house is 
stabilized and made sufficiently habitable in order to embark on a programme of 
more extensive structural change in order to bring it up to the standard imposed by 
changed external conditions or family needs. If the free market is to be retained for 
the advantages it renders, it can only be under strictly ecologically limiting 
conditions. Its reconstruction must also involve the transformation of its underlying 
ethic, possessive individualism, and the redirection of its principle focus towards the 
satisfaction predominantly of needs. To draw on our analogy again, the normative 
foundations may need some rearrangement, as, for example, some extra underpinning 
for a relocated load-bearing wall. 
The point that de Geus is making, however, is that ecological restructuring 
offers a flexible approach where adjustments can be made for any unforeseen 
problems, unintended consequences can be minimized, and theory and practice can 
operate recursively. Ecological restructuring thus turns out to be a model of social 
environmental learning. The point I would make, however, is that the application of 
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the middle-range reforms envisaged by de Geus, would need to be comprehensive, 
entailing the consideration of values, ideologies and legal/financial/policy 
instruments. One could imagine that if policy implementation was in any way 
defective, it could easily slip into piecemeal change. 
What is further attractive about the ecological restructuring model is its 
philosophical antecedents, which are to be found in the modest scepticism of 
Montaigne and Hume. The latter, in particular, was unhappy with the claims made by 
the natural philosophers for natural reason and hence was critical of the Cartesian 
method and the claims made for it by the Utilitarians, who, influenced by the means 
apparently afforded by the Cartesian method for the mastery of nature, thought that 
society could exist as a rational expression of human design. Hume's reason is 
grounded in experience and empirical possibility and therefore yields .a rationality 
sufficient for the limited planning of social ends. As de Geus remarks, the architect 
of the house under reconstruction is only needed some of the time. And with a 
rationality which is modest in its claims for the centrality of reason in human affairs, 
there is space for our part-time architect to enlist the aid of design principles 
informed by ecocentric concerns of care and responsibility. 
5.8: Sustainability as Ecopraxis 
This section endeavours to evaluate the prospects for sustainability as a 
project of ecopraxis, particularly whether it can further the regulative standards 
delineated above. To recapitulate: an ecopraxis of sustainability would be expected 
to (1) unify theory and practice with the aim of bringing a critical understanding to 
the problems of the ecological age; (2) encompass both ethical and political life, 
offering a practical-moral perspective on ecological crises; (3) foster ecological 
consciousness; (4) avoid the uncritical acceptance of ecological ideals and totalizing 
blueprints; while (5) pursuing adaptive change. The evaluation will proceed by 
comparing the relative merits of weak and strong sustainability discourses with 
respect to their performance on these criteria. 
Habermas has characterized modem societies as being technologically 
dominated, with reason appropriated by technology and theory disconnected from 
praxis. This state of affairs he sees as a recipe for insanity, because societies so 
dominated lack the capacity for critical reflection. It would be the task of a 
sustainability ideal to reunite theory and practice with the aim of overcoming the 
tension between socioeconomic sustainability and long-term ecological security. 
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Strong sustainability, as conceived in a discourse of ecological restructuring (ER), 
uses the ecological crisis to reflect on the irrationalities and discontinuities that now 
pervade modern life as a result of the theory/practice schism, while the weak 
sustainability of ecological modernization processes (EM) can only seek to overcome 
the ecological crisis by technical and procedural innovation. Rationality remains 
captive of technocracy. 
Sustainability as ER embodies strong normative and political components, in 
that participation is taken to be intrinsically valuable and the objectives of economic 
activity are discursively set within the parameters of ecosystemic and social viability, 
while EM relies on the setting of limits to resource use through more efficient. 
material and energy resource use and ecologically benign technologies. Participation 
is of instrumental value and limited to implementation phases of policy development. 
Integral to ER's moral-practical perspective is a critique of the values, knowledges, 
practices and institutions of industrial society and their role in social disintegration 
and environmental damage. The foundation of a viable ecopraxis is knowledge, 
understanding and practical wisdom, not technical knowhow. With its technocratic 
focus, EM is more concerned with the technical remediation of environmental 
damage than with understanding its root causes. 
The discourse of sustainable development has already fostered awareness and 
placed the integration of economic and environmental concerns on the political 
agenda, but there is yet to occur a sufficient shift in ecological consciousness (Jacobs, 
1995a, 7-8). Jacobs also notes that it has mobilized a process of institutional learning 
in which all manner of policy setters have been pushed to reappraise their policies 
and policy-making processes, a process which is under way from local government to 
international agencies like the World Bank. The processes of social learning which 
are integral to changing consciousness are fostered by participation in environmental 
decision-making and problem-solving. It is sufficient to note that opportunities for 
social learning are limited in EM to citizen involvement in environmental 
remediation measures, such as tree-planting, water , quality improvements, and soil 
erosion prevention. 
It is its contestability and hence the impossibility of precisely fixing its 
meaning (Jacobs, 1995a, 4-5) that precludes the translation of sustainability into a 
totalizing blueprint. As well, it is its contestability as a subject which lends it to a 
variety of ecological ideals and consequently inhibits the emergence of an 
authoritarian politics. On the other hand it is technocratic approaches to weak 
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• sustainability which are likely to fall victim to prescriptive ideology since they are 
not grounded in practical reason. As improvement and not development is the 
watchword of ecopraxis, that is to say, improved quality of life, the aspirations of 
sustainability programmes are more likely to be those which nature and humans can 
afford. 
As a programme of ecological rather than economic restructuring, 
sustainability can have no precision about beginnings or endings. It can only be 
concerned with movements towards or away from sustainability standards. We may 
use environmental indicators to gauge those movements and as a basis for 
readjustment, but all that is available to social innovators under conditions of 
uncertainty and complexity is to build onto established trends. They will be trends 
which exhibit a collective, public moral purpose. 
5.9: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have drawn upon a number of thought frameworks which 
appear to be particularly pertinent to the issues in a praxis of ecological restructuring, 
where the objective is to learn to live sustainably. The objective of the exercise of 
setting out the elements of a radical green praxis has been to illuminate obstacles to 
sustainability, while determining possible sites for relearning the art of earth-
dwelling, to highlight constraints on autonomous development while seeking 
possibilities for removing those constraints, and at the same time to set down the 
preconditions for sustainable and creative autonomous flourishing. 
The praxis paradigm, with its basis in knowledge, understanding and practical 
wisdom, is brought into service for its critical insights into capitalist political 
economy. It is used to highlight the relationship between social dysfunction and 
ecological crisis and to demonstrate that ecological irresponsibility is directly 
associated with the futile pursuit of radical autonomy both by individuals and 
institutions. From the paradigm guidelines are identified for defining the tasks of a 
radical ecopraxis as well as the pitfalls to be avoided, providing a critical 
understanding of present crises in order to transcend constraints on agency, and to 
pinpoint possible sites of creative potential and institutional innovation. By 
interpolating sustainability concerns with the praxis paradigm, I have endeavoured to 
establish the outlines of an ecotopian regulative ideal, which is both modest and 
radical. It is modest in being tempered by a sense of the enormity of the 
responsibilities confronting humankind, in its recognition of the dangers of the 
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uncritical acceptance of ideals, in its recognition of the uncertain nature of the human 
condition, in its awareness of human fallibility, in its eschewal of defined endpoints, 
and in its openness to a diversity of possibilities, all of which are underlain by a 
modest scepticism in the tradition of Montaigne and Hume. On the other hand, its 
objectives may be described as radical. The ecotopian ideal of strong sustainability 
seemingly amounts to the simple reinterpretation of the 'quality of life' ideal and yet 
the implications for political, economic and social systems at all spatial scales are 
radical. It means assimilating the needs of future generations and nonhumans to 
market exchange, improving society's capacity to understand and address the 
problems of ecological crisis, and recognizing the ills of modern life as dysfunctions 
inherent in these systems. It suggests that existing liberal democracies will have to 
make room for more deliberative input and that institutions will need to be 
restructured to encourage environmentally responsible values and practices.. The 
kinds of institutions envisaged will be capable of self-evaluation and self-
transformation, and, if necessary, self-supercession. 
The political economy approach was enlisted because it gives primacy to the 
social production of existence and therefore is more capable of grasping the social 
foundations of ecological problems. It also has a dynamic understanding of social 
change processes and can grasp aspects of capitalist society particularly relevant to 
sustainability concerns, generational inequity and the maldistribution of 
environmental bads and goods. Of particular utility for sustainability issues is 
regulation theory, especially in assessing possibilities for social transformation in 
capitalist societies. Regulation theory provides an explanation for the persistence and 
apparently coherent functioning of a crisis-prone system of production for extended 
periods. The theory has been used to demonstrate that the present concern with 
sustainable development is simply an attempt to avert the crisis generated by the 
inevitable unsustainability of the postwar consensus which coalesced around 
economic development. The theory also enables us to conclude that social 
transformation has to be pursued at all levels of social regulation, including social 
values, norms, practices, institutions and social systems. Regulation theory also 
provides a useful framework for assessing the viability of extant trajectories of 
development, the conclusion being that neither neoliberal policy regimes or 
ecological modernization processes are sustainable, the former being inherently 
contradictory and therefore unstable and the latter little more than a set of 
extemporization measures. 
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Alternative sustainability trajectories are little in evidence. Speculation about 
their possible forms centres around stores of value which might substitute for surplus 
value and that alternative social forms might be organized around values such as 
conservation of the stock of natural and social capital, or wellbeing, or utilization 
value. So far I am unaware of any speculation about the implications of valorizing 
utilization value, but one could imagine that the life-time value of an object might 
internalize any side-effects caused during its production, the costs of its disposal as 
waste and that, consequently, valuing its real costs might ultimately induce a degree 
of frugality, thus lowering throughput and waste production. 
Social structuration theories have also been important for the revalorization of 
agency and thus counteracting structural determinism. While it is clear that agency 
has been circumscribed in modern times, it is also certain that the character of 
institutions bears directly on its quality and on opportunities for responsible action. It 
follows that institutions can be structured to favour the emergence of ecologically 
responsible individuals and corporate entities. 
Creativity is argued to be the quality of autonomy most in demand since it is 
integral to responsible action and social innovation. Removing the blockages to 
creativity will involve determining the conditions for its flourishing and identifying 
possible sites for the activation and development of integrated creativity. These 
might include the "seams" between system and lifeworld (Habermas), the dissonant 
potential of "edges" (Coles) or perhaps the absurdities of modern life might be used 
as markers for sites of creative innovation (Maguire). 
The requirements of sustainability under conditions of ecological crisis 
demand that for communities to be healthy and sustainable their citizens must be not 
only democratically literate but also ecologically literate. A viable civic culture is 
critical to the generation of common purpose and therefore for attending to issues of 
the ecological commons. Liberal democracy, with its foundational assumptions of 
individuality, self-interest and human uniqueness (see Chapter 6.2), may only possess 
the resources to address issues of the common interest and the long-term to a limited 
degree. 
Finally, the social learning paradigm has been found to be particularly 
congenial to an era of multiple crises, for conditions of unfamiliarity and uncertainty, 
and for understanding change in highly dynamic social systems. It is apposite for a 
time when existing values, norms, knowledges and practices are proving inadequate 
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in the face of novel ecological problems, problems which are characterized by 
multiple cause and effect, circular feedback processes and nonlinearity. The social 
learning paradigm is shown to be particularly compatible with a praxis of 
sustainability. As a recursive model of thought and action, it is suited to situations 
where learning must be ongoing as is the case under conditions of unpredictability 
and rapid change. Parallels have also been drawn between the dynamic nature of 
social learning and ecological systems. Its practical importance is in structuring 
learning conditions so as to encourage the reconstruction of norms, values and 
behaviours and the redirection of collective purpose to ends more consonant with 
sustainability goals. 
Although I have drawn out the utility of the abovementioned theoretical 
frameworks for a green praxis individually, in addition to those points of intersection 
observed in the discussion proper, it is also worth noting that there are sufficient 
points of congruence between each that there is potential for their integration into a 
coherent green theory of social change. By way of example, the praxis paradigm and 
creativity theory share a common interest in blockages to actualization. It was 
intimated that the pursuit of radical individualism and the fixation with secondary 
creativity bear a direct relationship to ecological irresponsibility and that true social 
progress, including responsible autonomous development, could only result from the 
collective exercise of integrated creativity, wherein practical ends have appropriate 
normative guidance. The implications of these observations are radical to say the 
least, for they mean the redesign of a number of key liberal capitalist institutions, 
including the free market and its associated property arrangements, for these are 
institutions which promote radical individualism and confuse it with autonomy. 
Ecologically responsible institutions can be expected to foster collective interests 
while protecting individual autonomy. As a counter to the free market, existing 
arrangements oriented to the general interest, such as those having stewardship of 
natural areas or managing the remediation of environmental problems, could be 
fostered because their generalizable interest transcends the interests of individual 
participants. 
The praxis paradigm also has points of intersection with the social learning 
paradigm in that the guidelines developed for an ecopraxis of sustainability point to 
the need for institutions to be capable of self-evaluation and self-transformation. In 
other words, they must be capable of learning and, to be so, they must be structured 
so as to facilitate learning processes. Consequently, institutions must be open to 
changing signals and changing external conditions, especially under conditions of 
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unpredictability and uncertainty. The conclusions from the social learning paradigm 
have further implications for the design of institutions when married with insights 
from regulation theory. Thus, while the latter indicates the degree of social 
transformation and the appropriate objects of transformation necessary for a stable 
social existence, that is, values, knowledges and practices at all scales and levels in 
all social systems, the marriage of the former with sustainability theory specifies that 
reconstruction of the objects of regulation is dependent on the design of institutions 
which structure learning conditions in the direction of common purpose. 
The concern of social structuration theories with the quality of agency also 
bears directly on the character of institutions. From writings on ecological literacy, it 
was determined that a precondition for sustainable communities is that their citizens 
be both democratically and ecologically literate. Thus, another requirement of 
institutions is that they also be structured to promote these qualities by providing 
opportunities for participation and ecological learning. 
The conclusions reached by employing a regulative framework for 
understanding processes of social change in capitalist political economies also merit 
further elaboration for their implications. They reveal that current policy regimes 
relying on economic instruments and technical innovation are unlikely to produce 
stable and crisis-free solutions to ecological problems, but that, as a result, there is 
space for the purposeful shaping of sustainable futures. Capitalism is likely to 
remain in crisis until attention is directed to issues of social, political and ecological 
sustainability as well as economic sustainability. It is this continuing state of crisis 
which presents opportunities. If industrial societies are to surmount a simple 
accommodation to ecological limits, any restructuring programme must also address 
existing values frameworks and how they influence production and consumption 
norms; the values and assumptions underlying institutional arrangements and the 
kinds of personalities and practices that they foster; and the limitations of existing 
political arrangements, their philosophical foundations and how these influence 
policy formation and political processes. 
Although capitalism is in crisis, it is probably premature to predict its 
imminent supercession, but it is well to remember that it is not the only mode of 
production and it was only with the liberal and industrial revolutions that the pursuit 
of surplus value came to dominate other modes based around use-value and exchange 
value. It is certain that the present premise on which capitalist economies operate, 
that is, maximizing throughput, is unsustainable. It is more likely that an interim 
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accommodation in which a more integrated range of measures across different levels 
of social function and different spatial scales will emerge, although probably as a 
consequence of considerable dislocation and conflict. Gibbs (1996) envisages a 
scenario where a new mode of accumulation and a new mode of social regulation 
coheres around the integration of international environmental agreements and 
protocols, reinforced by national and local legislative implementation and the 
significant transformation of individual and collective production and consumption 
norms and behaviours. These trends are already evident, if somewhat distorted. The 
Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances has been relatively successful with 
the expectation that ozone levels will be repaired in the next several decades. 
Contrariwise, though, the Kyoto Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Reduction is 
currently stalled by the reluctance of signatory states to countenance the inevitable 
reductions in economic growth with all that might mean for political legitimacy. 
These examples suggest that it may be easier to generate common purpose in areas of 
environmental concern where there is less at stake. Present international 
arrangements based on the atomistic nation-state, whose overriding concern is to 
protect its own interests, are not conducive to issues which demand a significant 
degree of sacrifice and common purpose. The interests are seemingly so entrenched 
that it will probably require a significant climatic event indisputably linked to global 
warming to effect a shift in positions. 
At the state and local levels, awareness of environmental • concerns has 
translated into sustainable development policy, which, although couched in the 
language of ecological sustainability, is usually in actuality interpreted as 
environmental protection for economic sustainability. Such an implementation 
deficit indicates, as I argue in Chapter 6, that liberal democracies may have reached 
the limits of their accommodation with the sustainability imperative. The corporate 
sphere has also taken on a green tinge, although it is often cosmetic, while the 
emergence of green consumerism reflects a developing awareness among consumers 
of their environmental responsibilities. Although green consumerism may steer 
production towards more environmentally benign production methods and products 
or reduce the amount of packaging waste, it does little to address the need to reduce 
throughput. Nevertheless, these trends represent an emergent mode of social 
regulation and, if pushed, could cohere into a relatively stable interim 
accommodation and provide a platform for more radical transformation in line with 
the demands of strong sustainability, centring around the ecologization and moral 
reform of nthkets, state and civil society. 
CHAPTER 6 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
6.1: Introduction 
The emergence of sustainability as a normative goal has profound 
implications for the political economy of liberal democracy. Firstly, it both 
highlights and exacerbates the legitimacy problems currently being experienced by 
liberal democracies; and secondly, it exposes the shaky foundations of some its key 
institutional pillars (see Wissenburg, 1998, 82-83 on the legitimacy of property and 
its relationship to liberty). In the context of environmental concerns, sustainability 
represents both opportunity and nemesis. The challenge can be either benign, leading 
to reinvigoration, or it can result in less acceptable outcomes, when the value of 
preserving democratic forms is overridden for environmental ends. Several authors 
contend that sustainability could be the answer to liberalism's legitimacy problems. 
Achterberg (1993, 91), for one, argues that the normative political principles which 
justify liberal democracy may also be important in the legitimation of more far-
reaching environmental policies. 
Sustainability may also perform another service for green political thought 
and that is to transcend the disjuncture between a green theory of value and a green 
theory of agency (Barry, 1996), identified by Goodin (1992), by unifying greens' 
concern to expand democratic decision-making (as a green value) with particular 
substantive outcomes, namely expansion of the moral community to future 
generations and to nonhuman entities. In so doing, sustainability overcomes the 
charge that greens are rather more concerned with policy outcomes (ends) than with 
the processes used to achieve their goals (means) making them vulnerable to 
authoritarian solutions (Mills, 1996). It is precisely because sustainability perceives 
ecological problems as symptoms of an ethical crisis rather than a set of problems to 
be solved through technocratic measures that gives it the capacity to link means with 
ends. Because sustainability is a normative principle, it requires deliberation to 
operationalize it, and because sustainability demands far-reaching changes in social 
practices, it necessitates the consent and participation of whole societies. For this 
reason, operationalizing sustainability "deserves democratic institutions that 
encourage the active participation of all concerned" (Barry, 1996, 119). 
Whether sustainability has the capacity to rejuvenate liberal democracy is 
problematic, for its resolution turns on liberalism's limitations in responding to the 
objectives of sustainability, namely socioeconomic sustainability and ecological 
security, issues of the long-term and the common interest. The view was advanced in 
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Chapter 1.8 that, as a social order, the proceduralism of liberal democracy is morally 
thin. As sustainability issues can be said to be morally demanding, liberalism's moral 
capacity with respect to sustainability needs further explication. The discussion also 
addresses certain structural qualities which limit its capacity for sustainability. 
As a prelude to setting out these limitations, it should be recalled that 
liberalism's origins are the product of a different set of historical circumstance. We 
should be mindful of what it was programmed to achieve, namely to override the 
irrationality and uncertainty caused by religious extremism and to secure individuals 
in their lives, liberties and property against absolutism and arbitrariness. It is 
reasonable to argue that, as sustainability issues are largely commons issues, liberal 
democracy with its theoretical underpinnings in an ontology of individualism and 
instrumental values, will have difficulty summoning up the necessary resources. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the empirical practice of the last several decades with 
respect to progress in environmental protection. The gains of the 1960s and 1970s 
are being steadily eroded under the influence of neoliberal ideology. Moreover, the 
observation has been made by Michael Cahn (1995, 132-134) that, even with the two 
highest office-holders in the United States America expressing profound 
commitments to environmental goals, policy-makers have proved to be limited in 
their realization of that commitment by the imperatives of economic growth. Indeed, 
I would argue that liberal democracy's accommodation of ecological limits through 
ecological modernization policies has just about reached the extent of its capacity to 
do so63 . 
It is clear that liberal democracies are struggling to progress sustainability 
goals further than a minimal accommodation to environmental limits. We should 
therefore try to establish where liberalism's limits lie in relation to sustainability 
before attempting any assessment of sustainability's capacity to rejuvenate its 
political economy within the context of ecological restructuring criteria. There are a 
number of factors inherent in liberalism's ontological, moral and structural 
framework which derive from its early modern origins and which limit its capacity to 
respond to sustainability goals. 
Firstly, the primacy of individual interests protected by individual rights 
means that communally-directed policy is achieved with difficulty, the result being 
63Wissenburg (1998, 65) suggests that ecological modernization is the only environmental policy 
compatible with liberal democracy. 
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that environmental problems can only be partially addressed. Nor is the self-
interested individual encouraged either through expectation or social constitution to 
adopt an other-regarding stance (Mathews, 1996, 71ff.). Consequently, commons 
issues are debated in terms of a balancing of rights rather than in terms of a common 
good. The resulting tension between private rights and public good restricts policy 
options (Calm, 1995, 16-17). Moreover, the emphasis on rights and values as 
privately held leaves little space for a moral public discourse, an observation which 
points to the difficulties that liberalism has as a foundation for a truly public life 
(Kemmis, 1990, 62). Because there is little or no possibility of generating shared or 
communal values, there is little prospect of reaching common ground on difficult 
issues. Kemmis explains the prevalence of shrill protest as a form of public action, 
the routine blocking of initiatives (whether by conservationists or developers), and 
the withdrawal of people from public involvement as a function of this latter 
deficiency. Similarly, Barns (1996, 103) argues the case for a "thicker" form of 
public dialogue to address commons issues more effectively than does the thin 
proceduralism of liberal democracy. Ecofeminists lay the blame for the 
marginalization of collective forms of life and the dearth of public discourse on the 
public/private dualism of western life, which ensures that the care and responsibility 
that should be directed to communal issues is confined to the private sphere 
(Plumwood, 1996, 158-159). 
The emphasis on rights is also problematic for human/nature connections. As 
they are simply procedural rights to regulate relations in a community of political and 
legal equals, to ensure civil relations between strangers, they make little claim on the 
moral capacities of community members. By contrast, moral relations between 
humans and other nature are more demanding, relations for which the rights relations 
between members of a political community are not equivalent. Relations in 
ecological communities are much more complex, embracing elements of symbiosis 
and competition (diZerega, 1995, 27-30). Additionally, it is the interests of species 
which take precedence rather than those of individuals. 
Within liberal democracies there are a number of structural elements which 
foreclose on possibilities for effective responses to collectively-based problems of 
environmental decline. Plumwood (1996, 145) identifies the genesis of these barriers 
in inequality and privilege which act to quarantine areas of ecological concern from 
democratic attention, with the result that liberal democracy's capacity for adaptability 
and flexibility in the face of ecological crisis is diminished. Inequality and privilege 
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operate to restrict information flows and democratic attention so as to hinder the 
processes of transforming citizen choice into ecologically responsible action. 
Information flows and communication are obstructed by the hierarchical relations of 
administrative bureaucracy through censorship and the filtering of information across 
levels; by polarization and its attendant insecurity; by the manipulation of public 
opinion (Plumwood, 1996, 145-146); and by the use of symbolic politics (Cahn, 
1995, 18-27). Additionally, a shrinking political sphere consequent on the effects of 
econornism and globalization, both processes accelerated by neoliberal policies, 
means that "the area of life accountable to democratic decision-making and capable 
of being structured to meet social and ecological needs grows daily smaller" 
(Plumwood, 1996, 146). This last aspect is reinforced by zealous attacks on 
collective forms of social choice through the aggressive privileging of private 
interests. 
While the political sphere shrinks, the market sphere correspondingly 
expands and colonizes areas of life previously little affected by economic 
imperatives. As previously discussed, the market and its financial instruments, for 
example, discount rates, are inherently inimical to long-term time horizons. Further, 
the reliance of elites on growth combined with capitalism's inherently expansionary 
logic unrelentingly accelerates throughput, compressing time and space, and allowing 
liberal societies to ignore responsibility to future generations and the need for social 
reform (Barns, 1996, 102; Press, 1994, 54ff). 
Granted that liberal democracies have been more successful than other types 
of political systems in raising awareness and developing environmental policy 
(Dryzek, 1996a, 16), there are limits, nevertheless, to the efficacy of oppositional and 
interest group politics. With public morality limited to interest group politics, any 
depth of care and responsibility which can be granted to nature and future generations 
is also missing, while the range of possible policy and individual responses and their 
efficacy is similarly constrained. Policy instruments such as pollution rights have, 
according to (Cahn, 1995, 63), only served to "appease" rather than "ease" the tension 
between liberalism and environmental quality, while market mechanisms have been 
found to be no more effective than command-and-control measures unless policy 
prescriptions for better environmental quality coincide with self-interest (Kinrade, 
1995). Moreover, as a private ethic of care, green consumerism is clearly an 
inadequate response to ecological problems, because the emphasis on individual 
responsibility allows issues of production and technology, which should be subject to 
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collective debate, to escape democratic scrutiny. Until liberalism can conceive of an 
enlarged form of moral life, it is restricted to narrowly instrumental forms of public 
policy for environmental protection (Plumwood, 1996, 154-155). 
6.2: To Rejuvenate or to Transcend? 
The intention of this section is to evaluate liberal democracy's capacity for 
further adaptation to the ecological imperatives of sustainability by judging the 
potential of various theoretical attempts to adapt or refashion the principles and 
institutions of existing liberalism against the criteria of e,copraxis. These 
reformulations range across a continuum from the minimal to the irrunanent to the 
extrinsic. The minimal critique perceives no problem with liberalism's 
thoroughgoing anthropocentrism, holds that liberalism can be greened with little 
modification and that all that is required is to improve the effectiveness of existing 
institutions. A middle-ranging group of theorists have executed an immanent 
critique informed by ecocentric principles, which involves reforming the principles 
and ideals of liberal democracy and refashioning its institutions so that issues of the 
common interest and the long-term can be given greater prominence. At the other 
extreme on the continuum are the radical ecocentric theorists whose critic is extrinsic 
and who seek to transcend existing understanding of the human/nature relationship, 
arguing that an entirely different ontology and a different institutional framework 
grounded in an ecocentric consciousness is needed (See Figure 2 below). 
Anthropocentric 4-----•Nonanthropocentric 	Ecocentric 
Minimal Critique 	•Immanent Critique ------• Extrinsic Critique 
Improving the 	 •Reforming the Ideals 	 Transcending 
Effectiveness and Principles & Existing Ontology 
of Existing 	 Refashioning Existing 	and Institutions 
Institutions Institutions 
Figure 2: The Environmentalist Critique of Liberal Democracy. 
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The discussion begins with the group of liberal theorists who accept the 
fundamental legitimacy of liberal principles and existing political structures. 
Although they recognize that liberalism is suffering legitimacy problems in the face 
of ecological problems, some, like Marcel Wissenburg (1998, 2), see these problems 
as an opportunity to improve the legitimacy of liberal democracy. These attempts at 
harmonizing liberal democracy and sustainability imperatives principally draw on the 
distributive justice tradition within liberal political philosophy. Wissenburg's attempt 
at greening liberalism is possibly the most comprehensive to date. While conceding 
that environmentalism is responsible for highlighting liberalism's shaky philosophical 
foundations, most particularly with respect to property justifications, he nevertheless 
argues that liberalism can be harmonized with ecological imperatives. He sets out to 
demonstrate that liberalism has the theoretical resources to achieve all that 
sustainability requires of a political system and consequently that liberalism can be 
greened even if the bulk of the population does not possess an environmental 
consciousness. To achieve this objective he formulates the 'restraint principle', a 
variation of John Rawls' savings principle', which ensures justice between 
generations on the basis that this end is a necessary precondition for a just liberal 
society. The restraint principle sets limits to the exploitation of the material resource 
base in the form of conditional rights to scarce goods which should be distributed so 
that they remain, within the limits of necessity, available for redistribution. In that 
event the goods in question should be replaced by identical goods or their equivalent, 
and that being impossible, compensation should be paid (Wissenburg, 1998, 123). 
The restraint principle prohibits the destruction of the objects of conditional rights, 
unless unavoidable, say for the provision of some vital need. 
The destruction prohibition refers not only to particular objects but also to 
natural entities, because liberalism recognizes that there are material preconditions 
for a minimum social life. Attending to these necessary preconditions, which include 
a healthy environment, is a moral duty because only when these basic conditions 
have been met are humans freed to be truly responsible moral agents. Wissenburg 
(1998, 126) argues that the restraint principle thereby accommodates the 
preconditions for a sustainable society while simultaneously taking care of justice 
between generations. "It protects the interests of future generations by simply 
protecting those of present generations" and it accomplishes this end by relying on 
liberal self-interest or, at least, on mutual disinterest (Wissenburg, 1998, 126, 129). 
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The restraint principle justifies exploitation of nature only for basic needs, further 
wants then needing to be the subject of political determination. 
While the restraint principle takes care of utilizing material nature, the 
problem of waste is addressed through an 'inverse restraint principle', which is 
essentially the mirror image of the former. It prohibits the production of harms 
unless unavoidable or unless the waste so produced can be adequately absorbed by 
natural processes, in lieu of which nature should be restored as near as possible to its 
former condition, or failing that, compensation should be provided (Wissenburg, 
1998, 166). Like the restraint principle, the inverse restraint principle is primarily 
concerned with social sustainability and with ecological sustainability only in so far 
as it supports the former. 
There are a number of assumptions which appear problematic for ecological 
sustainability. Firstly, these principles assume that ensuring the social minimum will 
necessarily also be functional for ecological flourishing. Secondly, the assumption 
that any compensation can be just recompense for those whose life chances have 
been seriously affected by the production of unexpected risks must also be 
questioned. Further, the inverse restraint principle is practicable where polluters and 
pollutants are known and the effects obvious, but for environmentally diffuse and 
uncertain effects, where the offenders may number many millions, its efficacy is less 
certain. The principle would easily apply to the obviously deleterious effects of 
motor vehicle use on city dwellers in congested city conditions but not to motor 
vehicle users in uncongested conditions, where there are no obvious side-effects. Yet 
vehicle emissions are a major contributant to the production of greenhouse gases, the 
effects of which are uncertain and diffuse and may not be fully apparent until some 
time into the future. In the meantime, social sustainability may be maintained in the 
present yet at the expense of social sustainability for future generations and long-run 
ecological sustainability. The case for a level of environmental quality greater than 
that needed to sustain social sustainability has been put thus: 
The earth's natural systems have limits to the amount of damage 
they can take and still reproduce themselves over the long run. 
And though we may not know precisely what those limits are, it is 
possible that they are much more strict than the environmental 
quality needed simply to maintain the social minimum for society. 
In other words, limiting environmental protection to that needed to 
satisfy the social minimum might produce damage to natural 
systems whose impact on humans might not be immediately 
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manifest, but which would in the long run undermine the social 
minimum (Taylor, 1993, 271). 
The restraint principle thus ignores the time-dependent effects of cumulative use. It 
is a principle for contemporaneous and proximate rather than uncertain and diffuse 
effects. 
Although liberalism recognizes a healthy environment as a precondition for 
human moral existence, it reaches its limits with the moral agency of nonhuman 
entities. Some animals can be attributed the status of 'as if subjects' where the 
possession of agency and consciousness can be demonstrated (Wissenburg, 1998, 
106-114) and therefore may be assigned entitlements. However, where liberalism 
falls short is in attributing entitlements to collective natural entities, such as species 
or ecosystems, because "species as such have no interests, no feelings, no 
consciousness, no plans and, at least from a liberal point of view, it is only the life 
and welfare of individuals (with interests, feelings etc.) that counts" (VVissenburg, 
1998, 179). Recent findings in evolutionary ecology tend to contradict the 
privileging of individuals over species, as it is argued that it is the species and its 
bank of genetic information which has most interest in perpetuating itself. 
Liberalism's emphasis on the primacy of individuals and their interests precludes any 
accommodation in this respect. 
Further criticism can be applied to Wissenburg's greened liberalism for its 
retention of an unashamedly instrumental stance toward nature, all of which is 
available for human use. This seems to reflect a Eurocentric bias, where 
sustainability is being created in an already depleted natural environment and there is 
rather more concern with the maintenance of the sustenance base. In those parts of 
the world where ecosystems are relatively more intact and biodiversity a more 
pressing concern, there is a case to be made for adopting a non-instrumental stance, 
for recognizing that some environments are insufficiently robust to absorb any human 
intervention and that some natural entities may have an interest in perpetuating 
themselves as they are without the benefit of human intervention. The finely-tuned 
nutrient balances of the coastal heaths of Southern Australia, which support very 
diverse and complex communities on mostly impoverished soils, for example, just 
simply could not be substituted or their destruction compensated according to the 
restraint principle. It is just not possible to replicate the complexity of some 
64Christoff (1996, 486) makes a similar criticism of the ecological modernization discourse. 
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ecosystems. Yet to set them aside cannot be countenanced by even a greened 
liberalism for that would mean valuing them as ends in themselves 65 . Liberalism can 
take into account the needs of rainforest ecosystems where they impact on the 
wellbeing of their indigenous inhabitants, yet those natural systems with no 
indigenous peoples, such as the ecosystems of the Southern and Antarctic Oceans, 
have no standing, even though there is increasing evidence that their functioning 
impinges significantly on the regulation of the world's climates and hence on social 
sustainability. It seems that this degree of interrelatedness and complexity is beyond 
liberalism's epistemological and moral grasp. 
Theoretically, then, the distributive justice principles of political liberalism 
can account for most of the problems of social sustainability and, according to 
Wissenburg, ecological sustainability too. If there is a failure of sustainability, the 
problem resides in society itself, with the genesis of individual producer and 
consumer preferences. Yet, Wissenburg (1998, 224 -225) is reluctant to allow the 
pursuit of any strategies which might alter preferences in order that an ecological 
consciousness be more thoroughly dispersed, for that is the road to serfdom, a 
nightmare Green Utopia, he says. However, Roger Taylor (1993, 272-273), arguing 
from a welfarist stance oriented to equalizing opportunities in order to satisfy 
preferences, contends that, if the social minimum does not yield a liveable world, 
then additional measures might be taken to conserve natural resources with limits 
being placed on "the kinds and amounts of preferences that may be satisfied". 
While liberalism can theoretically be greened, the fact that liberal 
democracies continue to be dogged by environmental controversy suggests that there 
may be more profound structural problems to be addressed before the complex issues 
of ecological sustainability can be accommodated. The question of preferences, 
which were earlier identified as a major component of sustainability problems, is 
particularly taxing for existing liberal democracies as the changes demanded are 
likely to involve considerable sacrifices and significant changes in lifestyles. This 
dilemma can also be addressed from within the distributive justice tradition, in this 
case by means of the liberal principle of neutrality. This is the approach taken by 
Wouter Achterberg (1993) who argues that, given the impediments of interest group 
pluralism amd piecemeal change and in order to ground the legitimacy of the 
65To the contrary, however, Taylor (1993, 280, n.15) contends that to support the provision of the 
conditions necessary for the social minimum may indeed require that "some quantity of intact 
ecosystems worldwide" be set aside. 
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inevitable restrictions, one way of achieving the necessary changes is to remove 
ecological values from the political agenda and to generate a sense of common 
purpose based around their fundamental importance. Rawls' principle of an 
'overlapping consensus' based on liberal neutrality is a means of circumventing the 
plurality and possibly conflicting conceptions of the good. It furnishes justificatory 
principles for the social and political organization of society regardless of individual 
conceptions of the good. The focus of an overlapping consensus is on generating 
"common ground", which can survive shifting power balances and provide "a 
minimal but stable social unity over generations" (Achterberg, 1993, 94). 
In view of the threats to moderate scarcity from ecological problems and 
hence legitimacy, Achterberg is of a mind to supplement the minimal consensus that 
presently attends liberal democracies to "enlarge the durability of this consensus itself 
and thus of liberal democracy as well" (Achterberg, 1993, 95). Like Wissenburg, he 
perceives the present ecological crisis as an opportunity to improve the legitimacy of 
liberal democracy. To justify the possible restrictions on autonomy arising from 
restrictions on mobility, from conflicts over property rights, from restrictions on the 
means of production and hence the market mechanism, he draws on the 
supplementary services of the 'transmission principle'. While the transmission 
principle, which contains an injunction to transmit to future generations a world in no 
worse condition than it presently is, is at base anthropocentric, the injunction can also 
be extended to nature if its 'self-standingness' is recognized. Justice done to nature 
then means "leaving it the opportunities to an independent existence and a 
development of its own" (Achterberg, 1993, 97). Unfortunately this advance violates 
the neutrality principle, a dilemma which Achterberg (p. 99) sees has to be addressed 
with the enlargement of conventional liberalism's 'thin theory of the good' into a 
broader conception of the good, comprising human society, culture and nature. 
To achieve a thickened conception of the good would entail a shift, at least to 
some degree, away from the orthodox liberal understanding of human nature and the 
relationship between humans and nature. It would not necessarily signal the radical 
shift to ecocentrism advocated by some theorists, but it might allow humans to 
assume at least a non-anthropocentric stance in order that interests other than those of 
individual humans can be routinely accounted for in environmental debate. The 
interests of communities and of ecosystems might then more easily be considered 
when dam-building, logging or road-building operations are proposed, for example. 
Sheryl Breen (1995) envisages that changing the assumptions about what constitutes 
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humanity and what differentiates humanity from nature can be achieved within the 
existing framework of liberal thought and that this is likely to be a more fruitful 
approach than arguing for a new ecological outlook. She argues that it is liberal 
conceptions of human nature based on individuality, rationality and self-interest 
combined with a human/nature relationship underpinned by assumptions of 
instrumentalism, human moral superiority, and the primacy of individual interest that 
obstructs the progress of environmental protection and the broadening of the 
environmental agenda (Breen, 1995, 10, 12). However, given the radicalness of 
ecocentrism and its opposition to atomic, individualistic conceptions of human life 
and the privileged position held by human interests, it is unlikely to be incorporated 
into the existing framework of liberal thought. Yet, Breen (1995, 14) thinks that if 
liberalism were to accommodate ecocentric influences, it might "ease the 
constrictions now inherent in liberal environmental debate". 
To achieve this end, Breen attempts to disconnect humans' superior moral 
status from their possession of certain idiosyncratic attributes, which have hitherto 
enabled humans to think of themselves as supremely powerful. The reality is that 
humans have certain unique qualities, but these qualities do not make them almost 
omnipotent. As she says: 
humans are not the only living entity that can change its 
environment to suit its wishes. However, humans do possess 
decisive power in areas that cannot be excluded from conceptions 
of human nature or from environmental debate. Unlike other life 
forms, humans can change their environment globally, on multiple 
levels and, in some cases, nearly instantaneously (Breen, 1995, 14). 
The point is, though, that humans, as moral creatures, have the choice whether to be 
destroyers or preservers. 
Such a modified understanding of human power avoids violating the 
traditional assumption of human uniqueness, while also allowing consideration of the 
moral standing of nonhuman entities. Moreover, Breen sees no reason for liberalism 
to exclude the moral significance of systemic interests as advocated by an ecocentric 
ethic: 
The conclusion that other life forms and even life systems have 
interests as well does not violate liberal assumptions but rather 
forces their expansion. Assumptions of individuality, rationality 
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and self-interest can coherently accommodate a broader 
understanding of what counts as a unit of self-identity, how 
rationality confers specific forms of power but not moral 
superiority and how deeply the conception of interest must be 
applied to nature as a whole (Breen, 1995, 15). 
There is clearly scope for rethinking the underlying assumptions/principles of 
conventional liberalism informed by an ecocentric ethic. The advantage of an 
adaptive approach is, as Breen herself notes, that questions can "be asked within a 
theoretical framework that makes comprehension and examination possible" (Breen, 
1995, 15). Furthermore, it should be remembered that "the liberal perspective with 
its premises on individuality, rationality and self-interest, has allowed and 
encouraged considerable movement towards ecological conservation and, in some 
cases, preservation" (Breen, 1995, 10), albeit that the environmental agenda has more 
recently become primarily concerned with the maintenance of the human sustenance 
base. Yet, it is still a prudent approach to adapt and augment liberalism's partial 
strengths by seeking to overcome its weaknesses, which have so far largely contained 
sustainability concerns to risk avoidance. 
One particular element of liberalism's conception of human nature is both its 
strength and its weakness. Self-interest as self-regard was especially important in the 
struggle against absolutism and the building of the early liberal state, but in its 
rational egoist guise has become particularly problematic for sustainability. Rational 
egoism is an especially destructive expression of self-interest because the policies 
which derive from its ideology encourage short-term, calculative behaviours, such as 
free-riding, with the result that collective choice and social solidarity are undermined 
(Offe, 1987a, 534-535; see also Dryzek, 1996b, 92-97 on the destructive effects of 
rational egoism on democratic politics). As Dryzek (1996b, 105) observes, "any 
policy that promotes rational egoism in the vicinity of environmental problems is 
likely to exacerbate the tragedy of the commons and related problems". 
Working from the premise that self-interest, as presently expressed, is an 
incomplete understanding of human behaviour, Gus diZerega (1996a; 1996b) has 
endeavoured to reharness natural self-interest to the long-term community interest. 
For liberals, because self-interest is taken to be the natural condition of humanity, it 
is assumed that the interests of the community will be assured as long as the ability of 
individuals to look after their own interests is protected first and foremost. The early 
liberal philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment - Adam Smith, David Hume and 
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Adam Ferguson - believed that self-interest would be the human characteristic which 
could tame the irrational passions which had been in the ascendant during the 
religious terrors of the seventeenth century. However they did not envisage that it 
would come to dominate human behaviour. Rather they saw self-interest being 
balanced against the interests of others by the exercise of the virtue of sympathy 
(Dryzek, 1996b, 107)66 . It is this insight from the tradition of evolutionary liberalism 
(an alternative tradition to deontological and utilitarian traditions) that diZerega 
employs to reconnect self-interest to empathy, and thence to develop human empathy 
as a basis for an ecocentric ethic that harmonizes human action with the demands of 
ecological sustainability. 
The argument is developed thus: the models of social and economic analysis 
with their basis in egoistic rational choice only provide a partial explanation of 
human experience. Egoism, it is argued, is in fact self-defeating. Self-interest is 
more than egoism; it requires of the individual to be able to project himself into some 
future situation and then to choose some desirable course of action. For Smith and 
Hume, it was this ability which enables us to imagine ourselves in the place of 
another, an ability arising from the human capacity for sympathy. For empathy to 
manifest, though, requires the exercise of the rational intellect, which "is needed to 
grasp or deny relevant similarities" (diZerega, 1996b, 709). Empathy is not, then, an 
irrational emotion, but an integral component of human reason, the implication being 
that it is irrational to be egoistic, while empathic relations are definitely rational. 
Rational self-interest, which depends upon being able to anticipate 
the probable future consequences arising for us from something we 
do now, requires that we have the capacity to sympathize with 
others. In both cases the capacity depends on our ability to 
recognize similarities in beings other than our immediate self 
(diZerega, 1996b, 710). 
Empathy is directly linked to self-awareness, which, when joined with reason, 
creates the ability to exhibit care for others who may be of no utilizable value or may 
be unknown. "It proceeds from a thinking, conscious being" (Hume, 1969[17391, 
Bk. 11, Sect. 5, 411). It is humans' self-awareness that enables them to be aware of 
others and their capacity to care for their future self that endows them with a similar 
capacity to care for other selves both now and in the future (diZerega, 1996b, 715- 
66Through changes in meaning, "sympathy" as understood by Hume et al. is now more equivalent of 
the modern use of "empathy". It is empathy which elicits the emotional response of sympathy. My 
account will endeavour to use "sympathy" and "empathy" in their correct historical context. 
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716). But, like all human capacities, to be fully utilizable it must be developed and 
fostered, or it will wither away (Hume, 1969[1739], Bk. III, Sect. 2, 550). Hence the 
observation above that egoism is self-defeating. The many unsatisfactory paradoxes 
of rational choice theory and its derivatives have been noted by Bell (1997), Dryzek 
(1996b), Haworth (1994), Pusey (1991) and Self (1993) and have led Dryzek (1996b, 
145) to conclude that, under its influence, capitalism increasingly produces "grave-
digging individuals". 
Like all human qualities, empathy is enhanced through use. The capacity for 
empathy is strengthened with a diversity of communal relationships, which in turn 
enlarges the sense of self. Those who fail to develop this essential human quality 
"operate with a diminished level of human attainment": 
As a person sympathetically expands his or her awareness of the 
relations comprising not only themselves, but other selves as well, 
they see themselves as members of ever larger and more diverse 
communities. The result of such identification is increasing respect 
for nonhuman as well as human life (diZerega, 1996b, 715). 
Empathy is assisted by contiguity and resemblance (Hume, 1969[1739], Bk. II, Sect, 
11, 370) and for this reason humans have little difficulty relating to other higher 
primates and other sentient creatures. diZerega argues that sympathy can be 
expanded to encompass all life and used as a ground for at least a biocentric ethic. 
Having established this much, diZerega proceeds to develop sympathy into an 
ecocentric ethic, though how he achieves that end is not significant for this 
discussion. What matters are the implications of an environmental ethic grounded in 
empathy for ecological sustainability. 
The first observation to make is that, unlike some environmental ethicists 
who argue that there is no qualitative difference between humans and other animals, 
diZerega has stayed within the liberal paradigm, maintaining a commitment to human 
uniqueness, although somewhat modified. The distinction he makes is, not that 
humans are the only beings with self-consciousness or a capacity for empathy, but 
that "the human capacity for sympathy is qualitatively greater than with other animals 
because we are radically more self-conscious than they" (diZerega, 1996b, 715). 
Consequently humans have the potential to identify with or empathize with a greater 
diversity of living beings, especially as our knowledge of interrelationships builds. 
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The second point of interest is that the panoply of policy instruments 
presently favoured for sustainable development ends - markets, privatization, cost 
benefit analysis, contingent valuation, managerialism and so on - is unlikely to foster 
individual empathic development because the identity assumed to be underlying 
these instruments is the rational egoist. The empathic, caring self is only likely to be 
fostered through rebuilding social solidarities and by strengthening existing 
communal arrangements as a bulwark against disintegrative policy regimes. 
Thirdly, as empathy develops so does the capacity to care for future 
generations of others, an ability which is strongly dependent on the depth of 
community attachment and the sense of communal attachment to both the past and 
the future. In turn communal attachment over time influences the degree to which 
one develops a sense of self as a being extending over time: 
[T]he farther into the future our self-interest extends, the more 
developed our capacity for sympathy must become, since our 
present situation, and the temptations and pains it presents, is ever 
farther removed from that imagined being for whom we can 
effectively care (diZerega, 1996b, 710). 
The disembedded individuals of the modern liberal state must seek alternative means 
of embodiment and connection if they are to develop this vital quality. As diZerega 
(1996b, 710) remarks: "our discounting of the future is often due more to a failure of 
sympathy than a calculation of risk". 
diZerega has developed an ecocentric ethic from within liberal traditions by 
adapting one of liberalism's underlying assumptions about human nature, self-
interest, to advance a richer understanding of individuality and therefore of human 
potential, understandings that are more consistent with the demands of ecological 
sustainability. This enriched sense of individuality more equitably balances the 
interests of the self with the interests of others so that the sense of self is expanded 
while the capacity to care for others is similarly enlarged: 
As our understanding of our relationships with others becomes 
richer and more varied we ourselves become richer, with more 
dimensions to who we are. We then more fully embody our innate 
human potential for sympathy and its resulting deep individuality 
rather than the shallow individuality exemplified by models of 
economic man and rational choice (diZerega, 1996b, 728), 
or alternatively: 
The greater our sense of individuality, the deeper our capacity to 
realize our connections with all life (diZerega, 1995, 32). 
The concept of deep individuality also resonates with Christine Cuomo's warnings 
about the uncritical acceptance of a feminist ethic of care and the possibilities of loss 
of self in relationships of care (Cuomo, 1992). 
Finally, it is worth noting that Montaigne would have wholly approved of 
diZerega's approach. Indeed, there are links from Montaigne through the Scottish 
Enlightenment philosophers: concepts such as the unity of mind and body, the 
fallibility of reason and a modified scepticism being the most obvious. The notion 
that sympathy entails both the rational capacity to perceive similarities and an 
emotional capacity to care sees reason and emotion reunited as Montaigne would 
have advocated. 
Recognizing the moral standing of nonhuman entities is, for liberalism, a 
difficult step. While Breen relies on modifying assumptions about humanity and 
human-nature relations and diZerega on an enlarged understanding of individuality, 
Robyn Eckersley (1996a; 1996b) resorts to the 'rights discourse' as a "means of 
translating complex moral ideas about intrinsic value into ordinary political language 
and legislation" and thus to enlarge the moral community. She employs the liberal 
institution of rights and its underlying regulative ideal, autonomy, in a form of 
immanent critique with the purpose of connecting ecocentric values to democracy 
and thereby renovating liberal democratic processes and structures. From an 
ecocentric standpoint, Eckersley (1996a, 213) argues that it is "time to reevaluate and 
reframe notions of autonomy and justice in ways that reflect our changed ecological 
setting and understanding". This objective is best approached by utilizing existing 
regulative ideals and institutions in order to "challenge and gradually transform not 
only the form, style and content of democratic deliberation but also society's relation 
to nature". The rights discourse has played a pivotal role in strengthening democracy 
by extending the traditional political and civil rights guaranteed by the liberal 
revolutions, to subsequently include social and economic, and then development 
rights. There should then be no impediment to the emergence of a fourth generation 
of environmental rights to reflect the environmental revolution of the late twentieth 
century (Eckersley, 1996a, 220; 1996b, 177). She proffers the view that the 
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development of rights for nonhumans and environmental rights for humans would 
"furnish a further rationale for more substantial social and economic transformations 
towards ecological sustainability" (Eckersley, 1996b, 178). 
The use of the rights discourse is further justified by the argument that the 
connection between ecocentric values and democracy can be made at the level of 
principle so that environmental rights for humans can immediately be used to address 
'democratic deficits', identified as the under- or non-representation of the interests of 
non-citizens and the environmental welfare of citizens, while the inbuilt bias against 
long-term generalizable interests also makes rights an attractive proposition 
(Eckersley, 1996a, 215). Environmental rights can serve to alter the established 
framework of environmental debate in favour of environmental interests, thus having 
an effect similar to changing the parameters of the received view of human nature. 
As an existing and accepted theoretical framework, the rights discourse 
enables the comprehension and debate of the difficult notion of attributing moral 
standing to nonhumans in that it provides the language framework within which to 
argue for the autonomy of nonhuman entities as agents in their own right (Eckersley, 
1996b, 179). The principle of autonomy or the freedom of all living forms to unfold 
and flourish according to their own 'species-life' is applied to arguments for a more 
inclusive notion of autonomy and as a moral starting-point for the extension of rights 
to non-human entities. In mounting a case for humans to routinely account for the 
interests of nonhuman entities, Eckersley argues from conditions already existing in 
liberal democracies which allow for the imposition of restrictions on how people may 
exercise their entitlements in order that autonomy may be maximized for all citizens. 
Similarly, to arrive at a more inclusive notion of autonomy, she argues from the 
preconditions that enable autonomy to be exercised. For both premises to be realized 
moral standing must be generalized to all natural entities, both individual life forms 
and such natural entities as species and ecosystems. This advance in understanding 
can be achieved if, moral standing having been accorded to human and nonhuman 
individuals, the same moral priority can be assigned to the conditions of enablement, 
including ecological conditions. The implication for democratic citizens, 
individually and collectively, is that they should arrange their social systems so as to 
permit all entities to flourish, while the range of liberal entitlements would have to be 
realigned with the demands of ecological sustainability (Eckersley, 1996b, 223). An 
early subject for revision under this schema would be the moral justifications for 
Lockean property rights. The use of a more inclusive notion of autonomy therefore 
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represents an advance on minimalist human-centred arguments from the need to 
assure socially minimum environmental conditions with their base in welfare 
liberalism, which are simply not possessed of the theoretical resources to account for 
issues like biodiversity or ecological integrity. Yet it does not take a great leap of 
imagination to effect. 
Notwithstanding the efficacy of an adaptive approach, the rights discourse is 
not unproblematic for ecological sustainability. Liberal rights have been criticized by 
Benton (1993, 203), because they ignore the social and ecological embeddedness of 
individuals. The ecocentric critique, which holds that it is ecological 
interrelationship that constitutes the field of moral responsibility, is particularly 
problematic for the utilization of rights in environmental protection. Yet, Eckersley 
is reluctant to abandon rights because of their "protective, educational and 
transformational benefits" (Eckersley, 1996b, 192). Since their protective qualities 
have been instrumental in furthering minority interests, they should be able to do the 
same for ecological interests. She therefore enlists Warwick Fox's 'autopoietic 
intrinsic value theory' to overcome the problems presented by the individualism of 
rights entitlements. His is an argument for the attribution of intrinsic value to all 
those living individuals and entities which have a primary interest in "the 
regeneration of their own organizational activity and structure" (Fox, 1990, 171-172). 
The difference is that the entitlements available to autopoietic entities are relational 
and not individualistic, the rights of individual organisms being "framed in the 
context of the requirements of larger autopoietic entities, such as ecosystems, in ways 
which maximize the opportunities for both individuals and ecosystems ... to flourish" 
(Eckersley, 1996b, 189). 
Nevertheless, although an expanded notion of autonomy furnishes broad 
moral principles for human action, it runs into trouble with political-legal, 
definitional and other practical problems, not the least of which is the difficulty of 
defining the exact boundaries of ecological identities, which often nest or overlap. 
Similarly, the problem of representing the interests of nonhuman entities may be 
overcome at least to some degree by the appointment of political/legal guardians as 
suggested by Mills (1996, 110-111). However, that will not counter the tendency in 
polyarchical liberal democracy to disaggregate and downgrade the problems of 
ecology to the status of simply another interest (Dryzek, 1996a, 19). It must be 
concluded then that the rights discourse can be used influentially in the case for 
human environmental rights and even animal rights with little extrapolation from 
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existing human rights; however, it reaches its limits with collective entities 
(Eckersley, 1996b, • 190). Eckersley can only conclude that general ecological 
sustainability will have to rely on responsible human action through the 
precautionary principle and general sustainability planning (Eckersley, 1996b, 193). 
The weakness here is the difference in orientation identified between weak and 
strong sustainability - whether the objective is the maintenance of growth within 
environmental limits or the maintenance of ecosystemic and social viability. General 
ecological sustainability turns upon the degree of intrinsicality ascribed to the natural 
environment. 
This attempt to rejuvenate liberal democracy through an expansion of the 
scope of rights and• the extrapolation of rights to nonhuman entities informed by 
ecocentric insights is consistent with the adaptive criterion of green praxis. Liberal 
rights have been instrumental in furthering democracy through protecting the 
political, civil and socioeconomic conditions necessary for citizens to exercise 
political control. As Eckersley (1996a) remarks, the biophysical conditions of 
political and social life should be accorded the same importance. Biodiversity can be 
indirectly secured, at least to some degree, through environmental rights; however, 
more assured protection for ecological entities is dependent on further theoretical 
recovery of the notion of autonomy in preference to the privileging of individuality in 
order to strengthen and elaborate moral responsibility for autonomous development. 
Shifting from individuality to autonomy as the principle assumption underlying 
understanding of human nature would allow more profound points of continuity to be 
made between humans and other nature; thereby amplifying the communication 
between human and natural systems seen by Dryzek (1996a) as necessary for 
institutions to be ecologically rational. Finally, instantiating environmental rights in 
public environmental laws or perhaps in constitutional safeguards could act as a 
catalyst for more forthright action on global sustainability problems, if governments 
were required to be more effective in ensuring the protection of their citizens' rights 
to a healthy environment. Eckersley (1996a, 230) also envisages citizens' 
environmental rights as a vehicle for overcoming the implementation deficit which 
currently besets much environmental regulation and administration, while Mills 
(1996, 108) regards environmental rights as a basis for changing consciousness. 
While Eckersley relies on arguments from principle to rejuvenate liberal 
processes and structures, John Dryzek takes a more systematic approach to the 
institutional reconstruction of liberal democracy. His can be characterized as a 
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'quasi-extrinsic' approach in that he remains inside the liberal paradigm but looks 
beyond it to the principles of ecological democracy to criticize existing institutions 
and to search for more effective institutions, effectiveness being a measure of the 
degree to which communication between human and natural systems is promoted. 
Dryzek's ecological democracy is informed by two principle components, ecological 
rationality and communicative rationality. The former is used as a standard against 
which to judge the capacity of social institutions to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions (Dryzek, 1987, vii-viii), which largely involve problems of a commons 
nature (p. 11). Social choice mechanisms which have the capacity to respond to 
problems with a high degree of complexity and uncertainty are characterized by 
negative feedback mechanisms, coordination across different problems and actors, 
and particular performance capacities of robustness, flexibility and resilience, which 
enable them to respond to and correct for changing internal and external conditions. 
Polyarchical liberal democracies and their constituent social choice mechanisms are 
judged against these criteria to be ecologically irrational. Negative feedback is 
limited to oppositional politics; coordination is limited by the emphasis on individual 
interests; liberal democracy's atomistic tendencies mean that complex problems can 
only be treated in a disaggregated manner and responses only piecemeal; while 
resilience is compromised by short-term electoral cycles and a "general addiction to 
the 'political solvent' of economic growth" (Dryzek, 1996a, 16). General failure 
across the criteria of ecological rationality means that liberal democracies distort the 
signals emanating from natural systems and this plus the rigidities identified 
previously means that they are insufficiently adaptable and flexible in the face of 
social and ecological crisis. 
The second component of ecological democracy, communicative rationality, 
defines political systems where communication between subjects is said to be 
uncoerced, undistorted and engaged by competent individuals. The communicatively 
rational polity is distinguished by attention to 'generalizable' interests pursued 
through rational discussion, in contrast to liberal polyarchies where particular 
interests employ instrumentalizing strategies to protect and cement their interests 
with the result that any consensus generated can only be a less than satisfactory 
compromise between competing interests (Dryzek, 1987, 202). The practical reason 
of communicative rationality - through attention to shared norms, values, interests 
and purposes - acts to facilitate coordination across actors and problems, the lack of 
which results in commons degradation and problem displacement, issues which 
liberal democracy is only fitted to address in a limited way. This discursive 
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rationality, which takes political form as discursive democracy, Dryzek (1990, Ch. 3, 
esp. p.70) holds, is better able to cope with complex problems because it is oriented 
to "intersubjective understanding and the generation of action-oriented consensus". 
Notwithstanding these apparent strengths, a discursive democracy is not 
guaranteed to be able to address problems of ecological sustainability even if it can 
accommodate complexity. To be able to contend with the uncertainty and 
complexity of human/nature interactions, social choice mechanisms must also 
embody a purposeful orientation to signals emanating from nature. A precondition 
for such an orientation is the acceptance of agency in natural entities, which are 
recognized to possess an interest in their self-realization (Mathews, 1991, 98). Such 
an acknowledgement necessitates the design of institutions in which communication 
is undistorted by the kind of instrumentalizing strategic action which privileges 
particular interests. These institutions promote communication between human and 
natural systems more effectively than those that approach nature instrumentally. The 
appropriate attitude underpinning ecologically communicative institutions is 
expressed as a respect for signals emanating from the natural world similar to that 
which we would accord communication emanating from human subjects (Dryzek, 
1996a, 20-21). A polity which is both discursive (oriented to common purposes) and 
sensitive to ecological signals is an ecological democracy. It is both 
communicatively and ecologically rational. 
Like Eckersley, Dryzek is acutely aware of the demands of praxis. His is 
probably the most succinct and purposeful body of work oriented to the development 
of a green praxis. His seminal work, Rational Ecology, has its foundation in 
Aristotelian "practical reason" and the Habermasian critique of the domination of 
modern life by instrumental reason. Subsequently the communicative rationality 
aspects were more fully developed into discursive democracy and thereafter these 
insights evolved into the ecologically communicative ideal. It is this ideal which 
Dryzek employs as a regulative touchstone to highlight the deficiencies of existing 
democratic liberal institutions and as a normative guide for the design of new 
institutions. 
Where ecological democracy is used as a regulative ideal, the object would be 
to maximize effectiveness of communication between human and natural worlds. 
Consequently, where communicative effectiveness is the measure of the output of 
institutions (rather than efficiency of throughput), the implications for the form and 
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scale of existing institutions are considerable. The size and shape of institutions 
should match the scale and the nature of problems. The small-scale, decentralized, 
self-reliant living model is appropriate for communities which can respond to and 
look after their local environment, while problems of a global nature will require a 
global response. 
The ecologically communicative ideal exposes some "gross failings" in liberal 
democracies principally to do with distortions to signals from the environment. The 
hierarchical arrangements of administrative bureaucracies distort signals through 
censorship and filtering of information across levels, while "autistic" markets 
respond only to human preferences expressed solely in monetary terms (Dryzek, 
1996a, 25-26). Markets will punish market actors by curtailing profitability when 
these actors seek to take other values into account (notwithstanding the fact that some 
consumers may adopt green consumerist practices). The scale and scope of existing 
mechanisms also fails to match the size and scope of ecological problems. The 
globalization of markets, for example, overwhelms local signals and international 
competitiveness is used by sectoral interests to suppress local opposition to the 
overexploitation of local resources. 
On the question of effective praxis, like Eckersley, Dryzek (1987, ix) makes 
use of an existing language framework, the discourse of rationality, arguing that one 
has to use the language that one is trying to transcend. Accordingly, he puts the 
language of the dominant instrumental-analytic rational discourse to use in dissecting 
present social choice and to demonstrate that existing forms fail when evaluated 
against the criteria of ecological rationality; they are subject to a universal failing and 
that is the tendency to displace rather than solve problems (Dryzek, 1987, 12-13). As 
a counter to instrumental rationality, he draws on the alternative tradition of practical 
reason, argued by Habermas to be underdeveloped in modern societies. Practical 
reason is more suited to problems of the ecological commons because it "involves the 
rational scrutiny and generation of purposes as well as means, and proceeds 
pedagogically and communally rather than instrumentally and privately, ... accepting 
only a participatory, discursive kind of collective problem-solving" (Dryzek, 1987, 
13). Possible sites where a communicative rationality can be engaged are in the 
public spheres of civil society. Here discursive associations, separate from the 
instrumentalizing influences of state and market, may be "constituted around 
particular risks, social problems or policy issues" (Dryzek, 1995, 10). Thus a local 
community whose watershed is at risk of contamination from forestry operations may 
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organize to gather evidence against such state-sponsored and ecologically damaging 
activities. It is this kind of communicatively rational action which keeps 
instrumental action in check and which can contribute to the development of an 
autonomous civil society that countervails the dominance of state and market spheres 
and leads to better integration of political and ecological communication. 
Although Dryzek himself has warned on several occasions of the dangers of 
using ecology for a single blueprint (see Dryzek, 1987, Ch. 4 ex parte; Dryzek, 
1996a, 18), ecological democracy, being deliberative rather than instrumental, is 
theoretically inherently antithetic to blueprints or prescriptive ideologies. By the 
same measure, neither does it predispose to an authoritarian politics. As its 
objectives are the enhancement of existing democratic qualities and ecological values 
(Dryzek, 1995, 1), its starting point is in actually existing democracy, and ecological 
democracy can thus be said to be more concerned with processes than with end-
states. Further, being non-prescriptive should as a corollary encourage a diversity of 
ecological ideals and goals. Lastly, as ecological democracy is grounded in practical 
reason, it should conduce to self-critical modes of responsible action. Institutional 
designs which embody the principles of an ecologically democratic ideal would, as a 
matter of course, include mechanisms for ongoing self-evaluation. This quality is 
essential if institutions are to be capable of flexibility and resilience in the face of 
internal and external structural perturbations. The rigidities of liberal democracy 
mean that it is ill-equipped in this respect (Dryzek, 1987, 245-246). Bureaucratic 
administration and legal systems frustrate structural change while markets punish 
governments which attempt social transformation likely to threaten economic 
interests. Moreover, existing self-reflective mechanisms - ombudsmen, commissions 
of enquiry and so on - are found to be quite vulnerable to the influence which can be 
exerted by entrenched interests. They may find themselves under-resourced or 
subjected to systematic criticism when perceived to threaten such interests. 
On the whole, ecological democracy is predisposed to iterative rather than 
formalist institutional innovation (Dryzek, 1987). This is not to say that de novo 
design is not necessary. Indeed, the capacity for continuous innovation is an essential 
characteristic of the adaptive society. It is just that ecological democracy does not 
conduce to wholesale, revolutionary transformation of the 'clean-slate' sort. The 
extent of ecological democratization processes can be judged by the extent to which 
the political franchise and scope and the authenticity of democratic processes 
together with the degree of political greening have progressed. The latter process 
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may involve the degree to which the interests of nonhuman entities are recognized 
and represented or whether an increasing sensitivity to a safe, clean environment for 
human interests is a political objective (Dryzek, 1995, 1). However, for human 
development to be ecologically sustainable in an era of global risk, nonhuman 
interests must be formally configured into democratic political arrangements. The 
risks are simply too inordinate to leave the emergence of green democratic structures 
to evolutionary chance. 
We are then left with the perennial problem of ecological consciousness. 
Dryzek's position is that the structure of political systems makes a great deal of 
difference to the likelihood of green values being realized (Dryzek, 1996a, 12-17), 
that is, that green values need green structures. The present political economy of 
liberal capitalism embodies certain imperatives to do with maintaining a profitable 
business environment which influence the system to foster values synchronous with 
an instrumental-analytic rationality and which produces a certain type of personality, 
the rational egoist (Dryzek, 1996b, Ch. 5). The qualities of the rational egoist, short-
term, calculating, competitive and egoistic behaviours, are incompatible with the 
qualities of the responsible and other-oriented ecological self. It is precisely because 
there are limited prospects for the reconciliation of economic and ecological values 
that Dryzek advocates that ecological democratization processes be instigated and 
supported in civil society in opposition to state and economy and that the democratic 
forms so instituted take not only an oppositional stance but that they be used to 
reclaim control of particular areas of life from the state's ambit (Dryzek, 1995, 9-10; 
Dryzek, 1996c, 480; see also Dryzek, 1996c on the benefits of an exclusionary state 
for democratization; but see also Davidson, 1995 on the limits to the practice of 
ecological democracy in a corporatist state). It is therefore in civil society's 
autonomous spheres organized around "particular risks, social problems or policy 
issues" and most particularly when issues of social sustainability are integrated with 
issues of ecological sustainability that the emergence of ecological consciousness 
will be facilitated. 
The ecological self or ecological personality is a primary focus of the 
extrinsic critique of liberal democracy. That this critique is concerned with questions 
of selfhood relates to its stance on what is seen as the structural failure of liberal 
democracy, which is underlain by factors intrinsic to its philosophical and moral 
foundations. The systemic faults identified by the extrinsic critique are used to 
demonstrate that contemporary responses of liberal democracies to issues of the 
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ecological commons and future generations are ultimately limited unless the 
philosophic foundations of liberalism are also reworked. The themes that 
consequently suffuse this radical critique revolve around questions of ontology, 
identity and citizenship, the morality of public discourse, and issues of the political 
and social structures likely to foster ecological consciousness and responsible human 
development. 
Liberal democracy is perceived by this critique to have failed both democracy 
and ecology (Plumwood, 1996, 134). It is this recognition of liberalism as a failed 
expression of the emancipatory project together with its increasing vulnerability 
(Barns, 1996, 103) that provides the impetus for alternative radical democratic 
designs. The radical ecocentric critique of liberal democracy interprets its failure to 
respond in anything but a limited way to the ecological crisis as a measure of its 
democratic shortcomings, while the ecofeminist critique posits the western project of 
rational mastery, and its dualisms of public/private, mind/body and reason/nature, 
which have shaped its institutions and allowed antidemocratic and antinature 
elements to dominate, as the cause of democracy's partial subversion (Plumwood, 
1996). 
In ecofeminist discussion the public/private dichotomy's role in democratic 
deficits is explained by the positioning of economic activities in the private sphere, as 
a result of which production and consumption are largely exempted from democratic 
scrutiny. Because economic management is excised from public discourse, so too are 
large areas of ecological impact (Plumwood, 1996, 145-147, 153). Under the 
influence of an aggressive economic liberalism, with its privatization, deregulation 
and marketization ideologies, public responsibility for the provision of collective life 
recedes and with it the public sphere: "[P]rivate interests are emphasised to the point 
of irresponsibility and many of the forms of collective life essential to the flourishing 
of nature lead an increasingly precarious and marginalized existence" (Plumwood, 
1996, 146). 
Additionally, Plumwood identifies endemic privilege and growing inequality, 
accentuated by neoliberal policies, as a hindrance to communication and information 
flows, distorting decision-making and further reducing responsiveness to social and 
ecological dysfunction. "Mnequality acts both as a barrier to information and 
feedback on degradation and its human impacts, and to responsiveness to this 
information" (Plumwood, 1996, 140). The social polarization that accompanies 
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inequality creates instability through insecurity and dependency compounding the 
distortions to information flows resulting from censorship, the filtering processes in 
administrative hierarchies, media manipulation, and symbolic politics. 
The downgrading of public life is interpreted by feminists in part to be a 
function of individual identification with the private sphere, with the public life of 
citizenship and politics only instrumental to the private. Thus the radical disjunction 
between a rational, instrumental public sphere and an emotional, empathic private 
sphere means that actually existing liberalism cannot generate public moral regard. 
At best public expressions of care and responsibility for nature and future generations 
are restricted to narrowly instrumental forms of public policy (Plumwood, 1996, 
155), while social expression is limited to protest politics, interest group politics, or 
green consumerism. Those who attempt to expound an ethic of care are destined to 
clash with the instrumental rationality of the public sphere. They will necessarily be 
perceived as extremists, unless practices of care and responsibility are extended to 
those areas from which they are now excluded, production/consumption, public life 
and nature. 
Liberal democracy's narrow perception of citizenship as political 
representation and the concomitant non-recognition of economic and ecological 
citizenship is located in a form of mind/body dualism. This is explained by 
liberalism's limited recognition of agency in political representation but also its 
ignorance of agency in the material sphere of economic production, household and 
ecological life. Remedying the underdevelopment of democracy is thus located in 
extending citizenship and thus responsibility to these excluded key areas of the 
economic sphere, the household and areas of collective ecological concern. 
Similarly, the reinvigoration of political community is assumed to be the key to a 
democratic order in which individual identity is expressed as both public and private 
virtue. 
While furnishing fruitful insights into the nature of democratic deficits and 
the ecological failure of liberal democracy, the dualisms concept can also yield 
insights into the viability of sustainable development strategies. As a number of 
authors (including Barns, 1996 and Kinrade, 1995) have observed, the response to 
sustainability imperatives has generally occurred simultaneously with the ascendancy 
of market liberalism, with the result that the challenge of the Brundtland Report of 
1987 has been met, not with the collective social response that it advocated, but with 
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neo-classical free market environmentalism (Barns, 1996, 118). As Barns points out, 
market instruments are useful for guiding individual actors into more 
environmentally acceptable behaviours, but they are devoid of the conceptual 
resources to forge common interests and purposes. He warns that the resources to 
deal with commons problems will only be found where there is a sense of shared 
identity and common purpose. 
• Free market environmentalism also favours privatization of commons 
resources on the understanding that private owners are more likely to assume 
responsibility for their welfare. This strategy continues dependence on the Lockean 
individualist basis of property formation which has proved extremely doubtful in 
resource conservation (Kinrade, 1995). It perpetuates the denial of the dependence 
and legitimation of property formation on collective forms of social life (Plumwood, 
1996, 148), the case for which had been argued by Kant in the eighteenth century. 
Free market and privatization strategies not only compound ecological 
irresponsibility, but they also prevent the generation of common purpose and identity. 
Rather, these policy instruments, grounded as they are in assumptions of rational 
individualism, cannot produce community-minded and ecologically responsible 
individuals but only self-interested rational egoists and "end up producing more of 
the problems they set out to solve" (Dryzek, 1996b, 69-70). Additionally, as the 
negation of ecological interrelatedness is instrumentalized in the structures of 
property formation, the market and production (Plumwood, 1996, 149), the 
deployment of conventional neoliberal economic instruments in EM processes can, 
as earlier concluded, only represent a defective response to commons problems. 
Moreover, the reason/nature dualism underpinning contemporary liberalism, 
in privileging 'mind-people', managers and professionals, will tend to favour 
technocratic (that is, rationalistic, managerialist) responses to sustainability problems. 
Those social groups which continue to be associated with the body and things 
corporeal - women, children, manual workers and other outsiders - will also continue 
to be excluded from rational decision-making. The point has also been made that the 
purposeful extension of participation, as advocated by normatively-inspired 
sustainability strategies, will not necessarily mean the inclusion of those who most 
need to be included: "Extending formal participative structures may mean little 
unless we can rework the dualisms ... and reconcile the anciently divided spheres of 
nature and culture". These are the "increasingly urgent and convergent tasks of 
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creating a society in which both human freedom and nature can flourish" (Plumwood, 
1996, 163; see also Pateman, 1989, 220-223; and Phillips, 1991, 42-46). 
The radical critique of liberal democracy furnishes a public ecological ethic, 
which, it is argued, is a precondition for the solution of commons problems and 
without which any expressions of care and responsibility, can only manifest in the 
private sphere. For this reason, green consumerism can only represent a limited 
demonstration of ecological care for it relies on the responsible behaviour of the 
private individual, whereas the problems of resource use should in fact be the subject 
of public consideration around issues of technology and production. The 
confinement of responsibility to individual consumer and producer preferences 
means that those areas relating to the economic sphere, which should be subject to 
democratic control, remain unremarked. Individual producers may attempt to act 
responsibly but they remain at risk of market punishment. 
The extrinsic critique of existing democracy posits a radically responsive 
alternative, which has limited pretensions to practical implementation. It does 
however perform the role of regulative ideal against which to appraise the democratic 
effectiveness and ecological responsiveness of existing democracy. Its public 
ecological ethic substantially enlarges understanding of the arenas of responsible 
action, which I have established as the ethical/moral core of green praxis. It 
envisages the democratic community as more than simply a procedural republic; 
rather it is conceived as a moral community. 
Feminist insights into the nature of dualisms, which inform radical 
democracy, can be used to measure the ecological effectiveness of conventional 
sustainability strategies grounded in rationalism and a private ethic of individualism. 
As an ideal it highlights the structural flaws which liberalism has inherited from the 
rational mastery project and the rigidities that they generate. It reveals that 
overcoming liberal democracy's democratic and ecological failure is not a simple 
matter of fostering ecological consciousness, tinkering with the odd assumption, or 
refashioning its institutions. At base, reuniting culture and nature and thus 
addressing the difficult and complex problems of ecological sustainability is 
ultimately dependent on transcending liberal democracy's foundational assumptions. 
For Barns (1996, 126-127), the reconstruction of the emancipatory tradition as a 
thicker form of public dialogue also requires the retrieval of metaphysical and 
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spiritual resources indispensible for the formation of selfhood, community and public 
life in an ecologically responsive democracy. 
A related facet of the concern for contemporary liberalism's dearth of moral 
resources is its capacity to furnish the social conditions necessary for the emergence 
of an ecological consciousness. Its deficiency in this latter respect is attributed to the 
priority accorded to self-rule and the concomitant lack of an intrinsic concern for 
others (Mathews, 1996, 71). Liberal institutions promote an abstract individualism 
and not a culture of altruism, empathy or the non-instrumental identification with 
others and their interests. In order to generate different modes of ontology and 
identity as bases for the development of empathy with other humans and nonhumans 
as well as forms of society suited to the shaping of human identity along lines more 
conducive to empathic relationship, Mathews proposes ecocommunitarianism as the 
primary political prerequisite. She uses the ideal of the 'relational self to argue for 
particular sets of political conditions likely to foster empathic development. The 
identity of the relational self is determined by systems of relationships and it these to 
which priority is given rather than to individuals. Power is also vested in the 
relations of communication between the elements of the structure rather than in 
individual nodes. In the relational model, it is the quality of communication which is 
important for empathic development. 
The relational communities in Mathews' model are distinguished from liberal 
democratic communities in the means of self-realization: "[T]he end of liberal forms 
of democracy is to free individuals from political domination and to enhance their 
sense of autonomy, while that of community is to bring individuals out of self-
absorption, into sympathy with others" (Mathews, 1996, 82). These are socially 
binding communities with obligations and responsibilities and no room for the 
radical autonomy of liberal individual freedom. Autonomy in a relational community 
has to be redefined as 'freedom for' rather than 'freedom from'. 
Notwithstanding the problematics of the notion of community identified in 
green political discourse (see the discussion by Kenny, 1996), Mathews' attempt to 
give her model political substance does address an area largely ignored in the same 
discourse, namely the transnational political economy. The lattice model of 
communities is used in prototypical fashion for a praxis of global resistance. The 
increasing subordination of social life to the imperatives of globalizing capital is 
extrapolated to a future scenario of nation-state impotence and corporate dominance 
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of political and economic power - a kind of corporate feudalism, where first 
allegiances of employees are to corporate employers. Employees are seen as 
medieval vassals, while those whose services are not needed are discarded. Her 
defensive response is a relational model of political structure based around 
transnational networks of resistance. The rationale for their potential effectiveness is 
grounded in the prospect of reproducing, via resistance networks ranged across many 
countries, sufficient pressure applied at the cash-till to exert some control on 
transnational corporations which, in her scenario, with the withering away of the 
nation-state, come to stand outside the law. 
There is of course no reason to wait for this worrying trend to become fully 
established. There have been recent instances of the strategy's effective use, namely, 
the boycott of Shell's retail outlets in Europe which forced the abandonment of the 
disposal by sinking of the Brentspar and a review of that particular method of 
disposing of decommissioned oil-rigs. Similarly the rainforest action groups which 
link people from developed countries with indigenous peoples reliant on the 
rainforest constitute another such international network which can pressure 
governments that allow and encourage rainforest destruction and those that permit 
the import of rainforest timber (Thompson, 1996, 42). 
Janna Thompson (1996, 37) too, perceives potential in networks which 
promote transnational, cooperative relations of mutual obligation and practical 
relationship. These connections "can encourage people to sympathise with others 
and regard themselves as having a responsibility for each other's wellbeing". They 
are relational networks which have the possibility of transcending the insularity of 
conventional communities. Thus Thompson divines in contradictory globalizing and 
localizing trends, that is, the defense of community and cultural integrity against 
globalizing forces and the countering trend towards transnational institutions, the 
rudiments of opportunities for the creation of links and therefore transnational 
communities of mutual concern, responsibility and practical aid (Thompson, 1996, 
41-45). These too are communities grounded in practical reason. 
6.3: Conclusion 
Ecodemocrat critics have mounted a telling critique of liberal democracy's 
failure to further processes of democratization and to ensure ecological sustainability. 
Radical ecodemocrats would attempt to transcend liberal democracy by constructing 
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a democratic polity based around a relational ontology on the ground that its 
philosophical foundations need to be reworked and the ontology of radical 
individualism replaced with an ontology of the relational self. The approach taken by 
other ecodemocrats, that is, of partial modification of its philosophical assumptions 
and regulative ideals, is less likely to be subject to the problems of revolutionary 
action implicit in any course of radical utopian change. 
The test of any programme of reform or restructuring is its prospectivity for 
transcendence of what are the most pressing and intransigent obstacles to progressing 
environmental debate and sustainability. These problems largely resolve themselves 
into issues of structure and issues of agency. Structural problems include the 
expansionist logic of the capitalist market economy and its constituent imperatives 
which also limit the potential of the state to assume environmental responsibility; 
democratic deficits which account for the non-control of production and consumption 
decisions; implementation deficits in existing environmental protection legislation; 
and a proneness of liberal democratic political economy to short-termism and 
problem displacement. On the agency side, difficulties are experienced with 
population policy and planning, a rampant individualist consumerism, restricted 
dispersal of an ecological sensibility, and increasing inequality. 
From regulation theory the conclusion was reached that sustainable modes of 
production would only obtain if sustainability was pursued across all the spheres of 
life, economic, social, political and ecological, and at a variety of social and spatial 
scales. Given the limiting conditions outlined above, namely the limitations from 
praxis and the structure/agency difficulties, the questions to be asked of the 
modifications to liberal democracy proposed by ecological theorists are: 
Can the modifications overcome the most pressing obstacles to sustainability? 
To what extent will they contribute to general sustainability? 
Which reconstructive proposals are most prospective? 
Given the seemingly overwhelming and entrenched nature of the 
impediments, the most likely successful reconstructive programme lies in extensions 
to the existing structure of liberal democracy. Hence arguments for an extension of 
the rights regime to rights to a healthy environment or arguments from equity, both 
established discourses within liberalism, would most probably find greater purchase 
than reformulating its philosophical foundations. As Eckersley notes, environmental 
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rights would provide more legal force for existing environmental legislation, thus 
addressing the problem of implementation deficits. Their adoption might also act as 
a brake on the expansionist logic of capitalist accumulation (presently largely 
unfettered as a result of the prevalence of neoliberal policy influences) and, by 
extension, modify production and consumption preferences. Unfortunately 
individual rights cannot generate the common purpose necessary to address commons 
issues, although they can act as a priming agent in extending environmental 
awareness and understanding. This shortcoming may be partially remedied by the 
extension of rights to collective entities. Rural communities, for example, might 
have a collective, legally enforceable entitlement to water catchments, uncontam-
inated by pesticides and herbicides from forestry, agricultural or mining activities. 
The distributive justice tradition within liberalism has been shown to be 
prospective as a foundation for arguments concerning the liveability of the planet. 
As a healthy environment is taken to be a precondition for moral development, either 
from the restraint or inverse restraint principles, or from the need to ensure a socially 
minimum condition, these are arguments which can overcome existing 
implementation deficits while a prohibition against the production of harms might 
see the imposition of more stringent legal curbs and the onus of proof placed on 
polluters. It would also see the more purposeful inclusion of population issues, 
presently, avoided as too difficult, on the political agenda. In particular, the 
unsustainability of some urban concentrations might similarly receive more concerted 
attention if these principles were invoked. 
Such extensions to existing liberal concepts would serve the same function as 
the addition of a skylight, bay window or conservatory to a seemingly outmoded 
building, that of opening up previously latent potential occluded by the dimness of 
the old spaces. In these enlightened spaces might be found the latitude to begin 
consideration of alternative interpretations of liberalism's foundational principles and 
ideals - autonomy, individuality, self-interest, human uniqueness, justice and equality 
- and thence to expand the moral community, which, it is generally agreed among 
ecocentric theorists, is a precondition for the ecologically responsible society. 
However, it must be said that the genesis of such a moral progression must 
arise from practical experience, reflection and democratic participation. This means 
inaugurating opportunities for citizens to discern and comprehend the points of 
contiguity, continuity and resemblance between themselves and other natural entities 
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in order to generate empathic relationships and bring liberal self-interest to 
completion. Initially these opportunities will be in communities' defense of their 
livelihoods, cultural heritage, and natural environment against the monocultural 
influence of market capitalism. The discursive designs envisaged by Dryzek are 
oriented to the kind of public moral discourse about ends which is absent from liberal 
democratic politics, but of which there are hopeful glimmers in the formation of 
groups in civil society organized around local problems, environmental issues and 
risks. 
Moreover, to be ecologically sustainable, institutions must foster ecologically 
responsible attitudes and personalities. This will imply modifications to the 
economic imperatives of the liberal political economy and making the sustainability 
imperative more compelling so that there is engendered a more principled adherence 
to the latter, rather than it being considered as an optional extra for times when the 
economic fundamentals are healthy. It will entail quite radical changes in the culture 
of educational institutions, particularly universities, which contribute substantially to 
ecological irrationality in the production of increasing numbers of graduates imbued 
with antiecological rationalities, in law, business management and economics. 
Transforming the ontology of liberal democracy is more likely to be achieved 
by the initial refurbishment of its existing foundations. Thus individuality and its 
importance for human freedom might be retained and enlarged by deepening its 
understanding. This might be achieved from a communitarian perspective of self-in-
community, which recognizes cultural influences on the self but does not submerge 
the self (Barns, 1996, 122). The essential characteristic of communal relationships, 
whether local, regional or global, is that they engender respect and understanding of 
other community members and their needs, as well as a sense of mutual obligation, 
which are preconditions for relations of empathy. 
While I have been largely concerned to draw out the prospectivity for 
sustainability of each of the reconstructive proposals outlined in the discussion, there 
may also be some value in pulling together their points of intersection. Firstly, the 
fact that, aside from Wissenburg's minimalist reconstruction, all have, as a 
foundational premise, the acceptance of agency in and consequently the extention of 
moral recognition to nonhuman entities, indicates that a significant ethical reversal is 
required of existing liberalism. Secondly, these discussions - which theorize such 
matters as the need for a more inclusive notion of autonomy (Eckersley), the need for 
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a richer understanding of individuality (diZerega), the need for a broader conception 
of the good (Achterberg), and the need to expand liberalism's sphere of interests - all 
have, as an underlying concern, the problem of the primacy of the individual in 
liberal democratic theory. The picture they present is of a distorted notion of 
autonomy and a truncated notion of individuality, wherein individual autonomy is 
confused with radical individualism. This leaves the liberal individual poorly 
equipped to cope with the strong moral demands of sustainability imperatives. 
Thirdly, many of the proposed responses to these perceived deficiencies 
revolve around the revalorization of the collectivity and community and therefore 
redressing the problems posed by rampant individualism. Thus, Barns's public 
ecological ethic enlarges the arenas of responsible action from the individual to the 
collective and attempts to redress the charge of the procedural republic's moral 
thinness. Mathew's lattice model and Thompson's relational networks promote 
empathic development (essential to diZerega's more complete individuality) through 
practical aid between communities and the fostering of mutual obligation, while for 
Dryzek the key to effective communication between human and natural systems is in 
maximizing the integration of political and ecological communication, again in 
discursive communities. 
Taken together these contributions to ecodemocratic theory represent a 
significant body of argument for the reformulation of liberal democracy's 
foundational assumptions, ideals and its democratic practice. It is now clear that 
without significant reconstruction, the serious issues of ecological sustainability are 
unlikely to attain any prominence on the political agendas of liberal democracies. 
The impediments arrayed against the adoption of ecologically sound norms, values 
and practices are so comprehensive as to necessitate the use of a little "metaphorical 
imagination" (Buttimer, 1993, 79). The most appropriate metaphor which explains 
liberalism as a "form of arrested development" (Plumwood, 1996, 147) is that of the 
rebellious, egoistic adolescent who, in the self-identification process, selfishly 
demands his/her rights regardless of the effects on other family members, yet is 
reluctant to quit the material comfort, certainty and security of the family home and is 
therefore slow to assume responsible adulthood. Liberal democratic capitalism, in 
freeing itself of the shackles of its authoritarian feudal parent, has provided a 
comfortable degree of material welfare and certainty through heteronomous legal 
protection supported by a variety of rights, but has not, as envisaged by Hume 
(1969[1739], Bk. III, Sect. 2, 551), seen any "progress of the sentiments". The 
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emergent adult metaphor also provides clues to the direction liberalism might seek to 
develop its adolescent sentiments and thus to overcome the limits it places on 
democracy. In time morally mature adults are able to transcend the self-centredness 
of youth and to concern themselves with the wider social context, with the wellbeing 
of both personal and social relationships. A mature liberalism would reformulate 
those foundational assumptions which privilege individual independence and 
resituate justice and the rights that protect it in a framework of interdependency in 
order to overcome the tension, characteristic of liberal democracies, between 
individual and common interests. As diZerega (1996b, 715) remarks, "the 'self' in 
its commonsense meaning is at best a way station". In this, he echoes the sentiments 
expressed by Hume (1969[1739], 551): 
Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of 
justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the 
moral approbation, which attends that virtue. 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1: Introduction 
This thesis argues that the general social malaise of the late twentieth century 
bears many similarities to that which afflicted Western Europe in the seventeenth 
century, but that the present malaise is marked by two critical additional components, 
namely the global and the ecological. Just as the philosophes of that earlier time 
discerned the need to rethink the prevailing systems of values, knowledge and social 
organization underpinning all aspects of life, it is maintained that there is now a 
similar need to review the values, knowledges and institutions of liberal democratic 
modes of governance and examine their capacity to address the social and ecological 
crises of our time. The ideas and institutions which have evolved in response to the 
demands of life in the seventeenth century, that is the need for certainty and stability • 
and freedom from arbitrary control, are insufficiently flexible and adaptive to meet 
the present day crises of a burgeoning human population, cultural diversity, global 
interdependence and ecological instability. 
Furthermore, not only are existing social arrangements and their foundational 
values and ways of knowing limited in their capacity to respond to these novel 
conditions, but the ecological crisis itself is symptomatic of this general ethical, 
epistemological and institutional vacuum. Liberal democracies, as the offspring of 
that earlier period of social turmoil, appear to be reaching the limit of their capacity 
to address environmental issues in particular even if the problems of democratic and 
implementation deficits could be surmounted. 
The ethical and institutional frameworks necessary to meet these emerging 
conditions and to allow humans to live sustainably have so far manifested only 
embryonically. However, just as in the early modern period social change was 
preceded by a general breakdown of trust in established institutions, so among 
citizens in western democracies there can be discerned a rising level of distrust in the 
capacity of governments and political systems to provide for general social need. 
Indeed, under the influence of the ideology of economic fundamentalism, 
governments have tended to abdicate many of their social responsibilities, resulting 
in declining general welfare and the upward ratcheting of social resources. In the 
private sector those institutions, such as banks, which originated with a social 
purpose, have also abrogated their social responsibilities under the same ideological 
influence. The interests of economic and governing elites now overlap so thoroughly 
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that economic and political spheres appear to many citizens to be completely self-
serving and utterly unresponsive. 
Under these conditions of deteriorating trust, one function of environmental 
political thought is to bring forward for consideration the context of the institutional 
arrangements of modern life. The background conditions of modern life have been 
largely ignored in favour of a preoccupation with individual choice and empirical 
events (Lynch and Wells, 1996). This is true especially in systems of neoclassical 
economics. The advent of an ecological crisis reveals the repression of the enabling 
conditions of political, economic and social life to have been a flawed strategy, for, 
as was argued in Chapter 3, a worthwhile human life is dependent on integrating 
foreground with background conditions. 
7.2: Rethinking Enlightenment Ideals 
The ecological and social crises call into serious question the continuing 
efficacy of the ideals of the Enlightenment philosophes of a rational social order 
founded on equality and justice and human emancipation achieved through the 
technological transcendence of nature. The rational order has turned dangerously 
irrational and is threatening existence itself. The crises engendered by the rational 
mastery ideal now raise serious questions about the level of risk to which the world's 
ecosystems are being subjected and have consequently precipitated renewed 
theoretical interest in the rationalities driving economic activity. Theorists have been 
critical of the dominance of instrumental rationalities over modern life since the time 
of Weber, but the recent emergence of an environmental ethic represents a 
particularly intense challenge to the rationalities which have come to submerge 
values in all life spheres except the spheres of economy and administration. Of 
crucial importance in explicating an alternative ecological rationality have been John 
Dryzek's efforts, firstly, in making the connections between environmental decline 
and the instrumental rationalities of business, science and bureaucracy and secondly 
in exposing the ecological irrationality of the social choice mechanisms relied upon 
by modern societies. 
In the light of Dryzek's analysis, this research endeavours to demonstrate that 
solutions to ecological problems which rely solely on technical responses or 
individualistic market strategies, such as the privatization of commons resources, 
cost benefit analysis and so on, are limited in their utility because they are neither 
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communicatively nor ecologically rational. The legacy of Enlightenment modes of 
thought and the ascendancy of economic liberalism which favour applications of 
technology and bureaucratic management to solve problems limits and retards the 
possible range of responses to environmental and social crises. 
This failure to generate an adequate response has also focussed attention onto 
the ideal of progress as the process of human emancipation. As the vehicle of 
progress, economic growth has meant material welfare for perhaps a sixth of the 
world's population but for the majority it remains an illusion. Progress premised on 
economic growth can now be credited with burgeoning ecological and social costs 
resulting in what Arendt called the "anarchy of progress" (cited in Beck, 1995a, 65). 
The failure of technical transcendence to human social and moral progress combined 
with the rising social and ecological costs of its pursuit results in a growing 
disenchantment, which for many, it seems, can only be lessened by consumption, 
since other values and the goods that they valorize have been diminished. 
On the basis of these failings, a number of authors argue for a different 
objective for progress. Self (1993, 276), for example, puts the case for a qualitative 
adjustment to economic growth and its replacement with an ideal centred on 
enhancing the quality of life, while Craig Kuennen (1994, 62) argues that we do not 
have to give up on development but that it can be achieved by "less domineering 
means" through eschewing technical transcendence in favour of a co-adaptationist 
model of technology. This is a model wherein human action is harmonized and 
coevolves with the external environment. One of the objectives of non-domineering 
technologies is to maintain sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing external 
conditions, an objective which is beyond the capacity of many existing technologies. 
Thus the motor vehicle and its huge supporting infrastructure is the example par 
excellence of a rigid technology, which continues to consume an inordinate 
proportion of resources and to dominate its environment in spite of its universally 
acknowledged detrimental side-effects. Kuennen (1994, 63) maintains that "a true 
mark of progress will be the increasing transformation of our niche from its present 
disorganized mix of rigid, competing structures into an organized set of flexible 
components as compatible with each other as they are with the external 
environment". 
Other theorists, such as Eder (1990b), hold that to escape the dominant 
European vision of progress requires the recovery of the communicative tradition in 
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western thought. Eder contends that progress results not only from technical 
development but also discursive communication which opens up opportunities 
foreclosed by technical rationality. Here Montainge's ideas on progress have much 
relevance for the present. For this early humanist, individual progress consisted in 
advancing towards wisdom, while social progress could be measured by the growth 
in creativity and the diversity of reality. 
Sustainable progress implies the almost complete reversal of many current 
trends relating to quantitative growth and the eschewal of linear progress. If progress 
is to be retained as the myth enshrining human hopes for the future, it will need to be 
reoriented to furthering quality of life aspects and to adaptive technologies. There 
are just too many human lives which have not benefitted from technological progress 
and far too many have suffered from its ill-suited application. 
Like the myth of progress, western ideals of equality and justice must also be 
rethought, for economic equality has been shown not to equate with justice. Rather 
the spread of capitalist economic culture is revealed as homogenizing and reductive 
of cultural and economic diversity, and therefore detrimental to capacities for social 
and ecological resilience. The notion of environmental justice has largely emerged as 
a reaction to the concentration of environmental bads in socially deprived areas in the 
United States. However, it has now been enlarged to refer to arguments for equality 
of distribution of both environmental bads and goods, thus encompassing issues of 
global equity and the maintenance of ecological functioning. Neither social nor 
ecological sustainability can be pursued to the exclusion of environmental justice 
concerns, while technical solutions to environmental problems can only be a holding 
exercise. Long-lasting solutions will also entail addressing issues of social inequality 
and political access. 
The institutions which were the product of Enlightenment ideals have not 
only been hostile to nature but they have also been counterproductive for 
Enlightenment hopes for human development. They have been shown to have been 
defective in protecting the rights to autonomous development of a sizeable proportion 
of liberal subjects. Liberal democracies have relied on the culture of individualism to 
foster autonomy among liberal subjects, but, following on liberalism's paucity of 
moral resources, the development of the individual has been a one-sided one, 
compromised by the dominance of instrumental rationalities. Individual autonomy is 
a necessary precondition for the efficiency of the capitalist economy, but the price of 
281 
autonomy is neglect of its enabling conditions (Berger, 1992, 253). If liberal 
democracies are to survive as such, they need to reformulate not only the notion of 
autonomy, but also the notion of the common good, for as I argued in Chapter 3, 
these are interdependent objectives. Thus a fitting theory of the good must be able to 
provide an account of autonomy which is consistent with the flourishing of one's 
communal attachments and with the flourishing of nonhuman entities. Poole (1991, 
87) and Lash (1994, 164-165) pursue the possibilities for developing a notion of the 
self consistent with the relationships of community, as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
resulting concept of autonomy might better be referred to as bounded autonomy, 
which is marked by relationships of reciprocity, care and responsibility for the 
viability of those interdependent relationships. 
In a similar vein, Eckersley (1996b, 222ff.), in arguing for human 
environmental rights, has taken the liberal standpoint of autonomy and developed 
arguments for a more inclusive notion of autonomy, which is "socially and 
ecologically contextualised" (p.224). Her analysis rests on the expansion of moral 
considerability to nonhuman entities to enable them to flourish according to their 
'species-life' and thus by extension to the conditions which enable that flourishing. It 
is a notion of autonomy which places responsibilities on humans to ensure the 
conditions for social and ecological sustainability and requires "the realignment of a 
range of 'liberal freedoms' in ways that are consistent with these ends" (Eckersley, 
1996b, 223). 
7.3: Ecological Responsibility 
This section is principally concerned with how to resolve what Beck (1995a, 
109) refers to as the "crisis of responsibility". In Chapter 1.9 I described how the 
institutions of modernity are organized to avoid responsibility, and in Chapter 3.2.2 I 
concluded that the assumption of responsibility has to be a key ethical component of 
the pursuit of sustainability. I am confining the discussion of the resolution to this 
crisis to those institutions around which the thesis is arranged, namely, the public 
sphere and democracy, markets and capitalism, and private property (on bringing 
science and technology into line, see Beck, 1995a, 169ff.). 
What has made modern life remarkable is the detachment of the economic 
sphere, capital and markets, from its normative context, from social life, and from its 
biophysical base. Not only do markets have minimum ethical constraint, but they are 
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"distinguished from other realms of society by the fact that they only need a minimal 
morality to function" (Berger, 1992, 245). If markets are to be retained as supposedly 
democratic and efficient allocative and distributive mechanisms, then the connections 
to social and natural contexts must be enhanced, for, as Hirst (1994, 94) remarks, "a 
'market society', that is a social system where the fate of the social fabric hangs on the 
outcome of purely private sales and purchases is unsustainable". The social 
environment of markets is also a concern for Hirst (1994, 65), who holds that in the 
"right kind of social context", the market system is a "viable economic mechanism". 
The appropriate social context for an efficient market system is not one dominated by 
individual morality but one of thickened social embeddedness. This is a society 
which is "complementary to the market principle, but in being complementary, uses 
non-market calculations and forms of resource allocation". It is also a society that 
has certain expectations of the market system concerning "acceptable levels of 
employment, investment and a suitable composition of output" (Hirst, 1994, 65). 
There is no guarantee, however, that a socially embedded market system would 
promote long-term ecological sustainability without specific normative and 
institutional commitments to this objective. 
To promote ecological sustainability, Elcins et al. (1992, 80) similarly favour 
a progressive market as a system for organizing economic life, which includes not 
only information on price and quality, but also safety, production conditions, impacts 
on employees and the natural environment. This would require, firstly, that 
producers, perhaps organized by means of more numerous cooperative arrangements, 
commit to sustainability and its objectives and, secondly, that consumers be equipped 
with adequate information about production impacts in order to make informed 
consumption choices. Improved social regulation of the market system would then 
be based around principles of equity and sustainability as well as efficiency. 
To operate at all sustainably though, the democracy of the market system, 
imperfect as it is, has to be complemented by democratic political institutions 
(Grabosky, 1995, 221). To perform this task, Hirst (1994, 68) mounts cogent 
arguments for an associational form of democratic governance, asserting that 
"associational governance may actually help to rebuild ties between groups, and 
facilitate the construction of national, regional or social foci of common 
identification". The reconstruction of community was identified in Chapter 3.5.4 as a 
critical component of sustainable economic relationships, as a precondition for 
awareness of the needs of future generations and other nonhuman entities. 
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Achterberg (1996, 184) also identifies "mutual identification" as a necessary 
precursor for the redistribution which is an inevitable precondition of sustainability. 
Associations could also act as steerers of markets by strengthening the 
economic base of local and regional communities and other non-dominant economic 
actors, thereby not only counterbalancing the political power presently concentrated 
in political elites and formal political institutions but also raising political power to 
the level of market power. This latter outcome is construed by Self (1993, 275), in 
the context of the formation of the European Community, as a favourable 
development in pursuing social and environmental objectives and in controlling 
movements of capital, but the principle can well apply at other levels of governance. 
The aim of such a change is to reduce the contemporary dominance of markets in 
social choice and to reorient priorities to the social and ecological. 
The irresponsibility of capital, especially transnational corporate forms, can 
also be countered by associative arrangements based on the cooperative ownership of 
enterprises, which assist the localization of capital and may prevent its absorption 
into the cycle of fictitious, speculative capital. These mutual forms of ownership 
require the support of local financial institutions, such as local development banks 
and credit unions, thus promoting local or regional investment and prosperity. The 
decision-makers of mutually-owned enterprises are also likely to have local 
connections and are therefore more likely to balance management decisions in the 
interests of employees and local citizens rather than in the financial interests of 
absentee shareholders or managerial executives. 
While the social and political contexts of the capitalist market system can be 
reinforced as an antidote to the 'dominance of this social form, the market economy 
itself must also be sensitized to the destructive side-effects of its activities and its 
accountability enhanced. Work-place democratization and social regulation are 
favoured by some theorists (see Gould, 1988), but so far the former development has 
been minimal and the latter option is clearly not an option as long as neoliberal 
ideology holds sway. Rather than imposing accountability on economic entities 
heteronomously, Johannes Berger (1992) has explored the potential of "self-control" 
as a means of effecting institutional change in the economic sphere. He maintains 
that it is mainly because "the economic system succeeded in realizing a high degree 
of autonomy vis-à-vis its environment" that environmental issues have received only 
minimal attention in the economic sphere and this in spite of the efforts of new social 
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movements and the general public to raise awareness of social and ecological 
deterioration. The economic system is therefore structurally insensitive to 
environmental issues and can only perceive them in a distorted way via the medium 
of prices (Berger, 1992, 248). As the possibility of external control appears limited, 
the alternative is to increase spontaneous self-control in order to generate empathy in 
the system and hence increase its self-responsibility: 
The principle of self-control may be summarized as follows: the 
economy is restructured in a way that enables it to become aware of 
the side effects of economic decisions in the environment of the 
economy. As the capacity of self-control increases, the economic 
system stops maximizing efficiency without regard to the 
environment: the standards of a healthy environment are taken into 
account in decision making (Berger, 1992, 251-252). 
Despite the differing opinions over the efficacy of market-based economic 
instruments (see Cairncross, 1991, 193-195 on the pros and cons), Berger (1992, 
252) is of the opinion that they have some utility in that "fe]ach reorganization of the 
economy that is based on self-control amounts to an increase in the perceptive faculty 
of the economy". Improving the economy's capacity to perceive its environment 
increases its empathy with its environment and therefore limits the unprecedented 
autonomy of the economic sphere. Like the empathic liberal subjects discussed in 
Chapter 6.2, the self-binding economy is premised on self-awareness, which means 
that empathy is a function of types of control which reflect the negative side-effects 
of the economy's operations on its social and natural contexts. Reflexivity (including 
capacities for self-criticism) is thus a necessary precondition to the viability of 
economic systems operating in sympathy with their environments. 
Reflexivity may also be interpreted as having a learning capacity, which 
capitalist systems have already demonstrated in their integration of social welfare 
ideas, although this accommodation has unravelled somewhat in recent years. There 
is therefore some grounds for optimism on this point, but, as Berger (1992, 253) 
indicates, there are two fundamental preconditions for effective self-control. Bearing 
in mind that the state is unlikely to simply fade away, the first step is for governments 
to give priority to environmental policy. I interpret this condition to mean that, at the 
very least, environmental agencies would be accorded mainline status along with 
bureaux of treasury, finance and trade in the senior ministries of liberal democratic 
governments. It must be said, however, that this is only a possibility where the 
conservation imperative is given equality , with business and administration. 
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Secondly, the existence of the social movements which are presently attempting to 
influence public discourse over matters ecological and economic should be 
encouraged, because, as was argued in Chapter 2, their existence is critical to 
learning and reflexivity in both economic and administrative spheres. They are the 
only social elements which are in a position to expose the paradoxes and 
inconsistencies of ecologically destructive economic activity and bureaucratic 
decision-making. Neither of these preconditions appears to have the remotest 
possibility in the near future given that the interests of economic and governing elites 
now so closely coalesce around their imperative of continuing economic growth. 
However, the success of the German Greens in obtaining the finance portfolio and 
significant concessions on tackling the generators of major environmental problems 
following the recent elections may indicate a turning point. 
If the market system is to be retained for its self-organizing and democratic 
allocative and distributive elements, the capitalist economy eventually has to account 
for ecological values in more than a cursory way, because continuing economic 
activity on the present scale is undermining the conditions of production. Moreover, 
if the market economy is to retain the autonomy which promotes efficiency, it must 
be a bounded autonomy, operating within a social framework that enjoins in it 
capacities for learning and reflexivity and thus self-control. The state would then act 
as the facilitator of ecological responsibility in economic activity. It can achieve 
these functions by setting an appropriate normative framework within which firms 
and consumers operate and by giving priority to environmental policy. 
As the structural imperatives of state and capital are so strongly integrated 
and prospects for the general dispersal of the abovementioned conditions somewhat 
unprospective, the most promising option to effect an ecologically responsible 
society is a strong civil society oriented to the commons rather than private interests, 
thereby strengthening the public spheres which have crystallized around the activities 
of new social movements and instigated the beginnings of the necessary decoupling 
of the public from the state. This is the conclusion reached by other theorists of the 
capitalist political economy, such as Dryzek (1996c) and O'Connor (1994a). The 
latter maintains that a strong civil society "defining itself in terms of its "commons", 
its solidarity, and its struggles with capital and state, as well as its democratic 
impulses and forms of organization within alliances and coalitions of movement 
organizations ... [is] the first prerequisite of sustainable society and nature" 
(O'Connor, 1994a, 172). Additionally, Dryzek (1996c, 481-482) argues that power 
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can be exercised from within civil society to change the terms of public discourse, 
public policy and political culture, whilst also affecting ethics and culture outside the 
public policy arena in everyday life. Ecology movements have already achieved 
awareness of environmental issues and stimulated consciousness of individual and 
collective responsibility for systemic impacts. 
The structural dominance of the system of capitalist economy is due, in no 
small measure, to a system of property allocation which conflates rights to the capital 
means of production with rights to personal property and attributes to the holders of 
corporately-controlled resources rights to which not even individual owners are 
entitled (Hawken, 1993, 107-108). To ensure that property ownership is ecologically 
responsible will require radical change in the moral basis of property, in its 
justifications, and in attitudes to land. Firstly, a differentiation between control and 
ownership will need to be made. It is control that confers on owners the right to take 
whatever actions they so desire without regard to the interests of others. The 
concentration of resources in the hands of corporations confers on their management 
executives an inordinate degree of control and power to pursue corporate activities 
without due regard for future generations and the general interest. 
Secondly, to be ecologically sustainable, property structures must be 
regrounded in the communal/material basis of existence. This will mean, firstly, 
divorcing property rights in land from property rights in personal possessions. 
Absolute control of the material means of existence is simply a fiction which must be 
overturned. This will imply, secondly, rethinking attitudes to land, which can no 
longer be considered as inert parcels of physical nature predestined for human utility. 
Rather, all land has to be regarded as contributing to ecological processes which are a 
public good and to which all individuals and species have an entitlement. Lockean 
arguments for property, which underpin notions of absolute control, have been shown 
to have shaky moral foundations. As Wissenburg (1998, 119) concludes, self-
ownership is not a sufficient moral basis and, for the most part, the rights to make use 
of the endowments of nature are conditional rather than absolute or even 
unconditional rights. Conditional rights involve the right to use a good rather than to 
possess it absolutely "and to use it only in particular ways, places, periods or 
circumstances" (Wissenburg, 1998, 120). It is sufficient for most individuals' life 
plans that they have the rights to own, use and manage the goods in their legitimate 
possession. Kantian-derived reciprocal rights and duties can take care of spatially 
and temporarily proximate property relations but an ecologically sustainable system 
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of property must have a different moral basis, where the interests of nonhuman 
entities and future generations are assured by a broader basis of stewardship. The 
moral basis of sustainable property structures should emphasize responsibilities to 
connections and the stewardship role. 
7.4: Sustainability: Preconditions 
It was argued in Chapter 3.5 that, if sustainability is to constitute the required 
redefinition of the economic problem now confronting market societies, then it has to 
be approached as a 'whole of society' problem (in Gare's (1995, 74) terms), just as the 
classical economists interpreted their contemporary economic problem as a political-
economic one. The problem of ecological limits to resource exploitation is not 
simply an environmental one to be resolved through applications of technical reason 
but a social one to be addressed by an integrated package of ethical, political, 
economic and technical transformation. The first precondition then is that social and 
ecological sustainability are predicated on the ecological restructuring of society, not 
on ecological modernization. 
The second precondition relates to the assumptions of capitalist economics, 
namely, that land or the biophysical environment can be treated simply as the 
background to human affairs and as an inert factor of production. The neoclassical 
economic triad of land, labour and capital could stand an injection of Marxian 
understanding, that capitalist production is dependent on the communal/social 
infrastructure and on the material or biophysical framework in tow. Economic 
development cannot be reduced to 'economic growth'. In the words of Wackemagel 
and Rees (1996, 144), the "supra-economic role of natural capital" has to be 
recognized. 
Beyond the immediate interests of nature, the interests of future generations 
also have to be institutionally provided for, for as Norgaard and Howarth (1991) 
note, even negative discount rates will not necessarily ensure that the needs of the 
future will be properly taken into account, while markets are certainly restricted to 
contemporary needs and imperfectly so at that. Specific provision has to be made in 
the form of savings or direct allocation and this strengthened by a normative 
orientation to the future. 
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Other preconditions identified in Chapter 5 are the fostering of a civic culture 
and ecological citizenship, an institutionalized capacity for learning as a precondition 
for adaptability and flexibility, and the adoption of simpler lifestyles by those in the 
First World in parallel with the redistribution necessary to make provision for the 
basic needs of those in the Third World. 
73: Beyond Sustainability 
While the arguments of this thesis have been principally concerned with the 
pursuit of sustainability, this is not where social transformation should end, for 
sustainability is a principle only for stabilization and mere survival. Sustainability, it 
may be argued, is but an interim phase in the pursuit of a liveable society. As 
Wackemagel and Rees (1996, 136-137) observe, communities need breathing space 
to restore, strengthen and revitalize themselves and particularly to develop the shared 
values and mutuality necessary for the restoration of civil society. The social 
contract on which this strengthened civil society is founded is a balance of individual 
and community needs where rights and responsibilities are of a piece. 
However, while improved community cohesion, both local and global, may 
be an advantageous outcome of the search for sustainability, there are also dangers. 
Timothy Luke (1993) cautions that the concept of sustainability is such as to lend 
itself to bureaucratic capture and thus to provide the pretext for further bureaucratic 
intervention into daily life. What may eventuate is not the communally-directed 
steady state but an "environmentalizing state", which is no improvement on its 
welfare predecessor. "It simply places welfare states on an ecological footing and 
deputizes their administrative personnel as bureaucratic greens" (Luke, 1993, 153) 
with an unwarrantable surveillance capacity to coerce the health and wellbeing of 
their citizens. 
Nevertheless, sustainability could fulfill the hope, expressed by Wissenburg, 
that it may promote the rejuvenation of liberal democracy. It may compel liberal 
societies to rethink the unquestioning priority accorded individual producer and 
consumer preferences and to invalidate the almost religious faith that economic 
liberals have in the free market to provide for all of society's needs. It may also steer 
liberalism towards concepts of autonomy and human freedom more consonant with 
the autonomous development of other species, expanding the concept of self-interest 
and reorienting the notion away from its contemporarily dominant form of rational 
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egoism. As a consequence, liberalism may yet be characterized by the expanded 
sense of self promoted by ecophilosophers and a richer notion of individuality, thus 
amplifying individual capacity for empathy, care and responsiblity. Innovations such 
as these will be necessary to the liveability of liberal democracies and sustainability 
may thus foster the social and moral progress that was once the expectation of 
technological transcendence. 
7.6: Ecological Enlightenment and Maturity 
I began this thesis with the Enlightenment and it also serves as a fitting 
conclusion. I argued that Kant's hopes for enlightenment remain unfulfilled in that 
we are neither free nor mature. By David Orr's (1994, 77) yardstick, we will only • 
demonstrate maturity as a species when we have the capacity to value those "life-
forms, landscapes and ecological processes" presently considered to be valueless, 
when we can routinely value that which has no obvious utility to humans. 
Alternatively, we may be said to be mature when we have developed "our capacity to 
identify with the biotic community and to shelter life". 
The moral maturity of any society which is coming up against biophysical 
limits will consist of its acceptance of limits on its projects and taking responsibility 
for any side-effects that they may generate. In part this will also involve overcoming 
enslavement to instrumental rationality and technology as the only route to problem-
solving and developing foundational understandings more consistent with an 
environment of biophysical limits and ecological uncertainty. Furthermore, those 
limits and constraints will be embedded in institutional design. 
The institutions of industrial societies can be described as both morally and 
ecologically immature. To employ the metaphor of plant succession, capitalist 
societies have not outgrown the pioneer stage of succession which is characterized by 
a high and wasteful use of energy, with minimal diversity, and producing plants of 
generally lower quality and usefulness (Hawken, 1993, 19ff.). In an ecosystem, more 
mature successional forms are marked by energy-efficient and resource-conserving 
plants as energy is converted into more diverse, complex and stable forms of 
organization. The function of pioneer life forms is to prime the soil for the more 
mature and complex forms that follow. During the pioneer stage, energy is mostly 
devoted to new growth, while in the later stages of succession, energy is dedicated to 
maintaining existing communities. The ecology of industrial societies apes the 
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resource-greedy, competitive and aggressive pioneer plant communities and, 
although the need to respond to emerging ecological limits is accepted, industrial 
social forms have responded only minimally. To the extent that industrial societies 
have so far failed to develop more stable, resource-conserving and energy-efficient 
social forms dedicated to maintaining existence, they can be said to be immature. 
The capitalist economic form of social organization remains a pioneering colonizer 
even after several centuries and is perhaps functionally limited to that role. 
How do we transcend the constraints of pioneering capitalist societies? The 
rational-analytic thinking mode that has dominated western thought and practice 
throughout modernity can only conceptualize what is. What we need to be able to 
conceptualize is what can be. This is a time, as Buttimer (1993, 77-79) says, for 
metaphorical not analytical thinking. Metaphor can set the "cognitive juices" 
(Buttimer, 1993, 84) flowing, exposing inconsistency in established social values and 
conventions, and revealing insight because "it touches a deeper level of undertanding 
than "paradigm", "model" or "theory". It points to the very process of learning and 
discovery, to those analogical leaps from the familiar to the unfamiliar which rally 
imagination and emotion as well as intellect" (Buttimer, 1993, 78). Metaphor can 
assist the adoption of that ironic stance advocated by Foucault, thus to seek, in the 
present, design possibilities for ecologically sustainable modes of dwelling. 
Metaphor can help to discern the possibilities for higher order integrations in 
contemporary trends such as cultural diversity, globalization and localism 67 . These 
higher order integrations may manifest as more ecologically sensitive modes of 
thought and more diverse, more flexible and therefore more stable organizational 
forms than the rigidities of capitalist regimes of production and analytic/instrumental 
modes of thought have so far afforded. Here we may divine opportunities for the 
social re-embedding and community-building that will be the necessary precursors to 
these more stable and satisfying social forms. The ecological society that is the 
objective of ecological restructuring promises to be an enlightened society that 
embraces life in all its diversity, dwelling responsibly and wisely. Thus, following 
Montaigne's example, vivereamus sapienter. 
67For a summary of such trends, see Lash and Urry (1987, 300-313). 
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